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I  say  we  must  draw  out  the  hidden  magic  from  an  earth  which  bears  no
resemblance to the egoistical world that persists in walking on its surface and
does not see the shadow that is falling on us all.
           ~  Antonin Artaud “Man against Destiny”
He was seated, a black table in front of him, with a pile of papers on it, as he had
written  a  text  especially  for  the  evening.  The  whole  room was  in  an  extra-
ordinarily emotional state... And then, little by little, at a given moment, he made
some clumsy gesture, I don’t know what... his papers went flying... he lost his
glasses... he went down on his knees to pick up his papers... but of course, not
one sound of laughter in the house... We were all in a very anxious state, after
all... and suddenly he took fright... he had sensed it... he told us afterwards, that
the emptiness of the house had frightened him... He had not even been able to
sense the emotion... he had not been able to feel the extra-ordinary love that we
all had for him... he had found himself alone...
~  Roger Blin
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Abstract
The notebooks in which Artaud constantly worked in the final years of his life (1946–
48) bring together writing, drawing and attacks on the very materiality of the paper. In 
bringing together these three regimes – visual, textual, material – the notebooks 
represent the culmination of Artaud’s complex ontology. They also continue to pose a 
unique set of problems for his readers.
These three regimes come together on what Artaud calls the “subjectile”, yet as he uses 
this word only three times, approaching it asks that we traverse his entire œuvre. 
Framing this thesis is the question of how reading Artaud, especially the notebooks, 
might engage we readers as ourselves subjectiles; how “reading” must be understood in 
an expanded sense to take in textual, drawn and material elements at once.
Artaud’s  writings  have  an  unparalleled  importance  in  continental  philosophy  of  the
“long  twentieth  century”:  perhaps  most  inalienably  in  Deleuze  &  Guattari’s
appropriation  of  the  figure  of  the  “Body without  Organs”,  and in  Derrida’s  career-
spanning  interest  in  Artaud’s  writing  and  drawing.  This  thesis  will  forge  critical
responses to how these writers accommodate and appropriate Artaud into their systems.
What is at stake in responding to their highly original literary-philosophical readings is
not  merely  a  philological  pedantry  concerning  Artaud.  Rather,  I  propose  to  both
examine elements of these philosophies in order to scrutinise, appropriate and respond
to the modes of reading Artaud which underlie  their  projects,  and to  trace how the
themes which they identify are taken up within Artaud’s own œuvre: to find both critical
responses to and productive lines from their work. On the one hand, this concerns the
aleatory  formation  of  subjectivities  in  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  through  which  they
imbricate  Artaud  in  a  Spinozist  project;  on  the  other  hand,  Artaud’s  own ideas  on
ontological  anteriority  and  the  methodology  of  case-studies  runs  against  Derrida’s
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deconstruction. As such, rather than using Artaud to illustrate a philosopher’s ontology,
I will engage with Artaud as a metaphysician and metontologist in his own right – one
whose project is deeply embedded in materiality, thought and causation. Central to this
proposition is close examination of Artaud’s articulation of the “subjectile” in relation to
matter, in particular following his journeys to Mexico and Ireland, and his development
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It is raining in Paris. The bouquiniste I exchange greetings with each evening on this 
walk from the manuscripts library on rue Richlieu to my rented accommodation 
overlooking marché d’Aligre, has packed up and left for the evening. He and I once had
a conversation – such as my broken French would allow – about Jean Paulhan’s notion 
of terror in literature: not representation of states of fear, but terror as the absolute, 
immediate effect of the page on the world.1
I pass a bookshop – not so uncommon an occurrence in a country which has not 
surrendered its literature entirely to the free market, where some precious vestiges of a 
Net Books agreement still remain, though the veneration of literature also, in its own 
ways, confines the page to the page. The new titles, so neatly displayed, lack the allure 
of the folded depths of the bouquinistes’ boxes; and the unmistakeable, irresistible 
olfactory draw of the paper of 1930s and ’40s Paris publishing – those years before and 
during which paper became so scarce – does not sidle out of the bookshop’s door.
But two of the newly-published books in the window feature images of Antonin Artaud, 
famous images of the heart-throb young actor and the emaciated, toothless 53-year old. 
Sincere and troubled; tortured and intense. I go in and buy both. The first is a small 
book on Artaud and what literature means today; the second is this quarter’s issue of 
Les Temps Modernes, the journal established by Sartre and de Beauvoir seventy-one 
years earlier, the succeeding issue of which will reflect on the city’s response to the 
“Bataclan” attack of 13th November 2015.2
In all there are over 400 pages; two dozen pieces on Artaud, all written this year. 
Writings on a man nearly seventy-years departed, yet whose life and works apparently 
raise questions which demand to be revisited, or which are still not reconcilable, in the 
present. I am not equipped to scrutinise these volumes fluently, to take them to task over
1 Jean Paulhan The Flowers of Tarbes, Or Terror in Literature trans. Michael Syrotinski (Chicago, IL: 
Illinois University Press, 2006)
2 Mehdi Belhai Kacem Artaud et le théorie du complot (Paris: Éditions Tristram, 2015); Claude 
Lanzmann (ed.) “L’Énigme Artaud” Special issue, Les Temps Modernes Nos.687–688 (January–April
2016)
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minutiae. My language skills improve, and I consult texts in the original language when 
I can, especially Artaud’s own. But beyond any given text, there is a history to how 
Artaud has been read by others and orthodoxies which have taken root outside of France
because of how, why, by whom Artaud has been translated, taken up, shown and written
on. And there is also the more immediate effect which Artaud would have on us, the 
demands he would make on his readers to renounce our complicity with those ways of 
the world which he felt – felt so acutely – divest him of himself.
The question that frames this thesis concerns what it means to read Artaud. What does 
Artaud say, how does he say it; but also, how does that affect our bodies, our 
institutions, or the metaphysical consolations we afford ourselves? When we read 
Artaud out loud, how do we find the patterns of breathing which he sculpted and beat 
into the phonemes, page layouts and materiality of his paper? What does reading mean 
when faced with the notebooks which Artaud filled in the last years of his life, in which 
text, image and material gestures all cross, attack, support and “aerate”3 each other? To 
ask what it means to read Artaud is not to ask what Artaud means, but to ask what he 
does to us; how what he writes, what he draws, how he moves, how he travels, how he 
suffers might exceed our given systems of explaining, thinking, moving, living. What 
does it mean to think of a reader as a body; what new body would Artaud have me 
become and how might that come about: through what re-articulations, discomforts, 
surgeries? Does the reader open Artaud’s books, or do his works open the reader? If for 
Artaud, it is in our bodies that the worst subjections of transcendent and worldly powers
take their effect, hide and breed; then it is there that those transcendences and agents 
must be winkled out and fought. To read, then, is to reinvent the body and through it, the
world.
As Artaud’s friend, the great director Roger Blin has it, “I’m inclined to think that 
fundamentally, Artaud’s importance in the theatre means less than his importance on a 
philosophic level, defining a certain mode of thought”.4 Indeed, this is a thesis in many 
ways about Artaud’s cosmology, his metaphysics. As we will see, this is a metaphysics 
which is always bound in the material, the concrete. In particular, I will argue, this 
3 p7 Antonin Artaud 50 Drawings to Murder Magic trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Seagull, 
2008)
4 p80 “A Conversation with Roger Blin” in Charles Marowitz Artaud at Rodez (London: Marion 
Boyars, 1977)
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“active metaphysics”5 is claimed for Artaud’s body and the Earth. Throughout his 
writings and drawings in the last years of his life, body and Earth are engaged with 
through a rich variety of ways of working – what I will call Artaud’s “lucid 
materialism”. As I will argue, these ways of working are never dissociable from the 
cosmology itself: they do not illustrate it, they are it already happening. This unfurls in 
complex ways: it can be the creation of a new order of things, or it can be a 
demonstration that this order is already active, remains from a deep past covered over 
by the current state of affairs, the false body Artaud finds blocking him from his true 
body and the various institutions and masters of ill-will which block and torture. More 
importantly, Artaud is always showing that, contrary to our habitual ideas on causation, 
what is to-come and what is always-already can be thought of as inseparable. I will call 
this odd logic and its associated manoeuvres “pluperfection”. It will be associated with 
“fictioning”, that is, an indissociable rediscovery and invention of states of affairs which
are not formally permissable in the given order of things. This is in line with Artaud’s 
refusal to be constrained by the possible: as he wrote from the ship bound to Mexico, 
“I’m leaving in search of the impossible. We’ll see whether I can nevertheless find it.”6
If Blin is right that Artaud’s importance lies in defining a certain mode of thought, this 
thesis will pursue a threefold question: how is that mode of thought lodged in Artaud’s 
body as a cause of itself and as inalienable from his work; how is an analogous but 
parallel notion of the Earth and of a materiality in which form and force are inseparate 
articulated in his late work; and how are these two sets of concerns and practices 
brought together in an autopoietic “sempiternal” body worked on through the material?7 
Which is to say, we will develop and bring together the figures of active metaphysics, 
idiocy (or Mômoisme), pluperfection, weaponised suicide and vulcan materiality to 
articulate an understanding of the term “subjectile” as a body and a material which 
locates it in the context of Artaud’s contemporaneous writings and practice – especially 
that of the notebooks where text, image and material treatments of the page come 
together.
5 p31 CWIV emphasis removed
6 p361 Letter to René Thomas 2nd April 1936 in OCVIII, cited p101 Ronald Hayman Artaud and After 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)
7 “For I want to be sempiternal, that is, a self that moves and creates itself at every instant, and not 




In particular, we will be concerned with Artaud’s later works. This is more a preference 
over a critical or oppositional stance, though it is one that is based in a malaise over the 
relatively scarcer attention these works have received, compared to the earlier works, 
especially in the anglophone literature and criticism available in translation. Where the 
later works have been examined, they are often interpreted as extensions or resumptions
of themes which are native, as it were, to the earlier works. Against this tendency, I will 
prefer to think about what logics, images, techniques, etc. are peculiar to the later 
works: this will not mean ignoring or denigrating the earlier ones, but being attentive to 
how the later works differ from them and can be read inter alia, as much as how they 
continue and ramify the themes of the earlier works.
This early/late distinction falls sometime in 1936: thirteen years after the beginning of 
the correspondence with Jacques Rivière which Artaud chose to open his Collected 
Works,8 and twelve years before his death, aged 53. It is a line which falls between his 
final edits to the manuscript of his best known work, Theatre and Its Double,9 and his 
time in Mexico. This preferred distinction will take on a more critical function in the 
third and final Chapter of this thesis, where I will argue against the widespread tendency
to talk about Artaud’s drawings and other works on paper of 1937–48 in the language of
– or indeed as – theatrical stages. Through a reading of the texts on Mexico – especially 
those from and reflecting on Artaud’s time in the Sierra Tarahumara to the west of 
Mexico – I will propose these drawings be thought of less as stages, than as evidencing 
Artaud’s explorations of what he calls “volatilised materiality” and the Earth.10 Thus, 
whilst I will draw on the earlier theatre writings, I will also be proposing a way of 
thinking which emerges during the Mexico adventures that persists into, and is 
developed throughout, Artaud’s final works. Indeed, it is in these final works, and the 
notebooks in particular, that the over-arching concerns of this thesis can be located: 
what are the understandings of – and modes of working with – materiality which Artaud
develops in these years? How do these come together with text and image in the works 
on paper? And how does he use these to guarantee and further pursue the protection and 
8 pp27–45 CWI
9 pp1–110 CWIV
10 p27 “Le Rite du peyotl chez les Tarahumara” in OCIX cited p112 Ronald Hayman Artaud and After 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)
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reinvention of his body through all means and at all levels of reality? Which is to say, if 
the subjectile names both a body and, more widely, that which is worked upon, and if 
the first and foremost problem for Artaud is how to work upon and reinvent his body as 
sempiternal autopoiesis, this thesis asks what techniques of subjectility are operative in 
the works on paper. The coordinates for understanding these goals and techniques for 
the body and its sempiternality will have been the focus of the opening Chapters of the 
thesis, namely the Chapters on Deleuze and Derrida’s readings of Artaud.
Again, it is around the works on paper that this thesis will culminate, and especially the 
notebooks which Artaud kept from February 1945 until his death, filling over 400 in 
these short years. As much as these discussions will be informed by the texts concerning
Artaud’s adventures, they will also draw heavily on his 1947 essay on van Gogh – a 
piece of writing deeply concerned with the materiality of the Earth and the artist’s 
substrate (paper or linen), and where Artaud lays out the most radical of workings to 
move beyond the determination of a body by outside and antecedent forces; all themes 
directly related to subjectility. We will also have read the van Gogh essay as the 
summation, in the previous Chapter, of our consideration of Artaud’s case studies, 
which includes pieces he wrote on the poets Lautréamont and Coleridge. This last took 
the form – ostensibly – of a letter to translator and editor Henri Parisot, to whom Artaud
wrote often, especially in his three years in the asylum at Rodez from February 1943. 
Five of these letters were published in 1946 as Lettres de Rodez.11 Another late letter, of 
July 1946, will be of great value to our first Chapter. It was written in response to Peter 
Watson’s request to publish parts of Artaud’s poem-cycle Artaud le Mômo in translation.
These case studies, letters and the poem-cycle, all recount and revise Artaud’s personal 
history in ways which offer deep insights into his cosmology of self-creation or 
autopoiesis. These texts – especially their “fictioning” elements – will inform our 
reading of themes central to the best-known of Artaud’s late works, the text and 
recording of the radio broadcast To Have Done with the Judgement of God of 1947.12 All
of these works are concerned with textual and lived forms of autopoiesis, of staving off 
those “thefts” effected by any ontology of an originary outside, and with positing the 
body – Artaud’s body – as sempiternal origin, prior to a variety of physical and 
metaphysical pretenders. All, thus, inform the notion of the body which, I argue, finds 
11 Collected pp443–465 SW
12 Antonin Artaud Pour en Finir avec le Jugement de Dieu Editions La Manufacture et I.N.A. LP 
(1986); pp555–571 SW; pp283–323 Watchfiends
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full fruition in the figure of subjectile – where matter, text and image are all fully 
integrated as expressive forces of the body, never energies or forms which would deliver
the body to an originary anteriority. Of the three, this first Chapter will have most 
recourse to the pre-Mexico writings, especially the Rivière correspondence of 1923–24 
and the final section to be completed of Theatre and Its Double, “An Affective 
Athleticism”.13
All of these works, in some way, will serve the two main critical functions of this thesis:
on the one hand they will allow us to form responses to those writers on Artaud with 
whom we will be engaging (more on these shortly); on the other hand, the concepts I 
will come to propose through our readings of these late works will provide the critical 
means with which to approach the spells, drawings and notebooks. It is through these 
works on paper – and the notebooks especially – that we will rethink the question of the 
subjectile, from which this thesis and its final Chapter take their titles.
“Subjectile” is a term which Artaud himself uses around the works on paper. But he uses
it rarely, perhaps only three times. As rare and enigmatic as it is – and we shall see in 
our third Chapter, just how slippery it can be – it nonetheless seems to articulate 
something crucial about these works, the works on paper and notebooks which this 
thesis is directed toward engaging with. Broadly speaking, “subjectile” means that 
which is worked on: the paper of the drawing and, for Artaud, the figures in the 
drawings, and more besides. The subjectile concerns the materiality of the body and the 
paper, taken as the sites of a war, both concrete and abstract, in which the coextension 
and inseparateness of the mundane and metaphysical is at stake. In this sense, it is a 
word around which all of the themes, figures and techniques which are discussed 
throughout the thesis converge, from active metaphysics to pluperfection, Artaud le 
Mômo to fictioning as the finding-founding of a lost world and the true body. If the 
thinkers whom we will work with in this thesis help articulate these ideas – through 
their innovations or through the finer distinctions made possible in disagreement with 
them – it is the figure of the subjectile which will allow us to draw the various themes, 
figures and techniques together. The subjectile, further, will offer us a way of 
positioning ourselves as readers – in an expanded sense – in relation to Artaud’s work.
13 pp100–106 CWIV
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Haunting this thesis, and briefly discussed in our Afterword, is the proposition, or 
knowledge, that the reader, too, is subjectile; that to read Artaud is to be worked on by 
Artaud. At various junctures I will call this “credulity”, which is to say, I will have 
cause to disagree with other writers on Artaud for refusing to be worked on by him. This
is not to say that I am arguing we must think like Artaud. Rather, I am suggesting that if 
we are to read his works – where we understand “read” in an expanded sense of 
exposure to image-text-matter of the notebooks and the anomalous cosmology of their 
lucid materialism – we will not only witness attacks on those metaphysics and Subjects 
we may already reject, but may find ourselves, too, disoriented, maddened, even under 
attack. If and when this happens, it may not be possible to save ourselves without 
passing Artaud back to suffering, to the being-spoken-for which, as we shall see in our 
first two Chapters, he constantly railed against and projects himself beyond. It is 
because of this preference for a credulous approach to Artaud’s assertions that we will 
speak little of so-called insanity – be it diagnoses of schizophrenia or paraphrenia, or 
proclamations of his being undiagnosable.14 Artaud’s own announcements of himself as,
for example, “an obvious madman” will, as we shall see, be included within the strategy
of pluperfection.15 Ultimately, credulity means not dismissing the impossible simply 
because it is given as impossible or impermissible.
The main themes which will emerge through the three Chapters of this thesis, then, will 
converge on our articulating a notion of the subjectile in relation to the notebooks and 
works on paper, and more widely as metaphysical warfare raging in the concrete. In the 
context of my privileging the notebooks, the importance of Stephen Barber’s work 
should be acknowledged. Through his Terminal Curses, especially, I began to think 
about the notebooks more carefully.16 For all its strengths, Barber’s work does not, 
though, make significant theoretical claims, and certainly not reflectively. Of all those 
who write on Artaud, I will concentrate on two writers who are concerned with 
elaborating wider philosophical systems who both engage with Artaud in the very 
depths of their systems: they are Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida.
14 Respectively, e.g. p240 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari “Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Interview 
with Vittorio Marchetti” in Gilles Deleuze Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974 trans. Michael 
Taomina (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2004); p11 Margit Rowell “Images of Cruelty: The 
Drawings of Antonin Artaud” in Margit Rowell (ed.) Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper (New York, 
NY: Museum of Modern Art, 1996); Jacques Lacan, see p97 Stephen Barber The Anatomy of Cruelty:
Antonin Artaud Life and Works (s.l.: Sun Vision Press, 2013)
15 p167 Watchfiends
16 Stephen Barber Artaud: Terminal Curses The Notebooks, 1945–1948 (s.l.: Solar Books, 2008)
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Deleuze and Derrida
Of course, Deleuze and Derrida are not the only thinkers of their generation to engage 
with Artaud seriously. Foucault, Kristeva and others of the Tel Quel group, Baudrillard, 
Blanchot, Cixous and Wahl have all written on him17; outside of France, Artaud’s works 
have impacted on philosophers as diverse as Kuniichi Uno and Nick Land and Reza 
Negarestani18; on theatre-makers and performers from Complicité, Mummenschanz and 
other graduates of Lecoq’s school, to Peter Brook and Living Theatre, to the sabbatic 
dance of Alkistis Dimech.19 He has influenced musicians from Bauhaus to Pierre Boulez
and Wolfgang Rihm20; and artists from Nancy Spero to Institution of Rot21; been studied
by critics and linguists from Tzvetan Todorov to Susan Sontag22; inspired fictions from 
writers as diverse as Jeremy Reed and Samuel R. Delaney23; and influenced radical 
psychotherapeutic environments from London to Finland to Rio de Janeiro.24
17 Michel Foucault Madness and Civilisation trans. Richard Howard (London: Tavistock, 1967); Julia 
Kristeva “The Subject in Process” trans. Patrick ffrench in eds. Patrick ffrench and Roland-François 
Lack The Tel Quel Reader (London: Routledge, 1998); Sollers, Philippe (ed.) Artaud (Paris: 10/18 
Union Générale d’éditions, 1973); Jean Baudrillard “Forget Artaud” in The Conspiracy of Art trans. 
Ames Hodges (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2005); Maurice Blanchot “Artaud” in The Book to 
Come trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Hélène Cixous 
Poetry in Painting (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012); Jean Wahl “Antonin Artaud? 
Personne” in Barrault, Jean-Louis and Simone Benmussa (eds.) “Antonin Artaud et le Théâtre de 
Notre Temps” Special issue, Cahiers Renaud Barrault (First trimester 1969).
18 Uno Kuniichi The Genesis of an Unknown Body trans. Melissa McMahon (São Paolo: n-1 
Publications, 2012); pp289–318 “Circuiteries” and pp411–440 “Meat” in Nick Land Fanged 
Noumena (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2011); and Reza Negarestani “Differential Cruelty” in Angelaki 
Vol.14 No.3 (December 2009), 69–84.
19 On Lecoq’s students and role of Artaud in his teaching, see Simon Murray Jacques Lecoq (London: 
Routledge, 2003); Peter Brook Shifting Point (London: Methuen, 1987); John Tytell Living Theater: 
Art, Exile and Outrage (London: Methuen, 1997); Alkistis Dimech Sabbatic Dance 
<http://sabbaticdance.com/> Last accessed 24th June 2016.
20 Bauhaus “Antonin Artaud” on Burning from the Inside Beggars Banquet LP 1983; Pierre Boulez 
“Son et Verbe” in eds. Barrault and Benmussa Cahiers Renaud Barrault (First trimester 1969); 
Wolfgang Rihm Tutuguri <https://www.digitalconcerthall.com/en/concert/23694> Last accessed 3rd 
September 2016.
21 pp109–179 “Codex Artaud” in Christopher Lyon Nancy Spero: The Work (Munich: Prestel Verlag, 
2010); Institution of Rot (Richard Crow) Radio Tarahumara (Tutuguri) 2015 (Online Video) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6IzdaELSx7c> last accessed 4th September 2016
22 Tzvetan Todorov The Poetics of Prose trans. Richard Howard (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977); Susan 
Sontag “Approaching Artaud” in Under the Sign of Saturn (London: Vintage, 2001).
23 Jeremy Reed Chasing Black Rainbows: A Novel Based on the Life of Artaud (London: Peter Owen, 
1994); Samuel R. Delaney “Wagner /Artaud: A Play of 19th and 20th Century Critical Fictions” in 
Longer Views: Extended Essays (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1996), 1–86.
24 Through the work of R.D. Laing, Martti Olavi Siirala and Nise da Silveira. See Zbigniew Kotowicz 
Laing and the Paths of Anti-Psychiatry (Hove: Routledge, 1997); Juhani Ihanus and Pirkko Siltala “A
Seeker of Human Understanding and A Unique Language: An Obituary of Martti Olavi Siirala” in 
International Forum of Psychoanalysis Vol.2 No.2 (2011), 119–124; p225 Kaira M. Cabañas 
“Afterword” in ed. Kaira M. Cabañas Specters of Artaud: Language and the Arts in the 1950s 
(Madrid: Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofia, 2012)
23
From the endless litany of names of those who have written on Artaud or who name him
as an influence or interest, Deleuze and Derrida stand out. From amongst their earliest 
works through to their latest ones, both return to Artaud, or he returns to them. But more
than the frequency with which they refer to him, these two, in their very different ways, 
are concerned with producing a system of thought which can account for Artaud, for the
singular case which Artaud insisted he was. In both of the first Chapters of this thesis, 
then – the first on Deleuze, the second on Derrida – we will attend to what they 
themselves write on Artaud – how they read Artaud – but also track how the concerns 
which are evidenced in these readings have tendrils running more deeply into their 
works, into their notions of what a body is or what it means to read and think. With 
Deleuze, these are the themes of immanence, organs, ethology and the constitutive 
outside; with Derrida, the questions of exemplarity and exceptions, of theft and 
systematicity, and of undecidability.
In both of these Chapters, we will find that Artaud had, himself, already written on 
relevant themes, most often in texts not discussed by the philosophers. In following 
Artaud’s own texts – primarily later works, as discussed above – we will find him to be 
in disagreement with the philosophers. The ways in which the two inform the final 
Chapter is quite different. Whilst Deleuze’s ontology of original exteriority will have 
been shown to be incompatible with Artaud’s insistence on a body which is “not to be 
touched”,25 the philosopher’s ideas on ongoing elaboration or “matter in variation” will 
be found to be much closer to ideas Artaud develops in Mexico of vulcan materiality 
and the intelligence of the Earth.26 Derrida’s persistence will be more as a foil to 
Artaud’s own notion of the case, and as a most careful reader of the notion of the 
subjectile. We could say, then, that Derrida persists into the third Chapter, where 
Deleuze (a different Deleuze, perhaps), returns in a more positive guise.
Discussion of tertiary sources, that is commentators on Deleuze and Derrida, will 
primarily concern their readings of more technical points: in the first Chapter, 
concerning Deleuze’s arguments about immanence, organs and idiocy; in the second 
Chapter on the wider context of Derrida’s interrogations of the example. Wherever 
25 “my body / is never to be touched” p303 Watchfiends
26 p407 ATP ; the notion of the intelligent materiality of the Earth is proposed by Artaud, for example, 
p379 SW
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possible, I have striven to foreground this focussed set of secondary resources – which 
is to say, the philosophers’ own readings of Artaud and the related parts of their œuvres 
– and, of course, most of all the primary resources of Artaud’s late works. Throughout, 
the preference is for depth over survey, and to be led back to Artaud’s own works and 
the concerns expressed and explored there. Whilst there is, at times, detours of some 
length into the technicalities of the philosophical systems that would read Artaud, these 
ultimately lead back to clarified readings of Artaud, and allow us to make comparisons 
and, sometimes, to extricate his works from misappropriations.
The wealth of books and articles on (and other responses to) Artaud have, of course, 
helped to form my ideas on his works. Of these, one in particular stands out and is 
engaged with at several points in the later parts of this thesis. Ros Murray’s recent Scum
of the Soul makes significant contributions to the possibilities of engaging with the 
materiality of Artaud’s work and opens paths perhaps previously unseen.27 Whilst I will 
often have cause to disagree with Murray’s conclusions, the horizons of this thesis are 
wider for her book, and it stands with Deleuze and Derrida as an important secondary 
resource.
Proceedings
The thesis unfolds in three Chapters: the first engaging with Deleuze, the second with 
Derrida, and the third turning to the works on paper and hence to Murray’s book and 
Derrida’s 1986 essay on the subjectile. Each Chapter is divided into Parts (between 
three and seven) dealing with a specific problem or set of sources, and is preceded by a 
Preamble, sketching out the trajectory of the Chapter.
Chapter I falls into three Parts, each of which work toward developing a full 
understanding of Artaud’s figure of “le Mômo” – a fourfold body (thought-unthought-
life-death) which projects itself out of all determinations and which thus, and in related 
ways, prefigures the subjectile. This mômoisme returns later in the thesis to undergird 
the arguments on the stakes and techniques of working on a body as these are 
investigated in the works on paper and, hence, in relation to the subjectile – itself a 
particular kind of body, never divested from its expressions and pitching itself beyond 
27 Ros Murray Antonin Artaud: The Scum of the Soul (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)
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determinations by outside and anterior forces. The first Part of this first Chapter looks at
Artaud’s notion of the “body without organs”, a term which is also used throughout 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia books.28 I will argue that two 
main themes identified by Deleuze and Guattari are germane to Artaud’s thinking on the
body without organs: namely, that there is a turn to immanence, exemplified by Artaud’s
call “To Have Done with the Judgement of God” (the title of the work from which 
“body without organs” is taken), and that this pursuit of immanence necessarily 
involves a rethinking of how bodies are constituted. Whilst there are these agreements, I
will also argue that the philosophers and Artaud have very different ideas about the role 
of “the outside” in the formation of the body without organs and the affirmation of 
immanence. For Deleuze and Guattari, we will find, the body without organs and 
immanence both involve a turn to an outside which is older than any particular body or 
event. They hence conclude that the body without organs is anonymous and 
prepersonal. Yet, for Artaud, the body without organs is precisely his body without 
organs. His very purpose in seeking and affirming it is to free his body from the 
malignancy of the outside and the impersonal. In articulating these differences, we will 
begin to see how Deleuze’s reading of Artaud both offers us very powerful insights, yet 
could also be accused of exacerbating, rather than alleviating, those problems which 
Artaud rails against.
The second and third Parts of Chapter I pursue related arguments about the constitutive 
outside in relation to affect and concept, themes which both Deleuze and Artaud give 
much attention to. The second Part, on affect, will look at Deleuze’s lifelong readings of
Spinoza – the philosopher with whom he most often, and most fundamentally, 
associates Artaud – and explore comparisons with Artaud’s text “An Affective 
Athleticism”. Particular incompatibilities will be found around affecting and being 
affected, here, or the conversion of passive to active. For Deleuze and Spinoza this can 
be articulated around metabolism and survival or “life”, which Deleuze associates with 
immanence29; Artaud, on the other hand, is not concerned with “eating well”30 but on 
expression not circumscribed by the organic necessities of living, and he develops 
breathing exercises to this end. It is here that we will first follow Artaud to Mexico, 
28 Especially pp9–16 AO ; pp149–166 ATP
29 Especially pp25–34 Gilles Deleuze Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life trans. Anne Boyman (New 
York, NY: Urzone, Inc., 2001)
30 “I like the poems of the starving [...] the poisoned.” p449 SW
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albeit briefly. The third Part, on concept, will look at Deleuze’s ideas around the 
“incapacity of thought” or “idiocy”31 – again a constitutive, impersonal outside – and 
compare this with Artaud’s own discussions of incapacity and idiocy in the letters to 
Rivière and the later Peter Watson letter and Artaud le Mômo (where mômo is 
Marseillaise slang for idiot). Combining the above ideas we will find Artaud proposing 
a notion of idiocy which does not divest or originarily anonymise thought and of a body
which does the same with life. As such, we will find a fourfold life-unlife-thought-
unthought constellated on Artaud le Mômo. It is worth noting that this is insistently 
Artaud’s body, in all its singularity, and cannot be raised up as a methodology nor, pace 
Deleuze, a generality. Again, this fourfold body of Artaud le Mômo prefigures many 
aspects of a body which, as I will argue in the concluding sections of this thesis, is fully 
articulated as subjectility, and established through the notebooks’ bringing together of 
materiality, image and text.
The Chapter will close with a summary of the incompatibilities between what Deleuze 
does in Artaud’s name and Artaud’s own ideas, whilst nonetheless acknowledging the 
importance of Deleuze’s influence – one which will resurface in the final parts of this 
thesis in relation to the notion of intelligent matter (around which Artaud elaborates his 
theory and related techniques for working with the Earth and with materiality toward 
the protection and invention of his body – techniques especially associated with the 
works on paper).
The second Chapter will turn to Derrida’s first essay on Artaud, “La parole soufflée”.32 
Derrida employs the figures of breath and theft as a way of thinking an originary 
outside. Associating this with a certain anteriority of language to the speaker – and 
hence the stealing of their breath by transcendent structures or law – Derrida concerns 
himself with Artaud’s struggle against metaphysics. This problem leads into the second 
Part of the Chapter which looks at the question of the example more generally in 
Derrida’s work. For Derrida, the example has a certain undecidability to it, in that it 
both belongs to a system, and escapes or violates it. As we shall see, he explores this in 
relation to Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Genet; but Artaud in particular exemplifies the 
problem because he rails against all metaphysical anteriority (which would make his 
31 e.g. pp55–60 WP
32 pp212–245 Jacques Derrida “La parole soufflée” in Writing and Difference trans. Alan Bass (London:
Routledge, 2001)
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case exemplify a general system, or make his speech originarily “belong” to a system of
language older than himself), but does so, for Derrida, in such a manner as to fall back 
on it, that is, by being “more faithful to [metaphysics] than it is to itself”.33 In our third 
Part we look in more detail at the problem of the man and the work – the poet and the 
poem – that is, the ways in which Derrida engages, through Artaud (and Hölderlin) with
the problem of developing a means of reading which does not make a choice of how to 
read (e.g. critically or clinically) which would pre-exist and confirm itself in each given 
case. Here, in particular, we will see that Derrida reasserts the method of deconstruction 
at the expense of being fully credulous of Artaud’s project. A thorough critique is 
necessary of such deconstructive reading in order to block realist complaints and 
deferrals and return his project – and, thus, his body – to its own proper creative fount; a
notion which will become fully articulated in relation to the subjectile.
Having looked in these first three Parts at Derrida’s reading of Artaud, and his more 
general concerns about the example or “case” and metaphysics, the next three Parts turn
to Artaud’s own case studies – sources which Derrida does not consider. Firstly, the two 
case studies of Lautréamont and Coleridge, in which Artaud lays out the problem which 
we have already seen in Derrida’s “La parole soufflée” of integration of the poet and the
work. For Artaud, failing to maintain or create the originary integrity of the two means 
death. In relation to Coleridge, Artaud is particularly concerned with the role of opiates 
and addiction in disintegrating the man-and-the-complete-work. As such, the fifth Part 
of this Chapter turns to Artaud’s writings on his own opiate addiction, in which we see 
him develop, over time, a mechanism of pluperfection and expression which rejects 
palliatives and reinvents the suffering body as older than that which makes it suffer (a 
logic we will be familiar with from “An Affective Athleticism” and Artaud le Mômo). 
The sixth Part raises these themes again, attending to how Artaud articulates a binding 
of death itself to the body and its expressions. We will look closely at his case study of 
Vincent van Gogh, “The Man Suicided by Society”.34 The Conclusion to this Chapter 
will summarise how Artaud’s own case studies, and the ways in which he works upon 
himself to bind externally imposed necessities to his body (rather than as thieves outside
and older than the body) demonstrate the incompatibility of his works’ metaphysical 




there will be valuable lessons from such equivocations in our third Chapter.
The third and final Chapter will turn to the works on paper and the subjectile. The first 
Part will introduce the complex nature of the works on paper – again drawing on 
Artaud’s van Gogh essay – particularly concerning the play of drawn figures, textual 
elements and Artaud’s bodily interactions with the paper as material substrate. We will 
also consider the capacity Artaud finds in van Gogh to reinvent nature through the act of
representing it, a notion of using artistic means to go beyond given reality which recalls 
the “fictioning” we will have already discussed. The first two Parts will both consider 
questions of force and form as a way of discussing artwork, drawing on ideas of the 
inseparate discussed previously in relation to the man-and-the-complete-work. Here, an 
inseparate force-form will be proposed against more classical-metaphysical notions of 
the finished work as absenting or having done with the process of making. It is in this 
Chapter that we will begin to look at sections of Murray’s book, in particular her ideas 
on matter and surface in Artaud’s work, and her introduction of a temporality of “delay”
to the problem of materiality. Murray refers to Artaud’s spells especially, but traces the 
logic into his œuvre more widely. Whilst I will draw a great deal on Murray’s 
foregrounding of questions of materiality and surface in Artaud’s works, this emphasis 
on the structure of delay will be seen to fall back on the less desirable parts of other 
discourses – namely the incredulous, realist and defeatist readings of Artaud’s 
metaphysical conflicts – which some elements of Murray’s book seem to do so much to 
circumvent. This disagreement will allow us to articulate a way of foregrounding matter
in Artaud’s work and thinking which does not foreclose the impossible, proposing 
instead what we have been calling his lucid materialism.
The third Part of the Chapter will engage with the subjectile directly, beginning with 
Derrida’s 1986 essay “To Unsense the Subjectile”.35 The most important outcome of this
Part will concern the logic of the cicatrix, being those actions of what Derrida calls 
“amorous aggressions”36 or wounding-healing which characterise Artaud’s works on 
paper (and, as I will argue in our fourth Part, his work on himself also). However, 
Derrida will also repeat the logic we will have seen elsewhere that, for Artaud’s works 
to continue to have this discomfiting effect today, their ultimate goal of making a new 
35 pp61–148 Jacques Derrida “To Unsense the Subjectile” in Jacques Derrida and Paule Thévenin The 
Secret Art of Antonin Artaud trans. Mary Ann Caws (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998)
36 p144 ibid.
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body which would not be subject to cruelties cannot be finally achieved. In a different 
way to Deleuze’s ontology, the body for Derrida, here, must remain open to, repeatedly 
be opened by, an ontological anteriority: one, indeed, with which it is unwittingly 
complicit. It is precisely such an argument which the reading of subjectility given in this
thesis aims beyond and which, I argue, Artaud’s late notebooks explore. As such, we 
will ask whether it is rather possible that something like the logic of the cicatrix could 
be thought without the melancholia of deferment and delay. In order to propose 
precisely this, we will turn in our fifth and final Part to rethinking Artaud’s works on 
paper not through the stage but through the Earth, as he rethought it during his 
adventures outside France. In turn – and herein the figure which brings together all of 
the strands of the thesis – I will propose a notion of the subjectile which affirms and 
produces both Earth and body in such a way as neither is given as an originary outside 
or metaphysical anteriority to the other: the sempiternal body of Antonin Artaud and the
intelligent matter of the Earth self-articulating in parallel without abstraction from their 
creative founts; all this most intensely articulated in the works on paper and above all in 
the notebooks, and their bringing together of text, image and vulcan materiality.
The Conclusion will restate this rethinking of the subjectile as opening onto a lucid 
materialism. We will turn to each thinker again – Murray, Derrida and Deleuze – and 
restate their arguments through their shared interest in holes. The main ideas this thesis 
generates through its readings of Artaud through and against these thinkers – 
pluperfection, fictioning, the fourfold of Artaud le Mômo and lucid materialism – can 
thus be combined around the notion of the holes which Artaud discusses as both 
material and metaphysical, to give a way of thinking the subjectile which is 
commensurate with, rather than appropriative or foreclosing of, his project. In the 
subjectile as a means of working and as a figure of the ontological primacy of the body, 
the reclamation of lucidity and the expressive production of reality come together 
through Artaud’s anomalous ontology and his manifold techniques of working in the 
notebooks and through them – through and as the subjectile – on his inseparate body. 
Working through the complex machineries of Artaud’s notions and figures of the body, 
the outside, lucidity, sempiternality, materiality, weaponisation, suicide... are problems 
and propositions clarified and at times supported by the ontologies and metaphysics of 
Deleuze and Derrida, and whether at each turn I am in agreement or contradistinction to 
them, this work would not be possible without the depth of their scholarship and the 
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inventions of their own searches for the freedoms of thought and body.
The complex practices which culminate in the notebooks of Artaud’s final years are, in 
particular, where this journey through the work of his commentators and, of course, his 
own travails and travels must culminate: these notebooks which are the place of the 
subjectile. For, as Paule Thévenin wrote,
if the drawings are for him, as subsequently all the lines of the notebooks will 
be, the manifestation of a war undertaken against the evil force dispersed in the 
world in order to prevent any lucid consciousness from speaking out, they are 
also a means for finding a profound reality once again.37
In search of this lucidity and profound reality once again – which is always also for the 
first time – and wary of reinscribing at every turn those cruelties which Artaud suffered 
in his body that is insistently inseparate from his body of work, we will recall these 
words of Roger Blin: “Artaud himself was profoundly optimistic”.38
37 p22 Thévenin “The Search for a Lost World” in Derrida and Thévenin Secret Art




The borrowed figure of the Body without Organs appears throughout Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia books, as well as at crucial junctures of 
Deleuze’s solo ventures,1 but has disappeared by the time of their final collaboration, 
What is Philosophy? This latter book, shortly after its first mention of Antonin Artaud, 
the progenitor of the term “Body without Organs”, makes a turn toward the cataloguing 
of error. Concerning the “infinite” list of illusions which can waylay or capture thought, 
Deleuze and Guattari note that “[f]irst of all there is the illusion of transcendence, 
which, perhaps, comes before all the others”.2 They go on to parse this illusion of 
transcendence into two distinct but linked paths by which thought’s immanence is 
botched: the illusion of transcendence has the “double aspect of making immanence 
immanent to something and of rediscovering a transcendence within immanence itself.”3
Such a distinction is hardly an unexpected move from these writers. Indeed, the twoness
of things is a fundamental mode of Deleuzian, and Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, quite 
foundational to their ontology, such that for their contemporary Alain Badiou, 
throughout Deleuze’s philosophy “in order to say that there is a single sense, two names 
are necessary”.4 And it is for this reason that we might find it so surprising that their 
reading of the source from which this Body without Organs derives seems so cyclopean 
– having, as they do, no problem with the organs per se, only the organisation of them 
from a transcendent or hidden locus.
1 See, for example, discussions of the organs pp140, 185, 229 DR; and pp126–35 Gilles Deleuze “To 
Have Done with Judgement” CC
2 p49 WP
3 ibid.
4 p28 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999). See also e.g. pp50–2 ibid.
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My primary interest throughout this Chapter will be to demonstrate how Deleuze and 
Guattari’s use of the figure of the Body without Organs differs from Artaud’s own ideas 
on thought and the body – especially as they are elaborated in the unbroadcast radio 
performance Artaud prepared, and other works from his final years – and what the 
consequences of these differences might be. The misreading of Artaud, the 
misappropriation of the figure, is heavily associated in their writings with the proper 
name Spinoza, as we shall see in the second Part of this Chapter. Whilst we shall have 
some minor occasion to turn squarely to Spinoza’s own writings, the “accuracy” of the 
readings that Deleuze and Guattari make of Spinoza is not paramount. Unless the 
contrary is made explicit, then, reference to Spinoza is to be understood as Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Spinoza; or, where the passages under consideration are from Deleuze’s solo 
works, Deleuze’s Spinoza.
So, the purpose of this chapter is to attend closely to how Deleuze and Guattari’s 
borrowing of the figure of the Body without Organs takes it away from its Artaudian 
origin and hence compromises some of the power of Artaud’s thought – thought which, 
as we shall see, is for Artaud firmly lodged in his body. This may, at first, seem to be a 
gross misunderstanding of the way in which Deleuze and Guattari mobilize concepts, 
writers, thinkers – namely, freely and productively, rather than as canonical sites for 
meticulous excavation – but the purpose of this thesis is not to read Deleuze and 
Guattari as is most germane to them (though, in fact, in both this Chapter and the last, I 
will also be remobilising some of their ideas on other fronts); rather, it is to examine 
how their readings affect the body, the body of work, of Artaud. This first Part of the 
Chapter will attend to Artaud’s To Have Done with the Judgement of God, from where 
the term “body without organs” comes, and to the context in which Deleuze, and 
Deleuze and Guattari, mobilise it. I hope to show that the problem of the organs and the 
problem of Judgement are intertwined in Artaud’s and the philosophers’ work – 
demonstrating some similar goals and priorities, especially their stances against 
transcendence and for the binding of concept and affect – but that their approaches yield
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very different results.
As we shall see, for Deleuze and Guattari, the organs per se are no threat to immanence.
In this Part, we will look briefly at organs and organisation, and at what Judgement is 
for Artaud and for the philosophers; at their respective co-articulations of the body’s 
constituent parts; at how they map and undermine the axis of transcendence; and at the 
ways in which these ideas correspond to the finite and the infinite. In turn, this will open
the way to our second and third Parts, where we will consider the affective then 
conceptual dimensions of having done with judgement, and the different models of 
immanence – the different ontologies and strategies or programmes – which Artaud and 
Deleuze and Guattari develop. The second Part does so through ethology and what 
Artaud calls athleticism, the third Part through the question of idiocy and the proper 
source of thought as immanent in a body.
It is important to note, at this early stage, that Deleuze’s work will return, in a different 
key, in both the third Chapter and the Conclusion of this thesis. This first Chapter 
concentrates on an ontology of the originary outside (immanence) and its associated 
ethics – which is to say, on the Spinozist Deleuze and his notions of a body in the world.
As I will argue, it is in this register that Deleuze most often and in most detail invokes 
Artaud, but in a way which I find to be incompatible with Artaud’s insistence on himself
being originary and “untouched”.5 Nonetheless, as I will later suggest, there is another 
Deleuze – more associated with Nietzsche, perhaps – who is closer to Artaud and to 
some of the concluding arguments of this thesis than the Spinozist Deleuze. This is the 
Deleuze who explores processual becomings of “mattter-energy” or “matter in 
variation” more akin to what we will discuss toward the end of the thesis around the 
intelligent materiality of the Earth which Artaud finds in Mexico, and which I will call 
his lucid materialism.6 Where making distinctions between Deleuze’s use of the term 
5 “my body / is never to be touched” p303 Watchfiends
6 p407 ATP ; the notion of the intelligent materiality of the Earth is proposed by Artaud, for example, 
p379 SW
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Body without Organs and Artaud’s original coining of it will most often allow us to 
clarify the differences in their relations to an ontologically originary outside (or virtual 
plenum) and its associated ethics, the exploration of Artaud’s ideas in the later parts of 
this thesis (especially that of lucid materialism) will be more in sympathy with – and to 
an extent informed by – Deleuze’s ideas in Difference and Repetition of an imageless 
thought (comparable to Artaud’s challenges to “idolatry” in thought),7 the 
geophilosophy and notions of “matter-energy” of, especially, A Thousand Plateaus,8 and
ideas of holes and chaos of Deleuze’s final work with Guattari, What is Philosophy?9 
But none of these ideas is explored primarily by Deleuze through Artaud’s own works, 
and it is necessary, first, to address those questions of an ontologically prior “outside” 
and its associated image of a body and its capacities which Deleuze, and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Spinozism associated Artaud with.
7 pp129–167 DR
8 “matter-energy” see especially p428 and p489 ATP. See also Mark Bonta and John Protevi Deleuze 
and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004)
9 e.g. pp201–218 WP
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28th November 1947: To Have Done with the Judgement of God
For tie me down if you want to,
but there is nothing more useless than an organ.10
So run the oft-quoted lines from the final section of the recorded version of Artaud’s To 
Have Done with the Judgement of God. These lines are immediately followed by the 
first use of the term “body without organs”, but it is rather the lines that precede which 
are more telling. Artaud announces the remaking of the body:
– By having him [man] undergo once more but for the last time an 
autopsy in order to remake his anatomy.
I say, in order to remake his anatomy.
Man is sick because he is badly constructed.
We must decide to strip him in order to scratch out this animalcule 




There is a certain ambivalence, then, about whose organs these are, in man’s shoddy 
anatomy: his, or His. And it is precisely this conflation – this knowledge that parts of 
the body are not of that body but have been hidden or grown there by a higher external 
cause, a higher authority with who-knows-what nefarious, furtive purpose – that Artaud 
must operate against. Where Deleuze and Guattari warn us of the illusions of 
transcendence, Artaud takes up a knife against it, a knife turned toward his own belly. 
Metaphysical threat, for Artaud, can subsist in the body and this is thus one of the fronts
on which it must be fought. The wrecking of transcendence which the piece’s “having 
10 p307 Watchfiends
11 ibid. Here, and in longer quotations throughout, we will attempt to approximate Artaud’s own layouts.
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done with” announces must take place through both storming the gates of heaven, and 
through reinventing the body itself such that it leaves no dark depths or clandestine 
corners for the enemy to hide.
Perhaps the most instructive thing which Deleuze and Guattari have to say about the 
“BwO” (Body without Organs) in A Thousand Plateaus is that it is not at all, in fact, the
organs themselves which Artaud is railing against, but the “organization of the organs”, 
which they equate with the “organism”.12 They continue: “the BwO is not at all the 
opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism.”13 
Indeed, they go so far as to argue that Artaud himself, his war on the organs, is really 
against the organism, because it is the organism which is the judgement of God: “the 
system of the judgment of God, the theological system, is precisely the operation of He 
who makes an organism, an organization of the organs called the organism”.14
Deleuze and Guattari are, I think, only half right, in that, for Artaud, the war for his 
body is a war on two fronts: the metaphysical and the organic-microscopic. Moreover – 
and here we glimpse Artaud’s sense of immanence – it is a war on the very logic which 
would make the metaphysical and the bodily, the abstract and the concrete, two separate
fronts. My argument can be elaborated around the question of “the double genitive”.15 In
English, as in French (and many other languages), there is a duality, a bilaterality, to 
“of”: it demarks a belonging which runs both ways, making the two nouns which it 
links symmetrically available to each other as subject or object of the sentence. For 
Artaud, the judgement of God is not solely God’s judgement presiding over man (that is,
the biblical accounts of God’s sovereignty and man’s infinite debt); the judgement of 
God is also man’s judgement of God. This latter is not to say that man puts God on trial,




15 Derrida notes this construction, and makes of it an ontological more than a grammatical question. 
See, e.g., p91 WD
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tendency toward the Absolute which has defined western philosophy since its inception,
as the abstracting of thought out of the body (in the third Part of this Chapter, Descartes 
will exemplify this, in our second Chapter, Hegel’s Absolute Spirit and Beautiful Souls).
Man’s judgement of God is, then, that most pernicious illusion of thought which 
Deleuze and Guattari identify: the “illusion of transcendence”.16 For Artaud, as we shall 
see, western metaphysics, Abrahamic monotheism and certain habits of western theatre 
conspire in this fundamental splitting of body and thought, in which bodies are 
expendable and thought is made unproductive judgement rather than creation.
Similarly, I would suggest, the “organization of the organs”17 could be understood with a
more Artaudian bivalency as both the organs suffering arrangement (organism), and the 
organs as themselves forces of organisation (harbouring God and orienting the body 
toward a conservative, subordinated relation with the outside). Deleuze does, in fact, 
note this distinction in his essay “To Have Done with Judgement” when he remarks that 
“organs are both judges and judged”,18 which is to say that, it is not only the 
organisation of the organs which evidences God’s judgement, but that the organs 
themselves are given as a measure of man, judges of the Body without Organs. The 
insight is, however, not explicitly pursued elsewhere in Deleuze’s œuvre.
For Artaud, the tendency to think transcendence occurs not only under the name of God,
but is also the problem of humanism, the orientation of the scientific relation to truth of 
the Enlightenment: as he writes “every man is that evil thought, / which pretends to be 
spirit, science, when it doesn’t have a body.”19 Again, here, the “organization of the 
organs”, if we are to retain Deleuze and Guattari’s phrase, would be not only the 
organisation which relates one organ to another and assigns them a place within an 
overdetermined Subject-body, but also the intensive register by which each organ on its 
16 p49 WP
17 p158 ATP (emphasis added)
18 p130 CC. See also p47 Judith Poxon “Embodied anti-theology: the body without organs and the 
judgement of God” in ed. Mary Bryden Deleuze and Religion (London: Routledge, 2001).
19 p253 Watchfiends
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own subordinates the body to the outside, making of that outside the transcendent sine 
qua non of interiority, the body. Whether we call this God or not (and let us remember 
that Deleuze’s sources for discussing immanence are often those who would call it God:
Spinoza, and Duns Scotus20), for Artaud it is still the outside subordinating his body: the
alpha and omega, the body’s origin and final destination predetermined (ashes to ashes),
and is thus God already there in every organ, every cell of the body. Artaud is 
unmistakably explicit about this pincer attack, that the body is being squeezed out of 
itself from above-outside and below-inside; from the sovereign heights of the abstract 
(God’s judgement) and the molecular constituents of the body (through the organs): 
“We must decide to strip him in order to scratch out this animalcule which makes him 
itch to death, / god, / and with god / his organs.”21
The organisation of the organs is, indeed, a problem – the articulation of each element in
relation to another which locks them in to the construction of a singular totality, a 
bounded and molar entity called the organism, which is oriented toward survival as-is, 
and which is subjected to (and by) judgement. Deleuze and Guattari are quite right to 
draw this out from Artaud. Indeed, we could go as far as to say that if this were all 
Artaud had to say on the matter, the philosophers may even be justified in naming 
“Spinoza’s Ethics the great book of the BwO [Body without Organs]”, and in their 
contingent claim that “all BwO’s pay homage to Spinoza.”22 But there is also the other 
side of the double genitive, the fact that each organ on its own is a force of organisation 
which subordinates the body to an ontologically prior outside. The organs, as we shall 
see, regulate flow relative to their outside – this function is what they are. As Deleuze 
has it, having done with Judgement is “to pose the problem [of the body] in terms of 
force”, rather than preordained form.23 The result is that in raising up the organs against 
organisation – finding their origin in a forceful, immanent outside not a self-sufficient 
20 We will attend to Spinoza in detail shortly. For Deleuze’s appropriation of Duns Scotus’ theology of 





molar inside – Deleuze’s body without organs becomes prepersonal, “already surpasses 
all subjectivity”.24 For Artaud, I would argue, this is no more than another God at the 
level of the organs, the other side of a pincer attack. It is not merely a case of gaining a 
certain fluidity of organ-to-organ relations, of atomising the molar body. It is, as Artaud 
plainly states, also a case of “scratch[ing] out this animalcule”.25 It is not only that the 
organism is made in God’s image: for Artaud each organ is already God within the 
organism, within Artaud’s body; God, provender and fickle withholder of daily bread, in
every need as it subordinates the body to its outside. This is what Artaud is telling us as 
he draws To Have Done with the Judgement of God to a close:
When you have given him [man] a body without organs,
then you will have delivered him from all his automatisms and restored 
him to his true liberty.26
Those automatisms, the non-static equilibria which sustain the body and which it tends 
towards in its conservative, survivalist aspect, are the productions – not only the 
articulations inter alia – of each organ. Each organ is itself riddled with God – bottom-
up subordination to the ontologically anterior outside – and must be removed, scratched 
out. Because man is the image of God, and God survives in the molecular construction 
of man: indeed, “microbes have been reinvented in order to impose a new idea of 
god.”27 God, Artaud insists, is not only the face of Christ, He is also “microbial 
noxiousness”28 and man’s body is riddled with God’s organs.
Theism of the Organs
But is it really the case that Deleuze and Guattari do not deal with the organs 







John Protevi makes an instructive reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of 
the organs. He tells us that, in their philosophy a “body is any economic system 
considered as a mechanism of capture and appropriation”, and that they are thus 
indebted to Nietzsche’s understanding of a body as a system of dominated and dominant
forces.29 Despite the organic affiliations of the terms, then, we can see how for Deleuze 
and Guattari “body”, “organism”, or “organs” need not apply to only biological bodies, 
but to any site of differential intensities or where multiple differentials are organised 
inter alia by an operation conducted at another level – there is, for example, a body 
without organs of capitalism for Deleuze and Guattari.30 As is consistently clear 
throughout his œuvre, such analogy is not defensible as a reading of Artaud’s notion of a
body, which is relentlessly used to mean Artaud’s own body – without comparison, 
equivalence or other exchangeability.
Like the body, for Deleuze and Guattari the organs are emergent phenomena, what 
Protevi calls “liminal intensities”,31 which is to say that boundaries form and reform 
through aleatory processes, rather than being given a priori, and that they emerge from 
the outside in, as if the outside were “folded” into pockets of relations with itself (“The 
BwO howls: ‘They’ve wrongfully folded me! They’ve stolen my body’”32). As we shall 
see below, for Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, the body without organs appears 
after the fact of its being differentiated, as the “miraculate, enchanted surface” upon 
which differentials and organs are forming.33
Attending to A Thousand Plateaus, but drawing heavily on the vocabulary of Anti-
Oedipus, Protevi writes,
Organs are machines, that is, flow/break couplings in which a matter-energy 
29 pp36 John Protevi, “The organism as the judgement of God: Aristotle, Kant and Deleuze on nature 
(that is, on biology, theology and politics)”, in ed. Bryden Deleuze and Religion
30 p10 AO




flow is interrupted and part siphoned off to flow in the slower economy of the 
body. Organs are a body’s way of negotiating with the outside, appropriating and
slowing down a bit of matter-energy flow. Organs are points of intensity of 
matter-energy, a place of activity less intense than the surrounding outside but 
more intense than the body’s other organs (with regard to its particular flow, that
is).34
For Artaud, the organs are just as much a part of judgement as the organism is – in the 
tiniest part, God is already at work – subordinating the emergent inside to the anterior 
outside, and making parts specialise in this or that, like knowledge split into disciplines. 
On this schema, we might say that for Artaud, it is not only the aggregation of parts into
larger parts and their top-down control which opens the body up to transcendence, but 
the very regulation of all internalisation: the subordination of the body to the outside-as-
anterior, and the sundering of the parts of the body from each other whereby God makes
himself crannies to hide in (sites of articulation with the outside or with other parts of 
the inside: organs or the synovia of the knees, etc.35). Indeed, any passive determination 
of the body by the outside is classed as divine impropriety: and as Artaud insists “my 
body / is never to be touched.”36 The organs are not morally neutral, not atheistic, for 
two reasons: because they have that “relative consistency”37 as a quality; and because, 
as Protevi points out, they “regulate rates of capture and escape”38 and hence are caught 
in a system of maintaining a certain kind of hierarchy of relations with the outside – 
between, we might say, the infinite anterior outside and the finite posterior inside. The 
purloining of the body from itself – for Artaud the very root of needing to have done 
with the Judgement of God – is not got rid of simply by wrecking transcendence. Artaud
insists that he must also be paranoiacally vigilant to it sneaking back in, because the 
theism of the organs can return, pace Deleuze and Guattari, in the organs’ service of 
life: in the conservation and reproduction of what is given and its given order: God, and 
34 pp36–7 Protevi “The organism as the judgement of God”
35 See p259 OCXIX, cited p126 Derrida “Unsense”: “Let what rolls in the kneecap roll while true being 
will form itself on the somber hearth of its synovia. And where are the synovia? In these exploded 
globules of the body, which every soul holds suspended in its emptiness to bombard with them the 
atoms of a being that does not exist”. See also figs.25 & 44.
36 p303 Watchfiends
37 p36 Protevi “The organism as the judgement of God”
38 ibid.
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the givenness of the given, the transcendence of God. To find God only at the level of 
the organisation of the organism would, for Artaud, be to fail to winkle him out of His 
deeper, more constitutive hiding places within the immanent. It is worth introducing, 
here, the concept of immanence in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy.
Immanence
In a forensic and historical journey around immanence in Deleuze’s œuvre, Christian 
Kerslake names this rare Deleuzian “terminological constant” as perhaps “the problem 
inspiring his work.”39 Referring to Deleuze’s early (1968) work Spinoza and the 
Problem of Expression,40 Kerslake asserts that,
Absolute difference is shown to be formally coherent in the Spinoza book, but 
its existence could not be assumed without recourse to an ontological argument. 
[...] the procedure of “starting” with absolute immanence risks falling back into 
“pre-philosophical presupposition”. But in fact, absolute immanence lies at the 
“end” of the system, rather than its beginning: it is the telos towards which 
cognition and critique move.41
What becomes clear, even relatively early in Deleuze’s writing, then, is that immanence 
is not something which thought or a body simply finds itself in as a given: 
philosophically, that would be the error “of rediscovering a transcendence within 
immanence itself.”42 It would be to rely on axioms rather than experimentation – 
something which Deleuze and Guattari warn against in A Thousand Plateaus, and which
as we shall see below is linked to a philosophical “idiocy” which assumes a stable 
ground against the vertigo of immanence.43 Immanence must always also be an 
experimental milieu for Deleuze, one which must be found and made at the juncture of 
praxis (ethics) and ontology – it is life and thought: the conjunction of these is 
39 p10 Christian Kerslake “The Vertigo of Philosophy: Deleuze and the Problem of Immanence” in 
Radical Philosophy no. 113 (May/June 2002)
40 Gilles Deleuze Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza trans. Martin Joughlin (Cambridge, MA: Zone 
Books, 1990)
41 p20 Kerslake, “The Vertigo of Philosophy”
42 p49 WP
43 See Kerslake “The Vertigo of Philosophy”; p60 WP and p131 AO.
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constitutive of, and constituted by immanence. Indeed, the plane of immanence always 
presents “two powers, power of being and power of thinking”.44 These are not assumed, 
but may be intuited, provided they are also then moved toward or “drawn up”45 in their 
immanent, reciprocal constitutivity.
When Deleuze and Guattari come to write of immanence in What is Philosophy? as 
“pre-philosophical”, it is not in the temporal sense of preceding so much as it is the 
sense of an enveloping of philosophy, the synthesis and uncovering or anamnesis of an 
ontological anteriority. This is the climax of the “Spinoza and Us” chapter of Deleuze’s 
Spinoza: Practical Philosophy,46 just as it is the Spinoza whom is crowned once again in
What is Philosophy?:
Spinoza, the infinite becoming-philosopher: he showed, drew up, and thought 
the “best” plane of immanence – that is, the purest, the one that does not hand 
itself over to the transcendent or restore any transcendent, the one that inspires 
the fewest illusions, bad feelings, and erroneous perceptions.47
A temporally prior understanding of “pre-philosophical”,48 would be precisely the re-
establishing of a transcendence; that is, it would make thought only an excrescence of 
immanence, and not also its affirmation and its very production. But it is only when 
“immanence is no longer immanent to something other than itself [that] it is possible to 
speak of a plane of immanence.”49 Immanence cannot prioritise, but must bind bodies 
and thought to their anterior, prepersonal creative force. In an assertion which, as we 
will see in the third Part of this Chapter (on idiocy), is indebted to their reading of 
Artaud, Deleuze and Guattari argue that immanent thought is
at the same time, that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. 
44 p48 WP
45 See p60 ibid
46 pp122–130 SPP
47 ibid.
48 See p220n.5 ibid. This note also allies the non-philosophy of François Laruelle with Spinoza, which 
we will have brief recourse to below.
49 p47 ibid.
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It is the nonthought within thought [...] – an outside more distant than any 
external world because it is an inside deeper than any internal world.50
Indeed, they go on, turning toward the constitutive outside is “[p]erhaps [...] the 
supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of immanence as to show 
that it is there, unthought in every plane.”51 Immanence then, the “best plane of 
immanence”, is not merely that which precedes philosophy (as an ontological 
anteriority), nor is it simply that which philosophy constructs; it is the affirmation and 
weaving of the plane of immanence – it is both the creative fount and the goal of 
practice which, furthermore, binds thinking and affective encounters, philosophy and 
ethics. Importantly, even though interiorities (bodies, thoughts) do emerge on the plane, 
they remain always-already transected by it: the plane is “the not external outside” of 
“the not internal inside”52, and the infinite-outside remains – pace Artaud’s search for an
originarily unalienated body – “deeper than any internal world”.53 The plane remains 
this anonymous, extrinsic thing; a One-All constitutive of, yet massively in excess of 
the finite. As we will see in the final parts of this thesis, whilst it can be argued that 
Artaud sought such a thing as a model for thinking the Earth as intelligent materiality, 
he would not accept it as an ontology of his own body, which must be incomparable and
self-positing, not aleatorily emergent.
There is nothing which does not lie on the plane of immanence – this is both intuited 
and demonstrated – such that Deleuze and Guattari talk of its flatness. Where 
transcendence, understood as “a plan of organization or development” (even “be it a 
hidden one”, Deleuze vigilantly reminds us), will always have “an additional dimension 
[...] supplementary to the dimensions of the given”, immanence, or consistency, is flat.54
Such planes are not flat in the sense that they have only two dimensions, but, as Deleuze








consistent with it, immanent to it – and this “it” is always necessarily the plane itself, for
as we have seen, immanence is always immanence to the plane, immanence to 
immanence.
At the level of thought, to intuit and orient toward or “draw up”56 the plane is to return 
thought to its creative fount, the Nietzschean insight that, as Deleuze and Guattari 
paraphrase it, “thought is creation, not will to truth.”57 Yet deeper within this diagram of 
thought as creation is the fundamental element of passing through the unthought, 
through the prephilosophical which must be woven in and woven back into, not 
abandoned, sloughed off, disavowed. Deleuze explains, “there is in this way an 
‘incapacity’ of thought, which remains at its core even after it has acquired the capacity 
determinable as creation.”58 Deleuze and Guattari surely have Artaud in mind as well as 
Nietzsche when they note that “[w]e have no reason to take pride in this image of 
thought, which involves much suffering without glory and indicates the degree to which
thinking has become increasingly difficult: immanence.”59 And yet as I will argue 
below, in the final Part of this Chapter, it is precisely on the intensity and affective 
correlates of this “difficulty” that Deleuze’s and Artaud’s ideas on “unthought” and 
idiocy are most different. It is worth noting here that the passage through a constitutive, 
anonymous infinite outside is as much a part of Deleuze and Guattari’s diagram of the 
affective body as it is of thinking. For Deleuze, if transcendence is necessarily had done 
with, “[t]here is no longer a subject, but only individuating affective states of an 
anonymous force.”60 We will introduce this axis of immanence now, in an overview of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term body without organs before turning to Artaud’s 
own ideas. We will also return to it in the second Part of this Chapter, on the body in 







Anti-Oedipus; body without organs
Deleuze first appropriates the term “body without organs” in Logic of Sense to designate
“blocks of coexistence”,61 a concept which, as we shall see, prefigures the third or 
“conjunctive” synthesis of Anti-Oedipus, where the systematic use of the term in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy begins.
The three passive syntheses are detailed in Anti-Oedipus to show the aleatory 
emergence of a body from anonymous affections; a process which Simon O’Sullivan – 
in a reading which convincingly demonstrates the ties to Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza –
has called a process of “converting the passive to the active”.62 This is a theory of a 
purely immanent emergent body, detailing how the finite inside emerges from an 
ontologically anterior infinite outside – whilst remaining on that which it is constituted 
by. The technical details of this process need not detain us too long here – the salient 
points for this thesis concern how this philosophy differs from Artaud’s own, not the full
complexities of how it might function. As such, I will sketch the three passive syntheses
briefly here, with some recourse to O’Sullivan. Whilst the latter’s book must be 
criticised for its normalising use of the term “Spinoza’s body without organs”63 – which 
compounds the appropriation of the term which Deleuze and Guattari begin – his book 
also demonstrates how we might read Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy (amongst 
others) as one of relations between the finite and the infinite: here, the body as finite 
emerged from an ontologically anterior immanent infinite. As we have already begun to 
see, this articulation is one which will prove useful throughout this Chapter, and 
beyond. 
There are two points at which what Deleuze and Guattari call “the body without organs”
features in the three passive syntheses: firstly as it “miraculates” in the second synthesis 
61 p224 Gilles Deleuze The Logic of Sense trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (London: Athlone, 
1990)
62 p24 Simon O’Sullivan On The Production of Subjectivity (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)
63 See fig1.5, p26 ibid.
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as if a memory of a lost wholeness, and then as the fullest expression, as it were, of the 
newly “active” body which is produced in the third synthesis – the latter especially 
being further developed in A Thousand Plateaus. Let us begin at the beginning, in the 
undifferentiated world of pure difference, before anything works, in “the unorganized 
mass”.64
First, there is the production of production, connective synthesis which produces and 
joins. It is characterised by connection, flow, forces of attraction: “and ... and ... 
and ...”.65 It is, for O’Sullivan, “a realm of heterogenetic encounter” which, he argues, 
“is specifically Spinozist”, equated, in fact, with the first kind of knowledge, or 
anonymous affections of Spinoza’s Ethics.66 The second passive synthesis uncouples 
some of these connections, begins making selections (though never exclusions), 
disconnecting some and reconnecting others, “either ... or ... or”.67 These bifurcations 
and couplings are also called “recordings”, but they, too, constitute a mode of 
production, a synthesis.68 Deleuze and Guattari note that the sum total remains the same,
even as different configurations are experimented with here, as the permutations are 
variations “between differences that always amount to the same as they shift and slide 
about.”69 The organs are here, siphoning-off bits of flow or feeding them back into other
flows and articulations with the outside (like cleaned blood flowing up from the liver to 
be oxygenated in the lungs). Coupling and decoupling; eating and shitting.
It is thus in this second passive synthesis that the body without organs is first 
“miraculated”.70 Once the various permutations are appearing, an anterior totality or 
surface is posited, which is called the body without organs and which seems to be the 
source of all that is recorded upon it, including the organs.71 This can, Deleuze and 
64 p8 AO








Guattari explain, involve a sense of paranoia, as indeed it does for their privileged 
examples, Artaud and Judge Schreber: the organs which appear upon the body without 
organs are experienced as “an over-all persecution apparatus” or “a God at work 
messing it all up or strangling [the body without organs] by organizing it”.72
The body without organs, for Deleuze and Guattari, “has nothing whatsoever to do with 
the body itself or with an image of the body.”73 Rather, it is “the body without an 
image”, which repels the image.74 This is the body without organs in repulsion mode: in 
“order to resist linked, connected, and interrupted flows, it sets up a counterflow of 
amorphous, undifferentiated fluid.”75 To “resist organ-machines”, they argue “the body 
without organs presents its smooth, slippery [...] surface as a barrier.”76
The third passive synthesis is conjunctive, such that it combines the two previous 
syntheses. It overcomes the disjunction between them (without reducing or having done 
with them) and, further, synthesises from their passivity, converting passive flow into 
active force. We will look at this in more detail below, in relation to Deleuze’s Spinozist
ethology, and Artaud’s own ideas on synthesising active force from passive affections. 
Conjunctive synthesis, too, has a retroactive efficacy, in that it gathers up the “and ... 
and ... and ...” and the “either ... or ... or ...” and binds them in an act of recognition: “a 
wonderstruck ‘So that’s what it was!’”77; indeed, “So it’s me!”78 Importantly, this 
subjectivity “is produced as a mere residuum”79 of passive synthesis. Conjunctive 
synthesis overcomes the tension between the first two syntheses, and the emergent body
72 p9 ibid. One of the things at stake in Anti-Oedipus, and especially the “Introduction to 
Schizoanalysis” (pp273–382), is engaging with clinical cases as limit-experiences of a more general 
process, which can thus be learned from rather than used to reinforce the judgemental sovereignty of 
Clinician or Critic. To this extent, the approach of schizoanalysis is a model of “reading” which is 
resolutely uncruel to its subjects. The cruelties to Artaud which I will argue Deleuze and Guattari do 









is covered with intensities in place of contradictions (prefigured as “blocks of 
coexistence” in Logic of Sense80). Far from cancelling each other out, opposing forces 
have been resolved – through conjunction – as commensurate as intensities: no lack or 
holes, only “all positive in relationship to the zero intensity that designates the full body
without organs.”81 The body without organs is drawn up, here, in a positive sense, 
without repelling anything, as that on which all intensity comes to pass.
An entirely passively constituted subjectivity has, thus, become able to recognise itself, 
and attribute itself to itself as if causa sui, and thence to orient itself to the plane of 
immanence (zero intensity). As such, as we have seen Deleuze argue elsewhere, “[t]here
is no longer a subject, but only individuating affective states of an anonymous force”,82 
or subjectivities. The subjectivity which has emerged, which acts as well as being acted 
upon, still only acts by dint of passing, each time, through the anonymous forces, by 
“recording” the passage, and by binding these as part of its third synthesis of 
conjunction (as thought passes through unthought). The body without organs of Anti-
Oedipus, then, may have done with God’s judgement (in that all transcendent models of 
judgement and Subject-formation are had done with) but it nonetheless delivers bodies 
– Artaud’s body – to outside powers: the anonymous affections of the anterior infinite 
outside. Whilst this – and related notions such as smooth and striated83 – can be 
productively put to use in thinking the Earth in ways redolent of Artaud’s later lucid 
materialism (as I will argue toward the end of this thesis), it is not commensurate with 
his use of the term body without organs, which is precisely oriented against outside, 
primordial causes, be they vertical-judgemental or horizontal-emergent.
Concept–Affect
The body without organs had done with God’s judgement must always be Artaud’s 
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body, insistently so. Yet for Deleuze and Guattari, the body without organs is always 
impersonal, prepersonal, because it is an emergent phenomenon on an anterior plenum. 
In A Thousand Plateaus they explain, “the BwO is never yours or mine. It is always a 
body.”84 They go on, “the indefinite article does not lack anything; it is not 
indeterminate or undifferentiated, but expresses the pure determination of intensity, 
intensive difference.”85 Which is to say that the determination, or differentiations of that 
to which the indefinite article is applied – here, of course, the BwO as “a body” – is not 
enacted upon it from above (God), nor, equally from any worldly force from which it is 
sundered in the process of formation, but are differentiations on the BwO.
The body without organs is both the pure past of the emergent body – that on which 
organs appear – and a full body constructed as that upon which intensities circulate. 
Like immanence – or, O’Sullivan would add, Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge86 – it is 
both already there, and must be shown to be there: it is an ontology and an ethical 
practice; prephilosophical and telos as Kerslake has it; given, and lying at the “end” of 
the system.87 When Deleuze and Guattari insist that it is “no more projective than it is 
regressive”,88 they are bringing together this always-already with this orientation; not to 
insist on a wedge between the two (a melancholic, unfulfilled now) but in order to evade
transcendence by naming immanence twice, so never allowing it to be immanent to 
anything other than itself. Artaud, too, talks of the true body being restored to him and 
elaborates it as the goal of work across various media – culminating, I will argue in our 
third Chapter, in his notebook practices of his final years. But the strange temporality 
and ontology he develops also differs from Deleuze and Guattari’s in significant ways.
As well as this difference in their temporalities of the body without organs – and in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s application of the term across all and any scale – perhaps the 
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most pertinent difference is that, following O’Sullivan’s restatement of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s thought in terms of finite-infinite relations, we see how their body without 
organs accedes to its active “autopoietic”89 finitude as a residuum on an ontologically 
anterior infinite outside (one which Spinoza and Duns Scotus call “God”). For Deleuze 
and Guattari “it is not ‘my’ body without organs, instead the ‘me’ (moi) is on it, or what 
remains of me”90; for Artaud, this ontological priority and its divestment of his body 
from itself is, simply, suffering.
The Infinite and The Ends of Thought
I have already intimated the two problems expressed in the one phrase, “the judgement 
of God”, and both, for Artaud, must be had done with. On the one hand there is the 
sovereign and determining Godhead, the One. This operates not only at the biological 
level (blueprint), but also at the level of morality. This is the judgement of man by God, 
through which man is found to be lacking, through which, as Deleuze puts it, we are 
become “in our entire being the infinite debtors of a single God”,91 and as a result of 
which man finds himself cast out, in dis-grace. On the other hand, the “double genitive” 
complement of this is the judgement of God by man: the disparagement of the body in 
the name of purity, truth, the Absolute – judgement rather than creation. Put another 
way, there is the top-down: God’s judgement organising the body and keeping moral 
accounts; and there is the bottom-up orientation toward the One-Absolute beyond the 
body, which wrenches thought from the body toward the abstract-ideal. Both Artaud and
Deleuze and Guattari are explicitly opposed to conceptualising and deploying thought in
this way – as “judgement”. For Artaud, as for the philosophers, freed thought is not in 
the service of a transcendent One, and must be firmly lodged in an affective body. In To 
Have Done with the Judgement of God – as elsewhere in Artaud’s work – thought is not 
to be the pursuit of forms, but itself a force without predetermined limits. As Artaud has 





The number and order of possible suppositions in this domain
is precisely
infinity!
And what is infinity?
We do not exactly know!








The question of the body without organs having done with judgement, then, becomes 
for Artaud a question of the relation between finite and infinite. To have done with 
God’s judgement will mean no less than having done with the finite body’s 
subordination to the infinite; as such it is a refusal to subordinate affective and 
conceptual finitude by classing them as an emergent property of any ontologically prior 
infinitude to which the thinking-body would be subordinate or from which it would be 
barred – we note that the opening of consciousness is “toward”, a self-determination not
an alluring or submissive diastole. Whilst Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is 
consistently engaged with putting the body in immanent contact with the immeasurable 
– with finding its constitutive infinite – for Artaud, I will argue, finite and infinite will 
be bound in another way, within what he calls his body. (And, even in the Sierra 
Tarahumara where a certain outside does return to Artaud’s thought, as the Earth, it will 
be parallel to, not serialised with Artaud’s body.)
For Artaud, man made, and has continued to make, the wrong decision:
92 pp296–7 Watchfiends
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Two roads were offered to him:
that of the infinite outside,
that of the infinitesimal inside.
And he chose the infinitesimal inside.
[...]
And god, god himself hastened the movement.93
Which is to say that man retreated and has taken cowardly consolation in his finitude, 
“lent himself to the obscene meal” by which he bows to divine-organic necessity and 
the anteriority of the outside: to judgement and hunger.94 For Artaud, that finitude – as 
what is given, as the cruelty which determines what his body currently is – must be 
fought with a more ferocious cruelty, with his own force of determination, wrested from
the outside to be wielded by his self-made body, free from all judgement. The fight must
be taken up from here, where we are, from this cruel finitude to which we are subjected,
through which we must work and to which we must bind the infinite rather than hoping 
to fall into the infinite. Thus, the choice between those two roads will be shown to be a 
false choice: the body, as we will find Artaud thinking of it – thinking in it – will name 
something older than that false choice, older than his finitude, and older than God’s 
judgement.
This is the meaning of cruelty in the sense that Artaud uses it in The Theatre and Its 
Double: cruelty as determination.95 It will replace God’s cruelty that makes man finite, 
and it is these subordinations which Artaud will scrape out of himself, have done with, 
and in so doing reinvent his body. A sleight of hand of sorts, then, which we will look at 
in detail below; a certain twist so that that which marks finitude-as-posterior-inside is 
reoriented to bind infinite-outside to its pure surface: hence, the very final lines of To 
Have Done with the Judgement of God: “you will teach him again to dance inside out / 
93 pp293–4 ibid.
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[...] / and that inside out will be his true side out.”96
This is a much stranger, and more difficult thing than melancholic (effectively 
acquiescent) testings of the finitude of life and thought, and it is more than a regressive 
aspiration for the lost infinite. In it, Artaud will no longer suffer. This body, the body 
turned inside out, is “infinite as the volume or the plain of my whole body” and 
“impossible to pierce”.97 Artaud will “descend from a cross, / where god believed he had
long ago nailed [him]”98 and embody the infinite, protected from the determinations of 
the anterior-outside (be it God or his daily bread); he will keep his mouth and “his anal 
pocket closed”, and reinvent something beyond mere existence – for “[i]n order to exist 
you need only let yourself go...”, and Artaud will not be so passive.99
Toward Expression
For Artaud, this body – one no longer sundered from itself by its organs trading with the
outside, nor overdetermined by a divine or genetic plan – will not be a closed-off entity, 
but one which expresses, which determines, which produces. It is worth quoting To 
Have Done with the Judgement of God at length here:
there are those who say
that consciousness
is an appetite,
the appetite for life;
and immediately
beside the appetite for life,
it is the appetite for food
which comes to mind;
as though there were not people who eat
without any kind of appetite;





and who are hungry.
[...]
the space of possibility
was given me one day
like a loud fart
that I will let;
[...]
the pressing urgency of a need:
that of abolishing the idea,
the idea and its myth,
and of enthroning in its place
the thundering manifestation
of this explosive necessity.100
The link that Artaud makes between feeding the mind and feeding the body, here, is 
something which will be at stake throughout the remaining Parts of this Chapter. 
Similarly, the pairing of destructive, often scatological, motifs with equally violent 
scenes of creation – necessity, cruelty, determination – is one which will recur.
Artaud and Deleuze and Guattari are in agreement that thinking the body involves 
thinking through the relation to the outside, especially the outside as constitutively 
anterior to the body; but they are certainly not agreed that raising up the primacy of the 
outside is a desirable thing. If, for Deleuze and Guattari, the primacy of the outside is 
fundamental to having done with transcendence, for Artaud the judgement of God 
nonetheless subsists at the molecular level within the organs, that is, even within what 
the philosophers call immanence; what, as we shall see, Deleuze also calls, “Life”.101 
Artaud’s own diagram of immanence then, will begin with the body: a body which 
binds the infinite to it, making of itself the first term in any ontological articulation. This
is a body, then, beholden to no outside as origin nor destination: as Artaud insists, “there
is no beyond or hereafter and no other abyss than this one into which one is put.”102 
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Reading Artaud, I have been arguing, we must always speak it twice: must reject God’s 
judgement from on high, and from where it would hide in the organs; must always say 
that the body is the body without organs had done with God’s judgement. Artaud 
constructs a very strange temporality around it. If this is crucial for reading Artaud 
against the philosophers’ appropriations, to name twice is also, I have suggested, a 
Deleuzo-Guattarian signature; and, indeed, both this Chapter and the third will be as 
indebted to their work as it will be discordant – especially, as noted above, on the 
question of the Earth as Artaud conceives it in Mexico and Ireland.
Artaud is again in agreement with Deleuze and Guattari that the means of thinking the 
body as immanent – the body without organs had done with the judgement of God – 
necessarily involves showing the originary non-exclusion of concept and affect. It is 
along these two lines that we will approach their arguments: first by attending to how 
affection is figured in each body of work; then turning to concept or thought. In each 
section, Deleuze and Guattari’s own readings of Artaud are necessarily at stake, but the 
longer goal of the Chapter will be to examine Artaud’s own articulations of life and 
thought in relation to their outside and to each other – his own sense of immanence as 




Athleticism is not Joy
Of the skeins of philosophers and authors who are woven through Deleuze’s œuvre, it is
Spinoza and Artaud who are the dye in the wool of its fabric. At times, they become 
fused, such that the figures of one come to be used by Deleuze and Guattari – as if 
without complication – to refer to the other: Spinoza is the “crowned anarchist”, and his 
Ethics is the “great book” of “the body without organs”, both figures taken from 
Artaud’s works.104
What would seem to bring Artaud and Spinoza so close, for Deleuze, is their profound, 
original and intricate calculations of the differentials between a body and its outside; the
body’s constitution from the stuff of the outside and, in turn, its actions upon the 
outside. If Spinoza’s Ethics solicits Deleuze’s lifelong attention because of its bringing 
together of affect, immanent metaphysics and the movement of bodies, it seems to me 
that he demonstrates much less extensive care in his readings of Artaud’s texts on these 
precise same matters. Perhaps the earliest text of Artaud’s that lays out a particular 
programme for the knotting of affect, metaphysics and the body as a physical organism 
is his Theatre and Its Double, and most of all the last chapter to be completed (in 1935–
6), “An Affective Athleticism”.105
It is my contention that by locating this programme for the body within the contexts of 
Artaud’s theatre training in the 1920s and his development of the theme in his later 
works, it will become clear that the proximity which Deleuze finds to Spinoza is not, in 
fact, entirely justified. Put most generally, the difference which makes Artaud 
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unavailable for Spinozisation concerns the horizon of life – survival and production at 
the level of pragmatism and intent, and the construction of a capacity to act. For Artaud,
as for Deleuze’s Spinoza, it is the body which is the locus of such a capacity. As such, 
breathing, food (and its excretion) and affections – as forces and necessities from 
outside the body – take on a metaphysical importance. “An Affective Athleticism” is a 
practical guide to acting, to the production of expressive force; but, as we shall see, it is 
one in which the highest metaphysical stakes are always present.
Expressive Force and the Vieux-Colombier
This voluntary breathing incites the spontaneous reappearance of life.106
It is the breath, Artaud explains in “An Affective Athleticism”, that mediates between 
the physical exertion of the muscular organism and the affective states of the body; that 
binds the ephemeral and the concrete. A mastery of the breath, he infers, leads to a 
mastery over the body. Moreover, as the affective states and the musculature of the body
are inseparably bound, sovereign modulation of breath not only produces affective 
states in the body, but determines the poses and gestures of the muscular body. And, as 
Artaud had argued earlier in The Theatre and Its Double, the body’s gestures and form 
are its means of producing an unencrypted expressive force, or what he calls “true 
hieroglyphs” – a “posture language with its own ideographic values” which he sees in 
Balinese theatre and “some undebased mime plays”.107 As such, the breathing exercises 
he lays out promise sovereignty over both the form and force of the body, these two 
made inseparable. Under no circumstances may this expressive force be misunderstood 
as psychological expression; nor is it a derivative of any pre-existent state. Artaud 
explains:
I am quite aware that the language of gesture and attitude [...] are less capable of




precise states of consciousness than verbal language, but who ever said that the 
theatre was created to elucidate a character, or to resolve the kind of human and 
emotional, contemporary and psychological conflicts with which our modern 
theatre is filled?108
More starkly put, a few years prior, Artaud laid out his priorities for the theatre: “We do 
not think that life should be represented in itself, or that it is worthwhile to pursue this 
direction.”109 Here, the continuities of Artaud’s ideas with those of his predecessors, 
teachers and colleagues in the theatre of early twentieth-century Paris are most evident –
even if Artaud himself tended to stress their disagreements.110
Of particular note is the use of masks introduced by Jacques Copeau and Suzanne Bing 
as part of the training regime at the Vieux-Colombier – the theatre school founded by 
Copeau in 1921 on leaving the school of Charles Dullin, where he first met Artaud. For 
Copeau and Bing, masking an actor eliminated any reliance on facial expressions. As 
such, mask-work effects a break with the kind of theatre which stages individual 
psychological conflict – precisely the kind of theatre which Artaud, too, would have 
done with. The mask not only covers the part of the body upon which psychological, 
interior states are most readily inscribed and read – the face, which Artaud would later 
try to reinvent in his portraits, for it had become no more than “an empty force, a field 
of death [...] a form which has never corresponded to its body”.111 As well as covering 
this cluster of features, where “expressions” appear as if they were clues to more 
fundamental interior states, the mask necessarily mobilises the whole body of the actor. 
For Étienne Decroux – a contemporary of Artaud, who had first begun working with 
masks in 1923, in the classes of Maiène Copeau112 – the neutrality of the mask, far from 
being limiting “allows me to do everything”.113 Indeed, the mask-work opened the way 
to the reinvention of the mime tradition which Copeau and Jean-Louis Barrault would 
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so intensely undertake throughout the 1930s, culminating in Barrault’s Autour d’Une 
Mère which Artaud would review in The Theatre and Its Double.114
Whilst the denigration of mime is today, perhaps stronger than ever, in the 1920s and 
’30s, recalls former Vieux-Colombier student and instructor Jean Dorcy, it was no less 
than “a world of fiction where nothing exists, where everything must appear”115; a world
of fiction in which the body of the actor takes up Copeau’s mission “to save the theatre 
from the morass which realism held it [in]”.116 Artaud’s ideas were forged in this milieu: 
pursuing the reinvention of theatre through expressive bodily means, the mobilisation of
the whole body as an integrated unit, the integrated body as an expressive fount rather 
than the playback machine of an absent playwright. As the mask work shows, for 
Artaud’s contemporaries, this may involve the effacement of parts of the body: the face 
especially, but also, as in the voluminous-sleeved classic pierrot costume, the hands, the 
second most legible extremity of the body. Indeed, Andres Bossard of the 
Mummenschanz company – whose lineage can be traced back through Jacques Lecoq 
and Jean Dasté to the influence of Artaud and Decroux – talks of comparisons between 
their extreme masking techniques and lobotomisation.117
There is a move at work, here, then – nascent in Decroux’s practice, itself symptomatic 
of a certain unrest – away from the theatre as the presentation and resolution of 
psychological conflict, toward the mobilisation of the body as an expressive totality. 
The fate of the body and of the theatre are linked; and if Artaud does not use masks in 
his later works, and even if his contemporaries do not express themselves with the 
viscerality and polemic force of Artaud’s later work, the broad sense of stakes and 
solutions are neither unprecedented nor ignored. Certainly Artaud and Decroux 
disagreed about the role of the director (Artaud thought the role central, and 
increasingly assumed it in his later theatre projects). But for Decroux if “we were not 
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able to have a very prolonged conversation”, this signalled that he and Artaud “were 
truly like two brothers [...with] the same needs”.118
For Artaud, the death of the old theatre is necessary to reawaken a theatre which 
explores the expressive capacities of the whole body. In place of representation of 
interior psychological states, Artaud calls for a “sacred” theatre which would mobilise 
the whole body to produce expressive force119; a force which would affect the audience 
directly. These goals and means are not so dissimilar from Copeau’s aims with the 
mask-work120 – and it is no coincidence that Artaud would later praise Jean-Louis 
Barrault – his friend and Copeau’s closest collaborator in the 1930s – not only for his 
corporeal mime piece Autour d’Une Mère, but for continuing to develop the breathing 
techniques outlined in “An Affective Athleticism”.121 Barrault would continue to refer to
these techniques – what he referred to as the “Alchemy of the Human Body”122 – well 
after his theatrical path and Artaud’s had wandered far from each other: for Barrault, 
always “I was to adhere with my whole being to Artaud’s definition [...]: ‘The actor: An 
affective Athlete’.”123
With both the mask-work and Artaud’s own theatre projects, the body of the actor and 
the theatre itself were to become places where affective states were produced not 
reproduced; both would become (to borrow a phrase from Deleuze and Guattari) more 
factories than theatres.124 It is such a break with the given state of affairs which Eleanora
Duse had in mind when she wished a plague upon the theatre. Duse would often visit 
the Vieux-Colombier, and Decroux also took up the image of the plague in his invective,
but it would become a core theme for Artaud, raised of course to metaphysical stakes.125
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Despite the eschatonic imagery it conjures, the plague as Artaud thinks of it does not 
entirely break with the past. Like Decroux’s often misunderstood suggestion that speech
be banned from the theatre for twenty years and slowly reintroduced via a five-year 
transition phase of only asignifying speech (a process of “twisting the neck” of the 
playwright which we will return to in our second Chapter126), Artaud’s notion of plague 
is, rather, a sorting mechanism. Rather than destroy all that is in order to fill the 
resulting vacuum with his own vision, Artaud is calling for a stripping back to some sort
of fundamental actorly tools and purposes. What he seeks is akin to what, for Deleuze 
and Guattari, “was present in art from its beginning, but was hidden”127; an art which 
accesses what Jacques Lecoq – whose teaching of mime draws especially on Artaud’s 
breathing techniques128 – calls the “fond”: the base or source.129 The plague, then, is less 
an end than a pass through the beginning – a calling-upon the past as a new beginning, a
looping backward to go forward: counterintuitively, the plague is purifying. But this 
going back is neither nostalgia for a historical golden age, nor a starting from scratch. It 
is, rather, a slip back to an extreme youth, to a body ontologically anterior to history’s 
divestments. It is already operative in “An Affective Athleticism” and, I will argue, 
becomes an increasingly frequent sleight in Artaud’s later writings, especially in relation
to the body.
From the Audience to the Body
Artaud’s call for a theatre which will revivify its sacred function – of affirming a 
physical and metaphysical inseparateness – necessitates a return to an unmediated 
efficacy of gesture as it affects the audience. Shortly after filing the final changes to The
Theatre and Its Double, from Mexico City, Artaud embarks on a trip to the Sierra 
Tarahumara which we will look at in more detail in subsequent Chapters. Artaud’s 
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lectures in the capital urged the Mexican students to look to the indigenous peoples of 
their country rather than to the Western “revolutions” of surrealism and communism,130 
and his trip to the Tarahumara, too, is undertaken in search of an audience unsullied by 
western values. He writes, “soon I am going to reach the Indians [...] and there I hope to
be understood”.131 Nearly a decade later, from the asylum at Rodez, Artaud recalled: “I 
did not go to Mexico on a voyage of initiation or for a pleasure trip [...] I went there to 
find a race of people who could follow me in my ideas.”132 What is at stake, here, is 
precisely that which was at stake in the search for an audience for his theatre projects of 
the late 1920s, and throughout Artaud’s subsequent endeavours:
If I am a poet or an actor it is not in order to write or recite poems but in order to
live them. When I recite a poem I don’t do it to be applauded but to feel the 
bodies of men and women, I said bodies, tremble and turn in unison with my 
own, turn [...] to the bodily and physical materialization of a total being of 
poetry.133
The western audience, for Artaud, had proved itself too sick to understand his work. But
if there is invective against the theatregoing public, it is exceeded by his demands of 
himself and his expectations of his own body. If for Copeau “for the theatre to be 
reborn, all actors must die of the plague”,134 similarly for Artaud, if the connection to 
the audience has been lost in the theatre, it is remaking the body of the actor – as an 
“affective athlete” – which will “reforge the chain [...] breath for breath”.135 In 
overcoming the cabotinagerie [ham-acting] of psychological drama and returning 
expressive force to the total body, the affective athlete will heal not only himself, but all 
the sick bodies of the world: for “[t]o arrive at the emotions through their powers 
instead of regarding them as pure extraction”, Artaud argues, “confers a mastery on an 









New Sickness; New Science
For if a science of breathing sheds light on the tenor of the soul, it can stimulate 
the soul all the more by aiding it to flourish.137
For Artaud, fundamental to the project of healing the people of the world – and himself 
– through the actions of his own body will be a systematic development of an 
understanding of “the points of the body that must be touched […] to throw the 
spectator into magical trances”, accompanied by a rigorous training based on breathing 
exercises.138 Necessarily, Artaud explains, the return to sacred theatre requires both 
knowledge of the body and new modes of embodiment of knowledge; a new “science” 
paired with rigorous training:
the theatre, poetry and science must henceforth be one […]
And it is from this precious kind of science that poetry in the theatre has long 
been estranged.
To know the points of localization in the body is, therefore to reforge the magic 
chain.
And with the hieroglyph of a breath I want to rediscover an idea of sacred 
theatre.139
As “points of the body” suggests, practices such as acupuncture are informing Artaud’s 
notion of a poeticised science of the body. Having been greatly impressed by treatments 
administered by George Soulié de Morant – the man often credited with bringing 
acupuncture to Paris (at least to its white population) – Artaud’s notebooks of this 
period testify to a continuing interest in non-Western philosophies and esoterica, not 
least the ternary of the Kabbala which underwrites the breathing techniques elaborated 
in “An Affective Athleticism” and which continued to inform Artaud’s thinking.140 What
attracts him, Artaud writes, is that in these “Eastern” philosophies, “Metaphysics is part 
137 p102 ibid.
138 p276 SW; and see pp618–20 ibid.
139 p276 ibid.
140 Artaud’s most intense study of esoterica coincided with his acupuncture treatments in the early 1930s.
See especially his notebooks from this period, e.g. pp189–195 ibid.
65
of the daily practice of life”.141
It is just such a direct contact with metaphysics which Artaud seeks for the theatre – 
which the theatre seems uniquely capable of sustaining – and the means of bringing the 
metaphysical into the mundane will be binding it in his body. What is at stake in the 
new physico-poetic science of “An Affective Athleticism” is the elaboration of practical 
means of metontological transformation of the body using only what is given: 
autopoiesis, or the body transforming itself. If, as I have argued above, one of the 
reveilles of To Have Done with the Judgement of God twelve years later is having done 
with systems by which concrete and abstract, finite and infinite are sundered, then “An 
Affective Athleticism” is war with God, the excision of transcendence; and it is this 
undertaken at the level of movement, respiratory exercises based on the Kabbala ternary
and the production of expressive force.
From Doubling to the Puppet-body
Throughout Artaud’s œuvre, there is an escalating need to determine his body’s own 
relation to the outside. From his earliest writings he reports the awful theft of his 
thought; by the time of writing “An Affective Athleticism” he is addicted to opiates and 
in constant pain. The privations to which he would be subjected whilst interred in 
asylums during the Nazi occupation – shearing, starvation, electroconvulsive “therapy” 
– were supplemented by his reports of succubi and other black-magical forces arraigned
against him. From a stated desire to heal the world through his body, Artaud becomes 
increasingly concerned with healing and protecting himself from perditions which 
threaten his very being. If the body is to transform itself, he determines, it must be by 
using even its suffering against its tormentors: the body which Artaud creates “suffers 




The world is suffered by the body in two ways, here: the outside assails the body with 
affects not of the body’s choosing; and it demands that the organism breathe to continue 
living, that it eat and shit. Two necessities oppress the body: the ontological anteriority 
of the world of affect before the organism; and the organic necessity of sustaining life 
through the outside. Through affective athleticism, the affects which assail the organism
are returned to the world as a force. In the process, expressive force is given a new 
origin – it no longer originates in the outside, but is the organism’s self-determination 
from the very base, or “fond”, of being. The reinvention of the body which Artaud 
begins in “An Affective Athleticism” slips the body out from under necessity – 
refinding the body’s integrity from an extreme youth prior to suffering. This anteriority, 
this radical youth, is the body of the sacred theatre.
The apogee of “Affective Athleticism” is not the muscular refinement of the body-
beautiful, then, but more like a puppet which poses itself: an expressive body for which 
every gesture is absolutely self-determined and which is not bound by the organic 
necessities of life and death – it breathes to express not to oxygenate.143 This autopoietic
puppet determines its own gestures and expressions, its form and force. By seeming a 
fiction – seeming to have less depth, life and psychology than the “real” world – it 
unbinds itself from this world and finds “a reality deadlier than the former and 
unsuspected by life.”144 This autopoiesis is, in one sense, made out of a body’s history – 
necessarily, for Artaud, its suffering – but it is not reducible to it. Remade as a body 
which produces expressive force but is produced by nothing but itself, the “Affective 
Athlete” is no less than “the bodily and physical materialization of a total being of 
poetry.”145 This mechanism of slipping back to a body older than suffering, into 
expressive force, will be the subject of the latter parts of our second Chapter, especially 
as it concerns addiction.
143 For references to puppets see pp215 and 442 ibid. Artaud had played a puppet in 1923 in his own 
adaptation of Jacinto Grau’s Monsieur Pygmalion and a robot in 1924 in the play credited with 




In “An Affective Athleticism” Artaud turns from describing what the theatre should 
become to developing the practices to achieve it. He asks how it is possible to make a 
true body out of the suffering, false body imposed by transcendent forms and external 
forces. The question becomes that of how to act: how to synthesise or convert external 
necessity into the capacity to act. And this is precisely the question of The Ethics in 
Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza: how does the body buffeted by affect convert it to 
affection; what is the conversion of passive to active, from anonymous sensations to 
subjectivity? (For O’Sullivan it is what establishes the parallel between Deleuze’s 
reading of Spinoza and the body without organs of Anti-Oedipus.) It would seem that 
Artaud and Deleuze’s Spinoza share the same concerns. For Deleuze, this problem of 
metabolising the outside into the inside is called, simply, Life; and the science of it is 
ethology. I will argue that it is precisely on the matters of being in the service of life, 
and of the conversion of passive to active that Artaud and Deleuze’s Spinoza are, in fact,
least compatible. I will attend to Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza at some length, here, 
before returning to Artaud.
Deleuze’s Spinoza
In reality we are never judged except by ourselves and according to our states. 
The physical-chemical test of states constitutes Ethics, as opposed to moral 
judgement.146
If, as Deleuze asserts, “[w]e do not even know what a body can do”,147 we are faced 
with at least two consequences. On the one hand, there is an imperative to experiment in
order to discover or test what a body is capable of. On the other hand, discourse about 
bodies must not proscribe that experimentation nor erect pre-existing transcendent 
forms against which bodies are measured. A science of the body – an immanent ethics 
and ethology – will replace the moral judgement which God would hold over man. 
146 p40 SPP
147 p36 Gilles Deleuze Nietzsche and Philosophy trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone, 1983)
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Indeed, Deleuze writes, the “ethical test is [...] the contrary of the deferred judgement: 
instead of restoring a moral order, it confirms, here and now, the immanent order of 
essences and their states.”148 Which is to say that, rather than judge, “the ethical test is 
content with analyzing our chemical composition”.149
Here, Deleuze is taking his lead from Spinoza. This “chemical composition” concerns 
what can be incorporated into a body, and what must be repelled. On the one hand there 
is good affect and joyful encounter (composition or adequation); on the other hand there
is bad affect and sadness (repulsion). There are encounters which increase a body’s 
capacity to act, and those which decrease it; these nutritions and poisons are joyfully 
incorporated or sadly abreacted. In his 1978 lectures on The Ethics, Deleuze adopts 
Spinoza’s terms affectus and affectio to distinguish being affected (affectus) from 
producing affects or the capacity to act (affectio).150 The conversion of affectus to 
affectio, then, resembles what Artaud calls athleticism – the conversion of a passive 
necessity to a capacity for producing expressive force. Where for Artaud the primacy of 
affectus must be rooted out such that his body “is never to be touched”,151 in Deleuze’s 
reading of Spinoza, it is an open process driven by an ongoing reciprocal relation 
between being affected and the capacity to affect. The field composed by this 
reciprocity is the plane of immanence; a “One-All” beyond any opposition of passive to 
active.152 It is both yet to be found – in that it is constructed by experimentation – and 
yet immanent, or always-already here.
Through the ongoing reciprocal relation between affectus and affectio, an organism 
experiments with its environment, composing itself by abreacting bad affects and 
148 p41 SPP
149 ibid.
150 n.p. Gilles Deleuze Lecture Transcripts on Spinoza’s Concept of Affect; Cours de Vincennes 
24.01.1978 Retrieved from <http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?
cle=14&groupe=Spinoza&langue=2> Last accessed 12.04.15
151 p303 Watchfiends
152 “One-All” is a translation of “l’Un-tout”, a phrase Deleuze and Guattari use in relation to immanence 
and the doctrine of univocity, e.g. pp35–41 WP. It is also the translation Burchill uses throughout 
Badiou Clamor of Being.
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seeking joyful encounters. These joyful encounters, in turn, fall into two categories: 
those which are impermanent, and those which pertain to essence; or, those which 
temporarily pass into the composition of the organism, and those which abide 
atemporally. As part of its composition, both of these increase the organism’s capacity to
act, but only one is essential.153 As such, “the inevitable sadnesses [...] will lose their 
exclusive or tyrannical character to the profit of notions and action”,154 as suffering must
pass.
Bad affect diminishes the capacity to act, decomposing the organism. In the ethico-
chemical “testing” of affect, Deleuze explains, “bad occurs when extensive parts that 
belong to us in a relation are caused by external factors to enter into other relations; or 
when we meet with an affection that exceeds our capacity for being affected.”155 The 
fact that an element is demonstrably alienable from an organism’s composition at any 
given time, necessarily entails that “destructions and decompositions do not concern 
either our relations in themselves or our essence.”156 Poison may “belong to us for the 
time being” but this composition does not pertain to essence.157 Nonetheless, it cannot 
be firmly known in advance what is poison. Only by testing, entering into encounters, 
can an organism raise up composition over decomposition. Experimentation, 
supplemented by the chemical wisdom of selection, is not only the path to finding 
essence and continuity with the One-All, it is also the immanent constitution of it.
If in sadness “the parts of the human body have a different relation of motion and rest to
one another”, the limit of this diminished state is suicide.158 The decomposition of the 
organism through an excess of sad encounters means that “unknown external causes so 
153 See especially, 327–351 Benedict de Spinoza On the Improvement of the Understanding, The Ethics, 
Correspondence trans. R.H.M. Elwes (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1955); and pp30–43 SPP.
154 p144 CC
155 n.p. Deleuze Lecture Transcripts on Spinoza’s Concept of Affect
156 p42 SPP
157 ibid.
158 p39 Benedict de Spinoza Collected Works, Volume 1 trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), cited p33 SPP
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affect the body that one takes on another nature, contrary to the former”.159 This is the 
body disintegrating through the terminal diminution of its power of acting, which is to 
say, the ultimate sadness is an inability to compose affectus and metabolise it as affectio.
If the triumph of bad affect, here, is equated with death, its opposite is Life, where Life 
is not merely a path through the world as given, but also a mode of constituting world: it
is both means and ends, experimentation and One-All. Deleuze elaborates their 
coextension and reciprocity under the name “ethology”.
Ethology
In the final chapter of his Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze takes up Jakob von 
Uexküll’s treatment of the life of a tick.160 For Deleuze, the world of the tick (its 
“umwelt” as von Uexküll calls it) is understood as its “affects and capacities for 
affecting and being affected”.161 Three affective relations compose this umwelt: with 
light; with the olfactory; and with the thermal. These three affects determine the 
organism’s behaviour: guided by light it “climb[s] to the top of a branch”; drawn by 
smell it “let[s] itself fall onto the mammal that passes beneath the branch”; and led by 
thermosensitivity it “seek[s] the area without fur, the warmest spot”.162 Having reached 
this spot, the tick feeds. The longevity of this three-affect world is dependent on 
transgressing neither an optimal nor a pessimal limit of ingestion of the outside: “the 
gorged tick that will die, and the tick capable of fasting for a very long time.”163 The 
result of transgressing either limit is the same: death, be it by over-gorging or by 
starvation.
Nonetheless, the way of life – the ethics – which Deleuze’s ethology advocates is not 
temperance, but to cleave as closely as possible to the optimal limit without ever 






exceeding it. The maxim implied is not “be moderate”, but “know your limits”.164 
Establishing these limits, Deleuze tells us, is, again, a matter of experimentation.
At the other end of the spectrum from morbid obesity is fasting, the capacity to wait. In 
Deleuze’s Spinozism there is no ethical value to cleaving close to this pessimal limit: a 
capacity for going without food is certainly useful, but going without per se, is best 
avoided. The capacity is solely instrumental: hunger is seen to produce nothing as and 
of itself; it merely serves the feeding, the promise of feeding. Indeed, asceticism and 
abstinence – holding the outside in abeyance – is only ever useful. The action which 
hunger makes possible is its own negation: eating, the move toward the optimal limit 
just short of gorging (“the gorged tick that will die”).165 This Spinozist ethology is 
predicated on the avoidance of excess and the capture of ascesis for implementation 
towards particular, conservative ends: the successful organism is that which nets a 
metastatic equilibrium, and Life as the capacity to act rests on the controlled 
internalisation of the outside as preservation and prolongation.
Through ethology, then, affect is arranged around the idea of survival. It is not simply a 
matter of cutting off from the world, but of the organism managing the internalisation of
the world on its (the organism’s) own terms: a question of economics; cost–benefit 
analysis. The organism must be able to move from being acted upon, to incorporating 
the outside in accordance with its will – to controlling the borders it finds itself with. 
This incorporation is the synthesis of affectus into affectio. Given Deleuze’s 
organisation of the problem around longevity, eating and the conversion of ingestion 
into action, I will call this synthesis metabolisation. Again, there is no pre-given formula
for metabolisis. Rather, for Deleuze, metabolisation of affectus to affectio is a question 
of experimentation.
164 Spinoza himself does advocate the middle way. See, for example his praise of “temperance, sobriety, 
and presence of mind in danger” p172 Benedict de Spinoza On the Improvement of the 




The approach [of ethology] is no less valid for us, for human beings, than for 
animals, because no one knows ahead of time the affects one is capable of; it is a
long affair of experimentation, requiring a lasting prudence, a Spinozan wisdom 
that implies the construction of a plane of immanence or consistency.166
If ethology is the study of an organism’s metabolisis of affectus into affectio, 
experimentation is the immanent search for affects and modes of metabolisis with the 
goal of prolonging and intensifying life – joyfully convening with the One-All. This 
unfolding, reciprocal relationship between the world and the organism – their ultimate 
conjunction – is what Deleuze and Guattari call the “best” plane of immanence.167 At 
the end of his life, Deleuze gave this “pure” plane of immanence another name: “A 
Life”.168
Speaking of Artaud, experimentation and the risk of disintegration of the capacity to act,
Deleuze had once remarked that “[i]t would be irresponsible to turn a blind eye to the 
danger of collapse in such endeavours. But they’re worth it.”169 These endeavours are 
what Deleuze and Guattari call, in Anti-Oedipus, the “Artaud experiment”.170 They place
Artaud at the “schizorevolutionary” pole of art, which they define as art’s “authentic 
modernity, which simply consists in liberating what was present in art from its 
beginnings, but was hidden”.171 The “Artaud experiment”, then, is art in all its vitality: 
“the pure process that fulfills itself, and that never ceases to reach fulfillment as it 
proceeds”; which is, equally, “art as ‘experimentation’.”172 A footnote quoting John 
166 ibid.
167 pp59–60 WP
168 pp25–33 Deleuze Pure Immanence
169 p240 Deleuze and Guattari “Capitalism and Schizophrenia” in Deleuze Desert Islands
170 p370 AO
171 p371 ibid.
172 ibid. It is this kind of “pure process” which, as we will see in the third Chapter of this thesis, informs 
Deleuze’s geophilosophy, bringing it close to Artaud’s lucid materialism. My argument in this 
Chapter is that this experimental ethology and its correlative ontology are not compatible with 
Artaud’s ideas on the body against an originary outside. Artaud’s argument is, moreover, articulated 
in works and terms which Deleuze appropriates to illustrate his own position.
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Cage – who had been introduced to Artaud’s work as early as 1952 by Pierre Boulez173 –
reiterates an important proviso: “The word experimental is apt, providing it is 
understood not as descriptive of an act to be later judged in terms of success and failure,
but simply as of an act the outcome of which is unknown”.174 Experimentation, here – as
Life – designates an open process for which neither means nor ends are predetermined.
As we shall see in the next Part of the Chapter, this model of experimentation must, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, equally be applied to thought. We shall use, here, a few of the 
details of the argument which will be laid out in more detail in that discussion of 
“idiocy”. In What is Philosophy? it is, again, preset goals which must be done away 
with: Deleuze and Guattari reject the Enlightenment “image of thought” which they 
argue is merely a method of “following tracks”.175 Against such a pre-ordained path for 
thought would be an experimentation which “lacks the compass” to orient itself toward 
Truth and Virtue.176 Again, experimental productivity is associated with Artaud:
as Kleist or Artaud suggests, thought as such begins to exhibit snarls, squeals, 
stammers; it talks in tongues and screams, which leads it to create, or try to. If 
thought searches, it is less in the manner of someone who possesses a method 
than that of a dog that seems to be making uncoordinated leaps.177
Experimentation, then, derailed from the Enlightenment tracks to knowledge and fully 
engaged in this “idiocy”, risks a decoherence which is the conceptual correlate of 
affective sadness. Indeed, idiocy, for Deleuze and Guattari “involves much suffering 
without glory”.178 Thought, it would seem, courts collapse in a way “Life” is reluctant 
to.
Whilst the experimental aspect of the thought of the idiot is a problem which Deleuze 
173 See p158 Hayman Artaud and After






approaches largely through readings of Nietzsche, it is Artaud who explicitly straddles 
the problem of affective and conceptual breakdown: the idiot who suffers. Even in 
Artaud’s earliest writings, the collapse of thought manifests as suffering in the body. 
Indeed, this is precisely Artaud’s suffering: thought leaping about in him without his 
volition, just as anonymous affect traverses the untrained body like maggots under the 
skin. But this suffering idiot-body would seem to be precisely what Deleuze raises up in
the name of “Life”: if “[t]here is no longer a form, but only relations of velocity 
between infinitesimal particles of an unformed material”179; and if, as such, “[t]here is 
no longer a subject, but only individuating affective states of an anonymous force”,180 
then “Life” describes precisely what Artaud experiences as suffering; as the suffering 
body that “Affective Athleticism” would deliver him from.
An Artaudian Ethology?
It is certainly true that this experimental ethology restores the question of composition 
to the composed, to the body and to life – and this would seem to be consistent with 
Artaud’s goals of having done with judgement. But in finding “pure immanence”, 
Deleuze’s Ethics delivers the body to a different outside which composes the body and 
directs its experiments – and thus maintains the body as a posterior effect of a vertiginal 
anteriority. Far from beginning an aleatory process through which essence might be 
reached, affectus for Artaud is nothing but an unstinting assault at the level of the nerves
and a violation of the proper boundlessness of the body: “this unframed hole, / that life 
wanted to frame.”181
As Maurice Blanchot observed, the fullness of life and the nostalgic (if still violent) 
urge to recuperate a lost power of composition might once have been Artaud’s concern, 





Jacques Rivière of 1923–4. Subsequently, Blanchot argues,
by a sure and painful development, he [Artaud] comes to reverse the polarity of 
the impulse [to restorative healing] and to place dispossession first, not the 
‘immediate totality’ of which this dispossession seemed at first the simple lack. 
What is prime is not the fullness of being; what is prime is [...] erosion and 
destruction, intermittance and gnawing privation: being is not being, it is the 
lack of being, a living lack that makes life incomplete, fugitive, and 
inexpressible, except by the cry of a fierce abstinence.182
This “fierce abstinence” – a cry we will hear, and try to heed again throughout this 
thesis – is, I would argue, very different from the kind of abstinence Deleuze describes 
for his Spinozist tick. For the tick, abstinence functions only as a promise toward its 
own negation: the patient wait for the outside to provide. Abstinence has no value in 
itself, there – it only awaits its own effacement. This is not at all the ferocity of which 
Blanchot speaks – the ferocity which I would call Artaud’s weaponisation of suffering. 
Artaud does not bravely suffer, all the while consoled by an eternally-deferred promise 
of redemption. Rather, he begins to develop means of metabolising external necessity 
into an absolute self-determination or autopoiesis which will never again be subjected to
judgement or the needs of its organs – needs which are, for Artaud, the enforcement 
from within his body of an extrinsic-anterior transcendent determination, or cruelty; the 
organs, too, as the Judgement of God.
As Blanchot observed, the fullness of being is not an originary given which has been 
taken from Artaud. Rather, it is something which must be constructed at the very origin 
of his being. It is a means of abreacting not only bad affect but of evading any external 
cause whatsoever – of refusing that false choice tout court between “the infinite 
outside” and “the infinitesimal inside”.183 On his body, Artaud insists, there must be no 
“generative slime”, no trace of the outside as a progenital cause.184 Through the refusal 
182 p38 Maurice Blanchot “Artaud” in The Book to Come trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford, CA: 




of an origin external to itself, this metaphysical, muscular, affective body is to be both 
constructed and found “always-already” there beneath the suffering body. This suffering
body is a false body, but it nonetheless remains the only resource with which to build 
the true body – there is only cruel affectus from which to execute the athletic slip to 
pure anteriority.
Of course, Spinoza, too, condemns the false body, but the names these two give this 
false partitioning are quite opposed: for Artaud the false body is that which labours 
under the dogmatic image of “life” which “want[s] to frame” it185; for Spinoza it is 
sadness, poison, suicide. The opposition is absolutely crucial and insuperable: beneath 
the false body Artaud finds himself, Antonin Artaud; whereas Spinoza finds that 
essential part of himself which partakes of God as the always-already of the body, as 
eternal, as One-All – what Deleuze calls “pure immanence”, or “A Life”.
It is precisely the problem of the construction and discovery of the “true” body which 
Deleuze and Guattari tackle in the sixth Plateau of A Thousand Plateaus186 – and thus it 
is here that the explicit conflation of Artaud and Spinoza is at its most pronounced.
Abreacting the False Body; Or, How Do You Make Yourself a Body Without 
Organs?
As we have seen, experimentation is not central to the discussion of the body without 
organs in Anti-Oedipus. By the time of A Thousand Plateaus, though, the BwO (as it is 
now denoted) is a properly ethical question, and a whole chapter is given to exploring 
its experimental construction. Whilst the BwO accompanies every body as its “own 
milieu of experimentation”,187 the watchwords are care, wisdom and dosing. The motive





“botched”.188 For every successful or “full” BwO, there is myriad botchings, which fall 
into two categories: botching “at the level of constitution” and botching “at the level of 
what passes or does not pass across it”.189 The difference between a “full” BwO and 
botched BwOs correlates to the true/false body problem which both Artaud and Spinoza
explore.
The three BwOs – two false or “botched”, one true or “full” – relate to the three types of
deterritorialisation Deleuze and Guattari have described in an earlier Plateau:
the first type is relative, proper to the strata, and culminates in signifiance; the 
second is absolute, but still negative and stratic, and appears in subjectification 
[...]; finally, there is the possibility of a positive absolute deterritorialization on 
the plane of consistency.190
For Deleuze and Guattari “Artaud was constantly grappling with” this “three-body 
problem”.191 From it, two questions arise: “How can we tell the three Bodies apart?” and
“How can we fabricate a BwO for ourselves without its being the cancerous BwO of a 
fascist inside us, or the empty BwO of a drug addict”?192 The two kinds of botching 
infer two tests for a BwO: “(1) What type is it, how is it fabricated, by what procedures 
and means (predetermining what will come to pass)? (2) What are its modes, what 
comes to pass, and with what variants and what surprises”?193 These are questions of 
composition, which is to say, ethological questions. Or, put another way, questions of 
the metabolisation of affectus to affectio, and of orientation toward experimentation.
The two failures, kinds of botching of the BwO, in a sense have the same result of 
interrupting proper reciprocity with the plane of immanence: either they fail to 








affected as if over-specialising it. Deleuze and Guattari seek to excavate an 
experimental vitality from potentially destructive “botching” behaviours, so that 
breakthroughs need not give over to breakdowns and there will be no suffering without 
glory. Inevitably, this experimentation advances through questioning: “There is a fascist 
use of drugs, or a suicidal use, but is there also a possible use that would be in 
conformity with the plane of consistency?”194 Or, again, “[c]ould what the drug user or 
masochist obtains also be obtained in a different fashion in the conditions of the plane, 
so it would even be possible to use drugs without using drugs, to get soused on pure 
water [...]?”195 What is at stake, here, is discovering if and how a false body can provide 
means for constructing a true body or full BwO. But there is a vitalist imperative 
shaping these experiment-questions: how can one use historically established 
technologies of anomalous encounter without immediate or long-term risk to organic 
survival? Or, how can we exploit these technologies of the self without the “tyrannical 
character”196 of poisonous affect winning out over the accrual of essence and 
communing with the One-All which is experimentation’s proper reward?
Artaud’s Body
Again, Deleuze’s argument would put Artaud and Spinoza in agreement. Deleuze’s 
reading of Spinozan ethology traces an aleatory emergence from passive affectus to an 
“essence” – and we could be forgiven for believing that it is just such a trajectory which 
Artaud is calling for in his own formulation of the body without organs from 1947:
When you have given him a body without organs, 
then you will have delivered him from all his automatisms and restored 
him to his true liberty197






– will be “to dance inside out”.198 And, he goes on, “that inside out will be his true side 
out.”199 But far from finding the absolute, positive deterritorialisation onto Life which 
Deleuze’s Spinozist formulation of the BwO seems to seek – which is to say, its 
continuity on and as “THE” plane of immanence200 – we find that Artaud’s own 
programme is more macabre. He describes a cruel process of removal or decomposition,
rather than joyful encounter: man must
undergo once more but for the last time an autopsy
in order to remake his anatomy. [...]
We must decide to strip him in order to scratch out this animalcule 
which makes him itch to death.201
This remade body which Artaud writes of will not be bound to what is called life – 
indeed, it is already on the dissection table. Where Deleuze follows Spinoza in drawing 
a distinction between good and bad affect, for Artaud both composition and 
decomposition – both joy and sadness – conspire to deliver the true body to the 
anteriority of an always-malicious outside. Affectus of any kind is, for Artaud, “the 
perpetually guarded poet”,202 suffering and the theft of his body from himself, just as we
shall shortly see thinking was the theft of his thought.203 Death and Life, then, as the 
limits of the two kinds of affective encounter (sadness or joy) are, for Artaud, one and 
the same. If Deleuze’s Spinozist ontology of immanence is one of joyful encounter, 
accumulation and Life, Artaud insists instead on the primacy of his body against Life or 
death as the two limits of encounter with the outside. The body, here – undergoing its 
autopsy to be anatomically remade – is not an organism at the crossroads between life 
and death, but is an ontological substance prior to the opposition life/death – older than 
their disjunction and the God or ethologist who sunders them. The body, for Artaud – 
the body of Artaud – will aggressively unbind the body from any economy of organic 
198 ibid.
199 ibid.
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201 p307 Watchfiends
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survival, indeed from any anterior, imposed necessity. One of the earliest elaborations of
this is “An Affective Athleticism”, which elaborates the remarkable metaphysics of 
overcoming finitude through a system of bodily and respiratory exercises and unilateral 
expression.
Binding Death in the Body
As early as 1927 Artaud is finding himself on the other side of life: “Life no longer 
exists, life does not inspire or accompany the things I think. I say LIFE. I did not say the
colourings of life. I mean real life […] this nucleus. I feel the nucleus inside me is 
dead.”204 And twenty years later he recalls “looking carefully at this life I remember 
being dead in it really and corporeally at least 3 times, once in Marseilles, once in 
Lyons, once in Mexico and once at the Rodez asylum in the coma of electroshock.”205 
The striking quality of these deaths is that “in reality one never leaves one’s body.”206 In 
his body, for Artaud, contradiction is overcome. In his body, “yes and no, black and 
white, true and false, although contradictory in themselves have melted into one man’s 
style, that of this poor Mr. Antonin Artaud.”207 This binding of death and life in his body
is articulated most clearly in the late poem-cycle Artaud le Mômo.208 “Mômo” is 
Marseillaise slang for “idiot”, but it also invokes “momie” – mummy, as in the 
undead.209 The poem, then, animates an undead figure which goes before all 
contradiction. Artaud le Mômo, the body of Artaud, is unbound from the necessities of 
Life (and likewise of thought, as we shall see in the next Part of this Chapter). In the 
same way as we saw with the autopoietic puppet of “An Affective Athleticism”, the 
organic necessity of breathing holds no sway over the undead body. External necessity, 
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It is noteworthy that Deleuze himself makes a connection between Artaud and the 
undead in Cinema II, wherein a “Mummy” (“this dismantled, paralysed, petrified, 
frozen instance”210) is unearthed between the abstract and the figurative – between the 
formalisation of thought and psychology. It is quite apposite that Deleuze is drawn to 
Artaud at this juncture in his investigation of cinema as the production of movement, for
Artaud’s project is heavily invested in the restoration of thought to himself through 
movement, that is, through gesture, the actions of the body. Deleuze is discussing the 
shock of cinema, here, its “nooshock” or the force it delivers to the viewing body.211 As 
Artaud had explained, the cinema, no less than the theatre, must repel psychological 
drama, preferring “the very substance of our vision and not […] psychological 
circumlocutions of a discursive nature which are merely the visual equivalent of a 
text”.212 Deleuze bemoans the brevity for which Artaud “believed” in the cinema, but 
many of Artaud’s texts prefigure Deleuze’s warning that the force of shock might “be 
confused, in bad cinema, with the figurative violence of the represented instead of 
achieving that other violence of a movement-image developing its vibrations in a 
moving sequence which embeds itself within us.”213 As Artaud had explained, “cruelty 
is not synonymous with bloodshed [...] Practising cruelty involves a higher 
determination.”214 Most importantly, “cruelty is very lucid”.215
The bodily force of Artaud le Mômo – older than even the separation of life and death – 
sits at the end of the series which includes the cinema mummies, the affective athlete 
and the body without organs. What all these figures designate is the return to a true body
prior to all contradiction which produces pure expression. At the time of writing “An 
Affective Athleticism”, it seemed to Artaud that what blocked him from accessing this 








body was mimesis and psychological theatre. In later years, these furtive forces take on 
an occult character, and in response the breathing techniques take on a magical force. It 
is no longer the theatre which will be healed, but the body which must be protected 
from black magic: in late 1945, interred in the asylum at Rodez, he writes of struggling 
“against the evil spirits and the demons with the breathing system which I have invented
and which I mentioned briefly in ‘Affective Athleticism’”.216 This struggle is 
undertaken, on one level, by reciting the poetry of Baudelaire, Poe or Nerval “to a tone 
of rhythmic and incantatory psalmody”.217 And those names are not by-words for poetic 
œuvres; they invoke bodies: “What was Baudelaire, / what were Poe, Nietzsche, Gérard 
de Nerval? / BODIES”.218 Through his breathing techniques, Artaud mobilises these 
bodies in his defence. The counterattack which Artaud rallies them to must strike at the 
very metaphysical foundations of suffering and its occult agents:
These spirits do not want to be cast out because my body is good, because my 
pain is good for them, and because it is while I am suffering from poison, from 
comas, from bad food, and from the deprivation of opium that the beings of evil 
spirits seize my forces in the cadaver which I am, the walking cadaver that has 
been wandering through life like a living dead man.219
With his breathing exercises Artaud not only masters breathing, but refinds a body 
which evades the organic necessity of respiration: the “living dead man” is the state of 
perdition but also the beginnings of a weaponisation of the body at a metaphysical level;
its athleticism. Poetry, for Artaud, is not the mere recitation of words, it is the inflection 
of breath through which he makes contact with other bodies. In making this contact and 
accessing his own body – the true, unsuffering body – his cadaver is weaponised as the 
idiot-mummy, the body of Artaud le Mômo: a figure not bound by life any more than its 
thought is bound to the pursuit of Truth.






survival. As Artaud writes, his body is not at all constructed by “accidents and hazards 
in the unity of an entire body”.220 Such an ethology is, in fact, no more than another 
attack on his true body:





thus creating a whole order of hidden functions which are outside
the realm of the
deliberative will;
the will that determines itself at each instant.221
Artaud is insistent that his body is nonetheless not a cut-off nor fixed, molar thing. 
Rather, he explains, “I want to be sempiternal, that is, a self that moves and creates itself
at every instant, and not eternal, that is, having an absolute self which governs me 
always from the height of its eternity”.222 It is not change which he is against, it is 
change caused by anything outside of his body – which would include anonymous 
affections or causes historically or ontologically “older” than his body. There can be no 
form or force prior to Artaud’s body: no ahistorical abstractions and no history. In 
agreement with Deleuze’s Spinoza, transcendence must be had done with, but the 
swelling sea of anonymous affections which the latter bob on and weave is, for Artaud, 
no less suffering than the “doubles of the past, entitled eternity”.223
Genitality
As Alpha and Omega – the source and destination – and as that in whose image man is 
made, the rejection of God is also, for Artaud, the refusal of having parents, having 






too, is double-sided, as the ontological priority of parents as antecedent condition not 
only produces the body, it also operates with its organs – the sex organs, and correlate 
glands and hormones, determine the orientation, the destiny of the body as lying outside
of itself. The body in this sense, for Artaud, would be a near pointless linking point 
between its parents and its children, a void without substance which produces only 
babies and grandparents. As such, the body without organs had done with the judgement
of God rejects both being itself emergent and being innately oriented toward 
(reproductive) goals outside of itself (which would affirm its finitude). To have been 
gestated is for the body to be divested from itself, such that Artaud circularly equates the
maternal womb with a masturbating machine, stealing his seminal fluid: “masturbated 
nine months by the membrane, that shining membrane that devours without teeth”.224 
Artaud refuses this as vehemently as he refuses God, that other name of ontological 
anteriority: “I was born otherwise, out of my works and not out of a mother”,225 just as 
he “was born only out of my own pain” turned against the tormentors.226 In both cases, 
Artaud is wresting his body from the imposed finite circumstances he finds himself in, 
even if this entails athletics on a metaphysical scale, to slip in to his true body older than
any external moment of conception. We will return to these ideas of innateness, 
genitality and war with transcendence toward the end of this Chapter, when discussing 
the inseparate figure of the father-mother or “papamummy”, especially as it features in 
Artaud le Mômo.
Athleticism as Pluperfect Retroaction and Paranoiac Autopoiesis
Artaud’s athleticism does not seek a higher continuity with the world through the 
abreaction of poison and adequate aggregation of essence. Rather, all the world, all 
affect which falls on the body, is poison, is a noxious force which would determine that 





might be wielded by his body as expressive force. The repetition of an affect – the 
doubling of an affective state through the modulation of breath – is the means of 
claiming that force as a product of the body rather than vice versa. Put another way, 
athleticism is the wholesale recasting of all affectus as affectio. As such, athleticism 
already involves what I suggest would later become the primary and most characteristic 
Artaudian cosmological proposition: if the body is an effect of some older form or 
force, then the body is suffering; and, as such, the body must reinstantiate itself prior to 
all historical cause which it is apparently a consequence of. Having come about (into 
suffering), the body must retroactively become the cause of itself – and this means 
ultimately finding and founding the body at its “extreme youth”, prior not only to its 
biography, but to History and to God, be He transcendent or the univocal-immanent 
“realm of heterogenetic encounter”.227 So, quite unlike Spinoza, there is no foundational
reciprocity, for Artaud between affectus and affectio. On the contrary, the determination 
of the capacity to produce affect is wrested away from the outside by Artaud: expressive
force is found as an ontological antecedent, an extreme youth which is, again, 
historically consequent to affectus but metaphysically prior.
As I have shown, this field of reciprocity between affectus and affectio is what Deleuze 
calls a plane of immanence, or “Life”. It is around this word “Life” that the 
dissimilarities between Artaud’s “Affective Athleticism” and the Deleuzo-Spinozist 
metabolisis of affectus to affectio are most pronounced. Artaud, especially in his late 
poem-cycle Artaud le Mômo, slips himself before organic life to bind life and death in 
his body. And this shift from a body determined (by parents, God, affectus) to a self-
determining or autopoietic body is not an aleatory one. I would call this slip back to 
before causation: “pluperfection”. The past perfect tense of affectus is pre-empted by 
the pluperfect tense of the body’s sempiternal will; which is to say, the always-already-
having-been of Artaud le Mômo. The aleatory passive constitution of the body which 
Spinoza and Deleuze lay out is a seamless series of syntheses, productions and 
227 p171 O’Sullivan On the Production of Subjectivity
86
“chemical tests”. At the “end” of this becoming one finds what has always been there: 
essence and, ultimately, God as One-All or pure immanence. What Artaud makes from 
the “end” of this sequence is an ontological priority older than historical time; older than
any God in whose image a body might be formed; unbound by the organic necessities of
life; unthreatened by the finitude of death; and never delivered to the One-All. Dead 
God will never have been.
Calling on a philosopher who is now much more widely known, Deleuze and Guattari 
observe in a footnote to What is Philosophy? that
François Laruelle is engaged in one of the most interesting undertakings of 
contemporary philosophy. He invokes a One-All that he qualifies as 
‘nonphilosophical’ and, oddly, as ‘scientific,’ on which the ‘philosophical 
decision’ takes root. This One-All seems to be close to Spinoza.228
If, as I have been arguing, Artaud’s body destroys affectus or historical causation – if he,
rather, slips in before causation such that all which had seemed to make up the body is 
in fact its progeny – then athleticism is not only retroaction but a profoundly embodied 
science. To borrow Laruelle’s notion of the “non-” as a designation of ontological 
priority, or the “extreme youth” of something: in raising up an Artaudian ontology 
against a Deleuzo-Spinozist one, we might then rewrite affectio as non-affectus; 
expression as non-feeling; determination as non-passivity; or the idiot-undead body of 
Artaud le Mômo as non-suffering.
Suffering and Poetry
If the world as it is given is unbearable cruelty for Artaud, it is because it is constantly 
causing suffering – from the cellular level to the metaphysical. It is only the one who 
can mobilise and weaponise this state of affairs – without seeking consolations – who 
can refind the autopoietic body with its deliberative will directing its every moment and 
228 p220n.5 WP
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every molecule. This is art’s sacred dimension, for Artaud – and it is arrived at neither 
through beatitude nor the grace of inspiration carried on the muses’ breath, but through 
physical and metaphysical suffering. Neither body nor art are made by digesting the 
anaemic offerings from the outside and delivering back “pigshit”.229 For Artaud, they are
made by feeling intensely all the uninvited suffering, and not resting until it has been 
evaded. For “no one has ever written, painted, sculpted, modeled, built or invented 
except literally to get out of hell.”230
The poetry which Artaud can approve of and mobilise is precisely that which goes “to 
the point of poisoning”.231 Poetry is an act which brings the poet “painfully close to 
losing his soul”.232 This poetry is never the “work of a coward who [is] not willing to 
suffer his work before writing it”; not “the work of a man who ate well”.233 These are 
“the poems of the starving, the sick, the outcast, the poisoned”; poetry “which produces 
its verses out of its malady, being, and does not let you forget it.”234 Ultimately, for 
Artaud, “a poem made of the superfluities of existence has always done more than bore 
me, it exasperates me. – I do not like luxury feelings, I do not like poems of 
nourishment but poems of hunger”.235 This is not the hunger of Deleuze’s Spinozist tick,
the hunger that can wait for food. This is hunger as privation and suffering recast or 
weaponised as a metaphysical assault on both transcendent forms and vitalist 
hydraulics. Poems to be read aloud, of course, breathed out as expressive force, as 
“incantatory psalmody”, to animate the undead bodies of certain poets.236
As we have seen, the body without organs which Deleuze delivers to Spinoza is made to
affirm Life: “the inevitable sadnesses [...] will lose their exclusive or tyrannical 
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character to the profit of notions and action.”237 In Artaud’s case, these sadnesses take on
a metaphysical weight such that it is through necessity, from under its cruelty and the 
pounding power of cruel determination that an autopoietic body, the true body of 
Artaud’s body without organs, can produce itself with that “fiery abstinence” which 
Blanchot found in Artaud.238
As I have alluded to above, Artaud’s relation to the anterior-outside at the level of affect 
is wrongly Spinozised in Deleuze and Guattari’s work. But all are agreed that affect and 
concept, body and thought, must be co-articulated. It is to thought that we will now turn,
before concluding this Chapter by contrasting Deleuzo-Guattarian immanence to 
Artaud’s body, in particular the idiot-undead body of Artaud le Mômo.
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If, as I am arguing, Artaud le Mômo is to be understood as a body of immanence which 
is incommensurable with Deleuze and Guattari’s Spinozist diagram of finite–infinite 
relation, the two are differentiated on the axes of concept and affect, which is to say, not
only on the milieu of death-life (Mômo as momie), but also on that of thought-unthought
(Mômo as Marseillaise idiot). It is to this latter that we will now turn.
There is, as Frida Beckman details in her essay “The Idiocy of the Event”,239 a 
reconfiguration of the conceptual persona of the idiot between Deleuze’s Difference and
Repetition and his final book with Guattari, What is Philosophy? This shift could be 
cursorily summarised as a shift from a philosophical idiocy to a nonphilosophical one; 
the latter associated primarily with literature but extending its disturbances well beyond.
Equally, it could be summarised as the shift from idiocy as naturalisation of thought to 
idiocy as the denaturalisation of (or alienation from) thought.
The philosophical idiot, for Deleuze (and later, for Deleuze and Guattari), is most 
clearly evident in Descartes, for whom the capacity to think is “self-evident”.240 Indeed, 
for Deleuze and Guattari, the “conceptual persona” which Descartes takes on within the 
Meditations “should have signed [himself] ‘the idiot’, just as Nietzsche signed himself 
‘the Antichrist’ or ‘Dionysus crucified’.”241 There is an initial bilaterality to this idiocy 
which engenders what Deleuze calls the “dogmatic image of thought.”242 On the one 
hand, there is the universal arrogation to man of the capacity to think; that is, there is 
239 Frida Beckman “The Idiocy of the Event: Between Antonin Artaud, Kathy Acker and Gilles 
Deleuze”, in Deleuze Studies Vol.3, Issue 1 (June 2009), 54–72
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such a thing as common sense, and it is given as a “natural” and “pure element” in us.243
Concomitantly, there is the allying of thinking with a search for truth, such that thought 
“formally possesses” and “materially wants” the true.244 Deleuze goes on to identify a 
third naturalisation, common to Plato, Descartes and Kant, in which the capacity to 
recognise the True is granted to the thinker – this last being that which was condemned 
by Nietzsche for enshrining the false identity between the Good and the True as 
advanced by Platonism and Christianity. These three naturalisations together constitute 
the philosophical idiot of Difference and Repetition. Moreover, “[t]he supposed three 
levels – a naturally upright thought, an in principle natural common sense, and a 
transcendental model of recognition – can constitute only an ideal orthodoxy”, and as a 
result “[p]hilosophy is left without means to realise its project of breaking with doxa.”245
The stakes of such an idiocy then are high, for this is a toothless thought incapable of 
apprehending its own conditions, an enslaved idiot who “harms no one”, nor, indeed, 
harms any thing (hegemony of State, Church, etc.).246 Clearly, in this conceptual persona
we can recognise not at all the man of whom Louis Aragon announced: “Antonin Artaud
is the man who attacked the ocean... He will have respect for nothing – not your 
schools, your lives, or your most secret thoughts.”247
The later form which the idiot takes is presaged – and even, perhaps, best expressed – in
Difference and Repetition, though it will only be from the vantage point of What is 
Philosophy? that we can fully grasp the import of Deleuze’s words in the earlier book:
At the risk of playing the idiot, do so in the Russian manner: that of an 
underground man who recognises himself no more in the subjective 
presuppositions of a natural capacity for thought than in the objective 
presuppositions of a culture of the times, and lacks the compass with which to 
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That completed circle, which the Russian idiot does not make, is the one which would 
enshrine the syllogism that “[i]t is because everybody naturally thinks that everybody is 
supposed to know implicitly what it means to think”249; the circle, then, as cipher of the 
dogmatic image of thought.250 The dangers are clear: to naturalise thought and to 
prescribe its orientation and goal unweaves both thought and thinker from pure 
immanence, and shoots out legion transcendences – transcendent Subject, transcendent 
Idea, transcendent Truth – sundering each from the others and from the plane.
New Idiot
The conceptual persona of the idiot as it is given in What is Philosophy? twenty-three 
years later has become a more positive figure, an unambivalently affirmable one. It has 
completed the necessary shift from implicit (in the Cartesian model) to explicit and – 
perhaps not coincidentally – from philosophy to literature. It no longer harbours any 
hint of denigration, which cannot necessarily be said of the Difference and Repetition 
usage. The literary sources given are Tolstoy and, especially, Dostoevsky,251 such that 
the remade persona can be named the “Slavic” or “Russian” idiot.252 As Deleuze and 
Guattari explain, the “old idiot wanted, by himself, to account for what was or was not 
insistence on the timeliness of the New York exhibition of his works on paper in 1996: “As they are 
distinctive phenomena of our time, it appeared urgent to show them to an American audience before 
this century comes to a close.” p7 Margit Rowell “Preface” in ed. Rowell Works on Paper
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comprehensible, what was or was not rational, what was lost or saved; but the new idiot 
wants the lost, the incomprehensible, and the absurd to be restored to him.”253 The “new 
idiot”, then, is no longer a “thinker”, no longer naturally invested with the capacity to 
think, no longer steeled by doubt, directed toward rectitude, nor innately able to 
recognise Truth. Rather, this idiot can raise “the absurd [to] the highest power of 
thought”; he has found thought’s capacity “to create”, which Nietzsche especially 
insisted upon.254 Thought appears, through the Russian idiot, as an impersonal event 
rather than a natural endowment upon an individual; it precedes the thinker rather than 
emerging from his natural and self-evident capacity to think; rather, it is prepersonal, or,
put another way, the fount of the force of thought is not proper to the thinker. As we 
have already seen, there is an Artaudian root to Deleuze’s invoking the “cataleptic 
thinker or ‘mummy’ who discovers in thought an inability to think”.255 This idiot is 
never more redolent of Artaud and his own figure of idiocy, Artaud le Mômo, than when
Deleuze and Guattari note that “[t]he new idiot will never accept the truths of 
History”256; the new idiot who will not “be accountable to reason” but “wants account to
be taken of ‘every victim of History’.”257 This is a thought, then, which does not 
reinscribe the image of thought (thought as form, judgement; the circle of the Good and 
True), but finds the forceful fount of thought older than the thinker. This 
denaturalisation of thought’s propriety and orientation from the Subject is the 
conceptual persona of the idiot as Deleuze finds it in Dostoevsky and Artaud.
Good Mourning?
For her part, Frida Beckman attributes a certain recidivism to Artaud’s idiocy. The arc of
her essay – toward asserting a novel and superior form of idiocy proper to Kathy Acker 
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– is strategically served by diminishing Artaud, but the central reason, I would suggest, 
that she finds a lamentable nostalgia for thought in Artaud’s work, is that she is referring
only to the young Artaud, the one who died before Artaud le Mômo gave birth to 
himself. Beckman’s reading of Artaud’s idiocy relies on the unearthing of a Cartesian 
form of idiocy beneath the Russian one which Deleuze and Guattari associate him with, 
and on finding even in the Russian idiot tout court a falling back on to the earlier 
persona. Just as Deleuze does in Difference and Repetition (where he, nonetheless finds 
him praiseworthy), Beckman turns to some of the very earliest of Artaud’s writings, the 
correspondence with Jacques Rivière, then editor of the journal Nouvelle Revue 
Française, of 1923–4 (a role Rivière has taken on from no less than Jacques Copeau 
when the latter chose to concentrate on his theatre school).258 For Deleuze, these letters 
show Artaud unearthing a problem of thought which lies prior to philosophy; a problem 
which Cartesian idiocy does not turn to face, and which the new idiot – Artaud or 
Dostoevsky – exposes the mechanics of. If in A Thousand Plateaus “the BwO is never 
yours or mine. It is always a body”,259 in the Rivière correspondence, Deleuze again 
finds Artaud in contact with something beyond himself at the level of thought, an 
anterior infinite. Here, for Deleuze, Artaud is going beyond his own case to a generic 
problem concerning thought as an impersonal event. He argues that, in the 
correspondence,
Artaud does not simply talk about his own ‘case’, but already in his youthful 
letters shows an awareness that his case brings him into contact with a 
generalised thought process which can no longer be covered by the reassuring 
dogmatic image [of thought] but which, on the contrary, amounts to the 
complete destruction of that image.260
This represents, for Deleuze, no less than Artaud making a break toward the overdue 
revolution which thought needs: away from being inscribed within philosophy’s 
thought-as-circle, toward direct contact with the transcendental outside or the 
258 See esp. ppxvi–xvii Justin O’Brien “Introduction” in ed. Justin O’Brien NRF: The Most Significant 




impersonal creative fount of a thought prior to subjectivity; that is, the ontologically 
anterior infinite. If for Deleuze this is the revolutionary element of Artaudian idiocy – as
Deleuze puts it in Difference and Repetition, the “theory of thought is like painting: it 
needs that revolution which took art from representation to abstraction. This is the aim 
of a theory of thought without image”261 – I will argue that it is equally evident from 
these early writings that Artaud experiences this impersonality of thought not as 
revolutionary, but as suffering. Once again, it seems, in raising up Artaud as 
revolutionary, Deleuze is both missing Artaud’s most revolutionary strategies, and is 
reinscribing his suffering. As I will argue at the end of this Chapter, Artaud’s insights 
are not only those which concern how the world might work – a diagnostic which sees 
some broad agreement, I think, between Deleuze and Artaud – we must also look to 
Artaud’s development, especially in later life, of techniques to fight against that 
suffering, his strategies to metabolise revolution out of suffering; in order to do so, we 
must not label that suffering as in itself “revolutionary”. Where Artaud and Deleuze 
may agree on ontology, then, Deleuze reinscribes Artaud’s suffering, and pays less 
attention, if any, to his metontology, the techniques and strategies of bodily war against 
that same ontology – which, as I will argue in the third Chapter, culminate in his 
notebooks. But for now, we will turn our attention back to the correspondence with 
Rivière.
The Correspondence with Jacques Rivière, 1923–4
Introducing the proposed first volume of his Œuvres Complètes (Collected Works) in 
1946, Artaud explains that whilst “by rights the text of my first published book, ‘The 
Heavens at Backgammon’, should appear below” he quickly realised that he “would 
rather it did not.”262 Artaud found those poems of 1922, first published as a pamphlet by 
Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler,263 to be rather affected, written to please the tastes of the 
261 p276 ibid.
262 p17 CWI The poems appear as an appendix pp240–6 ibid.
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literary journals, and “not typical of me at all”.264 It was, of course, to the most eminent, 
indeed “sacrosanct”,265 of those journals that Artaud sent his next poems. On the first 
day of May 1923 a short letter refusing the poems for inclusion in the Nouvelle Revue 
Française (NRF) was sent by the journal’s editor himself, Jacques Rivière. Yet the 
poems had struck Rivière. What began as a stock rejection of the submitted poems 
continues, “[h]owever, I found them sufficiently interesting to want to make the 
acquaintance of their author [...] I would be happy to see you.”266 This was the first of a 
series of letters and meetings which would see Artaud raise his understanding of his 
own work, toward his first full articulations of problems concerning the theft of his 
thought which would obsess him through his life; a series of letters which would 
culminate in their publication – the publication of the letters, not the poems to which 
they consistently refer – in the pages of the NRF. This would be shortly followed by 
Rivière’s death in 1925, and the accession to the journal’s editorship by Rivière’s then 
secretary Jean Paulhan.267
Artaud’s first letter to Rivière sets the tone for all that follow. It is intense, cogent, 
unremitting. His letters’ topic is the flight of thought from himself, and his poems’ 
emergence from both the occasional moments of clarity he can seize and the more 
frequent absence of such clarity. What is at stake is not what must be done toward the 
perfection of the poems – not tutelage in understanding what the poems lack – but the 
forceful insistence that, for all the openly-admitted inadequacies of these “defective 
forms”268 as literature, the poems can be nothing other than what they are. The letters, 
and André Masson. For more on the singular life and achievements of Kahnweiler, see Pierre 
Assouline An Artful Life: A Biography of D. H. Kahnweiler 1884–1979, trans. Charles Ruas (New 
York, NY: Grove Weidenfeld, 1990)
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266 Jacques Rivière to Antonin Artaud p27 ibid.
267 Interestingly, Artaud claims that Paulhan also wrote to him about the submitted poems in 1923, 
seemingly distancing himself from Rivière’s rejection of them: “This is the text of the letter I 
received about September 1923 from Jean Paulhan [...]: ‘Dear Sir, Enclosed please find your poems 
which I have found full of charm. Jacques Rivière does not appear to have found their charm either 
uniform enough, or self-assured enough as yet.’” p18 ibid. Of course, by the time that Artaud was 




then, are a refusal of judgement, even this early in Artaud’s œuvre. He has submitted 
them to Rivière not for judgement, but for acceptance; not for publication (their 
publication or no is irrelevant, this is not the scale they are to be weighed on), but for an
acknowledgement that they, that he, their author, Antonin Artaud, exists. As he writes in 
the first letter to Rivière, harking back to their recent, first meeting, “[i]t is very 
important to me that the few manifestations of mental existence I have been able to give 
myself should not be dismissed as non-existent, because of flaws and poorly written 
phrases scattered through them.”269 It would be a gross misunderstanding – one which 
Artaud is desperate should be avoided – to think that he seeks only the publication of 
the poems. He has no such “immediate, petty goal in mind”; and anyway, no amount of 
“time or hard work will set these lapses and unintelligibility to rights.”270
By the first letter of 1924, six months into their correspondence, it is not only literary 
judgement which Artaud is indifferent to, but also the acceptance (which it seemed was 
being solicited in the earlier letter) of himself by others: “I am not trying to justify 
myself in your eyes”, he writes, “as it makes little difference to me whether I appear to 
exist to anyone. I have the whole distance separating me from myself to cure me of 
other people’s opinions.”271 He is at pains to assert that he is not intending insolence 
toward Rivière. Indeed, what he is doing is clarifying what is at stake: not literature, nor
his social being, but the singularity of his case, of Antonin Artaud. Necessarily, that 
singularity must not be judged within the criteria of an existing milieu (literature, 
society), nor according to any coordinates laid out by anything but what it itself gives. It
is not a judgement that he seeks at all then, but an acknowledgement, merely that 
someone believes him: “for you to finally believe and understand me. [...] I beg you, 
please admit the reality of these phenomena”272; and again, three months later, folding 






have the potential to crystallize things in appropriate forms and words.”273 What must be
believed is that his ideas are being stolen, that his mind is in a singularly fragile state; 
that he is suffering and is stupefied, plunged into idiocy; that he is suffering from an 
incomprehensible distance from thought, from himself, which is both constitutive and 
devastating of his being.
It is from this idiocy that Artaud writes, but its name is suffering:
There is, therefore, one single thing which destroys my ideas. Something which 
does not stop me being what I might, but if I may express it thus, leaves me in a 
state of suspense. Something furtive which robs me of the words I have found, 
which reduces my terseness of mind, progressively destroying the bulk of my 
ideas within its own matter.274
These attacks and limbos of suspense will later be called cruelty by Artaud, but in 1924 
he is yet to develop strategies against his sufferings, which is to say that his own 
protective and pre-emptive strategies of cruelty are not yet underway. Five months later 
the nature of this suffering as a metaphysical determination enacted from the outside 
upon Artaud’s thought and his physical body becomes more clear:
The moment the soul proposes to coordinate its riches, its discoveries, its 
revelations, unknowingly at the very minute the thing is about to emanate, a 
higher vicious will attacks the soul like vitriol, attacks the mass of words and 
imagery, attacks the mass of our feelings and leaves me as it were panting at the 
gates of life.275
The choice, then – which Artaud quite rightly will not acknowledge as a choice, for 
nothing like volition can be involved – is between the cruelty of this all-over theft-attack
which takes his words and the very air from his lungs, or the cruelty of “true wastage”, 






something – anything – from this divesting and devastating pincer attack which would 
sunder matter and thought, body and word. It is noteworthy that both of these passages 
from the letters to Rivière talk of thought in terms of matter and mass: these substantial 
ideas will be a central concern of the third Chapter of this thesis.
The Friend Vilified
But it is not only Artaud’s letters which are published in the NRF, it is Rivière’s also. 
They have been much criticised, including by Artaud at times, who found reason to 
“resent” certain parts, because, for example, “I [Artaud] had presented myself to you as 
a mental case, an actual psychic anomaly and your reply was a literary opinion [...] I 
flattered myself you had not understood me.”277 We see here not only Artaud’s need for 
control of the situation (more on which below), but also the root of the complaints 
against Rivière as they are taken up later, by others. Against the intensity of Artaud’s 
need to be acknowledged as a singularity – an intensity which, Artaud believed, was 
soon to kill Rivière278 – the editor-confidant was found to err, to misunderstand what 
was needed of him. As we shall see, anything else would have been impossible. For 
Marthe Robert – a friend of Artaud in later years who was instrumental in securing his 
transfer from the asylum at Rodez to Ivry in 1946 – Rivière’s
good will cannot be doubted. Clearly, the critic was in an awkward position: 
what does one say to a man who puts so much passion and talent into declaring 
himself incapable of everything, of thought and literature as well as life? 
Instinctively, Rivière got himself out of the situation by using a common tactic; 
he generalized the all-too-singular nature of the case [...]. To this fundamental 
state, which Artaud presented as unique and incomparable, Rivière contrasted 
the malady of the epoch, the malaise of contemporary literature, and more 
generally, the impossibility of all thought to account for itself absolutely.279
277 p30 ibid.
278 Artaud thought the misunderstanding, which displaced the poems as the centre of the correspondence,
to be the cause of Rivière’s death in 1925: “I asked him if it had been understood. I felt his heart 
swell up as if it would burst when confronted with the problem. He told me it had not been 
understood. I would not be surprised if the black cyst which opened up within him that day, drew him
away from life much more than his own sickness.” p20 ibid.
279 p26 Robert “I am the Body’s Insurgent...”
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In Difference and Repetition Deleuze gives short shrift to Rivière’s side of the 
correspondence: “The reader notes with astonishment that the more Rivière believes 
himself to be close to an understanding of Artaud, the further away he is, and the more 
he speaks of something altogether different.”280 This “something” is “the image of an 
autonomous thinking function, endowed in principle with its own nature and will”281; 
the Cartesian mode of idiocy as dogmatic image which Deleuze, not without 
justification, finds to be operative in Rivière’s letters. It bears repeating that Artaud, for 
Deleuze
does not simply talk about his own ‘case’, but already in his youthful letters 
shows an awareness that his case brings him into contact with a generalised 
thought process which can no longer be covered by the reassuring dogmatic 
image but which, on the contrary, amounts to the complete destruction of that 
image.282
We may whole-heartedly agree with Deleuze that Artaud’s destruction of the dogmatic 
image of thought is well under way even in this early work. But Artaud’s need to 
receive an acknowledgement of this, as we have seen, is an insistence on the fact that it 
is his very being which is at stake; the suffering matter of his body. If there is a 
difficulty manifest in Rivière’s side of the correspondence (and, really, how could there 
not be?), I would suggest that it is not so much the direct defence of that image of 
thought which Deleuze so succinctly identifies, but that this is accompanied by the 
abstraction of what Artaud is suffering into a general problem. That Rivière makes of it 
a general literary problem, where Deleuze makes of it a general (non)philosophical one, 
seems to be a minor, if not irrelevant, distinction, given what Artaud seeks and the 
magnitude of palpable suffering the problem causes him. This problem of the general 






There is, at first, a mourning by Rivière of the poet’s absent capacity, and, worse, this is 
accompanied by the consolatory promise that “[w]ith a little patience [...] you will be 
able to write perfectly coherent, harmonious poems”:283 Artaud’s state then is seen as 
both temporary and incidental, rather than necessary and singular. Rivière soon realises 
his error, and asks forgiveness for having “acted like those doctors who claim to cure 
their patients by refusing to believe them, by denying the singularity of their case then 
forcibly trying to bring them back to normal.”284 Ameliorative as this is, it would be 
wrong to claim that Rivière ever fully manages to recognise Artaud in the latter’s 
singularity. And even if he had, it is doubtful that Artaud would be able to accept it as 
such. When Rivière suggests, in his letter of 24th May 1924, that their correspondence 
be published in the NRF, Artaud inevitably rejects the suggestion that their names be 
changed, and a sort of “novel in letters”285 be made of it – indeed, Artaud’s response 
came by return of post and begins “Why lie”?286 Other than that refusal to distort the 
veracity of the letters, which of course would not serve Artaud’s need for 
uncompromised immediacy, for being returned to himself (“We have the right to lie, but
not about the heart of things”287) he is very keen on the idea. Later, it bears noting, 
Artaud will adopt precisely such techniques of “lying”. We shall frequently see 
throughout this thesis that Artaud’s “fictioning” of his autobiography, and that of others 
(van Gogh especially) becomes a crucial technique in his later works precisely for its 
superior capacity for getting to “the heart of things”.288






288 p39 ibid. Writing objectively untrue autobiography had been encouraged at the beginning of the 
1940s by Léon Fouks, an intern at Ville-Évrard asylum, who saw its potential use in diagnosis (see 
pp20–1 Watchfiends) and Artaud will sign off his letters from the asylums of Ville-Évrard and Rodez 
with many names. He also requested that one of his pieces on Mexico appear anonymously (see p636
SW)
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“pleases me, I am delighted with it, it fills me with joy”,289 the theft of Artaud’s self is 
still at stake: shortly after the overflowing of that threefold joy, we see Artaud claiming 
(with all the transparent nonchalance of a playground lie), “I had long since thought of 
suggesting we collect them together.”290 Just as he cannot allow, here, his words to 
appear under another name, Artaud cannot allow his words, in their publication any 
more than in their writing, to have been brought about by any executive decision other 
than his own. Even in this assured printed agreement that Artaud’s is a singular case – 
one, moreover, worthy of special attention – Rivière risks violating him, alienating 
Artaud from that which he struggles interminably to lay claim to. When Artaud 
rhetorically asks “[s]hould [this man] be condemned to oblivion on the pretext he can 
only give fragments of his self?”,291 Rivière has given the required “No”. But in doing 
so, Artaud once again smells an attack. The touching and genuine concern which 
radiates from Rivière’s letters does him great credit, but Artaud is terminally incapable 
of receiving it as such – every offer of friendship appears as a Trojan horse.
Deleuze – and his condemnation of Rivière makes this clear – will not make the mistake
of trying to reconcile Artaud with an absent image of thought, nor measure his distance 
from it. Nonetheless, in recognising the magnitude of the ruination of the dogmatic 
image, and the wide-ranging effect it would have, Deleuze does draw out a 
generalisation from – that is, makes a generalisable “case” of – Artaud (just as the body 
without organs is appropriated as a general figure of the synthesis of subjectivities). 
Surely this is just as cruel a violation of the singularity which Artaud needed to win at 
all costs. Deleuze is right that Rivière is too slow in realising how Artaud is suffering, 
the kind of suffering. Yet what Rivière prioritises, however ham-fistedly, but which 
Deleuze displays no interest in, is how to not exacerbate that suffering in his reading of 
Artaud. This is as important now, after Artaud’s death – when the body that is his body 





friendship offered by Rivière – albeit one impossible to fully deliver, and one which 
Artaud could not receive, for even that would be a violation – it must also inform any 
project for outlining a method for reading him; for reading Antonin Artaud in his own 
name, and under his own name, in that uniqueness of his “case” and his insistence that 
no outside nor above precede him. Perhaps this is why these two – reading and 
friendship – can come together in the beautiful piece written by Marthe Robert, in a 
question asked with all the authenticity, blindness and self-admonishment of a true 
friend and a true reader:
Among all those who approached Artaud, who loved and admired him as a man 
and as a poet, how many can be sure of not having aggravated his suffering with 
a look, a question, a doubt? How many guessed that their advice, their 
appeasements, their words of consolation, indeed the way they remained silent 
at times, were for the perpetually guarded poet an intervention scarcely less 
scandalous than the coercive measures which society was legally able to use 
against him?292
Whilst inspired by Rivière, this is clearly not an accusation thrown out without also 
being a question Marthe Robert asks of herself. And it is one which, I would argue, in 
order to read Artaud, we must take up as our own, as an affective and intellectual 
imperative.
“because my thoughts are ill-formed”293
Beckman by no means denies the uncovering of an anterior forcefulness which 
accompanies Artaud’s disassociation from any image of thought – his discovery that 
thought is not innate in him. She does not even, perhaps, part ways with Deleuze when 
he tells us that the difficulty of, and distance from, thinking which Artaud experienced 
“is not a de facto state of affairs but a de jure structure of thought”294 – that is, Deleuze’s
generalisation of the “case”. It is rather when Deleuze asserts that “Artaud opposes 




genitality to innateness in thought, but equally to reminiscence”,295 that the two part 
ways. We have discussed, above, the role of genitality in Artaud’s thinking, and will 
return to it, below, in relation to the fourth section of Artaud le Mômo. Against 
Deleuze’s reading of Artaud’s evental idiocy, for Beckman, Artaud is precisely 
reminiscent: he mourns the capacity to think; he rages against the theft of his thought. In
this, at least, she seems to be making the same rejoinder to Deleuze that I have been 
arguing for: that Artaud experiences the theft of his thought by the anterior outside as 
suffering.
It could be said that Beckman is quite right that the Artaud of the early 1920s is not only
experiencing the rending of thought as painful, but that he wishes this pain to be gone; 
that he reminisces not for his own thought to be returned to him (the mistake which 
Rivière makes in the earlier letters), but that he would acquiesce to the return of the 
dogmatic image of thought if it would grant him but a moment’s respite from suffering. 
In short, in these early years the unbearable cruelty of his suffering has not yet been 
revealed to be absolutely necessary: he is still the man who asked for “a sufficient 
amount of subtle liquids, illusory agents, of mental morphine to raise my debasement, to
balance what is falling, to rejoin what is disjoined, to recompose what has been 
destroyed”,296 and who wrote to Madame Toulouse in 1921 lamenting that, in order to 
write, “one must be in possession of one’s mind in its entirety, something I have never 
achieved.”297
Even in the later, Russian, form of idiocy, Deleuze and Guattari talk of restoration, of 
how “the new idiot wants the lost, the incomprehensible, and the absurd to be restored 
295 ibid. (second emphasis added).
296 p51 CWI
297 p201 ibid. Madame Toulouse was wife of the editor of Demain. Artaud was in the care of, and 
worked for Dr Edouard Toulouse on the magazine in 1920s. Interestingly, it was an influence on a 
young Jean Paulhan, see Bernard Baillaud “Jean Paulhan’s Influences: The Review Demain” trans. 
Martyn Cornick in ed. Michael Syrotinski “The Power of Rhetoric, the Rhetoric of Power: Jean 
Paulhan’s Fiction, Criticism, and Editorial Activity” Special issue, Yale French Studies No.106 
(2004), 11–25
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to him”298; that is, the absence of the dogmatic image is to be restored, not as a 
reclamation of lost property, nor to “recompose what has been destroyed”299 but as a 
disorienting freedom from that image which is the right of the idiot, even if it is equally 
the name of his suffering. By contrast, Beckman summarises her argument with the 
assertion that
Artaud’s letters suggest that his failure of rationality does not do away with 
rationality and truth but compares itself with them. Not only does it invest these 
concepts with a sense of nostalgia; his recognition of his own lost capacity to 
think also keeps his thought in the grip of reactive forces [...] measuring his 
thought according to innateness and doubt”.300
She may be correct, but at best only of the young Artaud: if there is such a nostalgia for 
possession of his thought, it is short lived. As Maurice Blanchot observes, in an essay 
which itself appeared in the pages of NRF, even if “at the time of the correspondence 
with Jacques Rivière [...Artaud] manifestly maintains the hope of making himself equal 
to himself”,301 it is not long before any sense of lack – and its opening to judgement – is 
violently reversed into the burning necessity of his suffering in thought, in life, in 
poetry. We recall the passage quoted above:
by a sure and painful development, he [Artaud] comes to reverse the polarity of 
the impulse and to place dispossession first, not the ‘immediate totality’ of 
which this dispossession seemed at first the simple lack. What is prime is not the
fullness of being; what is prime is the crack and the fissure, erosion and 
destruction, intermittance and gnawing privation: being is not being, it is the 
lack of being, a living lack that makes life incomplete, fugitive, and 
inexpressible, except by the cry of a fierce abstinence.302
Beckman’s bibliography lists only two volumes of Artaud’s work: the first volume of 
the Calder edition of the Collected Works and the notoriously poor City Lights Artaud 
298 p63 WP
299 p51 CWI
300 p61 Beckman “Idiocy of the Event”
301 p38 Blanchot “Artaud”. Blanchot’s contributions to NRF were commissioned by Jean Paulhan.
302 ibid.
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Anthology.303 She is perhaps justified in her criticism of the young Artaud – he of the 
1921 letter to Madame Toulouse,304 and at times he of the Rivière letters – though we 
find it easier to sympathise with Deleuze’s less dismissive reading in Difference and 
Repetition, where he, of course, refuses to give up on Artaud. In either case, if we are to 
properly concern ourselves with idiocy in Artaud, of Artaud, we must turn to texts 
which both of these commentators neglect: his own reappraisal (again epistolary) 
twenty years later of the same poems which Artaud had discussed in the early 
correspondence with Rivière; and Artaud le Mômo, which Clayton Eshleman, who has 
repeatedly translated this poem cycle, asserts “is probably Artaud’s most honed and 
polished work.”305 Both are produced in the summer of 1946.
“Dear Sir,”
Between 27th July and 13th September 1946 – and hence straddling his 50th birthday, 
his half-century – Artaud worked on a letter to Peter Watson, arts editor of Cyril 
Connolly’s London-based Horizon magazine.306 Watson had asked to publish two parts 
of Artaud le Mômo as a part of his wider project to broaden representation of non-
British, and especially French, artists in Horizon. The letter could well be said to sit 
unashamedly alongside the other two texts which reflect upon – and constitute a part of 
– Artaud’s work from the last two years of his life: “Ten Years that Language Has Been 
Gone”, and “50 Drawings to Murder Magic”, both of which we shall look at in detail in 
303 The City Lights anthology was edited by Jack Hirschman, a junior editor who took over the task from
an overstretched Victor Corti. Hirschman had little or no prior knowledge of Artaud’s work, and was 
provided with poor translations he was in no position to recognise as such. Disturbingly, the 
anthology is still available (last reprint 2001) and whilst it has been revised since the first printing, 
with the worst crimes removed, it remains a poor broker of first contact with Artaud. For the most 
detailed history and further criticism of the volume see pp251–60 Barber Anatomy of Cruelty. See 
also David Rattray, “Translating Artaud”, in How I Became One of The Invisible (New York, NY: 
Semiotext(e), 1992), 283–290.
304 p201 CWI
305 p336 Watchfiends. Other translations include the earlier edition of Clayton Eshleman Conductors of 
the Pit (New York, NY: Paragon House, 1988). The selections of Artaud’s works had completely 
changed for the second edition Clayton Eshleman Conductors of the Pit (Berkeley, CA: Soft Skull 
Press, 2005).
306 For more on Watson see Adrian Clark and Jeremy Dronfield Queer Saint: The Cultured Life of Peter 
Watson (London: John Blake, 2015); and on Connolly: Jeremy Lewis Cyril Connolly: A Life 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1997)
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our third Chapter.307
Responding to Watson’s request, Artaud recalls his beginnings as a writer:
I entered into literature by writing books in order to say that I was unable to 
write anything, my thought when I had something to say or to write was what 
was denied me most. I never had any ideas and two very short books, 70 pages 
each, revolve around this profound, inveterate, endemic absence of any idea. 
They are l’Ombilic des Limbes and le Pèse-Nerfs.308
He acknowledges that when he wrote them – the time when he was in correspondence 
with Rivière – the poems of l’Ombilic des Limbes [Umbilical Limbo] and le Pèse-Nerfs 
[The Nerve Scales]309 seemed “full of cracks, of faults, of platitudes, and as if stuffed 
with spontaneous abortions, of abandonings and all sorts of abdications, always 
travelling along the side of anything essential”.310 It seemed to Artaud (and, as we have 
seen, Beckman would agree), that the poems lamented their inability to overcome or 
transform the difference between not-being-able-to-say as their generative force and that
same sundering inability that remained as a sharp and latent suffering plaguing their 
author: in 1923, writing a poem healed nothing. Yet by 1946, Artaud sees them 
differently: “after 20 years’ lapse they appear to me staggering, successful not in respect
to me but in respect to the inexpressible.”311 Indeed, whilst the poems still “lie as far as 
the writer is concerned, in themselves they constitute a bizarre truth which life, if it 
were authentic itself, should never have accepted. – An inexpressible expressed [...]”.312 
Certainly Artaud in 1946 is still raging against his suffering, the cruelty of fleeing 
thought; indeed, his suffering had continued to increase, and not only as his escalating 
addiction to opiates diminished their palliative effects and intensified his suffering of 
their absence. But suffering is not simply to be had done with now. As we shall see at 
307 Antonin Artaud “Dix ans que le langage est parti...” in Luna-Park No.5 (October 1979), 7–10; and 
Antonin Artaud 50 Drawings to Murder Magic trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Seagull 
Books, 2008)
308 p81 Watchfiends





several junctures throughout this thesis, by 1946 suffering has become an increasingly 
complex motivating force whilst it has also been made available as a necessary strategic
tool – strategy all the more subversive and effective for its particular foldings, or 
reclamations, of externally imposed necessity.
In retrospect, for Artaud, the poems which Rivière had rejected “are nothing but 
debacles now”; if they can be anything but absolute wastage they will still have no 
efficacy in the present, existing as they do only as curios set at an insuperable distance, 
“only through the posthumous distance of a spirit dead with time, and stalemated in the 
present.”313 We see here a theme which will return throughout Artaud le Mômo, a theme 
of cauterising the past, of returning to the unmediated moment of a body able to 
neutralise cruel forces, a body producing its own necessity which cannot be stalemated 
or placed in limbo by a higher power. The tables have been turned on what had earlier 
been experienced as a lament, such that any lack or failing is displaced from the body, 
disidentified with and neutralised by the power of a body which, as we shall see, frees 
itself and gives birth to itself. Indeed, all of Artaud’s real works, he tells Peter Watson, 
have succeeded in returning stolen forces to his own, remade, body: all of his writings 
are works “in which yes and no, black and white, truth and falsehood although 
contradictory in themselves have dissolved into one man’s style, that of this poor Mr. 
Antonin Artaud.”314 The necessity of Artaudian idiocy has shifted from the lamentable, 
insufferable yet quotidian fact – the incapacity of being unable to grasp a thought 
(thought become event, creation, but torturing the body which suffers its impersonality) 
– to something worked through, reaggregated to, and intricately woven into the new-
refound body and its inalienable expressive force. This is going through negation and 
repetition to affirmation of that body: “No, I, Antonin Artaud, well then no, well then 
precisely no, I, Antonin Artaud, I want only to write when I have nothing more to think. 
– Like someone eating his stomach, the winds of his stomach from inside.”315 Stark 
313 p81 ibid.
314 p82 ibid.
315 p139 Eshleman Conductors of the Pit. Eshleman’s older translation is preferable, here, not least 
because the later version (p84 Watchfiends) retires Artaud to the drawing room by giving “to ponder” 
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comparison, here, to the windless Artaud of 1924, “panting at the gates of life.”316
Breaks, then – denaturalisation of what masquerades as the inside yet is proper to a 
transcendental outside – have become crucial for Artaud, crucial in the returning of 
forces to his body and away from history: as Deleuze and Guattari observed, “[t]he new 
idiot will never accept the truths of History”.317 Artaud’s idiotic athletic break with 
History is effected through his writing: “from time to time, dear Mr. Peter Watson, life 
makes a leap, but that is never written in history and I have never written except to fix 
and perpetuate the memory of these cuts, these scissions, these ruptures, these abrupt 
and bottomless falls”.318 Artaud suffers these vertiginal cruelties, yet is now also able to 
recast them as a part of his own self-determination.
So, yes, the body still suffers, words still pass fleeting on the wind, and thought is 
exhausting, exhausted. But it has ever been so for Artaud, and he has built over these 
twenty-three years the resources for subverting and fixing and fighting this suffering.319 
He writes – later in the letter, as the lines begin to break up, as the rhythm comes more 
to the forefront, unearthing the materiality of the very gesture of writing, binding the 
wind of words –
but imagine, dear Mr. Peter Watson, that I have never been more than a 
sick man and I shall not go on about it to you.
I repeat to you, I have never been able to live, to think, to sleep, to talk, 
to eat, to write
and I have never written except to say that I have never done anything, 





319 I mean “fixing” here in the same sense Artaud does in the previous quotation, p85 Watchfiends, as 
pinning down, not as correcting. As we shall see below, this pinning down is also an important part of
the notebook drawings, where, as we shall discuss toward the end of this thesis, nails frequently 
appear. See figs.40ff
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nothing. My whole work has only been and could only be built on 
nothingness.320
This nothingness is the battle raging in the world and on Artaud’s body – the 
nothingness he suffers in thought and body, the “living lack” Blanchot writes of321 – and
he has come to realise that there is no use in mourning for a time when the battle did not
rage, when the suffering was absent. False reminiscence or to hope for a retreat from the
battle to a safe haven would be only to have “emerged from its pain, like fugitives”322; it
would in effect be to submit to transcendence, to judgement (and “Will the struggle be 
evaluated, will it be judged, will it be justified? / No.”323) Submission to judgement 
would be “to stop life”, and offer Artaud only the chance to “sniff the memories of the 
struggle”.324 A truce would be only a turn to mourning, not an end of suffering; a “true 
wastage” and “utter void” of defeat which even in 1923 he could not accept.325 Such an 
offer – God’s palliative, patronising promise – can be met with only one simple, 
adamant response, Artaud tells Peter Watson: “Never.”326
Death and Unlife
Clearly, this refusal to surrender is a far cry from the Artaud who corresponded with 
Rivière, from the Artaud whom Beckman found mourning. That Artaud has died, and 
had to die to renegotiate the plane of his fight, to claim his body and to make his voice, 
for “those who speak, are they dead or living? – One can no longer tell.”327 Artaud’s 
weaponisation of his body’s suffering has passed through the finitude of that body – 
death – and bound the power of that externally imposed finitude to the body, wresting 
the force of death away from the outside, where it would kill him.328 “[L]ife and 
320 p86 Watchfiends







328 In the same way, perhaps, as for Deleuze and Guattari the Junky wants the cold on his inside. See 
p153 ATP
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thought” and “death and the nought”329 have to be bound together, without one taking 
priority over the other. They will remain incompossible, contradictions, but ones which 
can be held together – “this rhymes, can’t you see that it rhymes?”330 – in and as the 
body of Artaud. If for Deleuze and Guattari the body without organs is built by 
conjunctive synthesis which nonetheless maintains the ontological anteriority of the 
outside-infinite, for Artaud there must be a fourfold of finite–infinite relations on the 
conceptual and affective axes with none prioritised over the others, and none originarily 
alien from his body. Indeed, this fourfold is his body, the idiot-undead body of Artaud le
Mômo.
We recall that Artaud explains to Peter Watson that “looking carefully at this life I 
remember being dead in it really and corporeally at least 3 times, once in Marseilles, 
once in Lyons, once in Mexico and once at the Rodez asylum in the coma of 
electroshock.”331 Artaud, then, is now undead, a mummy, able to see himself from both 
sides – life and death, thought and idiocy, the side of the infinite and the side of finitude.
This is not Artaud dead and returned, not a resurrection (which would only be eternal 
life, infinitude), but a death-life through which Artaud will “create whatever does not 
exist”332 in this new body, this newly revealed being which “suffers the world and 
disgorges reality.”333 The rhyming of thought and nought – thought and death – which is 
made possible only by Artaud’s undead body, again yields a figure linked to idiocy 
(though madder), which, as we noted above, Deleuze and Guattari call the “cataleptic 
thinker or ‘mummy’ who discovers in thought an inability to think.”334 This “mummy” 
is assiduously picked up on by Beckman: she not only reminds us of Artaud’s 1920s 
interest in catalepsis in “La Momie attachée” [“The Chained Mummy”], 
“Correspondance de la Momie” [“The Mummy Correspondence”] and “Invocation à la 
329 p84 Watchfiends
330 ibid. The rhyme in French is “la vie et la pensée” “la mort et les trépassés” p234 OCXII
331 p83 ibid.
332 p63 Antonin Artaud “New Revelations of Being” trans. Victor Corti in The Death of Satan & Other 




Momie” [Invocation to the Mummy]335 – figures which I would link into Artaud’s 
theatrical interest in automata such as puppets and robots, as discussed above – she also 
makes a further link to Artaud’s work in and writings on cinema, noting “the way 
[Artaud] celebrated the potential power of cinema to disrupt and disassociate thought by
‘un-linking’ images of the Whole”.336 This is a theme which, she reminds us, Deleuze 
too takes up in his Cinema 2: The Time Image. Indeed, in Artaud’s film scripts (of 
around 1929–30337), Deleuze finds a figure of the idiotic undead, “the Mummy, this 
dismantled, paralysed, petrified, frozen instance which testifies to ‘the impossibility of 
thinking that is thought’.”338 We catch a glimpse of how the figure of the mummy would
seem to attest to a special kind of bodily immanence: an immanence so “pure”, I might 
suggest, that it not only weaves concept and affect together tighter than life alone 
(where life would be both less and more, “the point of necessary cohesion to which 
being can no longer rise”339), but superadds to life by refusing to make its negative, 
death, simply in its own image (be that image reflected (afterlife, eternity) or negated 
(nothingness)). The poles of life and death, thought and unthought are all woven in. It is
just such a body of immanence, one which holds the finite and infinite together without 
reducing one to the other – that is, without making one immanent to the other, to 
something other than immanence to immanence – which, we recall, is the prime illusion
of thought which Deleuze and Guattari themselves warn us against.340 It is precisely this
335 pp164; 168–9; 188 CWI
336 p59 Beckman “Idiocy of the Event”. It is worth reminding ourselves that these scripts were for silent 
films. Spoken language in film, for Artaud enslaved it to representation, and would thus nullify the 
power of gesture: film must remain insubordinate to language, to retain that power by which the 
“mind is set into upheaval, beyond all representation.” (“Sorcery and the Cinema”, translation from 
p58 Barber Terminal Curses; cf. pp65–6 OCIII). Many others agreed with Artaud, of course: see e.g. 
Mikhail Yampolsky “The Voice Devoured: Artaud and Borges on Dubbing” trans. Larry P. Joseph in 
October Vol. 64 (Spring, 1993), 57–77.
337 This was the period of Artaud’s writing of film scenarios. CWIII gives the date of “The Butcher’s 
Revolt” (pp38–42) as June 1930. “Thirty-Two” (pp26–37) is undated, and “Eighteen Seconds” 
(pp11–14) is dated (clearly erroneously) as 1949. These are the three scenarios to which Deleuze 
refers.
338 p166 Deleuze Cinema 2. The quotation is from pp36–7 Blanchot “Artaud”, which reads “That poetry 
is linked to this impossibility of thinking which is thought – that is the truth that cannot be revealed, 
for it always turns away and forces one to experience it beneath the level where one could truly 
experience it.” Blanchot is writing about the Rivière letters here, and shortly turns to the letter to 
Peter Watson – evidence, then, that Deleuze, despite never mentioning it, was aware of the 





that the figure of the “mummy” prefigures, which Artaud begins to embody through his 
deaths, and which reaches its fullest expression in Artaud le Mômo and the concomitant 
notebook work.341
“Return of Artaud le Mômo”
The first thing which Artaud le Mômo does, the first of five movements in the poem-
cycle, is to return. This is not the return and ascension of the resurrected Nazarene; nor 
is it the noch einmal [once again] of Nietzsche’s eternal return.342 This is a return for the 
first and last time. There can be no deferment, no promise of happiness, no further 
sequence, no more of God’s “pranks”343: and not just God’s, but “the prank of the whole 
earth / against whoever has balls / in his cunt.”344 This latter, of course, is Artaud le 
Mômo, the whole body which lacks nothing, which engenders itself and which has 
generated itself. That “new idiot” who, as Deleuze and Guattari observed, “will never 
accept the truths of History”, has blocked both past and future at the level of his body; 
has taken possession of both his birth and his death, and returned them to himself. We 
begin to see how, for Artaud le Mômo, the idiocy which trashes the dogmatic image of 
thought has become inextricable from the having done with the organicity of birth and 
death which are God’s and Life’s methods of originarily divesting him from himself; of 
making Artaud’s body a mere image of something else, subjected to judgement and 
finitude. This arrogation of his own genesis is similarly linked to Artaud having passed 
through his own death in what might be called an epitaph-poem from the same period, 
“Here Lies”, which opens, “Me, Antonin Artaud, I am my son, my father, my mother, / 
and me”.345 This folding in of progeniture and progenitors sees Artaud making of 
himself the destroyer or “leveler” of “the imbecilic periplus where begetting impales 
341 Oddly, Beckman does mention Artaud le Mômo, but she does not quote from it. p59 Beckman 
“Idiocy of the Event”
342 See especially Aphorism 341 pp194–5 Friedrich Nietzsche The Gay Science trans. Josefine 





itself”.346 This nailing up of idiotic genitality is also affirmed, (without the importance 
granted to binding death, but with the conjunctive synthesis of male and female claimed
by Artaud le Mômo’s balls-in-cunt figure of plenitude) in the more oft-quoted lines “I 
don’t believe in father / in mother, / got no / papamummy”.347 The title “Here Lies” 
translates “Ci-gît”, and I think it well worth noting (not least because, to my knowledge,
nobody else has done so), that Artaud was surely aware of the word’s homophony with 
“syzygy”, a term in the Gnostic tradition which denotes the binding together of male 
and female into one.348 Carl Jung used the term in a broader context to denote the fusing 
of opposed terms349 – just as the mummy binds life and death, the Russian idiot binds 
thought and unthought, and Artaud le Mômo makes a further conjunction of these two 
syzygys into a fourfold incompossible third; a strange immanence of the body to itself, 
set against and before transcendence and any originary outside. Before we look in more 
detail at the play of innateness and genitality which becoming his own papamummy 
entails, a few words concerning the text of Artaud le Mômo will prove instructive.
Artaud le Mômo
The text of Artaud le Mômo as we receive it was prepared from notebook writings 
produced between July and September 1946.350 The final text came from Artaud reading
aloud from his notebooks, with some improvisations, and the result being transcribed by
his then secretary (and later legatee), Paule Thévenin.351 “Mômo” is a slang term 
associated with Marseilles – the place of Artaud’s birth – meaning, as Eshleman 
explains, “simpleton, or village idiot”.352 In one of his earlier translations of the piece, 
346 ibid. (emphasis added)
347 The lines are quoted p14 AO. They are also from “Here Lies”, cf. Eshleman’s rendering: “I believe in 
neither father / nor mother, / ain’t gotta / daddy-mommy”. p237 Watchfiends
348 For more on Artaud’s interest in gnosticism, see Jane Goodall Artaud and the Gnostic Drama 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)
349 Carl Jung The Gnostic Jung, Including “Seven Sermons to the Dead” ed. Segal, Robert A. (London: 
Routledge, 1992)
350 See p336 Watchfiends
351 See p64 Barber Terminal Curses. Jean Genet described Thévenin’s inheritance of Artaud’s notebooks 
as “a poisoned gift”. p30 ibid.
352 p336 Watchfiends. The introduction to an earlier translation by Eshleman also lists “screwball”, p134 
Eshleman Conductors of the Pit.
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Eshleman attempts to find an English equivalent for the term, choosing “Yoyo”.353 He 
explains that the poem “might be thought of as the return of ‘incompetent/undesirable’ 
Artaud to the world of imagination, with the English title [“Artaud the Yoyo”] 
underscoring the skillful jerks, odd tricks, and wild swings of the ‘yoyo’s’ 
imagination.”354 The remarkably careful sonic cohesions and explosions of the text, its 
rhymes and repetitions, is adequately served by the choice of “Yoyo”, as it maintains the
vowels of the original which, Eshleman notes, “probably suggested itself to Artaud 
because of the triple ‘au/o/o’ rhyme”355 – but, for this reader, the “y” of “yoyo” makes 
the vowels more frontal, hence softer than the exhalations of “Mômo”. Eshleman’s latest
translation returns to the original “Mômo”, choosing not to seek a cognate. Amongst the 
advantages, I would argue, is its retention of the identification with Momus, Greek god 
of mockery, patron of poets. Momus is often depicted with a crotalum, an early castanet,
which further puts us in mind of the stump which Artaud frequently used in his later 
years to beat out a rhythm as he wrote and read (see figs.1–2), no doubt including in the 
composition and dictation of this poem.356 Finally, to retain the original term 
untranslated, encourages the reader to accept the word as idiomatic, the forging by 
Artaud of a new concept-body which we may hope to engage with as it is posited, hence
allowing Artaud, as Eshleman puts it, to have “possessed the word and, in poetry, made 
it his own.”357
Genitality and Innateness
In the second section of the poem the figures of “pussy-toady” and “boss-pussy” appear,
parental figures arranged in a hierarchy whereby boss-pussy “opens” pussy-toady, and 
in turn they both “get the crudest pleasure” out of the besieged product of this union.358 
The fourth section, “Execration of the Father-Mother”, begins with the prioritisation of 
353 p134 Eshleman Conductors of the Pit
354 ibid.
355 ibid.
356 Artaud mentions the crotalum pp103–4 Heliogabalus, cf. pp321–2 SW
357 See Eshleman’s notes p336 Watchfiends
358 pp113–15 ibid.
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nonsense; the placing of the idiot prior to, rather than subordinate to, upright thought, 
intelligence or sense making.359 The intelligent are condemned by the idiot, Artaud le 
Mômo, who is thus differentiated from them and exempted from their fate: “I condemn 
you because you know why... I condemn you, – / and me, I don’t know why.”360 Having 
made this condemnation of enslavement to thought and sense-making, and distanced 
himself from it, Artaud le Mômo goes on to reaffirm the self-determined genitive 
capacity of the body as a finite-infinite incompossible conjunction against the enslaved 
spirit of those who acquiesce to being made in the image of God or parents. For “[i]t is 
not a spirit which has made things, / but a body”.361 This body is further empowered 
with self-generation – and that generative capacity bound to speech, to the tongue – 
through a series of asignifying words, “klaver striva / cavour tavine / scaver kavina / 
okar triva”,362 and the destruction of a piece of bread – the body of Christ – by the 
stripping of its crust and its ruinous penetration by Artaud’s tongue. The lines run: 
“Strip the crust / From the browsed bread”.363 “Browsed” here translates “brouté”, 
which has the slang meaning of “to lick out”, as in to perform cunnilingus. Eshleman, to
my surprise, misses this slang usage. The equivalence of the tongue and the penis recurs
throughout the poem, not only because of the generative power of language but also, I 
would suggest, because the tongue in the mouth is a sympathetic figure to the penis and 
vagina in one, another incompossible whole; the syzygy which gives life to words, 
which gestates and spurts out, forms and projects. The absolute urgency of Artaud’s 
wresting of himself from the doubly endless series of repetition (telescoping into an 
abyssal past and into the future, never self-possessed and in the present) becomes 
apparent. He will no longer allow himself to be another in any series of iterations, to be 
one of those who simply “defecate what they have defecated”364 – the “they” here being 
those who came before, who would engender him with “their ancestral putrefaction”.365




362 p131 ibid. All in bold in the original.
363 p133 ibid. (emphasis removed)
364 p141 ibid. (emphasis added)
365 p147 ibid.
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Nonetheless, continuity with the past (the cruelty of being made in its image) is not 
fully cauterized. The old suffering mounts a counterattack on Artaud le Mômo, “the old 
lament [is] coming back / from the story of the old Artaud assassinated / in the other 
life”.366 He continues to be attacked, plunged by the spirits “into a lower depth” by their 
calculating an “absence of [the] nourishment or opium” which Artaud takes to be rightly
his.367 These spirits are in cahoots with “the men of this world”, those responsible for the
nightly theft of Artaud’s sperm, who sneak into his pavilion at Ivry, undo the 
incompossible whole of his syzygised sex organs and take his solely-male member in 
hand, “nicely caressed and nicely grasped, / in order to pump out my life.”368 We are 
reminded of the opening section of To Have Done with the Judgement of God, and its 
revelations concerning the American public school policy of “asking th[e] newly 
enrolled child for a little of his semen in order to put it into a glass jar”.369 Again, there 
is the necessity for a complete dissociation from these torturers – be they spirits, God or 
men, they are all “cops”, sperm-stealers and thought-destroyers – with an adamant “No”
on all levels, “No first name basis, nor chumminess, / never with me, / no more in life 
than in thought.”370
This refusal of polite sociability, of bourgeois nicety, is always a “No” to being a 
product of, or reproducing, an image that is not of the present. As Leo Bersani 
succinctly puts it, for Artaud, “no present moment is to be responsible to any past 
moment.”371 Artaud is neither product nor producer in this sense – he is parentless, and 
366 p157 ibid.





371 p97 Leo Bersani, “Artaud, Defecation and Birth”, in Antonin Artaud: A Critical Reader, ed. Edward 
Scheer (London: Routledge, 2004). In this passage Bersani is making a not-entirely justified link 
between Artaud and Rimbaud. A young Artaud had remarked that he was little moved by Rimbaud, 
especially compared to the genius of Poe, see p201 CWI. Also, as Marthe Robert explains: “Artaud is 
not the last of the poètes maudits, but the first to have rebelled totally, ceaselessly, against all ties, in 
complicity with thought and words, to enclose within acceptable limits the strange, ever new, 
intolerable scandal of suffering.” p25 Robert “I am the Body’s Insurgent...”
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his work is not the mere faecal matter of representation. Again Bersani explains 
succinctly that “[g]iving birth and moving one’s bowels are both concrete illustrations 
of that ‘miracle’ [...] by which one substance becomes two substances. In both 
processes, being separates from itself.”372 For Artaud, as we have seen, sexual 
reproduction (which is also being made in God’s image) is “no way to be born, when 
you’re copulated and masturbated nine months by the membrane, the shiny membrane 
which devours without teeth”.373 And as we have seen, Artaud “was born a different 
way, from my works, and not from a mother”.374 Such genital genesis – being shat out – 
must be refused with a vehemence equal to that with which Artaud refuses producing 
artwork which is mere shit irreparably split from its expressive source in the body. The 
works from which Artaud is truly born are entirely of him and under his control, they 
are not placed there. Nor are they (shitty) representations of any kind. They are innate – 
born in Artaud, not what he is born out of.375 But they are still Artaud’s to control: it is 
still he who makes himself, for “I am he who, in order to be, must whip his 
innateness.”376 What had been a cruel suspension of being is now a necessary part of his 
self-control – one which, moreover, requires a further, self-administered act of cruelty.
All images of God and parents (genitals), like all writing, is mere representation, 
produced by a power from which it is disconnected – that is, it is all shit. Having 
reinvented the genital organs so that they no longer “shit what has been shat before”, so 
that the genitals no longer hold the body in the callipers of an image of the past 
(parents) with a constrained responsibility to the future (to reproduce) and give the body
(back) to the outside – and having similarly disassociated thought from the dogmas of 
representation – Artaud le Mômo is nonetheless still immensely vulnerable. For in 
372 p100 Bersani “Artaud, Defecation and Birth”. Kristeva’s interest in Artaud is similarly arranged 
around this one-two of a “subject in process”. See, e.g. Julia Kristeva “The Subject in Process” trans. 
Patrick ffrench in eds. Patrick ffrench and Roland-François Lack The Tel Quel Reader (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 133–78
373 Artaud, letter to Henri Parisot, 4th September 1945, cited p99 Bersani “Artaud, Defecation and 
Birth”.
374 ibid.
375 For Derrida on innateness, see pp73–4 Derrida “Unsense”
376 p19 CWI See also p148 DR
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wrecking all genitality, all representation, all images of thought, all telos and all 
judgement, all has become immediate. The immediacy runs both ways: his torturers can 
act directly upon his body to create needs (such as by stealing his opiates) and to steal 
his power (through nocturnally masturbating him), even from afar. The invention and 
instantiation of the true body – with its immediate, non-negatable, non-imagistic 
thought and expressive gestures – has equally rendered it wide open to attack. As the 
title of another text contemporaneous with Artaud le Mômo makes clear, whilst Artaud 
has mastered the immediacy of magical acts, the magic of others still works against 
him: it has become necessary to “Murder Magic”.377
“Alienation and Black Magic”
“Insane asylums are conscious and premeditated receptacles of black magic”.378 So 
begins the final section of Artaud le Mômo. Artaud recognises a similarity between the 
powers and ignoble intentions of God and those of the doctors at the asylums who 
“butcher and flay” him, and “live off the dead.”379 Indeed, the holding together of death 
and life which Artaud le Mômo has made possible is a power now sought by these 
doctors: for “there is nothing like an insane asylum for gently incubating death, / and for
keeping the dead in incubators.”380 It is in the asylum that he is attacked with 
electroconvulsive “therapies” – by which thought, unthought and body are unwoven 
from each other – and in the asylum that the body is emptied out by sperm-theft, all so 
that the empty bodies, melted down into a pliable “puddle state” can be exposed to 
“obscene anatomical and atomic solicitations”.381 We must never cease to remind 
ourselves, as Artaud reminds us, that this is his true history: “I went through it and I 
won’t forget it”,382 just as we must not forget that “medicine lies each time that it 
presents a patient cured by the electrical” for there are only “those who have been 







terrorized by the method”, and who are inevitably – for Artaud, intentionally – left in 
“pulverized states”.383 The electroshocked patient, beset by and emptied out by this 
black magic, remains open and incapable of self-possession: “all the facts of his past 
[are turned] into larvae which are unusable in the present yet [...] never cease besieging 
the present.”384 The necessity of doing away with the cruelty of society – the cruelty of 
medicine – is made urgently manifest, just as To Have Done with the Judgement of God 
would soon insist on a similar renunciation of a sinister and covert extrinsic power. This
necessity does leave open another question for Artaud: that of how to model a society in
which the necessity of idiocy does not pave the way to vulnerability; in which the 
practice of magic as bodily self-forging in immediacy does not invite a siege of black 
magic. This is the question found at the end of Artaud le Mômo: “what guarantee do the 
obvious madmen of this world have of being nursed by the authentically living?”385 But 
the answer which he gives is less plainly stated: “farfadi / ta azor / tau ela / auela / a / 
tara / ila / THE END”.386 It is worth noting that, for all the disagreements I have had 
with Deleuze and Guattari over their appropriative readings of Artaud, their writings – 
and Guattari’s work at La Borde clinic especially – seriously support contemporary 
confrontations with this question today from the perspective of public policy and 
clinical practice.
The question of an uncruel society is never answered by Artaud, not in Artaud le Mômo 
nor in any subsequent work. As important as this question no doubt was to Artaud, there
is the more urgent matter of protecting himself from the black magic which he has 
opened himself to and which attacks him constantly; the question of how to protect his 
remade, undead, idiotic body from the forces which would re-organise it in their own 
image: society and its language and genitality; God and his body-image and genitality; 
representation and dogmatic, engendered imaging in all its forms, affective and 
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months of his life, and it is in his notebooks that he will pursue the practices which will 
protect and continue to remake his body – his body – in all its expressive, athletic, 
magical, hungry muscularity.
Artaud’s body without organs
We will turn to these notebooks in our third Chapter – where, finally, the subjectile will 
find us. Let us first remind ourselves why we must insist, as Artaud insisted, that the 
body without organs must not be detached from his own name, just as Artaud le Mômo 
must not break the “rhyme” of conjunctive power, that is its fourfold idiot-undead 
body.387
I began this Chapter with a figure of twoness and illusion. For Artaud, the wrecking of 
transcendence – having done with judgement – is not in itself enough. For God has 
installed himself also in the organs, in the day-to-day relations with the world (daily 
bread), urges (sexual reproduction), pre-histories (gestation), and even internal 
operations (synovial, hepatic, colonic etc.) of our bodies. In each of these, the 
constitutive primacy of the “One-All” outside is affirmed, and the posterior emergence 
of the body or the thinking subject is articulated: a system which Deleuze and Guattari, 
informed by their reading of Spinoza, beautifully map. For Artaud, this positioning of 
his body as a secondary phenomenon is unacceptable, and the stakes are always both 
physical and ontological. The finite body, here, is for Artaud barred from the infinite, 
whether it be a transcendent God, or a Deleuzo-Spinozist immanence: an immanence 
for which Deleuze and Guattari – as if to add insult to injury – often appropriate 
Artaud’s own figures. As such, the body without organs had done with the judgement of
God must also bind the infinite to the finite, in order to not be subject to it. This is done 
in two ways in Artaud’s work: on the levels of affect and concept, which – just as in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy – are bound. Where for the philosophers their 
387 p84 ibid.
121
binding happens on and constructs a plane of immanence (affirmation of the originary 
outside), for Artaud they are bound in his body as the two axes of the fourfold 
incompossible whole of life-death-idiot-thought.
As affect, Artaud rejects the life of eating, faecal necessity and genital reproduction to 
return as an undead faster, suffering rather than seeking joyful encounters, and through 
this suffering – not despite it, but subverting it from its very root – “disgorg[ing] 
reality”, that is, creating fictions, expressive force.388 Artaud need not eat or shit, any 
more than the acting body he lays out, the affective athlete, needs to feed off lived 
experience to produce “authentic” expressions. Without food or affectus, Artaud’s body 
throws out expressions, not as waste, but as projectiles that do not diminish his body in 
any way: as “a loud fart / that I will let [...] / the thundering manifestation / of this 
explosive necessity [...] an explosive assertion / that there is / something / to make way 
for”.389 Artaud le Mômo makes something from nothing, makes reality where there had 
been only mere existence.
As concept, he finds himself alienated from himself, operating below the level of 
thought and in this suffering – the (non)conceptual and the affective-pathic already 
bound here, in his body – he rejects the straitjacket of reason and reinvents himself as 
mad and idiotic at a juncture before judgement can take root to find him lacking, 
separated from himself. On this question of Artaud’s thought, Deleuze and Guattari 
recognise well Artaud’s destruction of the dogmatic image of thought – his lucidly 
trashing the circle – but they still insist on the fount of creative thought lying outside 
him, impersonal as their indefinite-article BwO. In this way, they reinscribe his 
suffering once again.
To appropriate the body without organs from Artaud’s name can only be seen as a 




representation, to think beyond image, to engender its own innateness through its own 
syzygised genitality, and to whip that innateness; and hence this misnomer must be 
condemned for ushering in a new genital image. It is, in short, to remove Artaud’s balls 
from his cunt, the insidious nocturnal theft of his sperm, and the placing of that 
puissant, seminal fluid into a glass jar: a mislabelled receptacle in which that stuff, 
abstracted away from Artaud’s idiotic undead body, becomes but an image – the image, 
perhaps, of the Ethics.
As brutal as Deleuze’s rending of Artaud from himself is – and we must not 
underestimate the cruelty of that simple, jar-label phrase “Spinoza’s body without 
organs” – it is nonetheless with a great debt to his thought that it becomes possible to 
approach Artaud’s work in the depths of its ontological stakes. Deleuze and Guattari and
Artaud are agreed, I would argue, that there is something beyond reality as we live and 
think it – something, as Artaud puts it, “deadlier than the former and unsuspected by 
life.”390 From here, where we live and think, it is a fiction, one older and more 
fundamental than this world, though equally something to be found and founded. The 
difference lies in the fact that, for Artaud, this fiction is disgorged by a body which is 
never alienated from it; the body as original source of all expression, older than this 
world of suffering. When Artaud does come to think the world in a more positive 
(though still necessarily untouching or parallel) sense, however, as we shall see in the 
final Chapter, we will find more affirmable connections to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophies.
In our next Chapter we will turn to the writings of Deleuze’s contemporary, Jacques 
Derrida. In his obituary of Deleuze, Derrida foregrounds precisely the question of 
immanence and their shared passion for Artaud. He writes,
I will continue to begin again to read Gilles Deleuze in order to learn, and I’ll 
have to wander all alone in this long conversation that we were supposed to have
390 p103 CWIV
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together. My first question, I think, would have concerned Artaud, his 
interpretation of the “body without organ[s],” and the word “immanence” on 
which he always insisted, in order to make him or let him say something that no 
doubt still remains secret to us. And I would have tried to tell him why his 
thought has never left me, for nearly forty years. How could it do so from now 
on?391
Certainly Artaud’s search for a metaphysics against transcendence, and his articulation 
of it through his body will continue to be themes in our next Chapter. But we will not be
staging an encounter between ghosts. Rather, we will be concerned with Derrida’s 
acknowledgement that Artaud’s new metaphysics would have done with suffering in his 
body. As we shall see, though, Derrida too finds himself unable to finally assent to such 
a thing, so perpetuates a different kind of cruelty to Deleuze’s on Artaud’s body that is 
inseparately his body of work. If Deleuze steals from Artaud – and theft is raised to the 
level of a theme in Derrida’s writings on Artaud – Derrida himself suspends Artaud in a 
cruel limbo. The themes of breath, expropriation, expression and death will recur 
through this Chapter, and again we will be led to Artaud’s development of 
metontological strategies in his late works. And, again, if there will be strong 
disagreement with the philosopher’s take on Artaud, there will equally be crucial 
lessons to carry into the final Chapter of this thesis.
391 Jacques Derrida “I’ll Have To Wander All Alone”, trans. David Kammerman in Typanum: A Journal 
of Comparative Literary Studies Vol.1 (1998) <http://www.usc.edu/dept/comp-




Jacques Derrida’s first essay on Artaud would also take up the question of breath. 
Unlike the breathing techniques laid out in “An Affective Athleticism” and developed 
by Barrault toward his “total theatre”, Derrida’s interest in breath does not centre on the 
body as a locus of affect and expression. Rather, breath unfolds in Derrida’s essay as a 
figure which, like the edge of a coin, links and separates: there is the body which 
breathes and there is the speech which takes up breath into the abstract, into signifying. 
Breath, as we shall see, thus falls under two jurisdictions: the system of the body 
(“metaphysics of the flesh”1) and the system of meaning (which I must partake in in 
order to speak). Derrida plays on manifold cognates and meanings of souffle (breath) to 
find through breath a founding expropriation or alienation of self from self. Contrary to 
Artaud’s “stated intention”, of originary unity, for Derrida, breath (souffle) is never 
simply itself; it is, rather, always already stolen or “spirited away” (soufflée).2
The vagaries of this originary expropriation of stolen breath – which Derrida argues are 
endemic to Artaud’s work of the 1920s and ’30s – reveal it to be anamorphic to a 
methodological problem produced in the very act of reading: Derrida unearths, 
alongside the expropriations of breath, the expropriative effects of academic 
commentary, be it of a Critical or Clinical bent. Both of these expropriations, for 
Derrida, collude in the system of Classical metaphysics, understood as a teleological 
project bent on laying out a total system which would brook no exceptions. In this way, 
the problem of commentary – what we might call the problem of making examples, how
we choose them, how we justify those choices, how or if we are able to attend to them –
places this first of his essays on Artaud at the heart of Derrida’s wider project in his 
1 p226 Derrida “Soufflée”
2 p221 ibid.
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early works. As we shall see, the theme of the example, or the “case”, recurs throughout 
his major works of the 1960s and ’70s: in Of Grammatology, in Glas, in Truth in 
Painting. In Glas especially, the problem of the example again comes into contact with 
the problem of theft – the figure of the thief in Jean Genet – and of death: the glas is a 
death-knell. Indeed, it is around theft and death that I will articulate the differences, as I 
see them, between on the one hand, Derrida’s reading of Artaud and the more general 
problem of the metaphysics of the case; and on the other hand, Artaud’s own 
metaphysics and methodology of “casework”. In Artaud’s own casework – his case 
studies of Lautréamont and Coleridge, and especially of van Gogh and his own 
autobiographical writings – I will argue, we find a figure of what I will call 
pluperfection, similar to the slips of athleticism discussed in the previous Chapter but 
here elaborated through opiate addiction, theft and suicide. In the van Gogh essay 
especially we will find a rethinking of death comparable to that of Artaud le Mômo, 
which sees him acting against imposed finitude and the furtive anteriority of infinitude. 
It is thus in Artaud’s recasting of death as an expressive force proper to his body, and in 
his wresting of the cruelty of determination away from the outside, that we will find 
Artaud’s case studies and his use of fictions within them operating in a manner quite 
different from Derrida’s deconstructive reading.
The first part of the chapter will rehearse Derrida’s arguments in “La parole soufflée” 
before going on to examine the context of the problem of the case in his other writings, 
as detailed above. This will be followed in the second half of the chapter by a turn to 
Artaud’s own casework, in particular his writings on the poets Lautréamont and 
Coleridge, and on Vincent van Gogh. Between the discussions of each of his case 
studies we will have cause to discuss Artaud’s own biographical writings and his drug 
dependency – allowing us to reflect on how he incorporated the lessons of his case 
studies. In this recourse to biographical detail, we will thus diagram the confluences of 
Artaud’s critical arguments and his lived experience; which is to say, between his life 
and his work. As we shall see, the precise articulation of these terms – the life and the 
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work – is precisely what is at stake throughout this chapter and its various source 
materials. Whilst we will concentrate on “La parole soufflée” in this Chapter, Derrida’s 
second essay on Artaud, also collected in Writing and Difference, will be referred to in 
both this Chapter and the next. The deconstructive apparatus which that essay uses on 
Artaud’s writings is the same as the earlier essay, such that our conclusions on “La 
parole soufflée” hold for “The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation”, 
too.3




From the Slave to the Thief and After: Breathing & Reading in “La parole 
soufflée”
When an actor speaks, he shares the responsibility for his performance with the 
author of his words; in fact, he becomes the author’s slave.4
Decroux’s rage against the enslavement of the actor’s body to an absent celebrity 
wordsmith is, as we have seen, recast by Artaud as a war to be fought with breath. As 
such, Derrida’s first essay on Artaud restates it as a problem with the souffleur, the 
prompter: the one who sits neither offstage nor on, invisible to the audience, reminding 
actors of their lines. Like a point of transcendence, the souffleur – clutching the script 
(the authority of the anterior) in his unseen box – is neither properly of the stage nor 
properly off it, commanding and judging. Succinctly restating the problem as a more 
recognisably Artaudian concern, Derrida writes, “[soufflé]: at the same time let us 
understand prompted by an other voice that itself reads a text older than the text of my 
body or than the theatre of my gestures.”5 It is thus that the venom devolves from 
playwright to souffleur: on the one hand, there is the text which the souffleur holds, the 
intransigent prescription of which he subjects the stage to; on the other hand, there is the
very breath of the souffleur which carries the words which are older than the 
performance from the outside to permeate the stage – which is to say breath comes from
elsewhere, from offstage, and is thus alienable from the actor’s body. For Derrida, then, 
the souffleur is worthy of double the disdain which Decroux holds the anterior 
playwright, as through him both words and breath come to have originated offstage – a 
double anterior determination of precisely the kind we know, by now, Artaud to be 
perpetually hostile to. The souffleur which splits the expressive body into language and 
4 Decroux cited p70 Felner Apostles of Silence.
5 p220 Derrida “Soufflée” translation modified – I have altered Bass’ “inspired” to “prompted”, as we 
will deal with the relation between prompting and the breath of the other (the -spir- of inspiration) 
below.
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flesh – splits abstract from concrete – and determines both as if anterior to them.
If, for Derrida “Artaud attempted to forbid that his speech be spirited away [soufflée] 
from his body”6 (and as we shall see, for Derrida, this is ultimately no more than an 
ongoing “attempt”), this is because, properly, he “wanted the machinery of the prompter
spirited away”.7 As such, for Derrida, the project of the Theatre of Cruelty and its 
associated texts cannot be said to finally find an aboriginal unity of body and expression
prior to language or some other mode of divestment – what Lecoq calls the mime de 
fond. For Derrida, the Theatre of Cruelty cannot be finally understood as having done 
away with the problem of a theatre constituted by and beholden to a constitutive outside
(text, offstage souffleur). Rather, it must be seen as a kind of doubling of the problem: 
as a “spiriting away [soufflé]” of the prompter [souffleur]: “souffleur soufflé”.8 As we 
shall see, this is deconstruction par excellence: not to seek a new unity of closure which 
risks resembling the Classical metaphysics of the One, but to break open metaphysics 
and begin an endless shuttling between two systems, to open up to the other which falls 
back onto the one: for Derrida, Artaud’s work breaks with Classical metaphysics only to
fall back into it and thence to renew the war once again.
To the double problem of the prompter who steals words and breath, Derrida adds 
another problem. The existence of a text older than the performance compromises the 
stage for Artaud – and hence violates his body – but the legibility of language per se 
also falls back on a system of reading which, Derrida argues, is always anterior to 
writing or speech (even as unprecedented words spurt forth, the structural anteriority of 
the system of language would remain unchallenged). The stage, the body is hence 
subjected once again: to this text which historically precedes it, and to reading which is 





Whilst this reading of Artaud’s diagnosis and treatment for the theatre seems very much 
at odds with the tone of The Theatre and Its Double as we have seen it – his goals of a 
body which communicates with immediacy and plenitude through its own proper 
expressive force of determination (cruelty) – Derrida begins by grounding his claims 
regarding the originary double in Artaud’s work in the correspondence with Jacques 
Rivière.
Unpower of Inspiration
We have already, with Deleuze, looked in some depth at Artaud’s letters to Rivière, so I 
will limit the detail, here, to Derrida’s own reading of them. For Derrida, a term from 
Artaud’s Nerve-Scales (1925) summarises the letters’ theme: “unpower”.9 For Derrida, 
“unpower” designates not a capacity proper to the writer but a doubling, the vacillation 
between two states: an inability to express and the expression of that inability. The 
unpower which Artaud gives such a lucid account of in the letters to Rivière is not, for 
Derrida, a lack of inspiration, but is “Poetic inspiration” as such.10 Rather than 
experience inspiration as a fair wind which facilitates the authentic presentation of a 
sovereign self, Artaud understands that inspiration necessarily comes from elsewhere – 
in fact is, Derrida argues, breathed in from elsewhere; inspired (as in respired). As such,
what might previously have been thought of as the “generosity of inspiration”, its 
“positive irruption” is, in fact, a spiriting away [soufflé].11 Unpower, then, is for Derrida,
“the fecundity of the other breath [souffle]”,12 the breath of an other (what Deleuze 
celebrated as the impersonality of thought and the body without organs). Derrida reads 
Artaud’s letters as the torturous experience of a double-bind, the experience not so much
of a simple “absence” but also, at turns, of a “radical irresponsibility”,13 whereby Artaud







think, or when he does it is the anterior other which writes or thinks through him. That 
which we might have thought belonged to Artaud most authentically is, in fact, always-
already stolen by the “inspirator” [souffleur] which breathes it in to him – there is that or
silence, the void. As such, Derrida argues, what Artaud thematises as unpower is that 
“Poetic inspiration” is always-already expropriation: theft. And, just as Artaud took 
Decroux’s calls for silence to their metaphysical pitch – superadding ontology to the 
practical programme – Derrida notes that this “irresponsibility” “is a total and original 
loss of existence itself”14: the rending of the poet from himself through the very writing 
of poetry, and the resultant complicity in it always having been thus.
This poet’s problem extends to the actor. For if the consciousness of Artaud the poet is 
always already doubled as itself and not itself – is most itself, most poetic, when least 
itself, least responsible for itself – if there is always an expropriation by an anteriority 
which forces him to be aware of his poem as originating elsewhere (irresponsibility; 
impropriety), in precisely the same manner, “Artaud ceaselessly repeated this: the origin
and urgency of speech, that which impelled him into expression, was confused with his 
own lack of speech, with ‘having nothing to say’ in his own name.”15 Which is to say, 
expropriation is originary, theft is constitutive of being, anterior. The originary 
expropriation that is poetic inspiration is precisely analogous, for Derrida, to that 
undecidability at the edge of the stage (undecidably on/off the stage; of/not of the stage)
designated by souffleur. The souffleur being on the stage but not of it thus becomes a 
transcendent condition of the stage: a determination to which the bodies on stage have 
no access; a cruelty which is anterior to them and by which their words and breath dis-
integrate, and bodies are subjected to a theft as old as themselves, to an anterior 
determining force.




There is thus something that is destroying my thinking, a something which does 
not prevent me from being what I might be, but which leaves me, if I may so, in 
abeyance. A something furtive which takes away from me the words which I 
have found.16
So, Derrida legitimately finds in Artaud’s own writings the conflation which he is 
building this essay, “La parole soufflée”, around: the figuration of the problem of speech
on the stage raised to a metaphysical level and expressed through the figure of the 
prompter, which is to say, the thief who is always-already there when Artaud “finds” 
words. In this way, Derrida argues, authentic speech on the stage (as anywhere else) will
also be impossible. If, contrary to this given state of affairs in the theatre and in 
metaphysics rather “Artaud desires a theater in which repetition is impossible”, then this
will be, necessarily, forever frustrated, for “[a]s soon as I speak, the words I have found 
(as soon as they are words) no longer belong to me, are originally repeated.”17 
Repetition, theft, is originary here, not a posterior operation – nor can it, for Derrida, 
ever be finally gone beyond. There is, Derrida explains, no having done with the 
prompter. I use the phrasing “having done with” advisedly, for this archaic prompter – 
whose “history has taken place” always-already, wherever one might find oneself – is 
for Derrida not only “[t]he Other, the Thief, the Furtive One”, but also “has a proper 
name: God.”18
Reading as God
This always-anterior prompter which steals from Artaud’s every utterance diagnoses, for
Derrida, the specific theme of Artaud’s correspondence, but more significantly it is a 
general linguistic problem. The problem of the prompter, he says, is the frustrated urge 
for the sovereignty of unrepeated, uncopied speech, and this merely “amounts to 
acknowledging the autonomy of the signifier”.19 Put another way, “before me the 
16 Cited ibid. Bass has used the City Lights anthology which we have already explained our reasons for 





signified on its own says more than I believe that I mean to say, and in relation to it, my 
meaning-to-say is submissive rather than active”20: the generic proposition that the 
speaker comes after language. As a proposition of structural linguistics, this tells us only
that langue precedes parole – that the system of language precedes and grounds the 
possibility of a meaningful utterance; or, as Derrida puts it “speech and writing are 
always unavowably taken from a reading”,21 where “reading” names the anteriority of 
langue over parole, such that all speech would be merely an inflection of our 
constitutive passivity or posteriority in relation to language.
As such, reading – that “which simultaneously hides me and purloins my powers of 
inauguration”22 – is not simply one instance of the anteriority of the structure, but “the 
form of the original theft, the most archaic elusion”23; quintessential unpower. Like God,
the “history” of speech – its very ground, namely language – would always-already 
have “taken place”.24 As such, as Artaud viscerally experienced, language will always 
have stolen speech from the speaker – there would only be one origin of meaning. The 
power, the possibility and the very breath of an utterance is located in this ancestor – 
reading, langue, God, prompter – such that in order to speak for oneself, one must have 
recourse to a system of meaning – and a source of oxygen – which is not oneself, which 
is the Other: authentic utterance is always passage through the Other; the passage of the 
anterior Other through self.
It is thus that Derrida reasserts the continuity between Artaud’s letters to Rivière and 
themes of The Theatre and Its Double a decade later: what Derrida, borrowing from the 
Nerve Scales poems, calls unpower is thematised – indeed, exists as “the continuous and
always unperceived trait”,25 he argues – through Artaud’s œuvre as a pained 








body. In sum, Artaud’s very being is always-already purloined and divvied up. This 
anterior ground is theft, God-the-great-Furtive-One, the Other. Derrida rehearses the 
passage of this general statement – this classical metaphysical organisation – from its 
genericity into the disturbing conclusions of its embodiment in (or rather, its 
disembodiment of) a body, Artaud’s: throwing his voice, ventriloquising Artaud in an 
oddly violent stylistic quirk we will address below, Derrida writes,
If my speech is not my breath [souffle], if my letter is not my speech, this is so 
because my spirit was already no longer my body, my body no longer my 
gestures, my gestures no longer my life.26
And it is this rending asunder which, Derrida argues, sets the stage for Artaud’s project: 
“[t]he integrity of the flesh torn by all these differences must be restored in the 
theatre.”27 The theatre, then, as the reintegration of parts with other parts and of each 
part with itself, against originary theft and against the sharing out of the loot. As such, 
this furtive one is associated with two further terms: representation and death.
Death, here, is not given as that which comes at the end of life, not the conclusion of 
“the adventure”, but simultaneous with birth – for the theft must have happened at (if 
not as) the very first, the most anterior moment: it lives alongside us as impersonal other
constitutive of self. Derrida quotes Artaud: it is “‘as if being born has for a long time 
smelled of dying’”28 – and, indeed, we have already seen many more instances of 
Artaud equating birth, gestation and conception, with death. Within the “category of 
theft” which Derrida finds thematised throughout the first decade of Artaud’s œuvre, he 
goes so far as to argue that “[d]eath yields to conceptualization”.29 Far from being the 
unthinkable, in Derrida’s account of Artaud’s thought, death becomes the “articulated 
form of our relationship to the Other” in that “I die only of the other: through him, in 
26 p225 ibid.
27 ibid.
28 p11 Antonin Artaud “Douze textes inédits” in 84 No.5–6 (1948), cited p227 WD
29 p227 Derrida “Soufflée”
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him.”30 This other, then, represents death, is representation as death. Because it always 
precedes me, anteriority – call it Langue, the Other, the Thief, God – “is the difference 
which insinuates itself between myself and myself as my death.”31 As such, this death is 
anything which delivers the body to the systemic, impersonal and anterior. It is always-
already there: death already in life; signification-reading already in writing; souffleur 
already in speech; genital-parents and organ-God already in my body. It is this which 
Artaud consistently challenges. Where Derrida will find Artaud to nonetheless fall back 
on the very structure of that which he would have done with – the structure of theft, of 
death – through Artaud’s case studies, and in particular the way in which death steals in,
divests, and is refigured in these late letters and essays, we will find a quite different 
role for death in his œuvre (one prefigured in our reading of Artaud le Mômo, above).
Beyond Simple Anteriority
Far from “the dream of a life without difference” or “the essence of the mythic itself”, 
Derrida argues, we should ask “what difference within the flesh might mean for 
Artaud.”32 Artaud does not bow to the grace of inspiration with pious gratitude; rather, 
for Derrida, he demonstrates how the metaphysics of the One (Classical, Western 
metaphysics) breaks itself open in its incarnation, by coming into conflict with another 
law, the law of the flesh or the revolt of the particular. If Artaud wants to be 
acknowledged in his particularity vis-a-vis the anteriority of the general (of God, of 
death), this for Derrida opens up a vacillation between Artaud acknowledging the 
metaphysics of the One as his tormentor and fighting to establish another metaphysics; 
it is thus that Derrida finds Artaud – despite himself – to be available for deconstruction.
What Artaud seeks, Derrida tells us, is not nostalgia: he does not seek to steal back what
is his, but to steal theft from theft; to make expropriative anteriority his own. This 





because it precedes all texts.”33 Rather it would evade the prompter – the reader with the
text older than the stage and the breath older than the actors – and “would take 
possession of itself in a place where property would not yet be theft.”34 This, for 
Derrida, does nonetheless advance through “difference in the Flesh”: it is an inspiration,
but one in which Artaud “opposes to this inspiration of loss and dispossession a good 
inspiration [a good theft which] would return me to true communication with myself 
and would give me back speech”.35
It is precisely this search for the other law (the law of the flesh) which, as we shall see, 
for Derrida both falls back on the structure of Classical metaphysics (hence always 
restarting the interminable battle with God), and which puts Artaud’s “case” in a series 
with those other authors who thematise the problem of the case, that is, the problem of 







Put simply, the example always affirms and exceeds that which it is an example of, its 
proper belonging is undecidable. It affirms the general law which it exemplifies, 
supporting the One law without exception. In this it is exchangeable with other 
examples, which will also confirm the law. Yet the example also violates the One law, 
breaking it open by partaking of another law, the law testified to by the example being 
particular, by it being, perhaps, the best example, hence not equal amongst others.
The case study of Artaud in “La parole soufflée” is contemporaneous to Derrida 
addressing the example of Rousseau in Of Grammatology (1967). It is followed by the 
staged encounter between Hegel and Jean Genet in Glas (1974), and the problem of the 
example in relation to Kant and judgement in The Truth in Painting (1978). This Part 
will examine these discussions of exemplarity to enable us to understand the place of 
the example in Derrida’s early work, and to show how Artaud’s own series of examples 
works differently in significant ways – not least around the ideas of theft and death in 
finding and founding his body.
Rousseau; Or, Justifying the Example
For Irene E. Harvey – the commentator who has most doggedly pursued the problem of 
the example through Derrida’s work, whilst nonetheless avoiding the name Artaud – the
example is enmired in a certain impossibility from the outset of Derrida’s œuvre: in the 
case of Rousseau, the “impossible task” is “justifying the example”36; the problem of 
36 p206 Irene E. Harvey “Derrida and the Issues of Exemplarity” in ed. David Wood Derrida: A Critical
Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). See also Irene E. Harvey Labyrinths of Exemplarity: At the Limits
of Deconstruction (New York, NY: SUNY, 2002).
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how to justify this example over the others one might have chosen. Where the example 
should be replaceable – one possible option from a set which all conform to and confirm
the one system – Derrida encounters a seemingly intractable problem: “Why accord an 
‘exemplary’ value to the ‘age of Rousseau’? What privileged place does Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau occupy […]?”37 Already, we see, on this first encounter with the problem, that
the example is finding its place in two sequences which cannot agree with each other: 
“Rousseau” is antonomasia, a name which can stand in for “the ‘age of Rousseau’”.38 If 
he is the best example his name both serves the function of being typical of the age yet 
is also atypical: it is exemplary or unique; for Derrida, Rousseau’s work occupies “a 
singular position.”39 Always this splitting between system and singular – between 
belonging to a group governed by the law (in which the example is exchangeable for 
any other example) and unique, idiomatic, incomparable. The example vacillates 
between pillar and post, unable to fulfil monogamously the generic function of 
upholding the One law whilst preserving its own particularity. It is this problem – this 
undecidability of the example’s belonging – which, as Harvey explains, splits open the 
example to show it to be neither fully lawful nor “lawless”.40 She goes on,
Rousseau is already seen here as both a mere example – one case among others 
– hence justifiable, and at the same time, and necessarily so, an Exemplar – 
unique, singular, and therefore the best, indeed, the only, choice. The choice here
is thus divided by two laws to which it seems to adhere simultaneously: the law 
of uniqueness [...] and the law of substitutability, which is overcome [...]. Thus 
we have not one law here but two revealed in the process of justification.41
Artaud’s refusal to be substituted – his insistence on being purely “idiomatic” (the term 
used in Glas for the unique)42 – is, for Derrida, expressed as early as the Rivière letters, 
when he talks of himself as a case: not simply an example of something general (a 
lovely specimen, as I have argued Deleuze makes of him), but unique, not gone before, 
37 p97 Jacques Derrida Of Grammatology trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997).
38 ibid.
39 ibid.




without antecedent – “lawless”, we might say.43 But, this insistence on his singularity – 
Artaud’s being “one, not many”,44 that is, not one of many – is not ultimately tenable for
Derrida. As we shall see in the discussion of Kant, this is because, for Derrida, such a 
case opens up a law of the lawless, and this second law is still structured by the same 
system of legality as the law of substitutability which its Exemplarity seemed to 
overcome; which is to say that, on a structural level, despite itself, the idiomatic falls 
back on the law of the One. By always endeavouring to escape whilst always 
reinscribing it, Artaud, for Derrida, endlessly shuttles about without ever finally having 
done with Classical metaphysics.
Kant; Or, The Example and the Law
So, the example will always, for Derrida, attest to two laws: on the one hand, it must 
exist as a part of a system that it exemplifies and a set from which it can be chosen – as 
Harvey puts it, the “choice must be one of many: substitutable, replaceable, repeatable 
by others in a series”.45 On the other hand, the example must be apart from these 
systems and sets, must have an irreducible element: “be unique: one of a kind, not part 
of a series, but idiomatic.”46 We shall look further at how the example splits itself or 
vibrates between these laws – the law and the law of the outlaw – below, in reference to 
Genet, but it is worth jumping forwards, here, to look at Derrida’s treatment of Kant in 
The Truth in Painting. There, Derrida takes up Kant’s distinction between determinant 
and reflective judgement in order to distinguish two different functions of examples in 
thought. Though apparently different, these two operations ultimately, for Derrida, have 
the same result: to affirm systematicity (and, thus, anteriority). No case will be fully 
“lawless”, and thus will always fall back on systematicity as such. Derrida will repeat 
this argument in his early essays on Artaud to claim that Critical and Clinical readings, 
43 p207 ibid.
44 “Je suis Un / et non nombreux” [“I am One / and not many”] This is the only handwritten text from 
the notebook page reproduced p11 Antonin Artaud “Pages de Carnet avec Dessins” in Luna-Park 
No.5 (October 1979). My translation.
45 p214 Harvey “Derrida and the Issues of Exemplarity”
46 ibid.
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whilst obeying different laws nonetheless are “complicit”47 in legality as such, and that 
Artaud’s own outlaw breaks with closed, anterior systems always reinscribe the 
systematicity of the Law, never finally acceding to a body “impossible to pierce”.48
“Kant wrote his introduction after finishing the book”, Derrida tells us of the Critique of
Judgement.49 From this philological anecdote Derrida avers two orders in which to read 
the book: following the order in which the pages were written or the order in which they
are presented, bound. These correspond to a “de jure” or “de facto” reading,50 which is 
to say that one can follow either the Absolute law, or the course of events: a distinction 
Derrida also examines in the opening pages of “La parole soufflée”.51 Recalling that 
reading is associated with anteriority, we might argue that, for Artaud, the de jure 
corresponds to God (the always-already antecedent) and de facto to genitality 
(ancestry). These are in cahoots, for Artaud, and similarly, as we shall see, for Derrida, 
either way of reading the book ultimately affirms the law as an anterior ground of 
judgement, even if there are two operations of exemplification.
In Truth in Painting, the de jure and de facto – architectonic abstract or emergent/causal 
historical sequence – correspond to two articulations of particular example and general 
law as they are found in Kant’s third Critique: namely, to reflective and determinant 
judgement. It is worth quoting the relevant passage from Truth in Painting at length, 
here:
The faculty of judgment in general allows one to think the particular as 
contained under the general (rule, principle, law). When the generality is given 
first, the operation of judgment subsumes and determines the particular. It is 
determinant (bestimmend) [...]. In the contrary hypothesis, the reflective 
47 p218 Derrida “Soufflée”
48 p506 SW
49 p50 Jacques Derrida The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Ann Arbor, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1987)
50 ibid. We recall, also, Deleuze’s uncharacteristic use of this de jure/de facto distinction, a propos 
Artaud, p147 DR
51 See p213 Derrida “Soufflée”, where they correspond, in the response to Foucault, concerning 
madness as “abstract figuration” and “historicity” or “a historical relationship”.
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judgment (reflectirend) has only the particular at its disposal and must climb 
back up to, return toward generality: the example (this is what matters to us 
here) is here given prior to the law and, in its very uniqueness as example, 
allows one to discover that law.52
Through either path, the law precedes the example – an example’s historical relation to 
the law varies (illustration or discovery), but the anteriority of the law, its grounding in 
legality as such, is ultimately impervious. There is thus, for Derrida, already the Great 
furtive one lurking in any idiomatic break. The example cannot found a law, here, but 
can only facilitate the finding of a law. Vigilant searching for reflective breaks from the 
given (western theatre, western metaphysics as determinantly affirmed, illustrated, with 
each hammy performance, each prompted utterance) is crucial for Artaud – and 
throughout his life, he will continue to hunt down the hiding places of laws in order to 
weaponise against them. But for Derrida, the general structure of furtivity will always 
reassert itself every time the idiomatic breaks with determinant judgement, making 
Artaud’s project out of determinant metaphysics in fact ultimately “more faithful” to 
Classical metaphysics “than it is to itself”53; Artaud can break with originary 
expropriation, he argues, only by doubling the logic of expropriation – stealing from 
theft, “souffleur soufflée”54 – never by finally having done with it.
If, as Derrida argues, the goal of Western metaphysics is a book which “one ought to be 
able to begin anywhere and follow [in] any order”,55 which “one can in principle enter 
[...] from any point”,56 the only possible break with such an Absolute (and the reader’s 
place in its margins as pre-determined illustrator) is to keep opening the text up from 
within through its own reflective history. In the example of Kant’s third Critique, for 
Derrida the history of the book (introduction last) is not erased in the book’s 
completion, though it leads to that complete, architectonic system. (As we shall see, in 
52 p51 Derrida Truth in Painting
53 p230 Derrida “Soufflée”
54 p221 ibid.
55 p50 Truth in Painting
56 ibid. This is quite different from Deleuze and Guattari’s invitation (in a nod to Burroughs) to read A 
Thousand Plateaus in this way, pxx ATP
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“La parole soufflée” Derrida indicts Blanchot for seeming to erase Artaud’s history, his 
suffering, once the immutable truth he reveals has arrived.) Derrida refuses to choose 
either option – refuses to give ultimate priority to either the historical becoming of the 
book or its abstract Being as metaphysical “architecture”.57 Even if reflective and 
determinant judgement both attest to the anteriority of law over example, in Derrida’s 
reading(s) of the third Critique it is not the same law which both of these operations 
affirm: the One law is ever being broken open and fallen back onto, always the 
interminable ungrounding of one law by the other. As such, Harvey is quite right to 
assert that rather than “dislocating” metaphysics – that is to say, finally dethroning it – 
Derrida “doubles” it.58 In a sense, then, Derrida is not proposing anything after Kant, 
here, but putting two Kantian operations into an interference pattern; refusing to finally 
choose one over the other.
Certainly the refusal to reduce one metaphysics to the other is an astute move when 
reading Artaud, but we must not forget that even if Derrida takes seriously Artaud’s 
demands for a break with metaphysics, the restoration of “Danger”,59 he nonetheless 
refuses – interminably delays – any absolute break. Whenever Derrida closes in on 
affirming Artaud’s idiosyncratic metaphysical flesh – the unicity of Artaud’s “case” – it 
is always, rather, deconstruction which he finds. And, as Harvey notes, this “case” is not
unique for this in Derrida’s œuvre: everywhere,
[e]xamples for [Derrida] do nothing more than exhibit other laws. He opens no 
new territory here, but rather multiplies the traditionally univocal territory that 
metaphysics claims for itself. That we have many laws, or at least two here 
revealed in and through examples, does little to open the space to any other 
vision of exemplarity other than either the lawless or lawful. Both options 
simply determine exemplarity via the law and thus, ultimately, with 
indifference.60
57 p50 Derrida Truth in Painting
58 “even with God and the Holocaust, the two limits of exemplarity from Derrida’s point of view, we 
find another law, indeed the law of the other appears as the double of the law of the same, but 
otherwise not troubling the traditional economy of exemplarity as such.” p201 Harvey “Derrida and 
the Issues of Exemplarity”
59 p221 Derrida “Soufflée”
60 p205 Harvey “Derrida and the Issues of Exemplarity”
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What Harvey calls “indifference” of law is, I would argue, precisely the 
“irresponsibility” or “unpower” which Derrida finds thematised in Artaud’s letters to 
Rivière.61 It is indifference to the particular, to the irreducibility of the idiomatic which 
would allow it to remain proper to itself, rather than subjecting it once again to the 
anteriority of the law. It seems that, in Harvey’s reckoning of his reading of the 
example, Derrida would be no less cruel to Artaud than those advocates of the Critical 
or Clinical discourses whom he indicts in “La parole soufflée”. As we will see, Derrida 
argues that whilst those discourses are not commensurable at the level of their particular
operations or priorities, they are complicit in ultimate cruel indifference to the case as 
idiomatic. And the “resource” by which apparently opposed methods perpetuate such a 
“complicity” is precisely the “equivocality lodged in the notion of example”.62
Be it Critical or Clinical, here, the law of reading always steals into Artaud, steals him 
from himself. If Derrida’s response is that Artaud, as example, is also party to another 
law, the law of the other, this law is nonetheless never founded by Artaud, but only 
discovered by him and always still submitted to. If we can agree with Derrida that 
reading Artaud through reflective judgement, under the law of the outlaw is little better 
than using him to illustrate existing laws, we cannot agree that setting Artaud shuttling 
between the two is a marked improvement. As we saw in the previous Chapter with 
Deleuze, having done with the Judgement of God is not alone enough, especially if it is 
replaced with a field of difference which remains anterior to Artaud’s body. All 
anteriorities must be had done with: “my body is never to be touched”,63 Artaud wrote, 
and “Je suis Un / et non nombreux” [“I am One / and not many”].64 It is all the wrong 
cruelty.
61 See, for example, p221 Derrida “Soufflée”
62 p218 ibid.
63 p303 Watchfiends
64 p11 Artaud “Pages de Carnet avec Dessins”. My translation.
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Glas
The question arises, then, as to why it is necessary to think of that which is “outside” of 
the law as nonetheless subject to another law – why, for Derrida, can the idiom not be 
simply an exception properly untouchable by any “new” legislation? Why is there no 
outside to or “after” legality as such? We might turn, then, to Derrida’s attempt to 
account for another of the idiomatic bodies which has scorched France’s twentieth 
century – one whom is often associated with Artaud – Jean Genet65; and to what Derrida
calls the “non-example”. Must breaking the law instantiate a law of the lawless, or can 
there be an instance without law, a body with no anterior, a speech with no Souffleur, 
without its death (God) already inscribed in it? The consequences for philosophy, as 
Harvey explains, would be catastrophic:
the machinery of philosophy as the including of examples – indeed the 
constitution of examples (their creation, production, identification and control) 
[... is] such that the non-exemplary would violate the spirit (if not the letter) of 
philosophy as such.66
She goes on to make an important distinction between “excluded” and “radically 
other”.67 In Derrida’s reading of Hegel, the “excluded” is kept available for later 
inclusion under the One law (thus the sovereign is always-already in place), whereas the
“radically other” will not later be included but has properly broken with the law. 
Derrida’s most sustained attention to the non-exemplary and the “law of the outlaw” 
comes in his 1974 book Glas,68 which stages a confrontation between Hegel, as the 
apogee of Western metaphysical systematic thought, and Genet, France’s great outlaw. 
Here, the Great theft which is systematicity plays out in relation to an actual thief; and if
65 e.g. “Incarcerated with Artaud and Genet: Celebrating the Legacy of Two of this Century’s Most 
Inspirational Artistic Figures”. Conference held at the Institute of Contemporary Art (ICA), London, 
31st May–2nd June 1996. Details: 
<http://www.hmgt.co.uk/ica/OldWEBSITE/Bulletin/artaud/artaudgenet.html> Last accessed 12th 
August 2016.
66 pp195–6 Harvey “Derrida and the Issues of Exemplarity”.
67 ibid.
68 Jacques Derrida Glas trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1986)
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in “La parole soufflée”, theft, for Derrida, is both an ontological impropriety and the 
means of overcoming it, the same is true of Genet in Glas. Derrida’s title also refers to 
that other furtivity of the Absolute: God as “the name of Death itself, the name of God 
within me”69: Glas is a death-knell, the bell of death as vibration and reverberation, 
then, vacillating between one and the other.
The unusual layout of Glas is inspired by Artaud’s spells, drawings and notebooks 
(which we will consider in our third Chapter).70 Two columns of text run in parallel, 
each frequently amended and supplemented by further columns, such that a single page 
might have four texts running parallel. The left-hand column advances under the proper 
name “Hegel”, the right under the name of Jean Genet. Within each column, and 
between them – in the empty gutter which separates and binds them – runs the problem 
of the example and of self-exclusion from systematicity, but also the problem of the life 
and the work – the Critical and Clinical discourses, or philosophical vs. biographical 
readings – and their claims of anteriority or independence from each other. All themes 
which also run through “La parole soufflée”.
Hegel: Finite–Infinite
Examples, in Hegel’s philosophy, are finite. As Derrida puts it, examples “can be 
substituted for each other” because they are “particular cases classed according to the 
general law.”71 Under this general law, as we have seen is true elsewhere, finite 
examples can be treated indifferently as interchangeable: for Hegel, this is “the freedom 
of play”.72 Not only is this freedom “made possible by finitude”, but the freedom itself 
“is finite”.73 
69 p421n.29 Derrida “Soufflée”
70 See pp133–4 Geoffrey Hartman “Homage to Glas” in eds. W. J. T. Mitchell and Arnold I. Davidson 
The Late Derrida (Ann Arbor, IL: Chicago University Press, 2007)




Above this finite play of examples is the Exemplary, the example without comparison, 
the “most sublime {raised, elevated, relieved, eminent[...]} example”, which Hegel 
names God, Absolute Spirit.74 In that it is “the universal, truth itself, of which 
everything else is an example”,75 this God is absolutely anterior to everything and the 
final destination.
Necessarily, for Hegel, this exemplary, highest example – this infinite to which the finite
inexorably moves – is the Christian God: He who can “of himself [...] fall into the finite,
incarnate himself, become his own proper example”.76 The Christian God passes into 
the play of the finite, becomes an example, and reintegrates at a higher level through the
ascension of Christ – the finite element of God returning to the Absolute (the 
disjunction of finite–infinite overcome at a higher level). But in this ascension, the body
is let fall, is discarded or disappeared as utter waste left outside the system: the body 
that was the idiom of a life. We shall dissociate Artaud from this diagram of 
disembodied finite–infinite sublation in our discussion of materiality in our third 
Chapter, and in this Chapter when we return to the theme of life-unlife in relation to van
Gogh and Artaud le Mômo. For now, it is worth noting that whilst, as we have seen, 
there is little operative difference for Artaud between the improprieties of the divine-
absolute and of the genital-familial, philosophically speaking, however, one is infinite 
and the other finite: the family is precisely a sequence of finitudes: it is the system of 
sexual reproduction that is infinite-anterior. As he reminds us, Artaud, unlike Christ, is 
not born.
Alongside the Absolute and historical raising up of familial metaphysics – the passage 
through the finite other in order to recombine at a higher level – perhaps irreducible to 
this trinity, Derrida finds Genet; impious, orphan, childless Genet. Derrida’s reading of 
74 p51 G.W.F. Hegel “The Realisation of Spirit in History” in Lectures on the Philosophy of World 
History trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), cited p30 Derrida Glas
75 ibid.
76 p30 Derrida Glas. For an longer analysis of God the exemplary in Hegel and Derrida, see pp150–170 
Roland Gasché “God, for Example” in Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1994)
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Genet is driven by his refusal to subject him to the Absolute; just as his reading of Hegel
opens up and short-circuits the great System with biographical, incestuous 
embroideries.77 The refusal of a Hegelian reading of Genet – the refusal of a complete, 
closed reading; of ever having done with reading Genet – allows us to approach Glas as,
in part, a response to Sartre’s 1952 Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr.78
Derrida|Sartre; Genet|Hegel
The passages of Glas which most closely concern the example in Hegel (those pages 
cited from above) run next to a long quotation from and commentary on Sartre’s book. 
Sartre’s rejection of psychoanalytical and Marxist readings of Genet are, at least 
superficially, similar to Derrida’s own rejection of the false choice between Critical or 
Clinical (the man or the work) which he takes up in the opening pages of “La parole 
soufflée”. As Derrida recounts it, “the avoidance of psychoanalysis and Marxism” 
which Sartre’s existentialist reading proposes holds that Genet’s works – wherein the 
life of the man and the work of literature would seem to be intractably woven – “must 
be thought in the name of freedom”, the “‘original choice,’” and the “‘existential 
project.’”79 In the case of Genet, this original choice is that he “‘has chosen to live; he 
has said, in defiance of all, I will be the Thief. [...] this absurd determination will 
produce the poet Jean Genet.’”80 This choice, for Sartre – this “systematized, hardened 
sulking” – allows us to grasp, in one swoop, both “what [Genet] is today” and “what he 
writes”.81 Sartre is offering us, Derrida argues, the “key” to understanding Genet; that is,
the key to unlock what Genet means – placing him under the One law of signification 
by resolving the life and work at a higher level. It is the sublation of these two – the life 
and the work – under the name of freedom which permits Sartre to make sense of 
Genet.
77 e.g. p166–7 Derrida Glas
78 Jean-Paul Sartre Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr trans. Bernard Frechtman (London: Heinemann, 
1988)




No matter that Sartre had campaigned hard to keep Genet out of prison in the late 
1940s; Derrida does not hesitate to indict Sartre’s reading of “freedom” and “choice” as,
in fact, an “arrest”.82 For Derrida, if Sartre hands us “the ‘keys’ to the-man-and-the-
complete-work”, namely, “their ultimate psychoanalytico-existential signification” he, 
Sartre, impounds Genet through the creation, in a book which claims to advance under 
Genet’s name, of a “passkey, a universal key”.83 A study of a particular case becomes a 
reflective discovery of universal, impersonal anterior law. As Derrida argues, Sartre has 
closed his example up, safely, within the furtive universal, “so what signs Genet would 
be there only to make the example, the case, of a universal structure, which would give 
us its own key.”84 This puts Sartre in very bad company for Derrida – the kind of 
company Artaud too would rail against: “[w]hen one speaks of a case, the doctor, the 
judge, the prof, the guard, and the lawyer are already in consultation.”85 As Sartre calls 
out in the closing pages of Saint Genet, “Genet is we”.86 This is no less than stealing 
him from himself; making the unique an example to us all, no better than pillorying him
for his crimes against the established Law.
If Derrida thus condemns Sartre’s quasi-Hegelian reading of Genet (sublation of the 
man and the complete work under the name of freedom and the consequent offering to 
us of the key to his “freedom”), Derrida’s own reading of Genet delves into the latter’s 
notion of property – not as the thief who steals it, but as a “miser” so pure in his 
miserliness that his property becomes inseparate from him.
Proper
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Derrida writes,
He keeps nothing close by him, no goods, no works, not himself: no absolute 
having {avoir absolu} as being-close-by-self. He has no place. He slips away 
and squanders himself. But perhaps he’s the most consistent miser in all the 
annals of literature.87
This squandering divestment, far from being indifferent to or subtracted from the logic 
of the proper, is a sort of absolutisation of miserliness, for Derrida, in that “[i]t’s a 
matter of amassing an absolute treasure, withdrawn from any evaluation. Priceless.”88 A 
treasure, then, as if infinite, because it is out of exchange, out of the play of the finite. 
The miser as a passage from example to Exemplary; the miser as older than the system 
of exchange, comparable to nothing but himself, not even God – just as Artaud refuses 
to be made in God’s image, measured against that hoary old stick. But inevitably, for 
Derrida, even here a deconstructive logic opens up:
[Genet] knows that one only keeps what one loses. Self. One not only loses what
one doesn’t keep, one loses what one keeps. The other thing [...] is lost because 
you give it up. But the thing you keep is lost because you give up the other. And 
the crack between the two is nothing. The crack is what one must occupy. The 
consistent miser analyzes the crack. And so he shuttles {faire la navette} 
between the two.89
The great miser which Derrida finds Genet to be does not “deposit” his money, does not
keep what he has elsewhere, but makes it indistinguishable from himself (as Genet says 
of his money, “I walk with it, I steal with it, I sleep with it”90). That, or he divests 
himself of it in order to maintain what he is (possessions, like shit, which Genet leaves 
in hotel wardrobes and forgets).91 Property is either Genet himself or irrelevant. Genet 
the miser has no relation to property – as everything is either himself or is not. As thief, 
he is an example of the law, which he errs from and hence affirms (is available for the 
87 p206 Derrida Glas
88 ibid.
89 p207 ibid.
90 p206 ibid. Quotation from p228 Jean Genet Funeral Rites trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York, NY: 
Grove Press, 1969)
91 See p209 Derrida Glas
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courts to make an example of); as miser, he is out of all relation to property, is finding 
another law which cannot be relieved into the One law: the law of the outlaw-miser 
reflectively established – that is Genet’s adventure. These, for Derrida, cannot be finally
resolved, any more than the man and the work should be absolutely resolved one to the 
other or under a sublated, universal third such as existentialism. This wildly subversive 
freedom suits Genet well, perhaps. But as I have argued already, Artaud must 
experience the ongoing shuttling between law and outlaw – precisely what Derrida 
proposes for him – as endless cruelty. And, pace Derrida, two cruelties are no better 
than One.
Deconstruction as Shuttling, Ringing Glas
Derrida finds, a “certain undecidability” which means that Genet will never succumb to 
the One law: he “lets us oscillate between a dialectics (of the undecidable and the 
dialectical [the idiom and the law]) or an undecidability (between the dialectical and the 
undecidable).”92 The “shuttling” between the two laws continues, irresolvably, endlessly
deferring the possibility of ultimate signification (of the kind which would make Genet 
simply “for us”). As we shall also see in the third Chapter when we turn to Derrida’s 
later work on Artaud, this insistence on shuttling and deferment of final resolution 
means that Derrida will always be deferring the efficacy and urgency of Artaud’s 
demands for a metaphysics in the flesh. Derrida’s reading of Artaud is always tempted 
and never consummated, ever ringing the death-knell (the meaning of the word glas) 
and never fully heeding Artaud’s insistence that death is bound in his body, always-
already. Let us not forget that this death-knell on the page, the deferment of finality in 
the very layout of Glas is inspired in Derrida by Artaud’s spells – the immediately 
acting incantations. We will turn to those spells – and their unmediated efficacy – in our 
third Chapter; for now we will trace these wider Derridean concerns of the example, 
theft and death back to his first essay on Artaud.
92 p207 Derrida Glas
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III
Casework in “La parole soufflée”
As we have seen, the general theme of “La parole soufflée” is theft, especially Artaud’s 
characterisation of the anterior (be it playwright, hunger or God) as expropriative. It is 
the systematicity of anteriority which Artaud, Derrida argues, seeks “to explode”.93 It is 
worth recalling that in 1968, less than a year after the republication of “La parole 
soufflée” in Writing and Difference, Deleuze would also draw on the Rivière letters to 
make a similar claim around Artaud’s experience of himself as a “case”: where, as we 
have seen, Deleuze talks of Artaud’s “complete destruction” of the “dogmatic image of 
thought”94 in the Rivière correspondence, Derrida had written of Artaud wanting to 
“explode” “Western metaphysics”.95 For both thinkers, this is the problem which Artaud 
presents for thought. On the one hand Artaud’s experience would seem to confirm the 
structures of classical metaphysics – the total system without remainder; the system of 
theft – yet on the other hand, he is always also fighting this war, exploding and 
destroying the system even if the very necessity of that war (to have done with 
suffering) would seem to foreclose any possible success. The problem, as Derrida takes 
it up, is that the very break with the metaphysics of furtivity (Classical metaphysics) to 
establish a “metaphysics of the flesh”,96 necessarily falls back on the structure of 
metaphysics, one established reflectively rather than determinedly. Whilst they will 
never be commensurate, the final defeat is delayed only at the expense of any final 
victory: an interminable shuttling of escape from Classical metaphysics, only to fall 
back on anteriority as such.
93 p224 ibid.
94 p147 DR




For Derrida, the problem of asserting an anteriority is also ours, as readers. As we have 
seen, he indicts Sartre for making Genet an example to us, for offering us the “key” to 
the “man-and-the-complete-work”.97 In “La parole soufflée”, he demonstrates how both 
Clinical and Critical approaches collude in furtivity:
At the moment when criticism (be it aesthetic, literary, philosophical, etc.) 
allegedly protects the meaning of a thought or the value of a work against 
psychomedical reductions, it comes to the same result through the opposite path:
it creates an example. That is to say, a case.98
All systems of reading, then, create more finite exchangeable examples subject to 
anterior laws: it does not read idiom as idiom. The particular systems which Derrida is 
concerned with in these opening pages of his first essay on Artaud are most broadly 
called the Critical and the Clinical, and they are the two mutually excluding laws of 
reading: one may read armed with the history and forms of literature, or scan the work 
and the life for symptoms of pathology: the book as autonomous form or as excrescence
of a life. Which is to say, before (a) reading even begins, the decision is already made as
to what kind of evidence will be found: symptoms or forms. This is not to say nothing 
new is possible, only that when the idiom breaks out, it is incorporated as form or 
pathology – systematicity is always affirmed. One reads, then, according to these pre-
existing systems; and in accordance with them, one finds in the text “madness” or “the 
work”. Put another way, before the text the Critical or Clinical will already have spoken.
Whether Critical or Clinical, then, reading becomes a jeopardy-free practice which “is 
made to bear witness [...] to a structure whose essential permanence becomes the prime 
preoccupation of the commentary”.99 The example, here, reduced entirely to the system. 
Clearly, no dogmatic image of reading has been exploded, here, and Derrida must reject 
it as a method structurally indisposed to reading Artaud in line with his “stated 
97 p29 Derrida Glas
98 p214 Derrida “Soufflée”
99 ibid.
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intention”100 of a body and a body of work had done with the judgement of the great 
Furtive One.
Hölderlin and Artaud: Homologous Cases?
In fact, “La parole soufflée” begins not with the particular case of Artaud, but the 
general problem of caseworks Critical and Clinical. Derrida’s chosen examples for 
review are Foucault, Blanchot and Laplanche, all readers of Hölderlin concerned with 
the interrelations of Critical and Clinical readings. Whilst these sources sometimes 
speak of “madness and the work”, we will prefer to retain our established vocabulary of 
the body and body-of-work.101 Foucault’s argument is based on a close reading of 
Laplanche’s Hölderlin and the Question of the Father.102 As Derrida summarises it, 
Foucault claims to reveal not a conjunction of the critical and the clinical, but an 
“‘extraordinarily rapid oscillation’”103 between the two resulting in an “illusion of 
unity”.104 From this observation, which he underpins with a pronouncement on the de 
jure impossibility of a conjunction, Foucault concludes that this very illusion of unity 
between the critical and clinical “‘permits the absoluteness of the rupture between them 
to appear.’”105 Despite its being absolute, note, Foucault does insist that this rupture is 
not ahistorical – and he thus calls on us to question our culture’s production of and 
relation to the historical construction of this discursive disjunction.
Foucault had concluded his review by arguing that Hölderlin “occupies a unique and 
100 p221 ibid.
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himself mad before any judgement can take root. See, e.g. pp305–7 Watchfiends.
102 Jean Laplanche Hölderlin and the Question of the Father trans. Luke Carson (Victoria, BC: ELS 
Editions, 2007). Michel Foucault “The Father’s ‘No’” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice trans. 
Donald. F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 68–86.
103 Foucault cited p213 Derrida “Soufflée”
104 p213 ibid.
105 Foucault cited ibid.
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exemplary position” at the inaugural moment of the modern rupture between “madness”
and the “work”.106 And, indeed, it is the question of the example – the methodological 
violence shared by the critical and the clinical – that allows Derrida to segue, as if 
seamlessly, from discussing Foucault on Hölderlin to Blanchot’s 1956 essay on Artaud –
an essay from which we quoted in the first Chapter of this thesis.107 Derrida comments 
on what he calls Blanchot’s “pre-Hegelian” exemplification of Artaud: Blanchot writes 
of Artaud’s theme of “unpower” – Derrida’s own take on which we have discussed, 
above – as uncovering of something “essential to thought”.108 “Admiring” as he is of 
Blanchot’s insights, Derrida also admonishes him for accusing Artaud of making “‘a 
pathetic error’”, that is, the error of objecting to the pain contingent on the experience of
unpower, as if, for Blanchot the “error is Artaud’s history, his erased trace on the way to 
truth.”109 Restating Blanchot’s shortcoming in terms of the problem of the example, 
Derrida finds him to be bound to a classical metaphysics under which “Artaud’s entire 
adventure is purportedly only the index of a transcendental structure”,110 and through 
which the “pathetic error” is “the weight of example and existence which keeps him 
[Artaud] remote from the truth he hopelessly indicates.”111 We should be content, it 
seems, if our pain reveals a universal truth – but as Derrida notes, Artaud has no 
intention of “exemplify[ing]” any “system”.112 Deconstruction, for Derrida, does not fall
into such methodological traps, as Truth and history, de jure and de facto open each 
other in an endless shuttling.
For Derrida, Blanchot’s letting fall of idiomatic life as waste on the way to truth is 
revealed to facilitate a methodological disjunction of the Critical and the Clinical, such 
that, if we follow Blanchot’s argument, “[t]hat which belongs to Artaud without 
recourse – his experience itself – can without harm be abandoned by the critic and left 
106 Foucault cited p218 ibid.
107 pp 34–40 Blanchot “Artaud”







to the psychologists or doctors.”113 As such, Derrida argues, Blanchot finally reaches a 
Hegelian proposition: not by embracing the methodology of the dialectic, but by placing
Artaud into the series of “beautiful souls”, for whom “thought [is] separated from 
life”114 – body separated from body-of-work, with each under an anterior reading-
system. The horror with which Artaud was already experiencing this situation, this 
separation, is far from beautiful.
We see again, here, how there is not only the problem of the structure which steals from 
the example (cruelty of anteriority), but also the problem of splitting the subject into 
pieces between the two discourses – body|work, critical|clinical – cruelty of organ 
specialisation. This is the “choice” which Derrida is confronting himself with: on the 
one hand there is the metaphysical urge for One system without remainder (furtivity); 
on the other hand, there is the splitting of the subject into two – the part which heads for
the eternal (and comes under criticism) and the part which is let fall on this path and 
picked up by a different system (which falls to the clinic). As we have seen, though, the 
concern which Derrida has is that this disjunction, too, will be overcome at a later date, 
that the “shattering attention” that breaks the example between Critical and Clinical 
merely comes to affirm systematicity per se, the collusion of all commentary in 
systematicity per se. But where Sartre sublates the two modes into the unity of 
existentialism (freedom-as-key, the original decision), Blanchot raises the disjunction 
itself of Critical and Clinical to be not only a mode of commentary, but the very theme 
of the work of Hölderlin and Artaud alike.
The Theft that Takes Place
If for Blanchot (as Derrida summarises), “[t]he disappearance of unicity [of Critical and 
Clinical discourse] is even presented as the meaning of the truth of Hölderlin”,115 
113 ibid.
114 ibid. Hegel’s own privileged example was Novalis. See Bass’ translator’s note, p418n.7 ibid.
115 p216 ibid.
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Derrida finds precisely the same logic – which he does not hesitate to call “essentialist” 
– to be identically at work in Blanchot’s writing on Artaud (in particular in the 1958 
essay “Cruel Poetic Reason”).116 For Artaud, as for Hölderlin, then: not only are these 
examples subject to the theft effected by structure, this theft returns and reinserts itself 
in their work as the very theme of that work. We might say that Derrida finds in 
Blanchot’s reading of the poets, then, a sort of doubling of theft: the poet is subjected to 
theft as a general structure, and theft takes their place as that which is said in the work, 
coming between the poet and himself in general and in particular. If in Sartre freedom is
the universal key to a new prison, in Blanchot, for Derrida, theft steals the poet away 
from himself and steals into the poet’s place.117
In the cases of Artaud and Hölderlin, the doubling of theft sees the theft which is the 
generalised structure of language being found to be the meaning of the work, hence, 
erecting it in place of the example. If here the law is revealed through the example, the 
hegemony of the law over the example is reasserted – and this theft is doubled when the
example is effaced a second time by the assertion that its own effacement is the theme 
of the work. In this way, the case not only suffers the law as we all do (the 
exchangeability of the example, anteriority of God, etc.) but is found to (only) reveal the
law through suffering it, as if in a contorted celebration of it. My objection to this 
regards how debilitating and melancholic it necessarily is; an objection to which I will 
argue, Derrida is not immune. As I have already argued against Deleuze, to examine 
Artaud from the point(s) of his own thematisation of suffering misses the movement he 
makes into developing strategies through and against such thefts. It is just such 
116 pp293–297 Maurice Blanchot “Cruel Poetic Reason (the rapacious need for flight)” in The Book to 
Come trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
117 Derrida goes on to discuss Laplanche’s similarity to Blanchot, here, where interestingly it is not theft 
which names originary dispossession but “schizophrenia” (p217–8 WD). Where Blanchot can be 
indicted for following the critical route to find Artaud (and Hölderlin) revealing a truth for all 
thought, letting fall the idiom of life to the clinic and raising up the collapse of thought as the theme 
of the work; Laplanche erects schizophrenia as “not one among other dimensions [...] of the existent 
called man, but indeed the structure that opens the truth of man”, as well as being the theme of 
Hölderlin’s work. (p218 ibid.) The two reach the same double furtivity by opposite means: one 
through the Clinic, the other through Critical means. Either way, furtivity is restored to its anteriority 
de jure (structurally) and de facto (as theme of the work). cf. p451n.41 ATP
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weaponisation of his suffering body which, I will argue in the coming Parts of this 
Chapter, Artaud develops in his own case studies, not least in relation to theft, death and
anterior necessity.
For his part, Derrida does seem to recognise Artaud’s project as one aimed beyond the 
double usurpation. Within this conspiracy of the critical and the clinical – their 
conspiracy in maintaining systematicity, reading as always-already anterior, as God – 
Artaud will, Derrida argues, aim toward a double-turning away in the name of the body, 
and its place, the theatre to seek his
proper-body-upright-without-detritus. Evil, pollution, resides in the critical or 
the clinical: it is to have one’s speech and body become works, objects which 
can be offered up to the furtive haste of the commentator because they are 
supine. For, by definition, the only thing that is not subject to commentary is the 
life of the body, the living flesh whose integrity, opposed to evil and death, is 
maintained by the theatre.118
So, against the thievery of commentaries, of systems, “Artaud promises the existence of 
a speech that is a body, of a body that is a theater, of a theater that is a text because it is 
no longer enslaved to a writing more ancient than itself”.119 This, for Derrida, might be 
equated to thinking Artaud’s project as the excavation of “a totality anterior to the 
separation of the life and the work”.120 Yet, for Derrida this cannot be mere yearning for 
the One, for re-erection. As we have seen, that One, too, would be theft. Any war 
against furtive systematicity – theft – must not only fight determinant exemplarity, but 
also that reflexive exemplarity which finds a new law and, moreover, erects it in place 
of the example as the theme of the work. As such, for Derrida, Artaud’s war must be 
“the very protest itself against exemplification itself”.121 And this, for Derrida, would 








It is not that Derrida does not recognise Artaud’s project, nor that he is not lured to it. It 
is, rather, that he cannot ultimately agree that it succeeds – indeed, disagrees it ever 
finally could without necessarily falling back on the very metaphysics of the One it 
sought to destroy. It is thus that Derrida suspends Artaud in the limbo of shuttling. We 
cannot hesitate to condemn this as another kind of death for Artaud, another external 
necessity to which his body which is his body of work is subjected. In order to lodge 
this objection firmly, it will be necessary to track down the ways in which Derrida finds 
the deconstructionist thrust of “La parole soufflée” to be already at work in its case. But,
more importantly, it will also be necessary to demonstrate that there is in Artaud’s 
œuvre already a methodology of casework which is not commensurate with that of 
Derrida – though its themes (not least death and theft) do resonate. I shall attend to this 
first task briefly, here, as a means of consolidating this adventure through Derrida’s 
early writings and drawing this Part to a close. The latter – the casework – will require a
more extended excursion through Artaud’s own case studies and autobiographical 
writings of his later years wherein increasingly inventive strategies against furtivity are 
pursued and deployed against an ever-escalating threat to Artaud’s body.
Living in Ruins
[T]he structure of theft already lodges (itself in) the relation of speech to 
language. Speech is stolen: since it is stolen from language it is, thus, stolen 
from itself, that is, from the thief who has always already lost speech as property
and initiative.123
Herein the crux of Derrida’s argument. Theft is thus not simply a stable metaphysics of 
language – whereby the system (Langue) precedes and determines this utterance or 
example (parole); the structure of theft doubles itself – asserts itself – even within the 
domain of the Thief. It is just such a doubling which Derrida, at times, argues Artaud 
achieves, and through which he finds deconstruction to be indigenous to Artaud’s 
123 p224 ibid.
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œuvre. But this, for Derrida, is as much an achievement despite himself than Artaud’s 
goal. For Derrida, the very urge which Artaud has to “destroy the dualist metaphysics” 
is itself based in the same urge which brought about that very metaphysics – an urge for 
sovereignty, closure, completeness, unicity. As Derrida argues, in order to avoid the 
theft effected by commentaries, Artaud seeks “an existence that refuses to signify”, “an 
art without works” and “a language without trace”, ultimately, “a pure creation of 
life”.124 All these, ultimately, conspirators in a “unity prior to dissociation”.125
In seeking a “totality anterior to the separation of the life and the work”126 where the 
“critic and the doctor are without resources”127 to continue their cruelties, Artaud, for 
Derrida, comes to partake, once again, in a general problem which he calls the 
“necessary dependency of all destructive discourses” on that which they are pitched 
against.128 Through other means, Derrida argues, Artaud becomes one of many who 
merely return to “inhabit the structures they demolish”.129 The “desire for full presence, 
for nondifference, simultaneously life and death”130 which Derrida acknowledges the 
Theatre of Cruelty is calling for, is ultimately modelled on precisely that which it is 
hurled against: it “always risks returning to metaphysics”.131 Thus, for Derrida, this urge
for a metaphysics of the One will always set in motion an endless shuttling – a death-
knell rung by what Derrida calls Artaud’s “fatal complicity” with metaphysics.132 
Derrida thus makes Artaud his own worst enemy, agent of a self-cancelling which 
Derrida calls deconstruction and pretends to find already-there in Artaud’s work, saving 
it from itself. It is this deconstruction which, Derrida is arguing, holds Artaud back from
fully failing in his project, albeit at the expense of interminable incompletion. This 











spiked instrument in the arsenal of Artaud’s tormentors – with the added insult of it 
having Artaud’s name writ on it. The mirroring of an earlier image, of Artaud’s sperm, 
fresh from his desyzygised genitals, in a jar labelled “Spinoza” is, perhaps, clear: both 
Deleuze and Derrida find something confirmed or deferred in Artaud’s work.
We will return to this argument below. For now, I will turn to Artaud’s own case work, 
and to the complex arrangement of Critical and Clinical discourse which I will argue 
Artaud himself develops in a series of letters and essays from the late 1940s. The figures
of furtiveness and of finitude as death which repeat throughout Artaud’s casework (and 
which, as we have seen are also deployed throughout “La parole soufflée” and more 
widely in Derrida’s œuvre in the 1960s and ’70s) will, in turn, allow us to bring 




What I have been calling Artaud’s casework manifested over a relatively short period in 
his later life, between the beginning of 1946 and the first months of 1947, and so ends 
just as work on Artaud le Mômo begins. The first casework is a letter, written explicitly 
for publication; the second is another letter which should be considered alongside a 
collection of other letters to the same addressee from the same period. The third piece, 
which could be seen as a summation of the technique, is the celebrated essay Van Gogh,
Man Suicided by Society, the only piece to receive official recognition in Artaud’s 
lifetime, in the form of an ex aequo awarding of the Prix Sainte-Beuve, an annual essay 
prize. This Part will attend to the letters on Lautréamont and Coleridge, and the letters 
to Henri Parisot – Les Lettres de Rodez – which precede and contextualise them, and is 
followed by Parts on Artaud’s own opiate addiction and on the van Gogh essay.
Lautréamont-Ducasse
The first case study was written not long before Artaud’s “release” to the clinic at Ivry-
sur-Seine from the asylum at Rodez on 19th March 1946. It was putatively addressed to 
Arthur Adamov – the playwright and translator who was instrumental in arranging 
Artaud’s release from Rodez – but was written for inclusion in Les Cahiers du Sud’s 
special number on the nineteenth-century poet Comte de Lautréamont, which appeared 
in August 1946. That Artaud later expressed the intention to include it in Suppôts et 
Supplications [Watchfiends and Rackscreams] is testament to his high esteem for the 
letter.133
133 pp32–37 OCXIV*; see also p649 SW
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It is in this, the “Letter on Lautréamont”,134 that Artaud first develops the central 
characteristics of his method: to articulate the singularity of the case around the role of 
death, not as the coterminus of the life and the work of the case-subject, but as the agent
of disjunction which forces itself between life and work (as we have seen that the 
Souffleur comes between signification and breath – ultimately stealing both). Death, 
then, not only steals but also steals in; and Artaud’s casework is to analyse the life and 
the work from the point of the subject’s death, with the goal of not sharing the same 
disintegrative fate.
Artaud begins with a most difficult case, one who cannot even be named without 
complications. He is drawn to this death, but as soon as this draw makes its appeal, it 
begins to turn in on itself:
For no one has ever paid enough attention, and I insist on this, to the remorse, 
the evasive flatness of the death of the unthinkable Comte de Lautréamont.
This death was too innocuously flat not to make one want to look more 
closely into the mystery of his life. For exactly what did poor Isidore Ducasse 
die of [...] ?135
It is not so simply the case that Comte de Lautréamont is the nom de plume – nom de 
guerre – of the orthonym Isidore Ducasse. Nor even that the wretched creation has 
taken the name of the creator. For both Lautréamont and Ducasse are signatories of 
works: Lautréamont the signatory of Les Chants de Maldoror (1869), and Ducasse of 
the Poésies (1870).136 This is never a neat nor symmetrical disjunction, however, as 
Ducasse would also straightforwardly refer to Maldoror as his own work.137 It is this 
crippling asymmetry of names; the unbalance and disintegration of life and work – 
which Artaud saw Ducasse could not endure. Asymmetry, as a force stronger than that 
binding the life and the complete works, kills Ducasse.
134 pp469–73 SW translation modified from “Letter about Lautréamont”.
135 p470 SW
136 Parts I and II 1870, though first published in full posthumously, 1920. Comte de Lautréamont 
Maldoror & Complete Works trans. Alexis Lykiard (Boston, MA: Exact Change, 1994)
137 e.g. in a letter accompanying a review copy sent to Victor Hugo, 10th November 1868. pp255–6 ibid.
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The Death of Ducasse: sans autre renseignements
Alongside – exacerbating, if not causing – the problem of asymmetry is the problem of 
external attacks on Lautréamont–Ducasse. For Artaud, bourgeois society is trying to kill
the poet – just as he will later indict society for “suiciding” van Gogh. Bourgeois society
can kill by depleting the work with blunt sensibility. For Artaud, the intensity of 
Maldoror will “not be felt as such by the reader”,138 that is, by those who have grown fat
on capital: “this is because the latter [the reader, hence the bourgeois: the bourgeois-
reader] is merely the echoing apprentice of a whore and the incarnate substance of a 
pig.”139 Despite this bourgeois-reader’s inability to feel the trembling of each and every 
of Lautréamont’s words, they will still insist on bleeding the poet dry: this for the 
double-function of emasculating his aggression toward them – making of it titillating 
blasphemy rather than the force for transformation in the marrow which Artaud finds 
there – all the better to profit from it. Cunning double thefts.
This bourgeois exsanguination of poetry is, for Artaud, no less than the theft of the 
poet’s breath:
For the hypocritical and contemptuous bourgeois, sanctimonious, oblivious, 
potbellied with contemptuous assurance, is in reality none other than that 
thieving antiquity, that [...] ancient underhanded filcher of any pulsation of 
instant poetry, just as it is about to burst forth.140
It is this depletion of both poet and poetry which creates an infinitely thin space 
between Lautréamont and Ducasse. When Lautréamont–Ducasse’s assault on bourgeois 
sensibility threatens to be uncontainable, this seam the bourgeois have inserted between 





24 years old, dies. “History tells us simply, simply and sinisterly, that the death 
certificate was signed by the owner of the hotel and the waiter who brought him his 
meals.”141 A history so stark and paltry that, even for Artaud at first, all that is left is to 
repeat it: this being the “inocuous flatness” that makes Artaud “want to look more 
closely into the mystery of his life”.142
“[O]ne is forced to conclude” finds Artaud “that the world wanted no part”143 of 
Ducasse; that the world withdrew from him as if sucking the air from his lungs and the 
electricity from his nerves. Indeed, he finds something tantamount to a confession in the
cursorily speedy execution of the funeral rites – “the shoddiness of a burial so 
commonplace and so vulgar does not go with the life of Isidore Ducasse, although it 
goes all too well, I think, with everything that is simian about that surreptitious hatred 
with which middle-class stupidity gets rid of every great name”.144 Yet, for Artaud, this 
suiciding by society has a complex mechanism – not simply attacking from the outside 
(with blunt sensibility and profiteering) but also disintegrating Lautréamont–Ducasse 
from the inside which it has stolen into.
Double Death
Certainly, the bourgeois make of the poet a prostitute, his works read only by the same 
“munificent client whose money gave him the right to grind some poor creature in the 
epidermis of a pair of sheets, which may have been clean before the fact but are always 
nauseating afterwards.”145 As much as Lautréamont–Ducasse, by being read, is made 
just such a poor, ground creature, he is also the soiled sheets: the upper and the lower 
epidermal layers between which an irredeemable filth creeps in. Once that filth, the 







it is this which Isidore Ducasse, Artaud argues, dies from: the irreconcilable asymmetry 
between Ducasse and Lautréamont; the sheet of the man and the sheet of the work 
sundered by bourgeois attacks. Thus, the bourgeois makes irreconciliation of self with 
self the murder weapon: the work itself causes the death of the man. For Artaud, “it 
would take little, I would even say that it would take nothing to convince me that the 
impersonal unthinkable Count of heraldic Lautréamont was in relation to Isidore 
Ducasse a kind of indefinable assassin.”146
The bourgeois murder of Ducasse is, indeed, for Artaud the cause of death. But it is also
only a symptom of the playing out of a deeper death which is built into the work itself. 
The other death is the de jure death which is in Lautréamont–Ducasse from his very 
conception, slipped in as his non-inseparateness. It is in an unsuccessful attempt to 
overcome this original, intensive non-inseparateness that Ducasse is killed from the 
inside: “suicided”, as Artaud will later call it. It is worth, here, quoting an incandescent 
passage from the letter:
And I believe that it was this that in the final analysis and on the last day poor 
Isidore Ducasse died of, although in history the Comte de Lautréamont survived 
him. For it was certainly Isidore Ducasse who found the name Lautréamont. But
when he found it he was not alone. I mean that there was around him and his 
soul that microbic flocculation of spies, that slobbering, acrimonious mob of all 
the most sordid parasites of being, all the ancient ghosts of non-being, that 
scrofula of born profiteers who at his deathbed told him: “We are the Comte de 
Lautréamont and you are only Isidore Ducasse and if you do not acknowledge 
that you are only Isidore Ducasse and that we are the Comte de Lautréamont, 
author of Maldoror, we will kill you.” And he died in the early morning, at the 
edge of the impossible night. Sweating and watching his death as if from the 
orifice of his coffin147
Ducasse let his guard down for only a moment. By accident, we assume, but 
nonetheless enough for the death in his work – his death in his work – to catch up with 




who died just a few months short of his 62nd birthday, had not clung with such fortitude.
The Parisot Letters
Before turning squarely to Artaud’s second case, that of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, let us
first attend to a body of letters from a year before the “Coleridge the Traitor” letter, to 
the same addressee, which will provide biographical context. As I have noted, given that
casework concerns the very inseparateness of life and work, this is not mere exposition.
Artaud first wrote to Henri Parisot from Rodez in late 1943. Parisot was to become an 
important addressee: Les Lettres de Rodez (not to be confused with Nouveaux Écrits de 
Rodez, the letters from the same period to Dr. Ferdière) consists entirely of letters to 
Parisot,148 and another letter appears in Les Tarahumaras,149 an early version of which 
Parisot published in his series L’Âge D’Or (1945–7).150 Alongside his publishing work, 
Parisot was also a translator, most famously of Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking 
Glass, but of many others besides, including Coleridge (hence Artaud’s letter on the 
poet). It was perhaps for this reason that André Breton and Paul Eluard first introduced 
Parisot to Artaud, who had been encouraged to produce his own translations of Carroll 
by his doctor at Rodez, Gaston Ferdière.151
The letters to Parisot are wide-ranging in their subject matter. Artaud discusses details of
what he is writing and talks of the mundanities of asylum life and family visits. 
Quotidian concerns and metaphysical exegesis all give seamlessly into each other. In the
letter of 7th September 1945, for example, Artaud gives Parisot instructions to replace 
148 The book comprises five letters dated from 17th September to 27th November 1945.
149 The letter of 7th September 1945, see pp441–3 SW
150 It was excluded from the Flammarion reissues of 1964–92. Full lists of both series available from 
<http://www.revueslitteraires.com/articles.php?lng=fr&pg=1994#01> Last accessed 13.06.2014
151 Parisot was later to publish some of Artaud’s translations of Carroll. Despite these translations, or 
“adaptation-variations”, as he calls them, Artaud claims to have always been quite averse to Carroll’s 
writings see p647 SW. “Adaptation-variation” is the term used by Artaud in his “Variations a Propos 
d’un Thème d’après Lewis Carroll” pp138–40 Antonin Artaud Nouveau Écrits de Rodez (Paris: 
Editions Gallimard, 1977)
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the existing supplement to Voyage to the Land of the Tarahumara because it had been 
written under the evil influence of Christ. The supplement must go, Artaud explains, 
because in it,
I was idiotic enough to say that I had been converted to Jesus Christ, whereas 
Christ is the thing that I have always most abominated, and this conversion was 
merely the result of a terrible spell which caused me to forget my own nature 
and to swallow in the name of communion, here at Rodez, a terrifying number 
of hosts intended to keep me for as long as possible and if possible eternally in a
being which is not my own.152
This letter viciously – and at length – retracts the pious glimpses of asylum religiosity 
which Artaud had described in letters to his sister over the preceding months. But the 
religious mania, which had reached such intensity that the Chaplain himself was 
avoiding Artaud, does pass – and as Artaud explains to Parisot, there is much to be 
undone from these months of Eucharist-gobbling fervour.153 Revising the supplement to 
Voyage to the Land of the Tarahumara is one of these tasks, but there is also the matter 
of the attack to which Artaud has left himself open by taking the host, against which he 
must once again take up the task of defending himself. The supplement must not be 
published, and must be returned to Artaud, because it was not Christ that he went to find
in Mexico but himself, Antonin Artaud. In the next letter which Artaud writes to Parisot,
the matters arising from the publication of Voyage to the Land of the Tarahumara are 
settled, and dispensed with in a few lines. This is now the least of their problems:
dear friend, we still cannot rest. There is something else at the moment on earth 
and in Paris besides literature, publishing, and magazines. There is an old matter
which everyone is talking about privately but which no one in ordinary life is 
willing to talk about publicly [...] something which, through a kind of nauseating
mass hypocrisy, no one is willing to admit that he has noticed, that he has seen 
and experienced. This matter is a kind of mass spell-casting in which the whole 
world more or less participates off and on, while pretending not to be aware of 
it.154
152 pp441–2 SW
153 For the liveliest account of this period and the Chaplain’s avoidance of Artaud, see pp11–28 Sylvère 
Lotringer Mad like Artaud trans. Joanna Spinks (Minneapolis, MN: Univocal, 2015)
154 p443 SW
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Artaud explains – with the quietly disturbing shift of referring to himself in the third 
person, repeating his own name until it becomes an abstract, pounding rhythm, holding 
together the tirade and warding off his predators – that the confinement that he has 
suffered since his deportation from Ireland eight years earlier, and all that he has 
suffered as a result of that confinement, is an outcome of this spell-casting. There is a 
desperation here: he is under attack from the public, and the slightest drop of his guard, 
as he has explained, will allow those enormous, malevolent metaphysical forces to 
occupy his body: not only at that moment, but retroactively from his very conception. 
How close he is to playing out himself the ignominious death of Ducasse is quite clear: 
the endless magical effrontery of those with “their hatred of poetry” and “their love of 
bourgeois ineptitude in a world that has been completely taken over by the middle 
class”155 is relentlessly and ubiquitously striving
at all costs to prevent Antonin Artaud, writer and poet, from realizing in life the 
ideas that he expresses in books, because they know that Antonin Artaud has at 
his disposal means of action which they want to prevent him from using.156
As it would in the letter on Lautréamont, the sheer crassness of sensibility of the general
populous manifests as both a cruel indifference to poetry, and as a malicious intent 
complicit with the metaphysical evil of christ and other evil magics, the deracinating 
force of matrixial gestation, and the slime of sexual desire – all this taking place across 
local and metaphysical planes. It cannot be allowed to continue.
[S]ince my situation is untenable, things are going to go smash, although you do 
not believe it, for I cannot allow groups of spell-casters recruited from all classes
of society to be posted at certain points in Paris in order to influence and 
command my consciousness – me, Artaud, at the mercy of launderers, cleaners, 
druggists, grocers, wine sellers, storekeepers, bank employees, bookkeepers, 
tradesmen, policemen, doctors, university professors, civil servants, even priests,
especially priests, friars, monks, lay brothers, that is, incompetents, all 




which is nothing but the anal and vaginal discharge of all the masses.157
Two further lists follow this: a list of Artaud’s “daughters”, women whom he intends to 
save along with himself from the spell-casters (these daughters were often the subject of
Artaud’s drawings at Rodez and Ivry, and include both of his grandmothers (who were 
sisters), and several other women to whom Artaud was attached, both alive and dead158);
and a detailed list of the locations around Paris where, aided by the police, secret 
meetings of spell-casters take place. This latter list makes a disconcerting juxtaposition 
of empirical, anecdotal evidence (down to dates and times of spell-casting sessions) 
with a horrifying metaphysical war.
The final lines of this letter are deeply tragic in their clarification of the stakes of this 
war of spells and murder. Three matters are starkly highlighted: Artaud is in terrible 
pain, not least in his rectum, which will soon be rotted out by cancer; the desperate need
to be acknowledged which has been burning in him with a crippling intensity at least 
since his letters to Rivière continues; and he is genuinely terrified of soon sharing the 
fate of Ducasse:
I suffer constantly from colic and diarrhea, and this is the least of it. I beg you to
read and reread this letter several times with the greatest attention, for then you 
will understand the fate that bourgeois France imposes on a rebel writer.159
The urgency of all three of these matters – the intense, consuming pain, the need for 
acknowledgement, the imminent and terrible fate – engenders the urgency and acuity 
with which Artaud undertakes his casework. For the genus of “rebel writers” is one  
which he is increasingly aware of being placed in, and thus, I might argue, motivates his
close attention to their deaths, their defeats and their ability to hold together body and 
body-of-work against the furtive attacks of bourgeois magicians – that is, the poet’s 
157 p445 ibid.
158 For an account from one of these women, see René (Colette Thomas) The Testament of the Dead 
Daughter trans. Catherine Petit and Paul Buck (London: Vauxhall and Company, 2014)
159 ibid.
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capacity to write themselves and afford no hiding place to anonymous death. The 
pressing imminence of Artaud’s anxiety spills out in an oddly calm reference to his own 
posthumous readers “a few years from now”.160
We are reminded that these harbingers of death are also thieves: those metaphysical 
forces – so unbound from historical time that they might retroactively possess Artaud 
from his birth – have already stolen a book of Artaud’s and “spirited” it back in time so 
that Carroll could write his “Jabberwocky” as a “sugar-coated and lifeless plagiarism” 
of it.161 The letter ends with a defiance of these agents of magic and theft: the 
unrepeatable force of the stolen book (a unicity which both exacerbates the impact of its
loss and protects it from being fully plagiarised) will be regained. “Forthcoming events 
will make all this clear.”162
October 1945
The themes of theft and disintegration of life and work refrain throughout Artaud’s 
letters to Parisot of October 1945. They are remarkably consistent in their 
(idiosyncratic) logics, and expand to integrate further details. Not least of the 
augmentations is the identification of spell-casters outside of Paris, now covering the 
whole globe. This disturbing increase in numbers, however, signals not so much a 
heightening of Artaud’s fear, as evidence that he is winning the war: these spell-casters, 
he reports, are gathering in the Himalayas: locus of their powers, seat of their “hate-
filled masters”, and a place they have beat a retreat to in the hope they might “escape the
anger that has been rising in me for the past forty-nine years”.163 In addition to further 
details of the attacks made upon him, Artaud also expands on his own intentions. Two 




163 p454 ibid. References to Buddha in this letter and elsewhere, make it likely that Artaud associates the 
Himalayas and Tibet primarily with Buddhism, rather than the Hindu majority in these areas.
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temporalities: another retrospective revision to the intentions he had had for the trip to 
Mexico; and his plans for the future – which will also retroactively effect his life since 
the moment of conception.
The plans Artaud had had for Mexico, he now asserts, were not to be initiated to the 
ceremonies around the sacred Peyotl root, but to find a people capable of understanding 
him: “a race of people who could follow me in my ideas.”164 These ideas concern, 
fundamentally, the living out of poetry – what would later be called “blood poetry”165 – 
as expressive force which has immediate outward effect and affirms an intensive 
inseparateness. In Mexico he would “feel the bodies of men and women, I said bodies, 
tremble and turn in unison with my own, turn [...] to the soul, that is to the bodily and 
physical materialization of a total being of poetry.”166 We will look in more detail at the 
adventure to Mexico in our third Chapter.
Artaud’s explanation of his plans for the future and the concomitant anterior effects are 
expressed through a complicated play of negative, reactive, nihilistic, and positivist 
declarations. They are pitched against the spell-casters, they are thrown against the 
world, and projected beyond it in eldritch directions – a double movement of 
destruction-creation which will be discussed in relation to the subjectile and 
cicatrisation in our third Chapter. The familiar themes coalesce more explicitly, now, 
around Artaud’s poetry itself and the various attempts – metaphysical and mundane, 
gestational and libidinal – to contain and vitiate it:
I blame the men of this age for causing me to be born by the most infamous 
magical maneuvers into a world I wanted no part of, and for trying by similar 
magical maneuvers to prevent me from making a hole in the world in order to 
leave it. I need poetry to live, and I want to see it around me. And I do not accept
the fact that the poet who I am was committed to an insane asylum because he 
wanted to realise his poetry in its natural state. Still less do I accept the fact that 





shifts night and day, station themselves at certain prearranged hours in the streets
or on the boulevards in order to hurl at me torrents of hate which each one, with 
skirts raised or pants unbuttoned, draws from the depths of his sexuality, and that
I have to hear people say that I am exaggerating or that I am raving when I 
condemn these infamous maneuvers which everyone in Paris has seen.167
Genitality, death, hate, matrixial gestation and dark magics are again pitched against 
poetry, the inseparate and creative, expressive force capable of bursting out beyond this 
world and its anterior determinations. It is a battle between two modes of determination 
– between the cruelty of furtive God and the expressive cruelty of determination. Again,
it is neither solely quotidian nor metaphysical, as the inseparateness of these is precisely
what is at stake. Addresses, dates and times concerning the Parisian spell-casting 
network segue seamlessly into deeper details of the circumstances around his 
deportation from Dublin, and from thence to the sinister metaphysical machinery of 
Christianity per se, ultimately closing the circular detour by identifying with each other, 
at a deeper level, the means and metaphysical foundations of Parisian black magic and 
Irish Catholicism.
Artaud’s First Death and Retroactive Causation
The letter which immediately precedes the one on Coleridge – to which we will shortly 
turn – is remarkable for several reasons. It is a short letter, but is followed by a 
“postscriptum” over ten times its length. In the letter itself, Artaud states that he is 
writing two books, one on “Surrealism and the End of the Christian Era” – echoing the 
title of the third issue of La Révolution Surréaliste, which Artaud had edited twenty 
years before168 – and the other, entitled “Measure without Measure”.169 This latter 
reminds us of the lost book which was “spirited” away (for Dodgson–Carroll to 
167 p454 ibid.
168 “1925: End of the Christian Era”. The issue was published on 15th April 1925. Artaud’s rejection of 
Christianity is by now underwritten by quite different concerns to the primarily moral, rather than 
metaphysical complaints of the surrealists. The eschatonic phrase is used by Paule Thévenin as the 
subtitle to one of her books on Artaud. Paule Thévenin Antonin Artaud: Fin de l’ère chrètienne 
(Paris: Éditions Lignes–Léo Scheer, 2006). The preface to Thévenin’s book is by Bataille’s 
biographer, Michel Surya.
169 p456 SW. There is no evidence of either book, see p648 ibid.
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plagiarise “Jabberwocky” from), in that in it Artaud will achieve no less than to “find a 
new language”.170 We are granted a glimpse of this new language in formation, 
interspersed with a densely striking metaphysical proposition. An early form of the 
significant use of page space, which (as we will see in our third Chapter) would become 
such an important feature of the notebook practice, is evident here.
orka ta kana izera
kani zera tabitra
For the indefinite is a press 
ora bulda nerkita
which crushes even itself until it forces out the very blood of the infinite, not as 
a state, but as a being.171
What this new language is set to achieve, then, is to reintegrate blood and the infinite in 
the body, in language, in the “total being of poetry”.172
In the postscript, Artaud gives the fullest account yet of the incident of his being stabbed
in Marseilles in 1915. His account of it is dramatised into a dialogue – this in itself is 
not unusual for his writing, though it is unusual that both parties impart information: it 
is much more usual for Artaud to use other voices simply as feeders for his next lines. 
The account brings together two themes which I am arguing are characteristic of 
Artaud’s casework methodology, and which we have already seen in the “Letter on 
Lautréamont”: the theme of a subject possessed or not coinciding with itself, and the 
theme of transchronological and especially retroactive causation. Indeed, even the 
narrative voice of the account seems to shift across time and space, from 1915 





I was then nineteen years old. I was just passing the drugstore at the corner of 
the Cours Deviliers and the boulevard de la Madeleine when I noticed two 
suspicious-looking characters who were prowling around me as if they were 
about to attack me; I did not know them and one of them smiled at me as if to 
say, “You have nothing to fear from us, you are not the one we are looking for.” 
Then I saw his face change, and in place of the man who was smiling at me I 
saw in the same body a mask of bestiality which struck me because it seemed 
not to belong to this man, and I felt a terrible twisting spasm pass over him. 
“Who am I and what do I want?” he seemed to say to himself suddenly. “This 
man is not my enemy, I do not know him, and I am not going to hurt him.” And 
he walked away. I was starting to walk up the boulevard de la Madeleine when I 
felt the air behind me shake as if something were being torn; and I thought, “It is
the soul of the pimp which is being torn,” and before I had time to turn around I 
felt the blade of a knife tear the back of my heart from behind near the top of the
shoulder blade, less than an inch from the spinal column. And I was sure that 
before the blow a body had fallen behind me, and I fell to the ground myself, but
I thought, “This is not yet my last hour, the blood will go away, it will stop 
flowing,” and so thinking I got up with a terrible pain which, indeed, gradually 
subsided. The pimp on the ground said to me, “It was not me, I would not have 
struck you for anything in the world. I know you, although you have forgotten 
me, and I know who you are; I tried to avoid the blow they tried to force me to 
give you, and if my body delivered it in part, it was because I was suddenly 
possessed, but my soul was not in the blow and I fell trying to tear it out of my 
body.” I answered him, “I know very well who wanted to strike me down, and it 
is an angel, but it is not you. It is an old story which goes back to before the 
beginning,” and as I talked to him I remembered that story of a forgotten crime 
in which Jesus-christ is a moral ape and Lucifer the toady of god. “This story,” I 
told him, “will take us far, and it is far from over,” and indeed it has brought me 
all the way to the asylum of Rodez, where I now find myself in the shadow of 
the most Catholic cathedral on earth, which casts over me night and day 
indefeasible waves of spells. After thirty years I still carry on my back the scar 
of that knife wound whose moving force overcame the man who delivered it 
with his body but not with his soul.173
As Artaud then explains, the “possessed pimp is not unique, and the whole world is now
in the same state”,174 that is, possessed and directing themselves, often contrary to their 
own will, against Artaud. What began in 1915 as physical violence on Artaud delivered 
by proxies who had become separated from themselves is now, three decades later, a 
worldwide conspiracy attempting to split Artaud from himself – a strategy of divestment




the “coma of electroshock”175 at Rodez to the metaphysics and morality of the God and 
priests of Catholicism: “For it is this religion which has chosen to be mind and not 
body”.176 As Artaud observes, it “goes back to before the beginning” and “it is far from 
over”.177
Artaud explains that this anti-philosophy of the body has united Catholics, Buddhists 
and Muslims against him, though the forefront of the battle is between Artaud himself, 
alone, and the forces behind Catholicism. The detail of this hatred of the body is 
aleatory and furtive, slow subversion of self-possession in the name of a divine theft:
it sees in the principle of the body a void which becomes full, and gradually fills
the solid part which is merely its emanation. Which means that there is at the 
base of each living body an unfathomable abyss, an angel who gradually fills it 
from the cellars of eternity and who wishes by submersion to take its place.178
The stakes, as we have seen, are high. The meaning of Artaud’s committal to asylums 
vacillates between genuinely putting him on the back foot, and attacks which – for all 
the suffering which they cause – nonetheless only further attest to the magnitude of the 
threat he poses to those who would silence him. The metaphysical battle is present in 
every detail of his “case”. He explains,
It was for trying to divulge these things that I have been everywhere declared 
mad and finally in 1937 imprisoned, deported, attacked on shipboard, locked up,
poisoned, straitjacketed, put into a coma, and that I have not yet succeeded in 
regaining my freedom.179
The theme of opiates, an important one for this Chapter, also arises here. Indeed, “there 
is at the source of these spells an old matter concerning narcotics which goes back to 






180 ibid. The list of narcotics Artaud gives is largely opiates and sacred hallucinogens but, bizarrely, also 
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because they are linked to “an old pre-genital notion of being”,181 one which Artaud has 
rediscovered – what we earlier saw as the “balls-in-cunt” syzygy, and will find later in 
the Tarahumaran peyotl rite and Artaud’s cane. The organisation of all this around 
himself even allows a brief rewriting of the history of the Anglo-Chinese opium wars as 
a means of withholding drugs from him.
Where we should be engaged in an existence of pure poetry – embodied metaphysics – 
instead we receive slow, occasional drops. Such mean rationing resembles, by no 
coincidence, the sporadic lack of frequency with which Artaud is able to acquire feeble 
amounts of opiates, a class of drugs suited to escaping this fundamental boredom; this 
paralysis of being. His paeans to the powers of opium pass into his new language, with 









tena tana di li
kunchta dzeris
dzama dzena di li182
This language, the one which will recreate that from the stolen book, is “a rhythm of 
exorcism against the drying out of opium by conspiracies and consecrations”183: in 
short, a protection and a return to existence, capable of giving “the leap without the 
tomb”184 – a burst, perhaps, into the unknown beyond, without the termination or letting 
includes “agar-agar” and “beriberi”: the former is an algae better known as the substance in Petri 







fall (tomber) of the body.
It was in the context of Artaud pitching his own case against the metaphysics of 
withdrawal and hatred – amongst the themes of retroaction, opiates and furtive 
sundering – that his letter on Samuel Taylor Coleridge was written. Like the letter on 
Lautréamont, it was written for publication, in this case to preface Parisot’s translations 
of Coleridge’s poems “Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, “Christabel” and “Kubla 
Kahn”.185
“Coleridge the Traitor”
Between the letters to Parisot from the end of 1945 and the letter on Coleridge of 
November 1946, much had changed of Artaud’s material circumstances. A “Sociéte des 
amis d’Artaud” had been formed, led by Jean Paulhan, which raised – from an evening 
of readings of Artaud’s works and through an auction of donated artworks and 
manuscripts – a sum large enough to guarantee Artaud’s financial security.186 By the end
of May 1946 Artaud was in residence in the Parisian suburb of Ivry-sur-Seine. Two 
material guarantees – of accommodation at a clinic and of financial security – were the 
only conditions Dr. Ferdière had laid on Artaud’s release. At Ivry, the clinic’s director, 
Dr. Delmas, handed Artaud a key to the front gates, further attesting to the medical 
community’s diagnosis of an improving mental health. Artaud’s writings, however, bear 
little sign of adjustment of their themes nor any dampening of their intensity.
Like the letter on Lautréamont, the letter on Coleridge sees Artaud tracing the ways in 
185 A note in the Selected Writings states that the letter, dated 17 November 1946, “was not ready in time 
for publication. (The volume appeared in early 1947).” p651 SW. Neither of these statements is true: 
the front matter of Parisot’s volume states that it was filed in July 1947 (“Ce volume a été déposé 
conformement aux lois en juillet 1947”) and printed on 6th September 1947 (“imprimer le six 
Septembre mil neuf cent quarante sept”), ten months after the letter was sent. S.T. Coleridge Le Dit 
du Vieux Marin suivi de Christabel et de Koubla Khan traduit par Henri Parisot (Paris: Librarie José 
Corti (Collection Romantique), 1947).
186 The evening of readings was held at Théâtre Sarah-Bernhardt on 7 June 1947, the auction at Pierre 
Loeb’s Galerie Pierre on 13 June. Donors of work to the auction included “Paulhan […] Dubuffet, 
Braque, Picasso, Giacometti, Sartre, de Beauvoir.” p651 SW
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which the poet’s death relates to his life and work. And, as for Ducasse, Coleridge’s 
shortcomings are ones which Artaud does not find himself immune from. If “it was 
because he, I mean Isidore Ducasse, wanted to be the Comte de Lautréamont, that he 
died”,187 it is also through not integrating poetic and empirical selves that Coleridge will
be burned out and killed, that he will be terminally divested of expressive force: “the 
question arose of being and saying what he saw he was, and it was because he tried to 
say it completely that he died.”188 Like Ducasse, Artaud tells us, Coleridge, too, dies 
“between twenty and twenty-four”,189 in the period of writing “The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner”, “Christabel” and “Kubla Khan”.
Of course, Artaud is well aware that Coleridge lived for another thirty-six years after 
writing these poems, and that he wrote a great deal of poetry in that time – this kind of 
untruth, these fictions which express a deeper reality, will be crucial in Artaud’s essay 
on van Gogh, as we shall see. The death which Coleridge dies at this young age, but 
which does not catch up with him fully for over three decades is, Artaud explains, the 
result of a twofold loss: the loss of blood and the loss of mucus. The loss of mucus is the
loss of sovereignty over the articulation between empirical and poetic being, a condition
which we know already from the “Letter on Lautréamont”: “and for not being able to 
possess his own mucus, the Comte de Lautréamont died of rage.”190 It is mucus, then, 
which holds together body and body-of-work, life-and-the-complete-work. Or, rather, 
mucus separates and binds the two, so is the place where death would steal in to unbind 
their originary inseparateness, as the Souffleur or God unbinds expression from breath, 
splits meaning from life, body from “beautiful soul”, thought from matter. It is what 
Derrida would call “difference within the flesh”,191 which for Artaud is death – 
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The loss of blood is also familiar from Ducasse’s fate, as the emptying out of cruelty 
from poetry: blunt bourgeois sensibility took its revenge on Ducasse as it did on 
Coleridge by demanding and recognising only “poetry poetry”, the prettified singsong 
of poesy bereft of force, “a polite belch on top of the blood-red depths”,192 which covers 
and obscures those depths. As we saw, for Ducasse–Lautréamont, the attack of the 
bourgeois on the blood of poetry and the failure of Ducasse’s mucus are bound in the 
figure of the thief – blood is stolen, spirited away, and this very furtiveness also slips in 
(as death) to live inside as mucus which is proper to an anterior, disintegrating force. 
For Coleridge, this thief is again doubled: two things bind the blood and the mucus as 
they are both drained from him and spirited away from the poems. On the one hand 
there is opium, to which we shall return. On the other hand, there is ill magic, the work 
of initiates of many creeds who wreck immediacy through encryption and mediation of 
blood and debase poetry to song. These initiates are those who succeeded in blinding 
Coleridge from the intensity of his youthful poetic vision, for
Samuel Taylor Coleridge had seen clearly. Thus he had seen that the priest, the 
initiate, the guru, the scholar, with the complicity of the fashionable doctor, of 
the yogi under his folding screens, do not cease to flagellate in secret the true 
heart of the suffering poet, in order to prevent the mucus of blood.193
These initiates – from the monks of French abbeys to those of the Tibetan plains – are 
all intent on draining poetry. From “having wanted to avoid blood”,194 their plainsong 
and mantras become “poem[s] without blood [...] in the form of a song.”195 It is just such
an exsanguinated poetry which Coleridge is reduced to by the loss of his mucus. If he 
does make attempts to refind a poetry of blood, Coleridge fails to reclaim the mucal 
membrane binding life to poetry; he becomes filled with an obscene, simulated version 






and what, in the face of all this, did Samuel Taylor Coleridge do?
The mucus that they stole from him he transformed into opium, and he 
took laudanum until he was dead.
And, under the cover of opium, he wrote music-poems.196
In this blood-mucus matrix, then, music-poetry and opium addiction share a common 
set of causes and effects. Music poetry – “poetry poetry” – as we saw with Lautréamont,
is what the bourgeois reduces the poet to, often through erotic strategies (“the bourgeois 
tongue, the erotic flick of the tongue of Mrs. Obscene Lower-Middle-Class, has never 
loved anything but poetry.”197) Through the syncopation of the empirical and poetic 
selves which the reduction to music poetry causes, the sovereignty over the mucus is 
ceded, and a space becomes available for evil forces of a magical and metaphysical kind
to occupy the body of the poet – from his very conception – precipitating his death and 
from this stronghold of death retroactively draining the poetry of its blood. Copulation 
and capital collude in this process, under the direction of occult force.
Mucal Immortality
The figure of mucus is no less than the familiar Artaudian cosmology regarding the 
inextricability of the body of work and the body of the poet. It shares this much with 
Derrida’s casework, but for Artaud, the stakes are no less than immortality, “[t]he 
human world without mortality”.198 It is precisely this immortality which, Artaud argues,
Coleridge was aware of and which his poems had disclosed – and thus what had made 
Coleridge a target for ill magic. For “Coleridge had seen himself as immortal, and he 
was about to take measures to live, I mean the necessary measures to survive even to 
our own time”.199 All trace of it would later, retroactively, be scraped out of Coleridge 






he allowed himself to be “deceived [...] about the price of mucus”.200 In the end, for 
Artaud, Coleridge became complicit in losing the clarity of his vision, in ceding his 
mucus, and exsanguinating his poetry.
This is the nature of the treachery for which the letter, “Coleridge the Traitor” would be 
given its sobriquet.201 It is a treachery – choosing mere existence over life – Artaud also 
finds thematised in Coleridge’s most famous poem: for “no doubt the crime of the 
ancient mariner is that of Coleridge himself [...] the bird is the human soul which 
Coleridge killed in order to live.”202 Just as for Ducasse, then, Coleridge’s work is not 
only evidence of, but indeed an agent of the poet’s death – here, a protracted, living 
death. Through its exsanguination, Coleridge’s poetry, too, forsakes the mucus which 
would hold together poetry and life in their originary inseparateness. Bad poetry, Artaud
is arguing, is living death, being always-already divested of itself, form divested of its 
expressive force. Death, here, sneaks in to subordinate life and poetry to itself through 
effecting their retroactive, originary separation. It is this furtive separateness – originary
discontinuity with self – which, I have argued, Artaud is in the process of overcoming 
through his fourfold binding of life-death (that is, being, blood), thought and unthought 
(here, the poem as it “bursts forth”203): this is the metaphysics of blood poetry; the 
autopoietic body of Artaud le Mômo. It is a plan of metaphysical proportions because 
such is the wager of the blood poet: he must take on unsleeping forces of immense, 
transchronic power. Clearer and more urgent, here, than in the letter on Lautréamont, 
the stakes are the highest: pluperfect annihilation; never having been.
Opiates: Coleridge
The role of opium in Coleridge’s betrayal of blood poetry, and in his divestment of his 
mucus, is crucial and apparently quite different from the unblocking and lucid creation 
200 ibid.




which we have glimpsed Artaud associating the drug with elsewhere. Here, opium is the
very stuff which the mucus of the exsanguinated poet is transubstantiated into, and it is 
the agent through which the retroactive deletion of Coleridge’s ever having had insight 
is effected, leaving him in death’s waiting room with only anaesthetised regret. It is this 
regret and nothing more which, Artaud callously notes, will henceforth only be 
“expressed in lovely music” in Coleridge’s exsanguinated work.204 The regret is for the 
lost intensity of blood poetry, of the darkness of its insight. It is through his addiction 
that the retroactive rarefaction of the intensity of Coleridge’s vision is effected: “it was 
this darkness, this darkness of the poem itself, that Coleridge must have renounced”.205 
Indeed, this darkness disappears, other than as a shadow, even from “Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner”, “Christabel” and “Kubla Khan”, these poems reduced to mere traces,
“remains of a senseless loss which poetry suffered”206 such that, Artaud argues, “in the 
end Samuel Taylor Coleridge forgot everything.”207
Clearly, opium is not a positive force, here. Artaud is quite right that Coleridge was 
addled by the drug. By 1801 Coleridge, not yet 30 years old, was taking up to one 
hundred drops of laudanum (a preparation of opium dissolved in alcohol) each day. 
From this time, he would never go more than an excruciating day or two without the 
drug. At the peak of his opium “eating”, there are reports of his taking 20,000 drops per 
day – a staggering amount of the drug, not to mention the four pints of alcohol 
(probably brandy) needed to prepare the tincture. In 1816 Coleridge moved in with his 
Doctor for continual treatment, and lived there – addicted, though at times down to ten 
drops per day – until his death eighteen years later. His friends, not least William and 
Dorothy Wordsworth, admirable in their constancy, were painfully aware that a great 
talent was necrotising before them.208 Coleridge himself, as early as 1812, with twenty-
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the story of his addiction could be told as a warning to others.”209
Both Coleridge and Artaud were first given opiates medicinally, as children; and both 
had further medicinal needs as men, for toothaches and excremental pains. Indeed, the 
famous opium rêverie in which Coleridge glimpsed the pleasure dome of “Kubla Khan”
was induced by a dose taken for dysentery. More famously, the poem went 
unfinished.210 Indeed, of Parisot’s choice of poems to translate (and for Artaud to 
Preface), two of the three are unfinished, the other being “Christabel”. Certainly, opium 
draining Coleridge of the means to finish his poems is one exsanguination, but Artaud 
argues that there is also a sense in which the drug depletes the poems themselves: being 
a derivative of mucus,211 opium works on both body and body-of-work.
In her excellent study on Opium and the Romantic Imagination, Alethea Hayter finds a 
confluence in “Christabel” of two major elements of Coleridge’s opiate addiction – ones
which, I would argue, strongly resonate with Artaud’s own reading of Coleridge.212 The 
two themes are unfinished work, and opium personified as a sexually-predatory undead 
woman. If “Kubla Khan” is unfinished because of the famous interruption by “a person 
on business from Porlock”,213 “Christabel” is the first poem to be properly stricken by 
Coleridge’s use of opiates: it is in the foothills of addiction, when Coleridge was 
returning to “Christabel” with the hopes of completing its five-part narrative, but 
managed only to add the second part.214 It is from this winter of 1800, it would seem, 
that the phenomenon which Artaud calls the loss of mucus dates, that index of 
Coleridge’s “treachery” by which the intensity of his poetry is drained and his death – 
209 Coleridge paraphrased ibid.
210 This is Coleridge’s claim (p30 Samuel Taylor Coleridge Selected Poems (London: Everyman, 1996)) 
– but other critics have suggested that, for a fragment, the poem is curiously self-sufficient., e.g. 
pp29–30 Dominic Fox Cold World: The Aesthetics of Dejection and the Politics of Militant 
Dysphoria (Ropley: Zero, 2009).
211 p447 SW “The mucus they stole from him he transformed into opium, and he took laudanum until he 
was dead.”
212 pp205ff Hayter Opium and the Romantic Imagination. Nonetheless, I have no reason to suggest that 
Hayter had read Artaud’s letter.
213 p30 Coleridge Selected Poems
214 For her account, see especially pp205–6 Hayter Opium and the Romantic Imagination
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the death by disintegration of body and body of work which was also Lautréamont–
Ducasse’s death and which threatens to be Artaud’s – retroactively causes itself, sneaks 
furtively into him, between his body and his now-bloodless body of work.
In “Christabel”, opium-death is personified as Geraldine, a woman found in the woods –
ostensibly terrorised – whom the virginal Christabel takes pity on. Geraldine is initially 
unable to cross the threshold of Christabel’s castle-home; the sleeping courtyard mastiff 
gives an angry moan and dying embers rekindle as Geraldine passes; she offers a flimsy
excuse to avoid compline prayers. When undressing for bed – in one of the poem’s 
several homoerotic scenes – the unnameable horror of Geraldine’s hidden nature (“A 
sight to dream of, not to tell!”215) surfaces briefly: she is, as Hayter puts it, “death-in-
Life”.216 In the second part of the poem, a knight of the court recounts a portentous 
dream in which a dove which he knew to be Christabel was bound by a serpent. The 
snake does not eat the dove, but brings it under its power by more occult means: in a 
particularly unsettling passage which we can only imagine Artaud’s reaction to, the 
snake’s victory over the dove is confirmed through their breathing becoming 
synchronous. “For what she knew she could not tell, / O’er mastered by the mighty 
spell”217 – which is to say that, who would speak is silenced by the theft of their breath 
by an erotically-charged necrotic horror. A draining force from within the world of the 
poem, a fiction of death and stolen breath reaching out through the mucus to silence 
Coleridge, too. Hayter’s thesis, then seems perfectly compatible with Artaud’s: the 
poem is arrested not only by Coleridge’s opium torpors, but also as if from within by the
figure of Geraldine.
In one account of a dream, from his diary at the time Coleridge is composing the second
part of “Christabel”, another figure of opiates-as-sex-death seems to have ramifications 
outside of the dream. She gives herself a name:
215 p79 Coleridge Selected Poems
216 See pp205–7 ibid.
217 p91 Coleridge Selected Poems
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a most frightful Dream of a Woman whose features were blended with darkness 
catching hold of my right eye & attempting to pull it out – I caught hold of her 
arm fast – a horrid feel – Wordsworth cried out aloud to me hearing [my] scream
– heard his cry [&] thought it cruel he did not come
but did not wake till his cry was repeated a third time – the Woman’s name Ebn 
Ebn Thalud – When I awoke, my right eyelid swelled –218
The name is derived from a drug-dealer in the Arabian Nights. Artaud also reported 
succubus attacks from Rodez and Ivry, sperm stealers divesting him of his power and 
regenitalising him in attempts to subject him once again to the genital system of 
originary outsides and expropriable spurts. The problem of addiction, as he finds it 
personified as Geraldine or Ebn Ebn Thalud, has the same concerns: it is always-already
there, determining the user, directing their preoccupations and capacities from 
elsewhere, as the souffleur sits offstage overseeing it all.
Artaud’s case-study of Coleridge, as that of Lautréamont–Ducasse, examines the life 
and the work from the point of view of death. Coleridge’s death is brought about by the 
loss of control over his mucus, that is, loss of the originary inseparateness of life and 
work. His opium use – a drug he hoped would restore his mucus to him – in fact 
accelerated the exsanguination of both his body (addict torpor) and his body-of-work 
(making it either songs of regret, or a playground for personified opium-succubi). As we
have seen in the preceding letters to Parisot, Artaud’s own war against these precise 
same expropriating, disintegrating, furtive forces is in full operation – the letter on 
Coleridge, I would argue, leads him to consider ways of avoiding the same fate. We 
have already discussed at length much of Artaud’s thoughts on sex and genitality, our 
next Part will look in more detail at Artaud’s own drug-use as another site of his war 
with anterior determinations.
218 Notebook entry 129 28th November 1800 p19 Samuel Taylor Coleridge Coleridge’s Notebooks: A 




The first volume of translations of Artaud’s work into English were done because of 
drugs. This is a hyperbolic assertion, but one which is not entirely unjustified. In fact, it 
is not my assertion, but one put forward by two of Artaud’s most astute biographers: 
David Rattray and Stephen Barber.219 Both Rattray and Barber denigrate the Artaud 
Anthology published in 1965 by the press arm of Lawrence Ferlinghetti’s City Lights, 
the San Francisco bookstore established in 1953 which became a “beat” mecca 
following their 1956 publication of Ginsberg’s Howl and Other Poems. Ginsberg 
himself cited Artaud’s To Have Done with the Judgement of God and Artaud’s van Gogh
essay as major influences on “Howl”, and had been introduced to Artaud’s work by Carl
Solomon, to whom “Howl” is dedicated.220 As discussed in the previous Chapter, for 
Rattray and Barber, Jack Hirschman was ill-equipped to take on editorial responsibility 
for the book, and the result was poor. More importantly, here, the volume facilitated 
readings of Artaud’s relation to opiates that made him compatible with the libertarian 
frontierism of the beat generation – we will distance ourselves from such a reading 
throughout this Part of this Chapter.221
I will argue that Artaud’s relation to opium moves through three distinct phases. As we 
219 See pp283–290 Rattray “Translating Artaud”; pp251–60 Barber Anatomy of Cruelty
220 Especially to Artaud’s van Gogh essay see p23, p112, pp184–5 Allen Ginsberg Howl: Original 
Facsimile, Transcript, and Variant Versions (New York, NY: HarperPerennial, 1986).
221 Susan Sontag addresses a similar warning: “Most of the once exotic themes of Artaud’s work have 
within the last decade [she is writing in 1973, so the decade since “Howl”] become loudly topical: the
wisdom (or lack of it) to be found in drugs, Oriental religions, magic, the life of North American 
Indians, body language, the insanity trip; the revolt against ‘literature,’ and the belligerent prestige of 
non-verbal arts; the appreciation of schizophrenia; the use of art as violence against the audience; the 
necessity for obscenity. Artaud in the nineteen-twenties had just about every taste (except 
enthusiasms for comic books, science fiction, and Marxism) that was to become prominent in the 
American counterculture of the nineteen sixties, and what he was reading in that decade – the Tibetan
Book of the Dead, books on mysticism, psychiatry, anthropology, tarot, astrology, Yoga, acupuncture 
– is like a prophetic anthology of literature that has recently surfaced as popular reading among the 
advanced young. But the current relevance of Artaud may be as misleading as the obscurity in which 
his work lay until now.” pp.lviii–lix “Artaud: An Essay by Susan Sontag” in SW
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shall see, the Coleridge letter – which I have argued evidences Artaud’s tacit 
identification with the poet, a fear of sharing Coleridge’s fate – sets the scene for the 
final stage. In that third phase, I will argue, Artaud achieves precisely what Coleridge 
cannot: going through those determinations by the outside which are messing up his 
insides and exsanguinating body and work. Artaud will bind external necessity, demand 
and construct its return to his sempiternal will where it belongs, and return his stolen 
opium and his stolen body to the expressive lucidity of the body. As such, we begin to 
see how Artaud works on himself through working on his cases – a theme which we 
will see find fruition in his essay on van Gogh. For now, we will trace Artaud’s opium 
use and writings on drugs chronologically.
Opiates I: Withholding
The earliest of Artaud’s writings on opium for publication are characterised by his 
obsessions with the drug being withheld by the French medico-juridicial complex. They
are two texts from 1925: “General Security: The Liquidation of Opium” which appeared
in the second issue of La Révolution Surréaliste in January222; and the “Letter to the 
Legislator of the Law on Narcotics” included in The Umbilicus of Limbo of July the 
same year.223 The latter was originally to be titled L’Opium Pendu, ou la fécalité de 
l’esprit social [Suspended Opium, or the Excrementality of the Social Spirit], where 
“pendu” invokes both withholding and death by hanging – thus, from the outset, 
Artaud’s need for opium that he might subsist is being asserted.224
The “Letter to the Legislator of the Law on Narcotics” opens by calling its addressee 
“an ass”.225 The first seven of eight bullet points preceding the letter are concerned with 
correcting the Legislator’s apparent misconception of the real economics of drug use, 
222 pp172–5 CWI
223 pp58–61 ibid.
224 My translation. The book is advertised as such in the “Further Reading” listed on the inside cover of 
La Révolution Surréaliste No.2 (January 1925).
225 p68 SW
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namely that most drug addicts are pleasure-seekers not sick individuals, that such 
pleasure-seekers do not purchase their drugs in pharmacies, and that drug-dealers will 
continue to be active as long as there are pleasure-seeking drug users. The eighth point 
is perhaps more radical, and does not seem to logically follow from the preceding ones: 
“8. Sick addicts have an inalienable right within society, which is that they be left the 
hell alone.”226 This argument becomes Artaud’s theme for much of the letter proper. He 
argues that, given that for many the state of suffering defines their very being, it follows
that they have a right of access to any means for the alleviation of suffering, and that the
State has no higher mandate entitling it to deny them this. The law is thus untenable, as 
it “places in the hands of the inspector-usurper of public health the right to have control 
over human suffering”.227 This is a negative conception of freedom: freedom as the 
natural state denied us by blockages which must be dismantled or destroyed. In 
advocating this right to self-medicate, Artaud also shifts the authority of diagnosis from 
the medical professional onto the individual, such that “[e]very man is the judge, and 
the exclusive judge, of the quantity of physical suffering or of mental emptiness that he 
can honestly stand.”228
Beyond the basic right to self-diagnosis, Artaud argues, the awareness of the texture of 
one’s own suffering may well be the only lucidity one has: “Whether I am lucid or not, 
there is a lucidity which no sickness will ever take from me, that is the lucidity which 
dictates to me the sense of my physical life.”229 It is clear, by this point, that Artaud is 
talking of himself, of his “case”, and that he is advocating that the laws of France should
be rewritten around the immutable truth of that case, of his suffering. Quite simply, 
Artaud argues, “if I have lost my lucidity, there is only one thing for medicine to do, and
that is to give me those substances which permit me to recover the use of that 







medical knowledge is unsound: “All the fortuitous scientific knowledge of mankind is 
not superior to the direct knowledge that I can have of my being”.231 He goes on, “I am 
the only judge of what is within me.”232
Artaud is never so crass as to solely advocate the libertarian ideal of self-medication 
free from the state as a right as such of the individual. It is not a given, here, that the 
state should have no control over subjects because of a naturalised, individualistic 
freedom of choice: as the opening of the argument shows, the legislation is simply naïve
as to how drugs circulate and who is using them. What precipitates the demand for a 
freedom of access to drugs, for Artaud, is that he suffers and that as this suffering cannot
be gauged by any but himself, only he is qualified to diagnose and prescribe for his 
condition. It is not because the individual has a inborn sovereignty, but precisely 
because he does not that the state must not interfere. Rather than a negative, libertarian 
notion of freedom underwritten by a simplistic, positive conception of selfhood, then, 
Artaud is proposing that as he is not at all free in himself, and his only lucidity is the 
awareness of his own suffering, the only way to synthesise a positive freedom beyond 
suffering is by the state and the “dictators of the pharmaceutical profession”233 
relinquishing their claims over opium and hence over his body.
The earlier of the two texts, “General Security: The Liquidation of Opium” takes a 
similar approach. It argues for a freedom from State constraint which is the user’s right 
by dint of their ontological state of suffering. Again, the text is addressed to those who 
would limit access to drugs. Throughout both texts, despite the use of general terms and,
frequently, the first person plural, it is consistently clear that Artaud is speaking first and
foremost (if not exclusively) of his own “case”.





characterisation of opium as a palliative: it has no positive effect other than the 
temporary alleviation of suffering, of “Anguish”.234 Indeed, neither removal of 
legislation, nor easy access to opium have inherently positive value. But nor does opium
have any negative effect. This Anguish, in these early texts, is Artaud’s basic state, the 
distance from himself which he was describing in the letters to Rivière: of absence and 
furtivity of thought embodied as suffering. Suffering, then, is quite independent of the 
drug: it is, Artaud claims, “intrinsic to the soul”235 and would continue “EVEN IF THE 
DRUG DID NOT EXIST.”236
Opiates II: Withdrawal
The few instances of discussing opium in Artaud’s private correspondence of the time 
start to reveal a different relation to the drug, though. An argument that seems perfectly 
convincing in his literary life – the argument that opium is taken as an escape from a 
suffering whose character and depth is only accessible to the person suffering from it 
and, indeed, possibly their only lucidity and respite – in the letters takes on the hollowly
unconvincing ring of the familiar angry rationalisations of the addict: the dull swagger 
of “I can give up any time I like”, and the needling for refills.
This image of the burgeoning addict is tragically evident in a letter from 1923 to 
Artaud’s then-fiancée, Génica Athanasiou. The letter, of 24th October, evidently follows
an argument between the two in which Artaud’s opium use had been blamed for his 
unsympathetic manner. In the letter, Artaud turns the accusation back on Génica and 
claims that his opium use is to blame for nothing:
If there is one of us who needs to be cured, it is you and not me [...] you have 
always exaggerated the trouble. Ask my mother if you know her. She will tell 





opium, that I have never been able to tolerate contradiction.237
Just like the condition he describes in the Rivière letters contemporaneous to these to 
Génica, his inconstancy pre-exists any use of opium: “I wish you had known me three 
years ago, five years ago, ten years ago, I was a raging demon because of the evil which
smoldered within me, and which was not opium.”238 In an overly defensive argument, 
Artaud claims his use of opium is under control – and he vows as such on the most 
sacred thing to hand: “Whatever you think, I have not gone back on opium again since 
my return. Your deductions are false. To be sure, I take opium from time to time, but not
out of habit, I swear to you on the life to come”.239 This life to come, however, is not 
their life together, as one might expect of a passionate young man writing to his fiancée,
but the life of “the higher reality of my mind, which is the thing that is most important to
me in the world.”240 This higher reality, of course, is that lucidity which Artaud feels 
himself to be barred from, an exclusion which is the source of his suffering. The 
suffering, he seems to already be realising, is not terminable, for “the idea of suffering is
stronger than the idea of healing, the idea of life.”241 As it would with the two pieces 
from 1925 discussed above, here the fact of suffering justifies Artaud’s use of opium as 
a short-term amelioration; and it blinds him to the suffering of others, even Génica: 
the question for me is to relieve this suffering; the very intensity of this suffering
prevents me from thinking of anything else. [...] You talk to me of waiting, of 
being patient, as if the horror of my life could allow me to wait. Your brain 
which is healthy, your body which does not feel my pain, allow you to believe 
that I could wait, but my twisted body, my broken body, my hacked brain do not 
give me time to wait.242
Opium always appears as a need for Artaud – a condition of the proper lucidity he must 








see the familiar claim that he can stop at any time, that he is not addicted to the drug, 
though it is a privileged means. The pain associated with opium-taking, in these early 
years, is a pre-existing Anguish which is ameliorated by the drug, and which thus 
establishes that no one has the right to withhold it from him, for no one has sufficiently 
intimate understanding of his condition – be it doctors or Génica. As the years go on, 
inevitably and inexorably, the withholding of the drug ceases to be simply a scandal, 
and becomes its own anguish; no longer the rudeness of a normative social convention, 
but a suffering in the flesh doubling that which it could ameliorate. The tone of the 
writings on opium shifts from rants against its being withheld to descriptions of the 
symptoms of withdrawal and their emerging coincidence with those symptoms of absent
lucidity the opium had latterly offered respite from.
A letter from Artaud to Dr. René Allendy of 30th November 1927 confirms this shift.243 
The letter is a poorly-masked request for drugs. Evidently, Allendy has been providing 
Artaud with pills, and he has run out. He complains that people grow bored with him 
and think him to be cured when he is not; that the “same old business as in the letters to 
Rivière”244 continues. Despite the undisguised plea for drugs of the closing line of the 
letter – “Shall I die, or will you, having understood me and realizing the low value of 
my present life, which deceives so many people, will you find the medical means of 
saving me?”245 – Artaud adds a postscript to the letter making it plain:
P.S. Thank you for the pills, but I used them up two weeks ago. In 
Cannes I’ll need enough for three weeks. I would need at least forty 
strong ones, for as you suspect I have fallen right back on 
laudanum.246







Whilst the letter does reiterate the arguments about suffering which Artaud was making 
in 1925, the barely-contained desperation to procure drugs marks a disturbing shift from
vociferously defending a right, to trying to feed a need – a determination imposed on 
him by this new, hungry organ grown inside him. Certain details of Artaud’s suffering 
are new – despite his friends having grown bored by him, and despite Artaud claiming 
that it is the suffering “which all my books describe”.248 This mode of suffering 
foreshadows the symptoms Artaud would write of in his Coleridge letter nearly twenty 
years later, and are characterised by inaction, torpor: “This vegetation. How horribly I 
am vegetating. I can neither advance nor retreat. I am fixed, localized around a point 
which is always the same”.249 This torpor, this indifference which breeds inaction, is, I 
suggest, what is responsible for making it seem that this state is identical to the “same 
business as in the letters to Rivière”.250 Actually, this is a much more mundane problem 
than that which is so lucidly described in those letters. It is – and I argue this because I 
believe Artaud is actually quite aware of it – nothing more than the torpor of opiate 
withdrawal; not a suffering of metaphysical proportions and relevance, but the same 
shitty, shivering withdrawal as belongs to any user who is drying out. This is precisely 
the horrific fate which Artaud would later desperately try to distance himself from by 
writing about it so unsympathetically in Coleridge. And, of course, in Artaud’s 
reckoning, it is what killed Coleridge. That the fate which Artaud is suffering in 1927 is 
of this kind, and not of the order of “Anguish” which in the 1925 texts had entitled him 
to opium, is clear in his relation to his work which also seems exsanguinated:
Nothing I write is created, or participates in creation; everything has the 
appearance of a last resort, is done not haphazardly but without necessity, and 
always for lack of something better. Dear friend, I swear to you that it is serious,
very serious. I am vegetating in the worst kind of moral idleness. I never work. 
[...] I could just as well write or say or think something completely different 





just as badly. That is to say, not at all. I am not here.251
This “moral idleness” is surely the same as that which Coleridge referred to in a letter 
sent from his sickbed to Byron in April 1816. Opium, Coleridge explained, brings on a 
“specific madness which leaving the intellect uninjured and exciting the moral feelings 
to a cruel sensibility, entirely suspend[s] the moral will.”252 Indeed, Coleridge’s words to
Byron explaining his addiction resound with Artaud’s, as those of so many others: what 
begins as pursuit of life at intensity opens deeper depths of divestment from self. 
Coleridge’s
imprudences [had] commenced most innocently, and grown into the Tyranny of 
Habit before I was aware of my Danger. I refer to the daily habit of taking 
enormous doses of Laudanum which I believed necessary to my Life.253
At the end of 1932, Artaud underwent another in a long series of programmes of 
detoxification. In a letter to Jean Paulhan of 16th December 1932, he is making plans 
for when he leaves the clinic.254 Clearly, Artaud is busying himself – recovery and 
distraction mixing in an as-yet unclear blend. This was not the first attempt at breaking 
the habit, and nor will it be the last. Artaud will go “cold turkey” in Mexico in 1936; in 
1937 he will take cures in February–March – this treatment paid for by Paulhan255 – and 
again less than six weeks later.
During this time in and out of detox programmes, in late 1934, Artaud wrote a text 
entitled “Appeal to Youth: Intoxication–Disintoxication”.256 The sentiment of the piece 
seems clear from its title, and echoes Coleridge’s hope that the effect of his addiction on
251 p170 ibid.
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his life might be taken as a warning to those coming behind.257 In an event tragic for its 
inevitably, the piece is unfinished. Artaud’s explanation of his taking up opiates has not 
changed, nor will it. He has moved from denial, however, to understand that he will 
never be free from the drug: “I have not escaped from it and I never shall.”258 But 
Artaud is not simply fulfilling a part of the trajectory to recovery, here. Rather, I would 
suggest, as early as this 1934 article he is making the transition into the third phase of 
his relation to opiates – though this phase will become fully-fledged only in his last 
years. Coleridge, as Artaud argues, “took laudanum until he was dead.”259 If Artaud sees
that he will still be taking opium until he, too, dies, the question becomes how to avoid 
Coleridge’s fate: how to not be killed (“suicided”) by the drug. What is there between 
drugging to death, and death from withdrawal? Explaining this non-choice between two 
zeroes, the impossible double-imposition of necessity, of obeying two mutually 
exclusive laws, Artaud writes:
I can do nothing with opium, which is the most abominable illusion, the most 
formidable invention of nothingness that has ever fertilized human sensibilities. 
But I can do nothing unless I take into myself at moments this culture of 
nothingness.260
So, whilst Artaud is acknowledging his addiction, here, he is also beginning to confront 
the impasse which he finds himself at, and which, I will argue below, he will later 
submit to his signature logic of necessity – slipping in before addiction can take root to 
divest him of himself, to exsanguinate his body and poetry.
Opiates III: Synthesis
Whilst in the later writings there is still a celebration, at times, of the power of opiates – 
associating them, for example, with a certain “state outside of life to which opium does 
257 He “wished that after his death the story of his addiction could be told as a warning to others.” 





not do justice but with which it seems to have some very singular affinities”261 – there is 
also the emerging awareness that Artaud is addicted, is not sovereign over the relation 
of his body to heroin. But if he is addicted, this is a cruelty not to be denied or bent to in
a slavish, dosed management of symptoms. Quite the reverse, like any other seeming 
necessity which Artaud encounters – from parentage to God’s judgement to the organic 
necessity of breathing – it is to be doubled or inflected as a determining force proper to 
rather than sovereign over Artaud’s body: recast as an originary part of his body older 
than the Thief himself. It is in working through the architectonics of this shift that, I will
argue, Artaud will reach the final phase of his addiction to recast the lucidity of opiates 
as proper to his body.
An incident from 1937 offers an analogy to this kind of reversal and internalisation 
already familiar to us from “An Affective Athleticism”: in a letter of 30th April, sent the
day after leaving the detox clinic at Sceaux, to his new fiancée Cécile Schramme, 
Artaud makes an apology for the harsh words of some previous letters, especially that of
16th April in which he condemned Cécile’s duplicitous self-image and her “animal” 
urges.262 Or, rather, he writes something which resembles an apology but is not quite 
one: all the while affirming his rapturous love for her, Artaud nonetheless will not ask 
for Cécile’s forgiveness. Instead, he assures her that he is punishing himself for those 
harsh words “for which you will never reproach me as much as I reproach myself.”263 
The external pressure, then, is superseded and replaced by an internal force of greater 
intensity which is proper to Artaud, just as Rivière’s suggestion of publishing their 
letters was, Artaud insisted, something he had “long since thought of” himself.264
The logic repeats itself at an physical-ontological level with opium: Artaud will bind the
ravaging of his body by opium into the metaphysical warfare taking place in and around






distracting from the main one. Rather, through both the magical properties of opiates, 
and through their massive capacity for determination (not least their emergent addictive 
qualities), heroin will come to take its place in Artaud’s cosmology, his arsenal of 
cruelty rather than the litany of his suffering.
The four letters of the end of 1940 which Artaud sent to Génica – the former fiancée to 
whom he had not written for over six years265 – are largely devoted to this new insight 
on the role of heroin in Artaud’s cosmology. By this time, Artaud had been involuntarily
detained for three years, and he will remain held in mental asylums for nearly six more 
years before his move to Ivry as a “voluntary” resident in May 1946. The 1940 letters to
Génica are sent from Ville-Évrard asylum, where Artaud had been sent in February 
1939 after being branded “incurable” by, amongst others, Jacques Lacan at the hospital 
of Sainte-Anne, Paris.266 He would remain at Ville-Évrard until his transfer, via Chézal-
Benoît, to Rodez in February 1943. It should not go unremarked that the French asylum 
system under Nazi occupation was an appalling and dangerous place to be – and this all 
the more so for the supposedly “incurable”. These four years at Ville-Évrard were 
marked by abysmal indignity and brutal suffering: Artaud was sent to the drug-addict 
ward where his hair was sheared. Inmate uniform was mandatory. Food and medicine 
rations – scarce throughout occupied France – filtered through to the asylums in the 
slowest and thinnest of trickles. The threat of sharing the fate of Germany’s asylum 
inmates hung over Artaud like a carrion bird. Dr. Ferdière’s attempts at Rodez to fatten 
Artaud up with black-market milk and honey in the relative safety of unoccupied 
southern France were a far-off future, and it was under the deprivations of Ville-Évrard 
that the final transition was made from the beatific face of Artaud the film star to the 
hollow-cheeked, rictus-cramped face which stares out of the photographs and self-
portraits of his final years.
265 The letter of 16 August 1934, then nothing until the four letters of 1940: 30th October; 10th 
November; 24th November; 21 December. pp303–11 Antonin Artaud Lettres à Génica Athanasiou 
(Paris: NRF/Gallimard, 1969).
266 pp99–100 Barber Anatomy of Cruelty
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In the letter to Génica of 24th November 1940 – the penultimate missive which he will 
send her – Artaud demands heroin, and explains to her a sinister, occult plot which is 
working against him and which (though she may be unaware of it), on account of her 
attempts to help him she is also being plagued by. His account of the plot, and of 
Génica’s being drawn into it, casts a dark shadow on what might otherwise be read as a 
sweet apology, given from the wise vantage of later life, by Artaud to his first love: the 
final letter to Génica, of 21st December 1940 begins, “I know you have suffered 
horribly because of me”.267 This suffering, though, is not only that of the broken-hearted
young woman pushed away by a drug-abusing, incandescent and frequently spiteful 
boyfriend years before. It is, rather, the suffering visited on Génica and others by occult 
forces who are bent on denying Artaud the heroin he needs to combat Evil. Though 
Génica and other friends have procured heroin for Artaud, he explains, it has been stolen
from them before they could deliver it to him, and their memories of these events have 
been erased. It is worth quoting this sad, rich letter in full, as the complexities of the 
system arranged against Artaud and his plans and means of fighting it are laid out; and 
sad evidence is given, especially in the postscript detailing Génica’s infected dreams, of 
how not only his own heroin use, but even the lives of his friends and lovers are now 
arranged around the single pole of this cosmic battle which Artaud is embroiled in:
My very dear Génica,
You must find heroin at all costs and you must risk death to get it to me 
here. This is where matters stand. The Initiates have real instruments of torture, 
as I have already told you, and they use them from a distance to mutilate me 
while I sleep, each night a little more. If it is difficult to procure heroin or 
opium, it is solely because of me and because they know that it is the one thing 
that would restore my strength and make me fit to struggle against Evil. But the 
most serious aspect of the affair is that all my friends, including you, have 
rebelled, have taken up arms in Paris, have used force to get heroin for me, and 
that they extracted it from all of you by magic, and that they then caused you to 
lose consciousness of your rebellion and that they have weighed down your 
shoulders
your heads
and the backs of your necks with leaden spells in order to enslave you, for it is 
267 “Je sais que vous avez horriblement souffert à cause de moi”. p311 Lettres à Génica. My translation.
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thus that the common people are avenged and it is the common people who are 
now in power and who feed on my suffering here. Search your memory and you 
will see that some part of the use you have made of your time eludes you. 
Génica, we must leave this world, but first the Kingdom of the Other World 
must come, and we need armed troops in great numbers. So that the Bohemians 
can enter this world in number as one disembarks from a ship I must have heroin
so that I can open all the hidden doors and destroy the spells of Satan which are 
keeping them out and keeping me prisoner here.
I count on you and embrace you.
Antonin Artaud
Two nights ago you thought you had a dream that brought you to Marseilles, 
boulevard Perrier, but in reality you were having a vision from Paris of a real 
scene which was taking place in Marseilles, in which one of the gods of Evil 
went forth with his armies. These armies were cut to pieces by the Bohemians 
who reappear at night but some of their soldiers were loitering in Saumur, in 
Toulon, and in Paris in the vicinity of the Vieux-Colombier.268
Quite the reverse of the situation he finds Coleridge reduced to, then, Artaud needs 
opium to work his magic to raise his blood and mucus. The drug is no longer 
diminishing him, he seems to be claiming; nor is this simply a physical need which he is
fulfilling. If heroin is needed for him to continue with his work, it is because it is an 
ingredient in the magical process of saving himself – and the world – from Evil. 
Certainly, there is not a complete disavowal of the material need to keep one’s strength 
up for the endless vigilance and fighting. As Artaud explains from Rodez three years 
later, to Dr. Latrémolière:
To drive out evil and the demons one must have good food, nicotine in sufficient
quantity, and one must temporarily restore heroin in large doses to an organism 
that has been vitiated by foul humiliations and damaged in its deepest, most vital
sensibility by pain, deprivations, anxieties, occult traumatisms of all kinds, and 
by harmful treatments.269
268 pp418–9 SW. What “Bohémiens” designates for Artaud is not clear: he may mean the kinds of artists 
and writers whom we might still refer to as Bohemians, or he may mean the group whom inspired 
this usage: the Romani population who were believed to have come from Bohemia. The popularity of
Django Reinhardt had helped raise the status of the Romani in France in this period, and the 
advertising for Gitanes cigarettes, also named after traveller peoples, exploited romantic notions of 
freedom associated with the name.
269 pp423–4 ibid.
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But heroin is not simply reducible to this category: certainly the drug is needed for 
sustenance – for maintaining the defences without which Artaud’s “soul will be more 
and more scandalized by sin”270 – but not only this, for the power of heroin is also, he 
now explains, “bound to the vital energy of the person”.271 It is not only fuel, but a 
weapon, one which is capable of piercing holes in the very world, of opening doors to 
that awaiting army.
By the time of the letters to Henri Parisot from Rodez of 1943–6, the cosmic importance
of opiates (and, briefly, a few other drugs) is palpably clear, and this not least for its 
anerotic effects: heroin’s power, for Artaud, is also linked to its detumescent, ante-
genital effects. The reasons that various Evil forces are bent on destroying, depleting 
and withholding heroin become more evident. As they continue to attack Artaud, the 
battle is found to be taking place across all of time. As Artaud explains in a footnote of 
October 1945 (characteristically many times longer than the letter to Parisot it is 
attached to), the need for heroin is increasingly urgent:
And there is at the source of these spells an old matter concerning narcotics 
which goes back to before the flood and well before the creation. It was not for 
nothing that the English, many years ago, burned the opium fields of China and 
that all over the world prohibitions have been placed on the free use of opium, 
heroin, morphine, and all plants that allegedly cause convulsions like peyote, 
curare, agar-agar, and beriberi. It was to prevent people from ever returning to 
an old pre-genital notion of being which all of the religions and sects have 
buried.272
Thus the place of opium in the body of Artaud reaches its full relevance. This same list 
of drugs, “opium, agar-agar, heroin, beriberi”, are intimately linked to “the body of the 
soul” which the Catholic sacrament paralyses and renders asunder.273 Indeed, not only 
the sacrament, but Christ himself is responsible for this attack on the body, and is joined






are arrayed against Artaud: “There is in opium the secret of an immortal leaven, dried 
out by unleavened bread, and the alcohol of consecrated wines, violated also in dark 
orgies in the Caucasus and in the Himalayas.”274
Opium has not only been incorporated into Artaud’s world-view, into the eschatonic 
battle at hand. It has also, in this process, had its valency reversed – just as the organic 
necessity of breathing is reversed into production of expressive force through the 
affective athleticism of breathing. Where for Coleridge opium had reversed its polarity 
from its intimate connection to the project at hand (sweeping him up in the rêverie of 
“Kubla Kahn”) to become a force of disintegration and endless delay (and thence 
embodied as the horrific eroticism of Geraldine in “Christabel” or Ebn Ebn Thalud), 
Artaud has succeeded in uncovering the deep well of opium and of tethering this cosmic
power to his own body as an original unity. In the Artaudian logic of slippage and 
pluperfection, this is achieved not despite the necessity which opium has imposed on 
him through addiction, but through that necessity: through the cruelty of addiction to 
binding the cruel power of opium as embodied expression at a physical-metaphysical 
level. Quite unlike Coleridge, for Artaud “[t]he reverse heightening which opium 
provides is not a laziness about living, but the force to [...] go beyond oneself”,275 
beyond the organ-filled body one finds oneself in, finds oneself given as by furtive 
anteriority. As with Artaud le Mômo’s binding of external necessity into his own 
expressive force beyond even mortality, by 1945 Artaud has found the means by which 
“the force provided by opium, far from lowering the body, raises it, and in so doing 
causes it to rush ahead of itself, opens before it the gulf of immortal survival”.276 As we 
have seen, this immortality is both metaphorically and literally linked to the anerotic 
effect and nonreproductive, nonvitalist logic of opiates. It is what the case study reveals 






If the immortality which opium is capable of helping bring about is not more 
widespread, Artaud explains, it is because the entirety of history – and of colonialism 
especially – has been a series of events arrayed against the fulfilment of opium’s 
promise, all aimed at denaturing the substance.278 Indeed, this is not only stealing tonnes
of the stuff from Artaud, it is also qualitative depletion: “opium itself has been 
changed”,279 and “hate has denatured it”.280 This denaturing of opium is what has turned 
it into an intoxicant – a property, Artaud explains, that, unlike peyote, it does not have in
its proper state. This capacity unsullied opium has to “do things, without magic” is 
precisely what motivates those “dark maneuvers” against opium: a globalised 
(“white”281 led) “hatred for [opium’s] secret surrealism.”282 Indeed, in an interesting 
logic surely indebted to sympathetic magic, for Artaud hatred is not only the motive but 
the very method of denaturing opium.283
Opium: its true power rediscovered by Artaud from its exile to the hidden corners of the
earth; its subjecting power bound to his body and become a part of that body’s capacity 
for self-determination; its anerotic effects rewritten as not an affliction but as a part of 
the excoriation of genitality and the papamummy. The substance is now caught up in the
war which is taking place across Artaud’s body: a war which, like Artaud’s body is 
spread across all time and space. The withholding of the drug no longer an act of the 
State alone, but a magical plot across all history. Certainly, Artaud’s vigilance must be 
constant, lest those forces which made him forget himself during detox in Mexico,284 be 
allowed to reduce him to a corpse – it is through “the deprivation of opium that the 
beings of evil spirits seize my forces in the cadaver which I am”.285





282 ibid. Within this letter which mentions peyote, it seems clear to me that surrealism is meant in the 
sense which Artaud tried to reclaim it in Mexico – as a revolution in everyday life which has little to 
do with the western-scientific-Marxist project of Breton’s crowd and much more to do with the blood





Opium, in its true form, then, grants access to existence blocked by the magical forces. 
It reactivates the world as what it can be – as it always-already is prior to the opposition 
of death to life, leap to tomb. It is plenitude prior to blockage or, again “pre-genital” 
being. Turning to nature and the Earth – themes which will come up later in this Chapter
and in the next – Artaud appears as the entry point for opium to the system of the world,
through him everything can be returned to existence, even down to the tired wooden 
table he eats at: “Opium restores it to what it is on the floor of its forest, a servant full of
pity, Brueghel red, blood of the torments that all matter has endured before being able to
support me.”286 Beyond this bringing-back to existence even of the inanimate, Artaud’s 
capacities to engender everything find no bounds. Thus begun, he will now “be able to 
plant forests in order to liberate so much matter buried in the earth of eternity. Forests of
bodies which are souls and of souls at last become beings, because they will be flame 
bodies [...] it was in opium that life was created one day, but hate has denatured it.”287
Artaud is now far from the Coleridgean torpor which he had felt rising in himself and 
which he had feared would kill him. The Coleridge letter is Artaud’s last extended 
discussion of opiates. The “treachery” which Coleridge is accused of, then – his 
relations to blood and mucus – is clarified in Artaud’s distancing of himself from it: it is 
Coleridge’s failure to accede to and bind the fullness of the non-genital magic – both 
quotidian and cosmic – of opium. Opium, for Artaud, has become the claiming of his 
own mucus, the retention of poetry in his blood, the integrity of his body and his body 
of work. He will not die as Ducasse did, nor will he allow himself to be debased 
retroactively from his final moment – his whole body of work become mere lovely 
musical regrets288 – as was Coleridge’s defeat. For Artaud, his body, through the cruelty 
of opium bound to that body, is at the centre of being; is in and of that centre where 






created one day”, and this power, the very inception of being, is now bound to Artaud’s 
body as the expressive force, the unilateral cruelty of blood poetry.290
If the Coleridge letter heralds this summation of the phases of Artaud’s writings on 
opium, it does not in itself demonstrate the full maturity of the casework method. Not 
least because writing on Coleridge allows Artaud to distance himself from a certain part 
of his own history and hence protect himself against a certain set of strategies of those 
arranged against him. The summation of the method – the full articulation of being 
exposed to the work of others and through this (rather than against it) Artaud increasing 
his capacity of expressive force – comes, I would argue, several months later in Artaud’s
essay on van Gogh. There, strategies are developed through exposure to, rather than in 
reaction against the case, not in relation to opium addiction, but to suicide, nature and 




van Gogh, the Man Suicided by Society
Artaud’s essay on van Gogh was published as an illustrated volume in September 1947, 
six months before Artaud’s death, but the majority of the text had been written in the 
days following Artaud’s visit to the exhibition of 173 works by van Gogh held at the 
Orangerie, Paris, at the beginning of February 1947. As Charles Estienne commented in 
his review of the piece for Jean-Paul Sartre’s newspaper Combat, Artaud’s essay is 
characterised by an intense feeling for, we might even say vulnerability in front of, the 
paintings: Artaud was, as Estienne puts it, “perhaps the only contemporary writer who 
could speak of van Gogh without giving an uncomfortably ‘literary’ impression – that is
to say an impression of being oneself out of harm’s way.”291 It is this sense of the work’s
metaphysical consequentiality that I will argue marks both Artaud’s sympathy, even 
identification with van Gogh, and which characterises the highly developed sensibility 
which underwrites his case-work methodology – the final element of caseworking 
missing from Artaud’s insistent distancing of himself from Coleridge’s fate.
In her editorial notes to the Selected Writings, Susan Sontag claims that Artaud’s van 
Gogh essay was “inspired” by Artaud’s disgust at a review of the exhibition in which 
the psychiatrist François-Joachim Beer labels van Gogh “a degenerate”.292 Indeed, the 
Introduction to the essay, and its post-script (the Post-scriptum to the Introduction) lay 
out an invective against the psychiatric institution which would inspire a young R.D. 
Laing.293 Artaud, of course, goes further than Laing would, and allies its purposes and 
291 Charles Estienne Combat, cited p130 Transition No.1 (January 1948). This is quoted in the 
bibliographical notes at the back of the volume, and is most likely written by the journal’s editors, 
Eugène Jolas and Georges Duthuit.
292 See p653 SW. Beer’s article is reproduced pp302–4 OCXIII.
293 Whilst Laing only quotes Artaud once, in his last book, Kotowicz argues that the influence of Artaud 
(and of the van Gogh essay in particular) on Laing runs much deeper. See p13 R. D. Laing Wisdom, 
Madness and Folly: The Making of a Psychiatrist (London: Macmillan, 1985); and pp61–70; p71n.2 
Zbigniew Kotowicz R. D. Laing and the Paths of Anti-Psychiatry (London: Routledge, 1997)
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methods with the familiar themes of malignant sexuality and black magic. Bourgeois 
society, and its psychiatrist agents had recognised van Gogh’s singular abilities, what 
Artaud calls his “active” consciousness, and sought to neutralise them.294 As Laing 
would, Artaud finds society to be the one truly in need of repair. But, Artaud argues, the 
“sick consciousness” of society, of these tormentors, “has a vested interest [...] in not 
recovering from its sickness”,295 so that rather than take the opportunity to be healed by 
van Gogh, “tainted society” invents psychiatry “to defend itself against the 
investigations of certain superior intellects whose faculties of divination would be 
troublesome.”296 These psychiatrists do nothing to alleviate the very real suffering of 
van Gogh, indeed, they “possess nothing to mitigate the most appalling states of anguish
and human suffocation”, and fiddle around, rather, with “ridiculous terminology”.297 
Compared to van Gogh’s superior consciousness, the institutions are “a stale and useless
corpse”298 which uses the verdict of insanity not to rally to the suffering but to shut 
down yet further their consciousness – just as the bourgeois flocked to Lautréamont’s 
Maldoror not to heed nor be reinvented by it, but to imprison and defuse it – despite 
some appearances to the contrary, then, simple bungling this is not: it is a purposeful 
attack. And, Artaud continues, “confinement is not its only weapon”299: in its locking-
down of consciousness and nourishment of suffering, the socio-psychiatric complex 
also calls upon “world-wide spell-casting”300 and “vile sexuality”,301 to perpetrate “erotic
crimes”302 against van Gogh, and indeed against all those poets and visionaries whom 
Artaud calls “the geniuses of the earth” and “the authentic madmen of the asylums”.303 
Indeed, guarding oneself against these succubi is given as a criterion for this “authentic”













as the only alternative to the crudeness of society; those who “refused to become its 
accomplices in certain great nastinesses.”305
This general definition of “authentic madness”, then, is characterised by a certain choice
– even if that choice is met with a phalanx of unchosen (but posterior) cruelties 
perpetuated in the name of psychiatry. It is into this category – under this law of those 
who turn from colluding in society’s nastiness and who as a result continue to be 
hounded by it – that the names which have recurred throughout Artaud’s case studies 
appear, what he calls “certain particularly striking individual cases.”306 He goes on,
Thus there were collective magic spells in connection with Baudelaire, 
Poe, Gérard de Nerval, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Hölderlin, Coleridge,
and also in connection with van Gogh.307
Within this conspiracy, van Gogh’s suicide is figured as a murder. It is a murder 
perpetrated through an act of possession by these malignant forces of “civil magic”308 – 
just as the pimp who stabbed Artaud in Marseilles was possessed. Van Gogh being 
murdered by his own hand is an act of revenge against his higher consciousness. But it 
is too late to be a preemptive strike. Rather, Artaud argues, it was a means of “eras[ing] 
in him the supernatural consciousness he had just achieved.”309 If Coleridge had also 
achieved this, it is retroactively purged from his work; but in van Gogh’s paintings, 
Artaud argues, it tenaciously, remarkably, persists.
Whilst the word “consciousness” does repeat throughout this part of the essay, it is by 
no means thought alone which Artaud associates with van Gogh. On the contrary, the 
separation of thought from body is a strategy of the society which killed van Gogh, 
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agents of separation like the souffleurs and Eucharist-eaters, it is van Gogh’s body, the 
inseparable totality of body, thought and work which is at stake here. Van Gogh dies, 
Artaud tells us,
of having been bodily the battlefield of a problem around which the evil spirit of
humanity has been struggling from the beginning.
The problem of the predominance of flesh over spirit, or of the body 
over flesh, or of spirit over both.311
It is this disintegration effected through the imposition of a hierarchy which malignant 
sexuality, black magic and the Catholic church can all collude in – their common 
metaphysics is that of division and contradictions which declares war on van Gogh. 
Indeed, the divestment from self that these forces conspire toward, possession, is 
precisely the definition of modernity for Artaud, one which, by these diverse forces, is 
burrowed down into the depths of the flesh, consciousness and the spirit: “For it is the 
anatomical logic of modern man that he has never been able to live, has never thought 
of living, except as one possessed.”312
Just as we saw that Artaud could, at times, take the amassing of forces against him not 
as a threat but as proof of his succeeding, so, he argues, van Gogh’s suicide does not 
only signal a defeat but is the trace of a success – albeit one society replies to with fatal 
vengeance. Artaud argues that van Gogh
did not commit suicide in a fit of madness, in dread of not succeeding 
[in his work],
on the contrary, he had just succeeded, and discovered what he was and 
who he was, when the collective consciousness of society, to punish him for 






Is Suicide an Option?
This model of a passive suicide had appeared in Artaud’s writings as early as 1925, over
twenty years earlier. “Inquiry: Is Suicide a Solution?” was one of two pieces Artaud 
contributed to the second issue of La Révolution Surréaliste (the other being “General 
Security: The Liquidation of Opium”, discussed above).314 In the “Inquiry”, Artaud 
quickly turns to his own case, and to the themes familiar from the Rivière letters: “I 
suffer hideously from life. There is no state that I can attain”.315 He comes to the 
conclusion that “it is certain that I have been dead for a long time”.316 He has, the young 
Artaud argues, “already committed suicide”, but not of his own will, on his own terms, 
and as such the assertion must be repeated, if a little self-consciously, with a passive 
inflection: “They have suicided me, so to speak.”317 This victory over his body, this 
possession which divides him from himself, Artaud argues, has allowed some unnamed 
anterior force to have done with him.
And yet, here, this kind of suicide does not hold Artaud’s interest for long, signalling as 
it does only a defeat, and a mundane, that is worldly, one at that – a defeat on the wrong 
side of the war; the consummation of a defeat which has, in any case, always already 
happened. But in this death he does glimpse another kind of suicide which is not solely 
passive, one which would, rather, head off at the pass any de jure victory for the furtive 
other over him: “what would you say”, he asks rhetorically, “to an anterior suicide, a 
suicide which made us retrace our steps, but to the other side of existence, not to the 
side of death.”318 (The echoes of “a state outside of life to which opium [...has] some 
very singular affinities” are evident.319) The benefits of such a slip to the anterior – 
slipping in before the thief, as it were – “is the only suicide which would have any 







value”.320 The value is clear: it is the victory from the very first, the slipping back in 
time to the before of battle, from whence to derealise the battle itself. And it has, I 
would note, a particular grammar, that of the pluperfect: it is a slip to always having had
foreclosed the possibility of battle. This kind of suicide would mean “never having 
fallen into this interlude of imbeciles, abdications, renunciations, and obtuse encounters 
which is the self of Antonin Artaud, much weaker than he is.”321 This is death, suicide, 
not as the defeat and finitude of life, but as the negation, the absolute, pluperfect 
derealisation of this life and its cruel, divesting opposition of life and death. It consigns 
to oblivion – to never having been – this low, split, suffering-filled modern life in which
death hangs over anxious mortal heads – what will be condemned again in the van Gogh
essay as the very “anatomical logic of modern man”,322 that impoverished and hostile 
version of humanity which “does not want to go to the trouble of living” and which “has
always preferred to settle simply for existence”.323
What begins in 1925 as this pluperfection, this slip to an always-already-having-been 
body prior to the opposition of life to death, becomes fully articulated in the van Gogh 
essay over two decades later as an expressive, metaphysical, impermeable body of 
fiction: “that natural fiction of the forces that make up reality, in order to extract from 
them a body that no storm will ever be able to pierce.”324 Even in the youthful essay of 
1925, we catch a glimpse of how suicide, death, might not be simply the triumph of 
suffering and ill will – the loss of mucus to possessors, thieves – but might designate a 
different strategy to the simple termination of a life that “has never been able to live, has
never thought of living, except as one possessed.”325 The other suicide has more to do 
with escaping anterior possession such that this life of suffering would be had done with
as such. This is the meaning of the opening lines of Artaud’s “Inquiry”: is suicide an 
320 ibid.






option? “No, suicide is still a hypothesis.”326 And it is this hypothesis which is worked 
through in the van Gogh essay to become something like a strategy – a strategy whereby
“fiction” operates at a metaphysical, indeed metontological level to break with the 
always-already givenness of this life of possession.
Weaponisation of Suicide
As with the “Inquiry”, there are two kinds of suicide in the van Gogh essay: the passive 
and the fictional-expressive pluperfect slip. Their individual characteristics are little 
changed over the twenty years separating the essays, but the articulation between the 
two becomes more sophisticated.
In the “Inquiry” the passive suicide is a termination of a life in which death has, 
anyway, always-already won: a mere formality at the end of a living death already 
devoid of blood and poetry. On the other hand, there is the suicide which slips in before 
this living death, the suicide which is the death of this possessed life and the restoration 
of the true life of the body-and-mind older than (if not historically extent before) their 
division. In the Coleridge letter, this is called the life of blood poetry, and sovereignty 
over the mucus – that substance which makes body and mind inseparate. In the 
“Inquiry” these two suicides are simply opposed to each other in a rather simple, dualist 
opposition. Indeed, one might argue that there are still even traces of this dualism in the 
Coleridge letter. In the van Gogh essay, Artaud has developed the – for me, highly 
significant – argument that the relation between the separate (suicided) and the 
inseparate (slip-to-anterior) is not simple opposition but a kind of envelopment of the 
separate by the inseparate, a metaphysical anteriority of the inseparate over the separate 
which is nascent but not formalised in the earlier model and which we have seen a 






The inseparate body opened onto by the “good” suicide, the termination of this life, is 
echoed in remarkably faithful tones in the way Artaud writes about van Gogh’s painting.
It is not only “Painterly painting”328 (a category equivalent to the bloodless “poetry 
poetry” which Coleridge ended his days scratching out) which is killed by van Gogh. It 
is also the very subject of that painting: the tamed, debased nature which “painterly 
painting” tames and debases yet further. Van Gogh’s paintings “open to painterly 
painting, or rather to unpainted nature, the secret door to a possible beyond, to a 
possible permanent reality, through the door opened by van Gogh to an enigmatic and 
sinister beyond.”329 This beyond – that which suicide might open on to – is more, not 
less real than the world at hand, and “is frighteningly superior to [...] all divinity”.330 It 
recalls, rather, that “fiction” invoked in “An Affective Athleticism” which is “deadly” 
and “unsuspected by life”.331
This is the deeper suicide, the “good” suicide which van Gogh also achieves. Certainly, 
there is the bad suicide, the “suicided” which signals the triumph of society, psychiatry, 
over van Gogh. But there is also the deeper, more real suicide which van Gogh had 
already effected on the life of suffering imposed on him by society – suicide as the slip 
to the anterior-inseparate. This is the suicide which Artaud had already also glimpsed in 
1925 – it is this life overcome, dethroned, derealised. And, if the bad suicide (suicided 
by) is the loss of mucus – possession, the disintegration of flesh, thought, spirit – the 
“good” suicide is their integration, the slip to their always-already integratedness (blood
poetry, active metaphysics). By the time of the van Gogh essay, this totality is identified 
as the flesh which triumphs, which is found and founded not destroyed by suicide. 
Where suicided is a death which terminates life – the two in opposition even if they are 






finds an inseparateness even of life and death, just as we have seen Artaud le Mômo 
does a few months later. Death, then, is no longer that which names possession – the 
separation of life even from itself by some anonymous, lurking depth – but death as the 
name of the palpable anamnesia of the inseparateness of the body. It is crucial, of 
course, that we recall that this is not, for Artaud, the eternal life of Christianity – not a 
hypothetical reward in heaven which belittles and impoverishes life on earth, in a body. 
Rather, as he called it in his last letter to Parisot from Rodez, it is the body as 
“sempiternal”, the “immediate being in sempiternal time and space that exists, and not 
the doubles of the past, entitled eternity”332; or, again, in the Coleridge letter, it is, again,
“[t]he human world without mortality”.333
If, through his reintegration of opium in his body, Artaud “restores” the inert table “to 
what it is on the floor of its forest”,334 in van Gogh’s painting there is a rediscovery of 
“the repressed order with which the objects of real life ring”.335 This intensity is no less 




in this month of February 1947,
reality itself,
the myth of reality itself, mythic reality itself, is in the process of 
becoming flesh.336
For Artaud, this was happening then and there, in front of him, and had already 
happened in van Gogh’s life, his achievement of an inseparate expressive body. The 
suiciding by society – the murder by possession of van Gogh – as we have seen, is a 







it is irreversible. Indeed, Artaud does not even feel the need to add his voice to those 
lamenting a life cut short. As he argues,
If van Gogh had not died at thirty-seven? I do not call in the Great Mourner to 
tell me with what supreme masterpieces painting would have been enriched,
for after The Crows, I cannot persuade myself that van Gogh would ever have 
painted again.337
Crows Gathering
One day the painting of van Gogh, armed both with fever and with health, will 
return to scatter the dust of an imprisoned world which his heat could no longer 
endure.338
Above all of the paintings in the exhibition, it is “The Crows” which are the apogee of 
van Gogh’s work, of his war on this life. But all of the paintings partake in the 
revolution which van Gogh looses on the world, after which, Artaud argues, even nature
itself must answer to van Gogh: henceforth,
in order to understand a sunflower in nature, one must now go back to van 
Gogh, just as in order to understand a storm in nature, / a stormy sky, / a field in 
nature, / it is henceforth impossible not to go back to van Gogh.339
These paintings, Artaud tells us, are remaking reality as what it can be, have opened a 
possibility and are inexorably realising it from the canvas and the body back into nature:
“no one until [van Gogh] had turned the earth into that dirty linen twisted with wine and
wet blood.”340 And this inexorable process is very near to exploding: van Gogh’s 
landscapes “have not yet recovered their primitive apocalypses, but [...] will not fail to 
recover them.”341 Above all, the Crows are auspices of this return of the body and nature







by “I know not what father-mother will in opium be transformed, transformed in 
reality.”342
Artaud himself is swept up in van Gogh’s storm, as if he himself, Artaud, seeing these 
paintings, is caught up in a kind of suicide which is returning him to himself – not 
suicided by the paintings but hearing their call, finding a slip to the anterior of his 
suffering body. He asks, “Why do the paintings of van Gogh give me this impression of 
being seen as if from the other side of the grave”?343 Knowing all the while that the 
answer is that it feels thus because this is precisely what is happening, that van Gogh 
ignites in Artaud the certainty of that place before division, before the furtive 
disintegration of his body. This blood – blood poetry – set flowing, returning the body 
of Artaud, in front of the paintings, to “a time when there was no soul, no mind, no 
consciousness, no thought, nothing but the first rudiments”344; here, where the 
psychiatrist-magician-tormentors will never arrive to seize him, here
the patient glistens,
he shines,





It is, in particular, drawing which allows van Gogh to break through to this reality; to no
longer be bound by material conditions, determinations, anteriorities; drawing as a slip 
to the inseparate. Artaud cites van Gogh’s own writings to insist on the role of drawing 
in this break through – and we will be turning to Artaud’s own remarkable drawing 
practice contemporaneous to the van Gogh essay in our final Chapter. “Drawing”, writes






seems to lie between what one feels and what one can do.”346 This strength is that which 
penetrates description – but without separating from it – to become the manipulation of 
reality itself: van Gogh’s paintings are also an athleticism on the metaphysical level, 
turning a penetrating eye to how things are, to the “it is thus” and in doing so acquiring 
the capacity to forge the real: “it is thus and it is a fact” of given nature is burst through 
by the determined expressive force of the painting, its cruelty, its deeper fiction: “it is 
thus and this is made fact.”347 It is as if painting, drawing, were itself a mode of suicide. 
Van Gogh – the drawing of van Gogh – is going through the mundane world to a 
beyond: not leaving this world in a (neo-Platonic, Christian) transcendence, but 
transforming the mundane through putting it in contact again with itself – giving it the 
impression of being seen from the other side of the grave. It has never lost this, and is 
found and founded by Artaud in his case study, thus made available for Artaud’s own 
arsenal of strategies.
Crows: Posthumous Painting
But the Crows are most revealing because it is around this canvas that Artaud’s van 
Gogh essay moves past the dualist opposition of two suicides as proposed in the 1925 
“Inquiry”; and it is thus here that, I will argue, Artaud finds a role for death as strategy 
quite different from the role Derrida gives death in his reading of Artaud – namely as an
originary expropriation which must itself be plundered to return to life. In the van Gogh 
essay, we find two deaths not only beyond dualist opposition to each other, but also 
prior to the opposition of death to life. The means by which van Gogh overcame the 
suiciding by society in Artaud’s account, are both extreme and revealing. There are two 
especially remarkable things about Artaud’s argument which I would propose are of 
particular importance: on the one hand, the argument turns on his employment of an 
interesting rhetorical strategy – namely, a lie which accesses a deeper truth, and hence 
346 Undated letter (237) cited p498 ibid. Typography amended, emphasis retained.
347 p501 ibid. It could be said that this is precisely the logic of mime as Dorcy taught it at the Vieux-
Colombier: “a world of fiction where nothing exists, where everything must appear”. p46 Dorcy The 
Mime.
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reveals a fundamental if rarely used element of his casework method; and, on the other 
hand, he raises the theory he develops around van Gogh’s suicide – around the 
rhetorical lie, this fiction expressive of a deadlier reality – to the level of strategy: one 
resembling that which we have already seen put to work by Artaud le Mômo.
Crows in the Wheatfield is not, in fact, van Gogh’s final painting; but Artaud was not to 
know this.348 The “lie” which Artaud tells is that the Crows was painted posthumously, 
which is to say that it was painted in the days between van Gogh discharging a pistol 
into his stomach on 27th July 1890 and his ceasing to draw breath on 29th July; in the 
waiting period, the limbo when he has already killed himself but is not yet buried. With 
uncharacteristic understatement, Artaud notes that “[i]t is not usual to see a man, with 
the shot that killed him already in his belly, crowding black crows onto a canvas”349; van
Gogh “who, desperate, with a bullet in his belly, had no choice but to flood a landscape 
with blood and wine, to drench the earth with a final emulsion, both dark and joyous”.350
In light of this, we are forced to reconsider Artaud’s question – or rather to ask it again, 
to refind it at a deeper level, the deepest level: “Why do the paintings of van Gogh give 
me this impression of being seen as if from the other side of the grave”?351 This is the 
double-sided suicide of van Gogh. On the one hand, it is the suicided van Gogh, the 
death by possession perpetuated by black magic – which is to say psychiatry and the 
domestic economy which makes this impoverished painter despair that “he was one 
mouth too many to feed” when his nephew was born.352 The suicided van Gogh, killed 
“because the consciousness of society as a whole could no longer endure him”.353 
348 The painting is now dated 9th July 1890. Jan Hulsker reasons that Field with Stacks of Wheat (F771) 
must postdate the Crows, on account of depicting a harvested field: p480 Jan Hulsker (ed.) The 
Complete van Gogh: Painting, Drawings, Sketches (New York, NY: Random House, 1986). More 
recently the final work has been given as Tree Roots (F816) Bert Maes and Louis van Tilborgh “Van 





352 p511 ibid. Vincent was financially dependent on his brother Theo, whose first child was born in 
January 1890, five months before Vincent’s suicide.
353 p506 ibid.
217
Knowing this attack, this suiciding which is the ongoing living condition of all 
“authentic madmen”, van Gogh made, as it were, a final push which both precipitated 
this revenge by society, but also made that revenge too late – too late not only by a few 
days, but also always-already too late. This painting, done from within an enforced 
death, in fact throws itself to an ontological anterior, an always-already have been, 
where the society of suiciders and their expropriative model of death and life will have 
never taken root. It is just what Artaud had described over twenty years before this 
essay: the victory that will slip in before the battle and make a body of “never having 
fallen into this interlude of imbeciles, abdications, renunciations, and obtuse encounters 
which is the self of Antonin Artaud, much weaker than he is.”354
The second important element, which I noted above, concerns the articulation between 
van Gogh’s two deaths which revolve around this objective lie, this originary expression
of truth taking the place of a repetition of historical “facts”. Where the “Inquiry” had 
opposed the two kinds of suicide in a simply dualist arrangement, van Gogh’s suicide, 
the case of van Gogh is both of these suicides in one, not the dualist opposition of good 
vs. bad death, but the subduction of the “bad” suicide within the good, of the finite and 
separate within the infinite, inseparate. And it is by making these one that van Gogh 
wrests his death from possession-in-life to make it inseparate, in this live-dead body and
its final – which is to say first – painting. Suicided is a revenge, but it is also a necessity 
to be subverted – that which van Gogh must both bow to and subvert, obeying two 
incommensurate necessities. Alongside suffering, he breaks a hole in reality, binds death
to life in his painting, in his body which is inseparately his body of work – canvasses 
and gestures which undermine the iron wall of given reality.
If Artaud is still ostensibly writing about van Gogh, here, he is no less reflecting through
this casework on his own strategies not least of these Artaud le Mômo, the inseparate 
body of death-life-thought-unthought which Artaud has made of himself. And let us not 
354 p103 ibid.
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forget, this is no less the inseparateness of the life-and-the-complete-work: the very 
thing which, as Derrida has continued to investigate, is at stake in a casework, in the 
conflict and collusion of the Critical and Clinical in the metaphysics of theft – precisely 
that which had been at stake in the letters on Coleridge and Lautréamont. As we found 
with Deleuze, Derrida’s themes are very much germane to Artaud’s work – indeed, they 
are explicitly addressed in Artaud’s work. But where Derrida discusses, and would 
condemn Artaud to a limbo-death in endless deferment, to escape only to a metaphysics 
which must fall back on that which it left, endlessly, Artaud weaponises at a 
metontological level by binding the furtive metaphysics of necessity. This is both the 
subject and the lesson of his case studies, to show the way out of being made an 
example of, to find slips out of divestment as van Gogh paints outside of life-death 
oppositions.
Van Gogh submits to the necessity imposed on him – he shoots himself. But from 
within this death, within this imposed necessity of “what is” he plants a stake which 
radiates to the very source of that imposed necessity and submits it to his own blood 
poetry, “that dirty linen [...] twisted with wet blood” that are his paintings.355 By ceding 
his mucus to the society that would kill him for what he is capable of, van Gogh finds 
the very means to transform that society from its root – to put reality back in touch with 
itself. He pulls a trigger and lifts a paintbrush and so begins a shockwave which is still 
being felt in the Orangerie in 1947, and which soaks every corner of reality in such a 
way that matter itself – the sunflower, the field, the crow, the sun itself – must from now
on be addressed through his vision, which is to say, the reality he forged – found and 
founded from within the inseparateness of death-life. As we saw with Artaud’s 
“Affective Athleticism”, with the relation to opium and with Artaud le Mômo, the very 
necessity which makes suffering can, through slips to the anterior, through pluperfection






For Derrida, if Artaud’s project is to “restore Danger”356 to a world, to a theatre 
circumscribed by the already-given, it will be achieved not by having done with 
originary expropriation, but by doubling it: the “alienation of alienation”.357 Artaud, he 
argues, “wanted to plunder the structure of theft”358 rather than simply reclaim his lost 
property. This doubling of God’s furtivity is asserted against Artaud’s “stated 
intention”359 which is, indeed, a restoration (e.g. of “Danger”, that is, the capacity to 
open to something beyond the given). Derrida recognises Artaud’s demands for “an 
absolute restoration of the proper to the eve prior to all dissociation”,360 but asserts that 
such a goal is inevitably a reinstatement of Classical metaphysics, that is, of furtivity. 
Indeed, as we have seen, for Derrida, Artaud is “more faithful” to Classical metaphysics
“than it is to itself”.361 Each time Artaud breaks from furtivity, he reasserts its structural 
hegemony at a deeper level, which must again be broken with. This shuttling between 
the two, this vacillation of open/closed, Danger/metaphysics is the ringing of the death-
knell (glas), and it is the means by which deconstruction as a method – a method of 
reading Artaud, of examining Artaud’s exemplarity – perpetually forestalls his victory. 
If it forestalls victory, though, it also forestalls final defeat; the logic of Derrida’s 
casework (deconstruction) is most evident here: it both affirms the particularity of the 
case (its exceptionality) whilst also effacing that particularity by making it finite, 
exchangeable, just another example. If Derrida claims he will follow Artaud’s “stated 




360 p230 ibid. emphasis added. The figure of the “eve prior” has already come up p220 ibid. (“the eve 
prior to the deportation”). It will also feature in the second essay on Artaud, as “the eve prior to birth”
p293 Derrida “Theater of Cruelty”; and in in the final essay of the collection, the second essay on 
Edmund Jabès as “The first book, the mythic book, the eve prior to all repetition” p374 Derrida 
Writing and Difference
361 p230 Derrida “Soufflée”
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intention” to go unprompted, he will do so, nonetheless with “the exception of a 
calculated slip”.362 This “slip” could not be more different from the athletic slip of 
pluperfection which I have been proposing Artaud effects. Derrida’s is a slip between 
one and the other, the slip back into metaphysics or the slip out of it. Slipperiness of 
deconstruction, the slipperiness of he who would steal from the Thief, and who would 
keep the mechanism of the shuttle and the death-knell well greased; that is, keep 
undecidability in motion.363
If Deleuze condemned Artaud to life with his Spinozist appropriations, Derrida 
condemns him to the death-in-life of limbo. This limbo, and the ringing of the glas 
resembles the dispossessed, expropriating mucus of Coleridge’s opium addiction and its
personification as the voice-stealing, transfixing Geraldine; it is not at all Artaud’s own 
model of inseparate life-death which he forges in Artaud le Mômo and which stares 
back through the hole punched in the world by van Gogh’s “auspicious”364 Crows, in 
that “impression of being seen as if from the other side of the grave”.365
Two figures of the inseparate are found and founded in the van Gogh essay – and it is 
this which makes it the culmination of Artaud’s casework method, honed through the 
letters on Lautréamont and Coleridge. On the one hand, there is the inseparate life-and-
the-complete-work, that which Ducasse died of not holding together but which van 
Gogh achieved (he would, we recall Artaud arguing, probably never have painted again 
after the Crows anyway366). On the other hand, there is the body which holds together 
death and life, which is not killed (suicided) by the imposed necessities and magical 
cruelties of the outside. Coleridge failed horribly to manage this, and as the life drained 
out of his body through opiates, so his work too was drained of its blood – reducing his 
362 p221 ibid.
363 Elsewhere, I have performatively engaged with this figure of “calculated slip” through Derrida’s 
speaking as if prompted by Artaud, slipping into the first person, in “La parole soufflée”. Jon K. 
Shaw “With the Exception of a Calculated Slip” (performance paper presented at 5th Derrida Today 





work to the “polite belch” of “poetry poetry”, no longer “blood poetry”.367 Van Gogh 
achieved this binding by carving out a time, a time to paint, inside the imposed death 
(suicided), hence to create a life-unlife – a binding of finite and infinite – within his 
body: the man and the complete work coming to fruition from somewhere proper to 
neither life nor death, but those bound on his body and in his work. It is a similar slip 
which we saw Artaud make with Artaud le Mômo’s life-unlife inseparate, and it is a 
logic which, I have argued, he also applies to his own use of opium. In order to evade 
the ignominious death of Coleridge, Artaud effected a slip to make opium itself an agent
of his “sempiternal” expressive lucidity, not an agent of the anterior-outside depleting 
his body from elsewhere.368
Imposed death, like the imposition of necessity which emerges in opiate addiction is 
bound as the body, a body prior to any external necessity. This is effected through the 
pluperfect slip, a slip to before historical causes (de facto) and ontological anteriorities 
(de jure). The articulation of this, and the arrogation to his own body of these strategies 
and counterstrategies, is Artaud’s casework method, his autobiographical method, and 
especially his use of fictions to break with the hegemony of “facts” to remake “[t]he 
human world without mortality”.369 Yet Derrida’s “slip” is slippage between the two, 
never a slip back-and-out of this world – never finding and founding in one – but 
always the slipperiness which doubles furtivity to steal from it. Derrida claims to be 
saving Artaud from final defeat in greasing him up thus (to endlessly swim the channel 
between the two sessions), but I would argue that it is Artaud’s athleticism, the 
sempiternality of his inseparate body which has always-already evaded this slippery 
limbo.
Where Derrida takes Artaud as an example and finds him – in his revolt against his 




370 p244 Derrida “Soufflée”
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through his case studies and slippery fictions Artaud finds van Gogh (and himself) to 
bind death in their bodies and make of it a part of their expressive force rather than an 
exterior anteriority hanging over them or slipping inside: no longer suicided, these 
bodies are the inseparate: life-unlife-body-body-of-work.
It is by dint of this sempiternal fourfold inseparate that Artaud’s casework method yields
something quite different from Derrida’s adventures in the undecidability of the 
example, something beyond calculated slips. Artaud is quite adamant that the 
sempiternal does not fall back on the eternal, that is, on the logic of Classical 
metaphysics. It would not, then, begin an endless shuttling; would not ring its own 
death-knell. It would be, rather, that “leap without the tomb” Artaud writes of371: a break
into an unknown that is not simply a final resting place, and the production of a body of 
work which does not fall away from (tomber) the expressive body which makes it.
In the final Chapter of this thesis we will look further at the van Gogh essay as we begin
to consider the role of drawing in Artaud’s own œuvre, especially in the notebook 
practice of his final years. In these notebooks, the regimes of text, image, materiality 
and bodily gestures come together in an originary inseparateness: inseparate from each 
other and from Artaud’s body. The question of undecidability and incompletion as 
persistence and efficacy will again come up in relation to these notebooks, and to other 
elements of Artaud’s drawing practice – not least his spells – and again we will be 
looking at ways in which the body which Artaud insists upon finding and founding 
successfully evades these discourses of capture, resignation and, ultimately, of 
exsanguination. This final Chapter will come to engage with Derrida’s late work on 
Artaud, in particular his essay on the term “subjectile”, a term which we hope to rethink 
in light of the disagreements with Derrida’s methods which have begun to be addressed 
in this Chapter through comparison with Artaud’s own casework: that is, his use of 
fictions, his slips of pluperfection and his finding-founding of a fourfold inseparate 
371 p461 SW
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body-body-of-work. In relation to the subjectile – which, broadly speaking is that which
is worked upon in the act of drawing, so the paper of the drawing or that which is being 
drawn – these strategies and figures will allow us to address Artaud’s ideas on 





This final Chapter will take in Derrida’s later work on Artaud, especially the 1986 essay 
“To Unsense the Subjectile”, where the themes of force and form – as well as that of 
breath, which is often equated with force – return; but we will also take on a theme 
which is suggested in Derrida’s essay on the subjectile, but not, to my mind, 
satisfactorily resolved there. If the question of the subjectile is, in a sense, a question of 
the materiality of the substrate which Artaud draws and writes upon – the becoming-
paper of the page, we might say – this theme of materiality will lead us to recount 
Artaud’s adventures outside of France, alongside his drawings and notebooks. Derrida’s 
second essay on Artaud, “The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation”, 
also collected in Writing and Difference, concerns itself with a deconstruction of the 
relationship between force and form in Artaud’s theatre work, especially as it is 
proposed in The Theatre and Its Double. I shall not be discussing this essay in depth, 
here, for reasons of brevity – this is not, after all, a thesis on Derrida – and for two 
further reasons: on the one hand, we have already given some attention to Artaud’s 
writings on theatre in our first Chapter and will have recourse to them again in this, our 
third; on the other hand, the logic of deconstruction more generally has already been 
given close attention in our second Chapter.
The materiality which Derrida shows us Artaud is working through with the subjectile is
a materiality not divorced from formative force. As we shall continue to see, in Artaud’s
œuvre matter must be both reconnected with the abstract, and intensively “volatilised”, 
that is shown to be itself already forceful.1 This “volatilised matter”,2 I will suggest, 
1 p27 “Le Rite du peyotl chez les Tarahumara” in OCIX. Artaud writes of the ceremony in which the 
celebrants “made their own bodies, bodies in which the idea of matter is volatilized”, cited p112 
Hayman Artaud and After.
2 ibid. For eight alternatives to “volatilised matter” which Artaud considered see p245n.6 OCIX
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invokes – within Artaud’s work and in other discourses – the theme of the Earth. Indeed,
the Earth will be lighted upon in two ways in this Chapter: as a privileged example of 
the vulcanicity of matter, which we will think through, in part, with Derrida’s discussion
of force and form in relation to the subjectile; and as a totality of forces without outside 
which Artaud is also aiming at, in his search for a “lost world” and the “true body”.3 
Which is to say, the Earth will feature as a metaphor for the volatile-material body 
which is Artaud’s “sempiternal” body without organs had done with the judgement of 
God, but also as the lost world which the body is contemporaneous with without being 
subordinate nor posterior to in any way. The theme of the “subjectile” will also connect 
these: it is a complex term, but most simply might be thought of as what is worked on in
the act of drawing, for some the canvas or paper, and for Artaud also the body being 
drawn. The “subjectile” will, thus, be found to connect the becoming-paper of the page 
– the unearthing of the innate volatility of matter – and the anatomical reworking 
through which the true body is found and founded as active metaphysics.
If for some commentators Artaud’s battle against malevolent forces is not entirely lost, 
but is never finally won, we will seek, as he himself evidently did, a way of thinking 
beyond resigned melancholy, to ask how in this war Artaud’s gestures are always also 
productive (hence recalling our examinations of Artaud le Mômo and the van Gogh 
essay). This will involve stating an alternative reading of the subjectile to the 
deconstructive one put forward in “To Unsense the Subjectile”, in particular around the 
gestures of destruction-creation which Derrida discusses as “cicatrices”.4 The primary 
resource, here, will be those works which Artaud used this enigmatic word “subjectile” 
in relation to: his drawings and, above all, the notebooks of his final years. As Paule 
Thévenin writes,
if the drawings are for him, as subsequently all the lines of the notebooks will 
be, the manifestation of a war undertaken against the evil force dispersed in the 
3 “lost world” p9 Antonin Artaud “Dix ans que la langage est parti” in Luna-Park No.5 (October 1979),
cited p41 Thévenin “Lost World”; and “true body” see fig.25
4 p142ff Derrida “Unsense”
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world in order to prevent any lucid consciousness from speaking out, they are 
also a means for finding a profound reality once again.5
It is these stakes, and the mechanism of the cicatrixial gesture which both destroys and 
creates in one, which we will turn to at the end of this Chapter. We will do so through 
the question of volatilised materiality that emerges around the notebooks, and their 
intersection with a lucidity which, as we have seen, must for Artaud always be lodged in
his body. In the notebooks – where writing, drawing and material engagements with the 
page come together – Artaud finds and founds an inseparateness of these three, and 
through them remakes his lucid material body. This is the meaning of subjectile as I will
propose it, which in turn links to the lucid material Earth of Artaud’s adventures.
The goal here is to move forward through Artaud’s work and his words to try to reach 
the stakes of his project, of his œuvre, and to see how what we have learned from the 
earlier Chapters – in particular the mechanisms of pluperfection and fictioning – can be 
put to work in articulating and discovering something which has been less often 
commented upon in Artaud’s work: his ideas around and explorations of materiality, 
lucidity, inseparateness and the Earth.




No sooner has Artaud been seen from beyond the grave – found this power of painting 
with which van Gogh works his way through the invisible wall of iron that separates 
him from himself,6 that separates life-and-complete-work, life from death – than he 
finds these paintings to be also something other than paintings. The work of van Gogh is
also writing. Indeed, Artaud goes so far as to assert that van Gogh was “as great a writer
as he was painter”.7 It is no use our describing one of his paintings, for not only will we 
fail to do justice to it, we will also fall short of the remarkable descriptions which van 
Gogh habitually produces in his considerable written output – most famously and 
extensively in the letters to his brother, Theo.8 For Artaud, these descriptions, too, have 
a certain capacity for determination, for precipitating a kind of cruelty: van Gogh 
describes a canvas “simply, succinctly, objectively, permanently [...] massively, 
authentically, and miraculously”,9 putting us in touch with that same forceful source as 
burns in these paintings; which is to say, that force which is beyond but not exclusive of 
our finitude, the beyond the grave.
If van Gogh’s writing runs alongside the paintings – and already we glimpse here a 
relation of text and image which is not one of reciprocal exclusion but of something like
a shared origin, this being one of the main themes of this Chapter – the importance of 
the letter is not exhausted here. For, van Gogh’s sketches also appear within his letters. 
These can be sketches of canvases already painted or croquis (sketches) of possible 
subjects for canvases. In the example Artaud cites (fig.37), sketches are both “of” 
paintings and “for” paintings, not to mention being sketches “of” possible subjects 
(“nature”), and all these sketches are within the letters, accompanied by commentaries: 
any firm sense of hierarchy or of temporal precedence of writing over drawing becomes 
rather shaky.10
6 See p498 SW
7 ibid.
8 Vincent van Gogh The Letters: The Complete Illustrated and Annotated Edition ed. Leo Jansen et al. 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 2009).
9 p499 SW
10 pp498–9 ibid., Artaud cites the letter to Theo, 23rd July 1890 pp291–9 van Gogh Letters; see also 
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And a stranger twist. Artaud argues that the canvases and drawings are themselves made
up of written characters (“the i, the comma”11), such that – as well as troubling any firm 
chronological anteriority in the works of van Gogh – painting, drawing and writing 
appear inside one another, offering no firm sense of ultimate inside and outside. Neither 
painting nor writing frames the other. Indeed, as Artaud shows, in the letters and in the 
brushstrokes, writing and drawing seem to unground each other, both spatially and 
temporally, undermining the iron wall which would separate them; and in doing so, as 
we shall see, the work loses any sense of subservience to the world – or “nature” – as it 
is given.
As we have seen, Artaud often associates language with dead form: “pigshit”12 sundered
from formative force. Force is found, in the van Gogh essay, on the canvas, in the paint, 
where language and gesture converge at the level of the body pressing on the stretched 
material:
with the color caught just as it is when squeezed out of the tube,
with the impress of the separate hairs of the brush in the paint, [...]
with the i, the comma, the tip of the point of the brush itself twisted right into 
the paint13
The characters Artaud finds are vowels and punctuation, those most associated with 
breath, which, for Artaud, is the force of language, the bodily source of language and 
athletic expressive force more generally. This intensive forceful movement of written 
characters at the level of gesture puts us in touch with something which Artaud calls 
“nature”. He explains:
I shall not describe a painting of van Gogh after van Gogh, but I shall say that 
van Gogh is a painter because he recollected nature, because he reperspired it 
and made it sweat, because he squeezed onto his canvases in clusters, in 
monumental sheaves of color, the grinding of elements that occurs once in a 
hundred years, the awful elementary pressure of apostrophes, scratches, 
commas, and dashes which, after him, one can no longer believe that natural 
fig.38
11 p504 SW
12 p75 CWI modified in line with p134 AO. See also pp75–82 Lesley Stern “All Writing is Pigshit” in 
ed. Scheer 100 Years of Cruelty
13 p504 SW
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appearances are not made of.14
The intensity of van Gogh’s engagement of nature is not passive observation but “cruel”
determination, an athleticism vis-a-vis given nature itself; it is a means of working on it 
(“making it sweat”) and working on oneself; on working through any assumptions or 
subservience one might have about it and oneself by working through it (“reperspiring” 
it). If the theatre of cruelty denounced psychology in theatre, for Artaud, van Gogh 
“renounced storytelling in his painting”, decoupling narrative and representation from 
painting in the name of turning to this “nature”, to where nature and “the material, 
painting itself” are immanently engaged.15 And this, Artaud is arguing, is precisely what 
allows van Gogh to recombine description and written characters with the image at a 
deeper level: the bodily level of perspiration, of force and forcing, of nature and 
material still in touch with formative force. We will return to this idea of nature as 
bodily and forceful, and as being remade through the body from the given, later in this 
Chapter.
Picto-(choreo-)graphy
Here, then, painting and with it nature, writing and with it breathing, are arranged 
around a common goal of renewing contact with force. As Jacques Derrida puts it – in 
an essay from 1986 on Artaud’s own drawings – what Artaud recognises in van Gogh’s 
mark-making is the “formation of the letter in a drawing that takes away from the word”
and which in doing so refinds beneath words a “verbality of articulated language whose 
pure sonority nevertheless spurts forth”16: beneath language is writing as mark-making, 
and breath. The name Derrida gives to this spurting forth – this force refound at a source
apparently common to drawing and language and fully proper to neither – is 
“pictography”.17 This word designates, he explains, “work in which painting [...] 
drawing, and writing do not tolerate the wall of any division”.18 Crucially, for the 
discussions which will come below, this is both a question of disciplinary propriety and 
of material difference: pictography will not tolerate distinction “of different arts nor that
14 p499 ibid.
15 p504 ibid.
16 p99 Derrida “Unsense”
17 pp78–80 and 83–6 ibid.
18 p78 ibid.
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of genres, nor that of supports or substances.”19 Just as he was ultimately intolerant or 
incredulous of any “unity prior to dissociation” in “La parole soufflée”,20 Derrida 
eschews any notion of “myths of origin” or a magical form of writing (“incantatory or 
conjuring”) – mark-making with immediate efficacy – he nonetheless acknowledges 
that such themes of origin and immediate efficacy could be germane to Artaud’s work in
many media.21 Derrida clarifies that the sense of pictogram he is suggesting be 
understood more precisely as, “the trajectory of what is literally understood to cross the 
border between painting and drawing, drawing and verbal writing, and, still more 
generally, the arts of space and the others, between space and time.”22 This “trajectory”, 
then, reminds us that this work is always in process for Derrida, and is best thought in 
terms of projectiles and other “jets” [throws]:23 returning to force, Derrida argues, 
requires the application of a force. Whilst I will be in agreement with this insistence on 
force in what Artaud himself calls his “written drawings”,24 I will not agree with Derrida
(and others) that such a doubling – drawing on force to awaken force – necessarily reefs 
Artaud’s project in a never-yet-complete “to come”. Our Conclusion will look at how 
Deleuze and Guattari help us think beyond this.
Later in his essay Derrida takes this pictogram off the page to combine it with 
choreography, and thereby suggest a “picto-choreography”.25 He proposes that this is 
what Artaud finds in the Ciguri dance in his visit to Mexico, and which he had already 
begun to formulate in the essay on Balinese theatre in Theatre and Its Double.26 This 
turn to corporeal movement is, I will argue below, a very important one, but the ways in 
which drawing, writing, paper and bodies are related in Artaud’s work – and the role of 
the trip to Mexico in developing this – can be thought differently to Derrida’s 
picto(choreo)graphy, with far-reaching consequences. This chapter will thus discuss 
Artaud’s works on paper and Derrida’s arguments thereon, before giving an account of 
Artaud’s trip to Mexico which will in turn provide the means for investigating my own 
propositions about the role of force in Artaud’s homologies of drawing, writing, paper, 
bodies and the Earth. As a prelude to these three arcs – on Artaud’s subjectile and 
19 ibid.
20 p219 Derrida “Soufflée”
21 p78 Derrida “Unsense”
22 ibid.
23 See especially p75 ibid.
24 p20 Letter to Jean Paulhan, 10th January 1945 in OCXI, cited p19 Thévenin “Lost World”
25 p99 “To Unsense the Subjectile”
26 pp99–100 ibid. On Ciguri Derrida cites p22–3 OCIX
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Derrida, on Mexico, on the Earth – it will be apt for us to first look more closely at 
Artaud’s own interest in drawing – as a practice and a simile in his writings – with 
particular attention to their transections with writing and his body.
Youthful Drawings; Metaphor and Method
Paule Thévenin, in an essay which precedes Derrida’s “To Unsense the Subjectile” in 
the 1986 German collection of Artaud’s Zeichnungen und Portraits [Drawings and 
Portraits] – the first such project to bring together a sizeable, though by no means 
comprehensive collection of his works on paper – gives a detailed account of the role of 
drawing through Artaud’s life.27 She tells us that, in his youth, Artaud developed a 
certain facility in drawing and painting; these early paintings and sketches demonstrate 
an interest in, and sensitivity to, the techniques of Munch and Cézanne, and also to 
Bonnard (figs.3–6). His drawing talents were put to good use in his earlier years in 
theatre, especially by Lugne-Poë, for whom Artaud designed sets and costumes, but 
through the years of associating with the surrealists, of establishing the Théâtre Alfred 
Jarry and of producing the writings on theatre – which is to say, from the mid-1920s to 
the mid-1930s – he drew little, if at all.28 Nonetheless, the theme of drawing appears not 
infrequently in The Theatre and Its Double, and one of its central texts – “Mis-en-scène 
and Metaphysics”29 – advances through a study of a painting.
If the theatre is immobilised by dead forms which separate it from itself and, thus, 
collude in stealing the actor from himself, after seeing the Balinese theatre in 1931, 
Artaud can articulate his goal of a reintegration based on a “new physical language” of 
“moving hieroglyphs”.30 The language which Artaud reaches for to explain this is one 
27 Paule Thévenin and Jacques Derrida Antonin Artaud: Zeichnungen und Portraits (Mosel: Schirmer, 
1986) translated from the later-published French, but for copyright reasons presented without images,
as Thévenin and Derrida Secret Art. The most significant exhibitions of Artaud’s works were two at 
Centre Georges Pompidou (the latter following the death of Thévenin and the Museum’s receipt of 
her bequest (Antonin Artaud, Dessins 1st July – 11th October 1987 and Antonin Artaud dessins, le legs 




al.pdf> respectively; and the 3rd October 1996 – 7th January 1997 at Museum of Modern Art New 
York, curated by Margit Rowell, catalogue: ed. Rowell Works on Paper. I shall largely prefer the title 
of this later exhibition “works on paper” to refer collectively to these works.
28 pp3–10 Thévenin “Lost World”
29 pp22–33 CWIV, where mise-en-scène is translated as “production”.
30 pp38–9 ibid.
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shared with drawing – “sketches”, “gestures”31 – and one which seemingly has not 
entirely had done with written language. Rather, it is as if written language itself is to be
pulled onto the stage, being transformed and re-embodied. It is not writing which 
Artaud is against, it seems, but the written; the written as a fait accompli which would 
erect language as the absolute foundation of the theatre, and which from its hidden place
off-stage separates the actor from himself. What pulling writing onto stage would mean 
is the body becoming a sort of living writing – having done with the judgement of the 
written-as-anterior by incorporating it to the expressive body: writing as living gesture, 
as drawing, pictography or hieroglyphs.32 This bodily, substantial live-writing also 
integrates the prelinguistic voice and thought: “[t]here is no transition from a gesture to 
a cry [...] everything is connected as if through strange channels penetrating right 
through the mind!”33
In September 1931, Artaud came across a painting in the Louvre by Lucas van Leyden 
depicting Lot and his Daughters (c.1520) and wrote to Jean Paulhan detailing some 
connections he was beginning to make between this painting and the theatre he had 
recently written about in his article on Balinese theatre; the ideas became the essay 
“Mis-en-Scène and Metaphysics”.34 Both Balinese theatre and van Leyden’s painting 
achieved effects which, for Artaud, Western theatre had become unable to produce. If 
when writing “Mis-en-scène and Metaphysics” Artaud finds theatre to be “like a kind of
frozen world, with players frozen in gestures that were no longer of any use to them”, 
this is first and foremost because a reliance on dialogue had effected Western theatre’s 
subordination to the alien art of literature.35 In turn, this had contributed to a fracturing 
of the means used in the theatre, and the subordination of what were, for Artaud, its 
most important and necessary means now belittled as mere “craft”.36 The techniques 
proper to theatre – “expressive means” through which it plastically manipulates space 
and time, such as “music, dance, plastic art, mimicry, mime, gesture, voice inflection, 
31 pp38ff ibid.
32 There is no assertion, here, that this is a historical truth about what hieroglyphs are and their genesis. 
It is, rather, a means of articulating a set of associations. For more on the difference between 
hieroglyphs and pictograms, see e.g. Jacques Derrida “Scribble (writing-power)” trans. Cary Plotkin 
in Yale French Studies No.58 (1979), 117–147.
33 p41 CWIV
34 pp22–33 CWIV. See also pp23–40 Martin Harries Forgetting Lot’s Wife: On Destructive 




architecture, lighting and décor”37 – could no longer come together to produce a single 
overall effect and, as such, it had become impossible for a theatrical production to act 
upon its audience with the immediacy which it could and should: it had lost its “direct 
physical potential”.38
Van Leyden’s painting, on the other hand, had already achieved “what theatre ought to 
be, if only it knew how to speak its own language.”39 Indeed, the painting demonstrates 
“the impotence of Words, this supremely anarchic, material painting seem[s] to establish
their futility.”40 As with the lessons he takes from Balinese theatre, what is at stake in 
heeding this painterly lesson is no less than “to replace the set forms of the art with 
living, threatening forms, through which the meaning of ancient ceremonial magic can 
find fresh reality on a theatrical level”.41 Which is to say that the lesson of this painting 
is a metaphysical one, a lesson on the reintegration of metaphysics into life, here shown 
to be, in part, achieved through the painting’s “formal” qualities – the plastic means 
proper to the craft.42 In the theatre, these formal qualities are to be investigated through 
mise-en-scène, but primarily through the actor’s body as expressive hieroglyph: the 
determined use of “sign, gesture and posture language with its own ideographic 
values”.43 Again, eschewing the prescribed word allows the theatre to find its own 
language (of determination, of cruelty), and through the body’s graphism to re-engage 
“active metaphysics” in an inseparate body.44
As Thévenin puts it, “the gestures of an actor are so many ephemeral arabesques drawn 
with his body, the actors together constructing a sort of moving and colorful graphism 
akin to painting, having the stage for its frame.”45 But, I would add, as Thévenin’s words
demonstrate, in The Theatre and Its Double, the connection between theatre, drawing, 
writing, bodies vacillates between, on the one hand deploying this graphism as a literal 
part of the return to active metaphysics – debasing, abreacting and reinventing-









45 p13 Thévenin “Lost World”
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technical terms of painting and drawing as mere metaphor – explanatory drawings for 
something which will not house them. Thus, I would argue, if pictography was never far
from Artaud’s frame of reference in the early 1930s, drawing is not yet being 
investigated and deployed fully in its own right as something capable of ushering in the 
finding-founding of active metaphysics. That will not come until the return of drawing 
in the late 1930s.
Force and Form
It is worth addressing directly, here, this question of force and form, as it is these terms 
which seem to link Artaud’s ideas on theatre and those on drawing, especially in 
Derrida’s accounts of them. The terms will recur throughout this Chapter – especially 
force, which will also be associated with breath, with the holes which Artaud stabs and 
burns into his spells and drawings from the mid-1930s onward, and with the nails which
he will draw in many of the later drawings.
In an essay on art and force in Derrida’s writings – especially those on Artaud – Andrew
Benjamin makes a germane distinction around the word “work”.46 On the one hand, 
there is the form of a finished artwork, the “substantive” sense of “work”; on the other 
hand, there is the force through which it was made, the “work” which went into making 
it, or the “actative” sense of “work”.47 Habitually, force and form, whilst clearly 
complementary, are given as mutually exclusive: the actative working of art (force) 
ceasing when the substantive artwork (form) is made. Put another way, the presence of 
the artwork (as form) demands the absenting or closure of the work of art (as force). As 
Benjamin argues, to think force-form as non-exclusive, to think work beyond either/or 
in “both an actative as well as a substantive dimension” means raising up, rather than 
absenting actative force such that “substance becomes activity” and the “substantive 
was therefore always the actative.”48 For Benjamin, then, to engage with Derrida’s 
reading of Artaud, we must understand that form is always undecidably tied to force, 
46 pp391–4 Andrew Benjamin “Art’s Work: Derrida and Artaud and Atlan” in A Companion to Derrida 




never simply its negation, nor the final having-done with force (workful activity) in the 
name of form (full presence of substance). For Benjamin, then, the artwork is “workful 
presence”, but only by dint of never fully excluding nor resolving the relation of force 
to form, presence and volatility.49
Ros Murray, author of the recent Antonin Artaud: Scum of the Soul, which we shall have
cause to discuss several times in this Chapter, articulates a comparable workful presence
throughout her book.50 The “scum” which Artaud talks of in the youthful phrase which 
lends Murray’s book its title indicates not only the substantiality of being which Artaud 
insists upon in images such as the “nerve scales”, but equally designates the risks of 
such substantialisation, which is to say, that, once the intangible-eternal is reintegrated 
with the changing-material, it is subject to the dangers of drying out, flaking, falling 
away from the integrative force of the body to a different kind of dead, forceless form: 
from eternity to the gutter. As Artaud writes, “[w]hat you took to be my works were 
only my waste matter, the soul scrapings a normal man does not welcome”.51 As much 
as Artaud is tortured by the transcendent schema of an eternity to which, monotheism 
tells him, his body does not belong, he is also tortured by the thieves who would steal 
parts of him, steal him from himself in the very moment that the force of expression is 
cut from his body as artwork (form or substance). Both artwork and body are depleted 
in these sunderings – the artwork becomes flaky, dead mass, and the body’s force is, in 
effect, stolen from it. As Derrida observed in “La parole soufflée”, “the work, as 
excrement, is but matter without life, without force or form.”52 Hence Artaud’s concern, 
for example, in the letter on Coleridge, with “mucus”, on the means of holding the twain
together.53
For Murray, in an “overarching sense, Artaud’s drawings, writing and theatre practice 
implement a constant battle between force and form, in both graphic and linguistic 
terms”.54 This battle, though, as we shall see, is also force and form being made 
inextricable – the final victory of either would mean a sundering, a diminution of the 
49 ibid.
50 Murray Scum of the Soul
51 p72 “Nerve Scale” in CWI. “scrapings” translates raclure which Murray has as “scum”.
52 p230 Derrida “Soufflée”, it does not hold a shape, but still comes under the category of 
form/substance.
53 p477 SW
54 p119 Murray Scum of the Soul
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body. The holding together of force and form might be thought of as Artaud’s search for
a third way, beyond or prior to the separation of the two. Andrew Benjamin chooses the 
term “mattering”, making matter a processual or energetic stuff, we might say; and as he
asserts, first and foremost “[i]n the case of Artaud mattering pertains to drawings and 
portraits”.55 Indeed, this forceful problem is fundamental to the drawings, spells and 
notebooks from the outset. As Murray argues, all Artaud’s “drawings bear the influence 
of the spells particularly through this question of the relationship between force and 
form”.56 For Murray, the question of matter is best addressed in Artaud’s work through 
his innovative and relentless attacks on or within specific media – his ways of forcing 
what is usually taken for granted about the medium’s materiality to be revealed and to 
be put at stake within the work – the medium shown as also actative rather than hidden 
as substantive. For Murray, this means that in Artaud’s later drawings “all elements of 
their composition, whether material, linguistic, corporeal, or all of these at the same 
time, must be rendered visible”.57 The metaphysical import of just such a curtain call is 
made clear in Derrida’s second essay on Artaud, “The Theater of Cruelty and the 
Closure of Representation”, where Derrida describes Artaud’s project – Artaud’s 
projectile, we might say – as being an attack on the circumscription of theatrical force 
within dead form. The “energy of western theater”, Derrida summarises, has for Artaud 
“let itself be encompassed within its own possibility”.58 Ceding the source of its active 
metaphysics, theatre has fallen from its own “sacred” and integrative possibility.59
As we have seen, the reintegration of force and form, of body and breath, of language 
and expression is very much what is at stake in Artaud’s writings on the theatre. But it is
in the “works on paper” of his final years that language, gesture and breath – writing, 
mark-making and body – can be explored in concert with materiality – the materiality of
paper – such that the very support which holds up and received the force of Artaud’s 
expressive gestures can itself be put back in touch with its own formative force, rather 
than being taken for granted as dead, inert form. As we shall see, it is in this sense that 
the theme of force-form is doubled, and becomes the theme of the subjectile. Before 
turning to the subjectile, we will first consider Artaud’s return to drawing within his 
spells. In doing so, we will take in these ideas of force and form in relation to 
55 p392 Benjamin “Art’s Work”
56 p119 Murray Scum of the Soul
57 ibid.
58 p314 Derrida “Theater of Cruelty”
59 e.g. pp1–5 OCIV
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materiality and immediacy, and begin to distance our own arguments from those of 
Derrida, Benjamin and Murray, hence moving toward my own reading of subjectile as 
force-form which I will elaborate later in this Chapter through Artaud’s adventures and 
drawing on the fourfolds and slips proposed in previous Chapters.
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II
The Return of Drawing: An Overview
When Artaud’s return to drawing comes, it comes with an intensity, and with an 
insistence on immediate efficacy, that had characterised his demands for active 
metaphysics in the theatre, and in his body. As Artaud would later note of van Gogh, 
drawing can be more than slavishly copying nature – acquiescing to representation and 
the inviolable anteriority of the given; drawing can be to sweat nature out and to make it
sweat60 – an active engagement with metaphysics, and the incorporation of a 
metaphysics of sempiternal force. It is no coincidence that, from the outset, this is rarely
drawing alone: it is very often figures jostling and transected with text – phrases, titles, 
signatures, dates, glossolalia – or shot through by gestures that mark, pierce or destroy 
the paper: knife-stabs, cigarette-singes, match-burnings, pencil-stabs (“He takes his 
pencil [...] as he would a true weapon”61) and pulverisations so forceful the graphite 
marks “gleam like mica”.62
Artaud’s works on paper could be said to fall into three phases (again, we are indebted 
to Thévenin’s tireless work, here). These are the sorts (spells or “sendings”) of August 
1937 to May 1939 (figs.11–18),63 the preoccupations and techniques of which continue 
to inhere in all the subsequent works on paper. These are followed by relative inactivity 
through most of the long asylum years, until early 1945 when Artaud begins the larger 
pieces, what he calls his “written drawings” (figs.19–25).64 This phase will run until 
Artaud’s death (the one certified by the Mairie) and thus in parallel with the third phase,
the portraits which Thévenin dates from summer 1946 (figs.26–30). These begin, 
Thévenin tells us, as works to please Artaud’s friends, though Artaud also talks of trying
to earn a living by portraiture.65 But before long these portraits are being worked in a 
much more purposive way, employing, as we shall see, some of the techniques first 
developed in the spells. As Thévenin puts it,
60 p499 SW
61 pp26–7 Thévenin “Lost World”
62 p31 ibid.
63 pp15–16 ibid.
64 p20 OCXI, cited p19 Thévenin “Lost World”
65 p30 Thévenin “Lost World”
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very soon, the face will stop being an object to reproduce, in order to become – 
upon the sheet where Antonin Artaud forms hatchings, stripes, wrinkles, 
scrunching his pencil down until it breaks off – the very theater of a war from 
which he will emerge devastated, panting, and shrieking with a truth never until 
then attained.66
And this becomes all the more pronounced when, in 1947, shortly before an exhibition 
of his drawings at Galerie Pierre, Artaud revisits these faces, adding “signs” and 
“objects”, often in pastels and chalks which had previously only been used on the 
drawings – intense oranges and reds, such as those lighting up the hair and lips in the 
portrait of Minouche Pastier (fig.26).67 He will also begin to add text to the portraits, 
such as those of Jany de Ruy and Colette Thomas of July–August 1947 (figs.27–28), 
contributing to the defensive battlements he is establishing, through various magical and
mundane means, to protect himself and his friends. As Artaud would explain of the 
adumbrations to the portrait of de Ruy (fig.27), he was making for her “an armed 
head”.68
These final two phases could be said to come together in Artaud’s final drawings 
(perhaps a nascent fourth phase) (figs.31–32). Like the “written drawings”, these final 
pieces of January 1948 cover the whole page with figures and text; but, like the 
portraits, they privilege the human face as the last repository of the final scraps of the 
true body, and hence the site which must be most furiously attacked in order to release 
that body to itself (as we shall discuss in relation to the cicatrix and the subjectile). 
Thévenin gives us a powerful insight into the intensity and stakes that Artaud’s 
drawings will take on over this final decade, culminating in these two untitled pieces. 
These very final works, Thévenin writes,
these forests of intermingled faces sometimes haunted by [Artaud’s] own, these 
accumulated heads erected as totems, these landscapes constellated with eyes, 
syllables, or words, that he peoples with dead women of whom he makes living 
ones, and living ones who must pass through death in order to live.69
66 ibid.
67 From a letter Artaud sent to Thévenin (18th June 1947), calling her to see additions to portraits of her 
and her sister. Cited p35 ibid. Thévenin does not specify, but this is probably Paule aux Ferrets 
[Paule in Irons] (fig.29).
68 p148 Jacques Prevel En compagnie d’Antonin Artaud (Paris: Flammarion, 1974), cited p36 Thévenin 
“Lost World”.
69 p37 Thévenin “Lost World”
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Thévenin does not count the notebooks (figs.39–55) as a distinct phase – and her 
discussions can risk treating them as predominantly textual (indeed, she oversaw their 
publication as transcripts which neither maintained the layouts nor included images70) – 
but she readily recognises that “[w]hat Antonin Artaud accomplished with the first 
drawings done at Rodez is indissociable from the writing of the notebooks.”71 For 
Thévenin, it seems, the notebook writings approach the same goal as the drawings, but 
by a different route, which is to say that, in her estimation, for Artaud, “[w]hat counts is 
to affirm by writing, as he does by drawing, a certain identity found again [...] to 
reconstitute his dislocated framework.”72 But I would suggest the notebooks be thought 
of as a more integrated practice: they find text and drawing in forceful tension and 
collusion, the space of the page is used to bring out the incantatory rhythm of the words,
the pages are stabbed and gouged (figs.46–49). These are techniques, as we shall see, 
first developed in the spells of 1937–8, but it is in the notebooks that these techniques 
are maintained and honed not only in order to later reappear in the portraits and 
drawings of 1947–8, but as a fully developed practice in their own right.
One further point about the notebooks before we turn to the spells. It is worth noting 
that, as much as the notebooks have this intensive articulation of text, image and 
materiality, they also contain “commentaries” on many of the drawings which Artaud 
was producing at Rodez and Ivry. Not all of the commentaries can be firmly paired with
their correlative drawing (not least as some drawings are lost), but as Thévenin explains,
the commentaries that she was able to pair up give “abundant information” on how 
Artaud “envisaged his drawings and his own relation to the inert matter that presented 
itself to him: the paper on which he was going to project words, objects, and phantoms 
of beings”.73 This question of “inert matter” which the notebooks interrogate will be 
investigated closely, below, in relation to that enigmatic term “subjectile” and its 
relation to the drawings and portraits, to the notebooks themselves and beyond. But the 
existence of these commentaries – interspersed with sketches – also sets up a resonance 
with the same practice which Artaud would later observe in van Gogh’s letters: the 
seemingly extensive connection between drawing and writing as forms (what, for 
70 OCXV–XXV




Derrida “crosses the border”74), for Artaud testifies to an “awful elementary pressure”75 
shared across mark-making. No less than the “written drawings”, then, the 
commentaries in the notebooks affirm this inextricable and forceful link between text 
and image, just as they also embody it in their own composition, made up, as they are, 
of text, images and material engagements.
Spells
So, the practice of drawing returns in 1937 with the spells. Artaud has returned from 
Mexico and is now in Ireland. The first spell which is still in existence is one sent to the 
Surrealist novelist Lise Deharme on 5th September (fig.11). At first glance this spell, like
all the subsequent ones, might be mistaken for a letter: in the top-right corner the date is 
placed, as is proper, but is underwritten by its kabbalic reduction to 7 (a few steps are 
not spelt out, but the arithmetic is correct). In place of the signature, a symbol, or set of 
symbols, which also appears at the top of the page.76 These are sigils, one might say, a 
mark-making which is neither writing nor image-making. Their efficacy as magical 
symbols relies on being reducible, then, to neither word nor picture, neither signification
nor representation. At its centre, the page has been burned through – intentionally – with
further singe marks either side of the hole. No words are fully obscured by this damage 
to the paper; those that are partly burned through are still legible – indeed, because of 
the damage to and around them, they are even accentuated. The message of the text is 
deeply unpleasant and aggressive. It reads, “I will shove a red-hot poker up your 
stinking Jewish sex, and then ham it up on your corpse to prove to you that THE GODS 
STILL EXIST!”77 The words touched by the flame are “iron” and “red-hot” – “croix”, 
“rougie”, and the fricative “feu” – as if the match Artaud used were the flame heating 
the weapon, or the burning weapon itself, with the paper as Deharme’s body.
74 p78 Derrida “Unsense”
75 p499 SW
76 Thévenin explains, “Very often, during those months [...] his signature is accompanied by a triple 
sign: the symbol of the feminine sex – which is also that of the planet Venus – augmented with an 




A Note on Antisemitism
There is not room, here, to go too deeply into the question of antisemitism, but clearly 
some comments are needed. It is true that the last existing spell of Artaud’s is sent to 
Hitler in September 1939 at the outbreak of war, and that this spell claims that Artaud 
has brought down certain barriers so that Hitler might enter Paris and gas the Parisians.78
It has been suggested that, in 1939, Artaud believed that Hitler invaded Paris with the 
goal of freeing Artaud from Ville-Évrard.79 Certainly, there is no trace in the rest of 
Artaud’s work of any support for the Nazi war effort, nor its project for the wholesale 
destruction of the Jews; nor, does it seem to me, would such support be commensurate 
with Artaud’s project. Opinion remains divided, with the most extreme poles being 
represented by Sylvère Lotringer and Kimberley Jannarone: the former arguing that 
Artaud’s sufferings at Ville-Évrard parallel conditions in the camps and that Artaud’s 
psychology was marked by a repressed Judaism (causing him, for example, to identify 
as Christ); the latter, that Artaud’s theatrical project has much more than is habitually 
accepted in common with European fascism.80
What is certain is that Artaud included the spell to Deharme with a letter sent to André 
Breton. In the letter Artaud explains that “I am against all Jews to the extent to which 
they have denied the Kabbalah, all the Jews who have not denied the Kabbalah are with 
me, the rest are not”.81 There is a familiarity to this logic, that we have seen with 
literature, theatre, drawing: for Artaud, metaphysics must not be elsewhere, any force 
being repressed beneath a dead form which blocks us from ourselves must be violently 
rejected. For Artaud, any Judaism which does not have recourse to the Kabbalah is 
dead, and hence the enemy. Artaud’s is a mystic sectarian position, then, perhaps 
comparable to his preference for gnosticism against Catholicism which he takes equally 
vociferous (if not always consistent) positions on.82 The crux is always mysticism 
78 It is also the case that in 1943 Artaud inscribed a copy of Les Nouvelles Révélations de l’Etre, 
recalling their (uncorroborated) meeting in Berlin in May 1932 (when Artaud was there filming 
Poligny’s Coup de feu à l’aube [A Shot at Dawn], though the meaning of the inscription is less clear. 
p644 SW
79 p124 Alain and Odette Virmaux Antonin Artaud (Besançon: Editions la Manufacture, 1991), cited 
p81 Murray Scum of the Soul
80 See pp11–28 Lotringer Mad Like Artaud and Kimberly Jannarone Artaud and His Doubles (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2010).
81 p826 Letter to Breton, 5th September 1937 Œuvres, cited pp80–1 Murray Scum of the Soul
82 St. Paul condemns Gnostic glossolalia throughout 1st Corinthians 14. See also Goodall Artaud and 
the Gnostic Drama
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against monotheism, insight and active metaphysics over enslavement to a vengeful and
absent God; active metaphysics against transcendent-anterior. As the spell insists, the 
very point is to demonstrate that “the gods” – plural – “still exist”.83 But given the 
context of centuries of European antisemitism, and the hindsight we have of what would
soon follow in Europe in the 1940s, Artaud’s words remain indigestible for us; and all 
the more so when they are combined with the violent misogyny of the spell.
Protective Spells
Many of the other spells which Artaud sends will be protective. The spell to Roger Blin 
of 22nd May 1939 (figs.17–18) combined threats and protections. As with the spell to 
Deharme, the actions which are threateningly promised – burning and touching (the 
latter is also the crime being punished) – are also effected on the paper, as if the paper 
were itself the body of the intended victim, as if both paper and body were the 
subjectiles being worked on in the act of drawing, writing and marking. The spell reads:
All those who have gotten together to keep me from taking HEROIN all those 
who have touched Anne Manson because of that Sunday May 1939 I will have 
them pierced alive in a Paris square and I will have them perforated and their 
intestines burned.84
No barriers could prevent this, he continues, and even if “I am in a Mental Asylum” 
which he cannot leave, the acts described “will be enacted and enacted by ME. Antonin 
Artaud.”85 A similarly protective spell sent to Léon Fouks two weeks earlier (fig.14) 
includes instructions on how Fouks can himself activate the protective effects of the 
spell as needed: “Keep this spell on your heart, And in the case of / danger touch your 
heart with / the Index and Middle finger of your Right / Hand AND THE SPELL WILL 
LIGHT UP”.86




86 fig.14. Note that this gesture is the sign of the goat (devil), which is also the V-for-victory allegedly 
suggested to Winston Churchill by occultist Aleister Crowley as protection against the black sun of 
the swastika. p511 Richard Kacynski Perdurabo: The Life of Aleister Crowley (Berkeley, CA: North 
Atlantic Books, 2010). Kacynski also notes that it stands for the Hebrew “vav” which can be 
translated as “nail”, the theme of Part IV of this Chapter.
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indeed are sent through the post – and use the same means: writing, symbols and 
drawing working together in tension or concert to build an overall effect; fire damage 
and other maltreatment of the paper that highlights its materiality and the marks’ 
reliance on it; spacing and calligraphical variations to accent words and sentences, 
establishing stresses and incantatory rhythm. The fact that the quite opposite effects of 
attack and defence can be achieved with the same means, and particularly that – as in 
the portraits a decade later – the means of protection not only resemble but seem to 
actually require damaging the protectee will be discussed further, below, in relation to 
the subjectile and cicatrix. For now, I will take a closer look at the mechanisms by 
which the spells work, with particular reference to Murray’s reading of them.
Workings, Sendings
With the spells, Artaud is concerned with unmediated efficacy: as he insists on the verso
of the spell to Sonia Mossé of 14th May 1939 (figs.15–16), “this spell acts 
immediately”.87 This immediacy is already a familiar concern. Equally familiar is the 
use of force to do what inert form cannot: on the recto of the same spell: “I throw a 
Deadly Force your way”.88
But this forcefulness is not only rhetorical or reported by the letter: it is also enacted 
upon the paper itself, not least with the cigarette and match burns. In the spell to Mossé, 
the end of the word “immédiatement” (“immediately”) is almost illegible, as is “agir” 
(“act”). As Murray has observed, here, and in the spell to Blin (figs.17–18), it is the 
words of action which are burned – on which the cigarette-tip has been pressed. Murray 
argues that the burning “seems to illustrate the action described” yet also “negates it, 
[as] words are disrupted or silenced by being literally effaced.”89 I would argue that in 
order for the force of action to be effective, here, language in its dead form must be all 
but destroyed; or, better, in order for language to be pulled onto the page as an effective,
magical resource (as it was returned to the stage and bound in the body, reuniting the 
body with itself), it must first be massively, harshly, forcefully effaced – subjected to 





But, for Murray, it is not so simple as “the negation of the word is a simultaneous 
negation of the act.”90 At first glance, Murray seems to be wholly disregarding Artaud’s 
insistence on immediate efficacy – not least those texts on theatre which reject the word 
in the name of the act. In fact, Murray uses the double negation of word and act – a 
negation which irreversibly couples action and efficacious language; to destroy one 
destroys both – to ground an argument about delay as the fundamental mode of 
operation of the spells. It is an important argument, though ultimately one which I 
cannot agree with; it is also a line of thinking which will allow us to mark an important 
interposition between Artaud’s otherwise closely connected theatre project and the 
works on paper.
Delay
A highly simplified summary of Murray’s argument is this: a bomb needs a fuse or 
trigger. The spells are to be sent through the post, so if they are to have an immediate 
and devastating effect on the addressee (and let us remember that protection, too, begins
in aggression) their explosive force must not go off just yet, while the paper Artaud has 
touched is not yet touching their skin. If the spells must act directly, body to body, nerve
to nerve – as Artaud had wished in the theatre – how can this happen at a distance? 
Rather than turning to esoteric means of telekinesis, according to Murray’s reading, 
Artaud turns a problem of spatial separation into a solution in temporal separation: 
delay. As Murray argues, the verbs in the spells – those words most often burnt through 
– are frequently in the future tense, and paired with subjunctive clauses.91 The delay is 
built in at this grammatical level also: “I will have them perforated”, etc..92 But, as she 
also notes, Artaud acts immediately, forcefully and directly on the paper – the paper 
which is also an actual stand-in for the body of the addressee. This action, too, will not 
be activated until the obliging postal service has delivered it to the hand of that 
addressee. Whether it be retribution on Anne Manson’s attackers, or the protection to be 
laid over Fouks’ heart and activated by his fingers, it is magic done in the present, with 
the weight of Artaud’s body, and lies dormant until activated. In each case, the 
materiality of the paper transfers every action upon it to the body of the addressee; and 
in every case, word, image and matter are indissolubly connected.
90 ibid.
91 p83 ibid.
92 fig.18 emphasis added
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The medium in which the action is suspended, Murray argues – this action at the point 
where text, symbol and matter become force, albeit held in abeyance – is precisely that: 
the medium, “the scrap of paper [...] acting as intermediary”.93 What Benjamin calls the 
“workful presence” of the artwork would be for Murray the delay which subsists in the 
medium of the spells.94 For Murray, it is thus precisely because the spells accentuate 
themselves as intermediaries – accentuate their material and mediating aspects; their 
friability and their capacity to record or hold in suspension – that they might have an 
effect across time (and hence space). Indeed, this is the guiding argument of Murray’s 
book: this “scum of the soul”, she argues – each scrap that Artaud can grasp from his 
fleeting consciousness – “nonetheless bears witness to the force through which it came 
into being”.95 In holding off, in delaying their final expenditure, the scraps and scum of 
all Artaud’s works refuse the finality of falling to form.
For Murray, the spells’ “delay” signals what she calls the “defining feature” of Artaud’s 
œuvre: the “not-yet”.96 She tracks this logic and its related techniques into the later 
drawings but it also, she argues, epitomises Artaud’s ideas on theatre.97 Conceding that 
Artaud’s theatre projects failed – in that they did not bring about the true body that they 
announced, and have provided only a program that is impossible to follow98 – Murray 
advocates rethinking these supposed shortcomings, in line with the operative deferment 
exploited by the spells, as in fact a strength. It is the “not-yet” – bound to a reflection on
medium-specificity – through which the works continue to testify to the force which 
brought them to being, and from which they are (thus) “not yet” fully abstracted. The 
“not-yet” of the spells, she argues, is precisely what maintains the connection between 
force and form, and hence staves off the final defeat – even, it would seem, if this is at 
the expense of endlessly deferring the final victory. For Murray, Artaud’s “time frames” 
thus
follow an apocalyptic logic, if we understand that the very nature of the 
apocalypse resides in its imminence, the fact that it is always announced [...] but 
never reaching a conclusion, because the only conclusion to be reached would 
93 p84 Murray Scum of the Soul
94 p392 Benjamin “Art’s Work”
95 p122 Murray Scum of the Soul
96 p85 ibid.
97 On the “pas encore” (“not yet”) in relation to the portraits and theatre, see pp134–5 and pp84–5 ibid.
98 pp84–5 ibid.
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be that of complete eradication. The very existence of the text, of the object and 
even of the performance relies on suspension. [...] in many respects Artaud’s 
work exists in [this] realm, always coming into presence, but never quite 
arriving.99
And yet, aren’t Artaud’s constant attacks on states of in-betweenness – the limbo of 
electroshock coma and the periplus of being, for example100 – attacks on vacillations 
between absence and presence, being and non-being, and ardent refusals that his body 
will be subjected to such extrinsic forces? Indeed, as we saw with Artaud le Mômo and 
van Gogh’s paintings, Artaud’s strategies are more often to do with finding ways 
around, or through, precisely these kinds of vacillations; showing that his body is older 
than them, not simply subject to them. Murray’s raising up of the “not-yet”, I would 
argue, is imbued with a realism which forecloses any credulity regarding Artaud’s 
fictionings, his life-death rewrites of given reality. This realism is never more evident 
than when Murray asserts that Artaud’s work is “necessary yet impossible”.101 This 
seems analogous to the arguments underwriting Derrida’s early writings on Artaud, 
namely that Artaud is saved from himself by his unsuccessful attempts at finally 
escaping classical metaphysics; that (for the deconstructionist) is how his work actually 
functions rather than the immediacy with which he would have it function that saves it 
from oblivion, or worse. For Murray, a certain realism works in Artaud’s favour as a 
means of self-defence, even if it is a melancholic defence which may merely hold 
ground in this world with this body, and not fully show the other world, and the always-
already of the true body, already on the offensive. For Murray, ongoing deferral 
guarantees the longevity of Artaud’s work against ever being “had done with”, that is, 
falling to dead form. She argues that this is demonstrated by how Artaud’s notebooks 
and works on paper in particular continue to resist and rebel today: “by drawing 
attention to its own materiality”, she writes, each piece “will continue to draw attention 
to the new forms of media it is incorporated into: from the paper to the digital, from 
cinema screen to computer monitor, from facsimile, to microfilm”.102 The delay, it 
seems, has outlived Artaud’s body – projected his force beyond his demise – and thus he
continues to resist and trouble us today. Howard Caygill has called this bodily 
abreaction of the reader “Artaud-immunity”, and it is incumbent on us, and on our 
99 p85 ibid.
100 On limbo of electroshock see, e.g. p532 SW; on “periplus of papa-mama” as being, see p540 ibid.
101 p64 Murray Scum of the Soul.
102 p164 ibid.
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museums, to take this into consideration when ushering Artaud’s work into these 
institutions.103 Such was also the arc of Derrida’s argument in the lecture he gave 
alongside the exhibition of Artaud’s works on paper at the Museum of Modern Art, New
York (MOMA) in 1996.104
As I hope is clear by now, I am arguing quite the reverse of Murray’s “necessary yet 
impossible” realism: Artaud’s work is impossible yet necessary. And it is through the 
immensely inventive, complex and strange strategies and slips which Artaud develops 
that this impasse – of metaphysical impossibility, of metaphysical necessity – will be 
broken, toward material and metontological lucidities.
The shortcomings Murray perceives – that the true body “never quite arriv[es]”,105 that 
the works never fully deliver on what they announce – are nonetheless figured by her to 
have important outcomes to which much of this Chapter is indebted. Not least, it leads 
her to foreground medium – and materiality – as the site where the ambiguous presence 
of force inheres, and hence a hitherto underexamined question in the literature on 
Artaud (a point with which I am in broad agreement, though will take quite elsewhere, 
below).
As much as I disagree with Murray’s argument for this logic of delay – not least because
of its necessary associations with melancholic messianism – I am in firm agreement 
with her manifold and compelling arguments that materiality does not simply fall on the
side of dead form in Artaud’s work, but is, rather, a site where active force can be shown
to be at work: as we have seen, it is in this materiality of the medium that the 
considerable force applied by Artaud to the paper – the substrate of the spell which is 
also the body being worked on – can be applied without being spent. Moreover, Murray 
compellingly identifies that this forceful trouble has, if anything, increased today, for us,
with our diverse media so that she does allow Artaud to outlive himself to the extent 
that he troubles technologies developed since his death.106 As such, we will look more 
closely, now, at Murray’s articulation of matter and force in Artaud’s drawings and 
103 See Howard Caygill “Artaud-Immunity: Derrida and the Mômo” in Derrida Today 8.2 (2015), 113–
135.
104 Later published, but yet to be translated into English. Jacques Derrida Artaud le Moma: Interjections 
d’appel (Paris: Galilée, 2002)
105 p85 Murray Scum of the Soul
106 See pp163–4 ibid.
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conclude this Part with a turn to Artaud’s own late writing on drawing. This in turn, will
open on onto the next Part, and the delayed question of the subjectile.
Matter as Force
Murray makes two important assertions regarding matter: firstly, that when Artaud talks 
of finding “the fundamental matter of the soul”,107 he means “matter” in a literal sense; 
secondly, that this materialism involves treating the “physicality of the material object 
[...] as if it were scum to be scratched at, scraped away and disregarded”.108 Both of 
these arguments concern Artaud’s attempts to create and maintain connections between 
substantiality and process, matter and force. On the one hand, there is the 
substantialisation of the animating soul, its binding in his finite body; on the other hand 
(recalling Genet’s miserliness) there is the refusal to be separated, finally sundered from
the artwork. He substantialises the soul with a shout of “Shit to the spirit”109; and he 
condemns any art which falls away from the body with “All writing is pigshit!”110
For Murray, in both processes – debasement of ideal and retention of work – Artaud is 
not so much doing away with the metaphysical distinction between force and form but 
denouncing the scandalous cruelty of its anteriority and delaying the artwork’s 
inevitable return to it. “Shit to the spirit” does not elevate matter, she argues, but “nor is 
it entirely a refusal” of the distinction between animating spirit and base matter: it is, 
rather “an emphasis of process”.111 The same is true of the retention of works close by 
the body: “the word that is likened to excrement is the word expressing mobility, so not 
the fixed word that terminates the thinking process but rather the excremental matter 
that continues it, becoming a mark of this process.”112 Force, then, is given as something
applied to matter, or something which matter bears witness to. As Murray presents it, 
matter is not, in itself, forceful; any inseparateness of the two is very hard won, 
tendential and temporary, never a new metaphysics or sempiternal state of affairs.
Although I cannot agree, here, with Murray – again her realism bars the impossible, 
107 p192 OCIX, cited (as p175) p8 Murray Scum of the Soul
108 p8 Murray Scum of the Soul
109 p1506 “Chiote à l’Esprit” in Œuvres, cited p38 Murray Scum of the Soul
110 p100 OCI, Murray’s translation p38 Murray Scum of the Soul
111 p43 Murray Scum of the Soul
112 ibid.
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refuses to allow Artaud to rewrite ontological anteriority – her argument establishes two
important points. Firstly, that thinking through Artaud’s materialism “goes against the 
model of representation as absence, and situates it in a more immediate space”113 – a 
point which stands whether one takes Artaud’s materialism to be “volatilised”114 (as I 
do) or “[not] entirely a refusal”115 of form-force opposition (as Murray does). Secondly 
that this materialism is better discussed not through playing with scatological images (or
not only with these), but through the figure of eczema. This latter asserts the importance
of surface, and in accenting Artaud’s discussions of the skin – for example, man’s 
becoming “a walking epidermis”,116 an image which prefigures the body without organs 
– her assertion galvanises the homology between body and page which we have already 
seen at work in the spells, and will develop further, below. Eczema in particular, beyond
skin alone, affirms also the substantiality of surface, just as – as we will discuss in 
relation to the subjectile – the page must become the paper, that is, must be materialised.
As we have seen, for Murray, it is between Artaud’s processual materialisation of spirit 
and the inevitable splitting up of man-and-the-complete-work that his pieces lodge 
themselves in a material coming-into-presence. It is this “not-yet” between the anterior 
and the inexorable which, for Murray, holds the efficacy of the spells and ensures that 
even today Artaud’s works trouble our institutions, publishers and screens.117 Murray’s 
“immediate space [...] of the material object”118 then, is one embedded within delay, 
caught between the originary state of affairs (spirit and body separate), and just holding 
off the sundering of work from body. But, as I have argued, holding off the final battle 
of the work – that is to say, allowing Artaud’s ongoing efficacy to occur only at the 
expense of what Derrida called his “stated intention”119 – is something we can strive to 
think beyond. And Artaud’s materialism is precisely the site where we might begin to 
think of force and form as originarily inseparate. His notion of the subjectile – which, 
like Murray’s discussion of eczema investigates skin and page alongside each other, as 
linked and homologous in important ways – is one of the most germane terms around 
which to do this.
113 pp33–4 ibid.
114 p27 OCIX, cited p112 Hayman Artaud and After
115 p43 ibid.
116 p27 OCIX cited p33 Murray Scum of the Soul
117 pp153–4 Murray Scum of the Soul
118 pp33–4 ibid.
119 p221 Derrida “Soufflée”
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In our next Part, we will attend to Derrida’s engagement with the subjectile, which he 
investigates in terms of both force applied to inert matter and as force innate in matter.120
Whilst we will not ultimately agree with all of Derrida’s conclusions, his essay provides
good spurs to our investigation. First, however, to conclude this Part, we will turn to 
Artaud’s own articulation of the forces on and in his work, as these are investigated in 
his notebooks and works on paper.
“Ten Years ...”
 The task at hand, for Artaud, especially in the spells, is to not only continue the 
investigations of how text and drawings can be shown to be inextricable – and through 
this inextricability produce an overall effect – but to also demonstrate the originary 
forcefulness of matter and to continue to explore it and affirm an inseparate, active 
metaphysics. In the spells and after, this will always be as a triumvirate of text, image 
and material page – and it will always involve the body as its ultimate stakes and 
primary actant (it is worth recalling that the page, the subjectile, is intimately connected 
to the body for Artaud, as we will discuss, below). Whilst I will argue later in this 
Chapter that this triumvirate does not originate in the spells, but elsewhere – and hence 
that the role of theatre in its development is rather different from that most often put 
forward – Artaud’s spells certainly mark the beginning of a new way of working.
On 23rd–24th April 1947 – so during the period when the first exhibition of his works on 
paper, at Galerie Pierre was first being discussed, and thus the development of his 
drawing practice was, perhaps, foremost in his mind – Artaud wrote a short text entitled 
“Dix ans que le langage est parti” [“Ten Years Since Language Has Been Gone”],121 
which lays out the techniques and stakes of what he has been doing, with particular 
reference to the articulation of text and image, the materiality of the paper and Artaud’s 
own body.
The decade-old having done with language which Artaud is recounting was 
120 See, e.g., pp75–80, p102 Derrida “Unsense”
121 pp7–10 Artaud “Dix ans...”. The piece was composed in Cahier 285 from p9 recto to p18 verso. See 
p771n.11 Cahiers d’Ivry vol. I. It has not been translated in full, though over half is quoted at some 
point in Derrida and Thévenin Secret Art so, where available, translations will come from Caws’ 
translations there. The title is from p74 Murray Scum of the Soul. The rest is my own.
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accomplished by coupling language’s main two modes – speech and the written word – 
to the act of drawing. On the one hand, writing is coupled directly to drawing: “since a 
certain day in October 1939 I have never again written without drawing.”122 On the 
other hand, speech is bound into this by the strategy already familiar from the theatre 
and the incantations at Rodez, namely, by being returned to its fount in the expressive 
force of breath. The forceful substantiality of breath – “for ten years with my breath / I 
have been breathing forms hard, / compact”123 – is not only comparable to drawing, but 
forms an actual working triumvirate with writing-drawing, such that amongst all the 
works on paper, there is “[n]ot one that isn’t a breath cast out with all the strength / of 
my lungs [...] not one that doesn’t answer to some real bodily act”.124 Put another way, 
writing is doubly reconnected with its formative force, here: on the one hand as 
language lodged back in the body as breath, and on the other hand, as writing being 
always writing-drawing – always the gesture of mark-making, and of force onto a 
material substrate, and always accompanied by figures, bodies, nails, etc. (e.g. figs.32, 
41–42, 49). The process of language’s exile, reinvention and return is completed by 
binding writing-drawing-breathing as a triumvirate of force hurled at the page and 
simultaneously turning that innate matter, too, into force: making the page, too, 
volatilised matter, something “that breathes”.125 There has been a privileged site for this, 
Artaud tells us: the drawings which return force to the body, and usher in the “lost 
world” are “the drawings with which I constellate all my notebooks.”126
As we shall explore in more detail in relation to the subjectile, below, the writing-
drawings are not repetitions of the hallowed “themes of Art”127 any more than van Gogh
merely repeated nature. If Artaud’s writing-drawings are no less than “the search for a 
lost world” it is a world that “no human language integrates”,128 nor is it one that can be 
represented in a drawing. But if its “image on the paper is no longer that world but a 
decal, a sort of diminished / copy”,129 this is not a terminal problem, because writing-
drawing, the notebooks – as we have seen with van Gogh – are capable of undermining 
the iron wall which separates us from the lost world. If, that is, the force of drawing can 
122 p8 “Dix ans...” cited p121 Derrida “Unsense”
123 p8 “Dix ans...” cited p41 Thévenin “Lost World”
124 p9 “Dix ans...” cited p119 Derrida “Unsense”
125 See p8 “Dix ans...” cited p41 Thévenin “Lost World”
126 p9 “Dix ans...” cited p41 Thévenin “Lost World”




be refound. And this is precisely the project which Artaud is engaged in. As he explains,
the return to drawing is the return to finding a force. Indeed, “drawing / point by point / 
is only the restitution of a drilling”.130 But if this drilling will break through to the lost 
world, it is not directly, but by working on and reworking the very body which wields 
the drill and which would accede to that world: indeed, this is “the advance of a drill in 
the lower depths of a latent sempiternal body”.131 This body is both the means of finding
the lost world and the reason for doing so – just as in the opening pages of our first 
Chapter we saw Artaud turning the surgical scalpel on himself to have done with the 
judgement of God.
Writing-drawing triangulated to the force of breathing “is not a gesture of this world 
here”132 – this world of the religions, psychiatrists and “Society” which Artaud also rails
against throughout this text, for their destruction is what is at stake – but already 
belongs in the lost world; it is already working as a fragment of that true body (fig.25). 
To draw in this way is already to be working from the lost world, from beyond the 
grave. The figures which it draws are not figures of this world, and especially not those 
“decals” which can be sanctioned by the existing system of the arts133; rather they are 
figures upon which the drilling will take place, blocked forms and false bodies that will 
be protected and reworked, violent and cruel as this will be. And not only the figures, 
but the very paper, too, “the materialized paper” is a target for drilling, for force to be 
applied – a subjectile to work on: it too is a figure, an “efficacious target”, whose 
vulcanicity will be woken.134
Language has left, then, with the drawings, the writing-drawings; it has been done with. 
And it is precisely because this process has been completed, it would seem, that it can 
make a return. Artaud has had done with words, and now allows them to return and 
have exclusively the force his body gives them: “[i]n my turn I teach them a new way to
act.”135 It is thus that Artaud succeeded “Ten years” ago, with his works on paper and 
especially in the notebooks, in “leav[ing] the written letter for the letter”, for the active 
force of the letter which, as he had since seen in van Gogh’s paintings and writings, is 
130 p8 “Dix ans...” cited pp115–6 Derrida “Unsense”
131 p8 “Dix ans...” cited pp115 Derrida “Unsense”
132 p9 “Dix ans...” my translation “ce n’est pas dans ce geste de ce monde-ci”.
133 p8 “Dix ans...” cited p41 Thévenin “Lost World”
134 p10 “Dix ans...” cited pp119 Derrida “Unsense”
135 ibid.
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manifold: it is that written letter which runs alongside the drawing, inextricable from it; 
it is the place where writing and drawing are bound (the letter as missive, the form the 
spells also take); the letter which describes and projects a painting, that is, the 
commentary; the letter which is the very gesture of painting, the curls of its “i”s and 
“commas”.136
And all this takes place, Artaud has noted, with a drilling and materialized paper; all of 
it forcefully hurled from this impoverished world we find ourselves in, hurled at this 
impoverished world, this already all-but-broken body; but also, somehow, beyond this 
world to the lost one which it invokes, and from that lost world surfaces with “whirling 
force”.137
It is these complex diagrams of throws and targets, of figures, gestures and bodies, of 
writing, drawing and matter which Artaud also constellates around this term “subjectile”
– this term which Derrida investigates so closely, and which this Chapter takes its title 
from. It is this term which we will now turn to. We will return to the written-drawings in
our Afterword, to defend my use of the word “Reading” in the subtitle of this thesis to 
designate something which is, clearly, not exclusively textual, but which might, rather, 






It seems that Artaud used the word “subjectile” as little as three times in his writings. It 
is worth quoting each use, here, in order.
First, the final line of a letter to poet André Rolland de Renéville, dated 23rd September 
1932: “Herewith a bad drawing in which what is called the subjectile betrayed me.”138 
The bottom of the page is torn off.
Then not for over thirteen years, in late January 1946, when it appears in a notebook 
commentary related to a drawing he was making titled Dessin à Regarder de Traviole 
[Drawing to be looked at Sideways] (fig.20):139
This drawing is a grave attempt to give life and existence to what until today has
never been accepted in art, the botching of the subjectile, the piteous 
awkwardness of forms crumbling around an idea after having for so many 
eternities labored to join it. The page is soiled and spoiled, the paper crumpled, 
the figures drawn with the consciousness of a child.140
Then, finally, a year and at least one-hundred-and-eighty-five notebooks later, in 
February 1947:
The figures on the inert page said nothing under my hand. They offered 
themselves to me like millstones which would not inspire the drawing, and 
which I could probe, cut, scrape, file, sew, unsew, shred, slash, and stitch 
without the subjectile ever complaining through father or through mother.141
Two failings, it would seem, with a long gap between them; then, comparatively soon 
after, a breakthrough. A “bad drawing” linked to a betrayal; then an awkwardness linked
to a botching. But, in fact, the shortcoming of this second drawing is not its 
138 pp171 OCV, cited p61 Derrida “Unsense”
139 p259 OCXIX, cited p24 Thévenin “Lost World”
140 Cahier 52, pp259–60 OCXIX, cited p122 Derrida “Unsense” translation modified
141 pp78–9 Antonin Artaud Cahiers d’Ivry Février 1947 – Mars 1948, Tome 1, Cahiers 233–309 (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2011), cited pp136–7 Derrida “Unsense”. The words are from Cahier 237, p2 recto, so can
be dated to the first half of February 1947.
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awkwardness, nor its botching: rather, these are the things that are to be achieved, 
precisely what Artaud is struggling to endow with “life and existence”.142 The only 
shortcoming, here, is inferred by this drawing being only an “attempt”. The seemingly 
negative terms of awkwardness and botching are, rather, reorientations of the field of art
tout court, which will be achieved in the final use of the word, with its cruel and 
liberatory overtones.
But first we should approach a working definition of what this word might mean. What 
is a subjectile?
The Klingsor-Bonnard Subjectile
As I have said, put simply the subjectile is what is worked on when drawing, for Artaud 
both paper and bodies. He is giving an expanded and idiosyncratic but not ungrounded 
meaning, here, to a seldom-used word. Thévenin has argued that it is most likely he had 
encountered “subjectile” in a 1921 article on the paintings of Pierre Bonnard (1867–
1947), where it is also used three times.143 Thévenin cannot provide proof-positive that 
Artaud had read the article, but Artaud does say “what is called” the subjectile: he does 
not claim to have coined the term and the Klingsor article seems by far the most likely 
place he would have encountered it – not least given that in the year this article 
appeared Artaud had produced a sketch after Bonnard (fig.6). Regardless of the solidity 
of the connection, Klingsor’s discussion will give us a sketch to begin from.
For Klingsor the “use of a subjectile so rarely used before, that is cardboard, facilitates 
[Bonnard’s] work.”144 (figs.33–34) The subjectile, then, is simply the surface on which 
the painter makes his marks; the substrate of the painting, be it canvas, paper, 
cardboard. Bonnard has innovated with a material entity rather than simply innovated 
upon it with paint. As a result, the substrate will no longer disappear without trace 
beneath the paint, but rather persists in materially affecting the colours: here, “[t]he way
the cardboard absorbs so readily”.145 Absorbency, then: no longer a tabula rasa, the 
surface being painted on has a depth, which remains evident. Moreover, in allowing the 
142 p259, OCXIX, cited p122 Derrida “Unsense”
143 Tristan Klingsor “Pierre Bonnard” in L’Amour de l’art Vol.2, No.8 (August 1921).
144 ibid. cited p64n.1 Derrida “Unsense”. Note, Derrida does not critically engage with Klingsor’s article.
145 ibid.
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subjectile to remain evident beneath paint and picture, Bonnard puts something at risk, 
namely, care, propriety, craftsmanship: as Klingsor puts it, “Pierre Bonnard, with a 
seeming negligence, lets this subjectile show through here and there.”146 This “seeming 
negligence” echoes Artaud’s references to “bad drawing” and “awkwardness” in his first
two mentions of “the subjectile” – and, as we shall see below, Derrida gives much 
attention to these terms.
The subjectile, then, for Klingsor, is not only a term for the material which is being 
painted on, but already is linked to the persistence of those material qualities on the new
surface that covers the subjectile. The material-substrate, as subjectile, is not that which 
must be absented for Bonnard’s picture to appear, but itself maintains what we might 
(after Benjamin) call a workful presence. Moreover, for Klingsor, this brings “a general 
harmony”147 or all-over effect to the compositions’ tones (a set of musical analogies 
which Derrida will note Artaud using in reference to van Gogh). As I shall argue, for 
Artaud, investigations into making the subjectile appear or persist as forceful materiality
– rather than disappear under the picture-surface (as a mere page) – allow us to think of 
a compossibility of matter and force that has neither its source nor its telos in the 
separation of force and form. This approach to the works on paper, and especially the 
notebooks, will thus facilitate us in thinking of the subjectile in a more affirmative sense
than that allowed by the delay and shuttling of Murray and Derrida. We shall turn to the 
latter now.
“To Unsense the Subjectile”
The long essay “To Unsense the Subjectile” sees Derrida’s third and penultimate 
engagement with Artaud. First published in German in 1986, it falls (off-centre) 
between the two late-1960s essays collected in Writing and Difference – refashioning 
and pithily redeploying their core arguments – and Derrida’s 1996 lecture at MOMA on 
the occasion of their exhibition of Artaud’s Works on Paper – themes of which it also 
partly prefigures.148 This essay on the subjectile, which also accompanied a collection of
Artaud’s drawings, is by far the most sustained investigation of the term to date.149
146 ibid.
147 ibid.
148 See Derrida Artaud le Moma
149 Other, shorter, discussions of the subjectile include: Edward Scheer “Sketches of the jet: Artaud’s 
abreaction of the system of Fine Arts” in ed. Scheer 100 Years of Cruelty; Caygill “Artaud-
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Perhaps the most immediately evident difference between Klingsor’s use of the term 
“subjectile” and Artaud’s own is that in the former, the subjectile is always only the 
passive substrate of the painting. It is inert, passive matter the qualities of which can be 
exploited to interesting effect. On the contrary – as Agnès de la Beaumelle puts it in the 
catalogue to the MOMA exhibition of Artaud’s works on paper – whether it be letter-
paper, notebooks or drawing paper, the substrate “becomes for Artaud a surface that is 
as much active as acted upon”.150 Derrida makes much of this fact: Artaud’s subjectile is
never simply passive object, it also acts – it “betrays”, and seems to have the capacity to
complain or not complain – which is to say, it is also a subject. This undecidability – 
stated as a double negative – features in the opening lines of Derrida’s essay: 
“Subjectile, the word, the thing, can take the place of the subject or of the object – being
neither one nor the other.”151 Derrida’s argument, then, does not begin in the material, 
but in a much more abstract, metaphysical and linguistic space. It will be necessary to 
join him there in order to trace his argument back into the concrete.
For Derrida, the very ground on which the subject-object distinction would take place is
already troubled by the subjectile: the subjectile is a slipperiness where there should be 
a solid setting for dualist distinctions to take root. As such, for Derrida,
I would call this a scene, the ‘scene of the subjectile,’ if there were not already a 
force at work prepared to diminish the scenic elements: the visibility, the 
element of representation, the presence of a subject, even an object.152
This scene – and whenever we assume we stand on solid ground, there is a scene – must
be put back in touch with the force from which it has become abstracted or cut off. It is 
this possibility – the possibility of a scene or neutral setting which could fade into the 
background unnoticed, as the inert support of a subject/object split – which the 
subjectile, in Artaud’s version, holds open by making it persist as part of an overall 
effect rather than disappear as anterior given. As we shall see, what is at stake is a 
denaturalisation of the given, forcing it to appear as such so that its false neutrality, its 
Immunity”; pp97–137 Herman Rapaport “Subjectilities” in Later Derrida: Reading the Recent Work 
(London: Routledge, 2003); Xymena Synak “Subjectile and le corps morcelé” paper presented in 
absentia 5th Derrida Today Conference, London 10th June 2016.
150 p40 Agnès de la Beaumelle “Spells and Gris-Gris: Introduction” in ed. Rowell Works on Paper
151 p61 Derrida “Unsense”
152 ibid.
259
masquerade of inertness can be had done with – just as anything which would claim 
anteriority to the body must be gouged out of it.
For Derrida, this will mean Artaud taking a two-fold approach to the subjectile: both 
attacking it as an object, and putting it back in touch with its own formative force; a 
frontal attack of remaking, and a calling upon to unforget the always-already force-form
depths. These are, we might say, the two valencies of “forcener” (“unsense”) in 
Derrida’s use of it: the force applied to something extrinsically, and the force which is 
older than its form, from whence it came. It is to drive the subjectile mad,153 and to 
return it to a sense older than sense – an unsense akin to the anteriority of idiocy, 
perhaps, which we discussed in relation to Artaud le Mômo at the end of the first 
Chapter. For Derrida, then, the subjectile’s undoing of and antecedence to the scene (the
givenness of the scene) necessarily involves the projection of an aggressive and curative
force. Indeed, “[w]e will never grasp the drama of the subjectile without grasping this 
strategy of the projectile.”154 If Bonnard allows the cardboard-subjectile to show 
through, to not disappear as an inert surface, following Derrida’s argument, Artaud also 
applies an external bodily force, such as the gougings and burns we have already seen in
the spells, going into the subjectile to bring it forward, using applied bodily force to 
reveal the material’s innate force.
Betrayal
Between these two forces – the strategically applied one and the innate or always-
already – the scene, the form, cannot take place. And such a scene, such form – here, the
page as inert, anterior given – is always, for Artaud, fought against as a chunk of 
intransigent eternity; that is, a face of God. For Derrida, all betrayal – we recall that the 
first thing which the subjectile does is “betray” – is against God, a transgression of the 
law. The metaphysical stakes of the subjectile and its treachery are thus laid out: “As 
subject and as object, the maddened subjectile betrays the hardened, inert, chilled effort 
of the subjection to [...] god.”155 The “scene” in this sense, is no less than the 
transcendence of a God, smirking in his prompter’s hide, who Artaud wishes to show is 
153 cf. Caws first translation of a section of the essay: Jacques Derrida “Maddening the Subjectile” trans. 
Mary Ann Caws in Yale French Studies No.84 (1994), 154–171.
154 p85 Derrida “Unsense”
155 p112 ibid.
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hiding in, and structuring, our thought, bodies and being; a God who hides his own 
divine antecedent force in the synovial fluid of our knees and in the page we draw on, 
just as the souffleur hides himself to divest the actor’s body of its breath, its expressive 
force. Artaud’s project, here as elsewhere, is to expose, attack and reclaim-invent for 
himself a metaphysics from which the body is not split off; an active metaphysics bound
in the sempiternal body. Under the name of the subjectile, this battle and invention takes
place in relation to the body, its language, its gestures and the paper itself. Their re-
integration with themselves and each other – as discussed at the end of the previous Part
– is here shown to be once again having done with antecedence and judgement from 
within the inseparate material-metaphysical.
Derrida traces the god whom is betrayed, here – the god who is also a scene which is 
also a page – into the metaphysics of Hegel and Kant. What I might call the loyal page –
that is to say, the subjectile that does as it is supposed to – is also godlike, because, 
Derrida puts it, “it does not let itself be terminated. It is in-finite but, insofar as it is 
indeterminate matter, it is a ‘bad infinite,’ as Hegel would have said.”156 This loyal, 
godly page would be the one that simply takes the paint without showing through; 
which allows itself to be resurfaced and covered over – all the better to rule, to guide 
and usurp the hand as the souffleur guides and steals the breath, when unnoticed. As 
Derrida says, “[i]t never appears itself”, but is always there “[s]urreptitiously”.157 He 
turns to Kant, here: if this page is “a place where everything appears” – this is what 
Klingsor breaks with in his use of subjectile: the inert cardboard substrate that shows 
through – then “itself it disappears under the phenomena”.158 As such, this loyal page-
substrate is “the thing itself or [...] the transcendental object=X”.159
The first task, then, will be to show that this loyal page is, in fact, treacherous, a hiding 
place and armature of transcendence: that this apparent “loyalty” is always-already a 
betrayal of Artaud on a different level, keeping quiet to maintain its sovereignty. But 
this has to be shown, which is to say, that in betraying Artaud it must also be brought to 
betray itself, to show itself up in its hiding place. It is in this sense that Derrida 






subjectile which betrays Artaud is the one which gives itself away, like a prompter who, 
with a whisper, gives up the game: not because the audience discovers the actor has 
forgotten a line but because the structuring conditions of the stage – its ground – are 
revealed to reside off it. In Klingsor’s article on Bonnard the assumption that the 
substrate must disappear – that its surface must be resurfaced, that the material must 
disappear in order for the image to appear, that the paper becomes the page and then 
disappears entirely under the picture – is questioned; with Artaud the subjectile takes on 
its full metaphysical weight. The meaning of betrayal, here, becomes clear: it is the first 
moment of the substrate appearing as such; it is the material support arrested in its 
obliterative resurfacing, its disappearance beneath pigment and picture; hence it is also 
the calling into question of the distinction between subject (figure) and object (ground). 
Betrayal is a turning-to-face the anterior condition. If it is not yet having done with the 
judgement of god as that subsists in the picture, it is the moment this is put on the 
agenda.
From Bad Drawings to Botching
It is by dint of being part of a “bad drawing” that the subjectile, in Artaud’s first 
mention of it, betrays.160 It betrays both itself and the “good” artist by not disappearing –
a persistence of material-subjectile which begins a deeper detumescence of the page as 
the transcendent condition of the work on paper. As we have seen, Klingsor was aware 
of the same correlation in Bonnard, who “with a seeming negligence, lets this subjectile 
show through here and there.”161 Five years after the subjectile “betrayed” him, Artaud’s
spell-casting sees the beginning of his material attacks on paper, refusing to allow its 
materiality to disappear beneath his images and symbols, exploring ways of bringing the
paper to merge, support and combine its specific kind of force with that of language, 
graphism and his own breathing, marking body – making, in that instance, spells to hurl 
against dark forces and refind his body. But it would take nearly fourteen years for 
Artaud to begin to twist the correlation between the bad drawing and the persistent 
appearance of the subjectile into a strategy that he would articulate as such. As he writes
in 1946 of the Drawing to be Looked at Sideways (fig.20), the “piteous awkwardness of 
forms” and the “soil[ing] and spoil[ing]” of the page are means he has employed in “a 
160 p171 OCV, cited p61 Derrida “Unsense”
161 Klingsor “Bonnard”, cited p64n.1 Derrida “Unsense”
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grave attempt to give life and existence”162 – to give these to the forms, but to himself 
also, to ensure that his work did not fall from his workings, that no thief slip in between 
his bodily force and his work to steal his mucus, to divest him of active metaphysics.
At one level, what is at stake, here, is what had been at stake in the correspondence with
Rivière over two decades earlier: Artaud is not submitting his work for judgement or 
approval, but is hurling it (more violently now, perhaps, than then) in order to scramble 
the codes of judgement; in order that the field (here the arts) and all that issue from it be
put back in touch with the creative fount. This latter – no less than “life and 
existence”163 – is what “good taste” and the academies police and destroy with their 
insistence on good form, propriety, etc.: what Klingsor sees Bonnard risking in his 
“seeming negligence”.164 The botching of the subjectile – the subjectile which appeared 
as such in betrayal; appeared by remaining – now begins to be used as the very means 
of a reconnection or revivification. What is revivified by this botching are the dead 
forms – dead because “properly” drawn – which the system of Fine Arts165 (and its 
bourgeois, sycophantic familiar, the system of good taste), demands “should” be 
inscribed on that very subjectile.166
Botching and betrayal, then, are means by which false anteriorities are unhidden and 
had done with: the substrate is attacked in order that it does not disappear as a false 
given, just as the body is attacked to have done with false anteriorities. As with the 
body, drawing must be freed from its material disappearance under the picture-image 
and from judgement of what is proper or what is good (drawing). For Artaud, this attack
is always also a move beyond transcendent-anterior to recall the true body and the lost 
world, to liberate these from the blockages of God or the system of Fine Arts, and 
reintegrate metaphysics into the material from within; to find their originary, expressive 
inseparateness. As such, this is always also a technical matter, a question of bad drawing
162 p259 OCXIX, cited p122 Derrida “Unsense”
163 ibid.
164 Klingsor “Bonnard” cited p64n.1 Derrida “Unsense”.
165 “system of the Fine Arts” is the subtitle to Scheer “Sketches of the jet”. I will prefer it for its greater 
sarcasm than Caws’ retention of beaux-arts in her translation of Derrida “Unsense”.
166 Botching, here, contrasts with Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of the botching of a BwO, that is, a 
shortcoming in its formation whereby only some affects can circulate on it, though in fact this is a 
much lower level than the full and positive BwO. In order to reach the latter, one would need to break
out of one’s botched BwO. That operation could be effected, perhaps, through the mode of botching 
related to the subjectile: the mode of botching that reveals and begins to move past false, blocked 
transcendentals. pp161ff ATP
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as a strategy to go beyond the judgement of bad drawing; the weaponisation of bad 
drawing through paper, pencil, gesture and breath.
Pure, Excessive, Awkward
Derrida puts into tension two statements Artaud makes about painting: Artaud 
condemns “that kind of painting which only knows how to apply paint”167 – by which he
covers nigh-on everything from “the last few centuries of painting”168 – yet later praises 
van Gogh for “not try[ing] to go beyond painting as the strict means of his work and the
strict framework of his means.”169 Far from contradiction, though, these statements 
reveal the familiar distinction between an imposed order (anterior cruelty) – here, of 
good painting, the system of Fine Arts – against slipping to the cruelty that is the 
expressive force of the artwork inseparate from the body. As Artaud had sought a sacred
theatre older than psychological drama and had pursued, through affective athleticism, a
body which was just a body (and not also God’s image, genealogical iteration, etc.), so 
if he finds van Gogh to be “[o]nly a painter” it is because he was
the only one, absolutely the only one, who absolutely transcended painting, the 
inert act of representing nature, in order to make a whirling force, an element 
torn right out of the heart, gush forth [...]
Under the guise of representation he welded an air and enclosed within 
it a nerve, things which do not exist in nature, which are of a nature and an air 
more real than the air and nerve of real nature.170
Far from acquiescing to the anteriority of the given, then, van Gogh finds the anterior 
expressive force of painting, the “more real” nature proper to painting. But if this is a 
propriety so strict (“painting as the strict means of his work and the strict framework of 
his means”171) that it cracks proper painting open, then for Derrida, this exceeding of the
proper falls back on a deeper propriety, on the metaphysics of purity which Artaud’s 
167 p230 SW; p24 CWIV has “painting that was merely painting”. cf. p89 Derrida “Unsense”
168 p24 CWIV
169 pp501–2 SW, cf. p90 Derrida “Unsense”
170 p502 SW
171 pp501–2 SW, cf. p90 Derrida “Unsense”
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reading of van Gogh would ostensibly have done with. The deconstructive logic which 
we saw throughout our second Chapter is reasserted, here: an interminable shuttling 
begins between breaking with the proper law of the Fine Arts (and faithful 
representation of given nature) and falling back on the metaphysics of the One.
Van Gogh’s cleaving to strictness, here, awakens force: something “gushes forth” from 
within painting and nature itself as “whirling force”.172 We recall that van Gogh did not 
only sweat nature out, but “made it sweat”.173 As Derrida argues, the system of Fine Arts
and representation of nature are themselves subjectile in Artaud’s reckoning: they are 
givens, masquerading as inert, which must be worked upon in order to make them 
betray themselves so that they can be botched, put back in touch with their proper 
creative founts. It follows, for Derrida, that these systems cannot be taken as the “scene”
of the subjectile,174 as they are themselves called into question.
This engagement of the subjectile is interminably undecidable for Derrida. It shuttles 
between a frontal working on the subjectile to botch its innertness, and a bringing 
something innate out of its hidden depths. One technique of this, at a more material 
level, can be found in Artaud’s reference to “soiling” the page of his Drawing to be 
Looked at Sideways (fig.20), the correlative notebook commentary of which contains 
this second use of the term subjectile:
This drawing is a grave attempt to give life and existence to what until today has
never been accepted in art, the botching of the subjectile, the piteous 
awkwardness of forms crumbling around an idea after having for so many 
eternities labored to join it. The page is soiled and spoiled, the paper crumpled, 
the figures drawn with the consciousness of a child.175
Picking up on the word “awkwardness” Derrida segues to another of Artaud’s drawings,
drawn a few weeks later, La Maladresse Sexuelle de Dieu [The Sexual Awkwardness of 
172 p502 SW
173 p499 ibid.
174 p61 Derrida “Unsense”
175 p259 OCXIX, cited p122 Derrida “Unsense” translation modified
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God] (fig.19) of February 1946.176 The sexual impropriety – rather than an infacility – of
God relates to the collusion of metaphysics with parentage – the de jure and de facto 
anteriorities which Artaud rails against – which need not detain us again here. The 
drawings do share, though, some of the figures and themes which are common in 
Artaud’s drawings of this period: a figure with wrists cut all the way through; priapic 
cannons; embryonic bodies which seem to be both protected by forcefields and being 
worked on by spikes and other tools; lines of varying weights; small spots and ground-
in marks in pencil; blue, red, green and brown; smudges and rubbing which here seem 
like fine shading, there like ineffective rubbings-out, there again like mistakes left 
intact; a general flatness interrupted here and there by forms in eccentric three-point 
perspective which make jutting promontories or boxes set to tumble off the picture 
plane; text; Artaud’s signature, underlined. Both are what Artaud referred to as “written 
drawings”,177 they contain text as an internal, constitutive element, and have correlate 
commentaries in the notebooks; as we have seen, Artaud observes a similar complexity 
across van Gogh’s letters, croquis and painted “i”s and commas. For Derrida, the 
written-drawings demonstrate again the play of exceeding drawing (into writing) and 
falling back on the logic of purity (a myth of pure, shared origin of all mark-making).
The soiling of this subjectile debases the purity of the page, and in doing so it reveals 
the paper as subjectile, as something hidden which is not innate and given form, but a 
field of forces which will not disappear beneath the image. Soiling is an extrinsic force 
applied to the page by which the innate force beneath the inert form rises, is unsubdued 
– where Bonnard chooses an absorbent subjectile, Artaud grubs his up. Soiling is both 
the projectile of applied force and the other set of forces which rises from beneath the 
given: the dirt applied which botches the subjectile and the blocked innate forces 
revealed which give away (betray) the page as not inert; the dirt which will not be 
washed away because it is the paper. As Derrida might have it, we shuttle between the 
impropriety of dirtying the page (breaking with the purity of the anterior given) to 
176 For Artaud’s own commentary on this drawing, see p170 OCXX
177 p20 OCXI cited p22 Thévenin “Lost World”
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falling back on the mythic origin of paper as totality of forces; so restarting the shuttle.
In another play of excess and purity, Derrida picks up on the analogy of music – the 
words “composition” and “tone”, in particular, though without connecting this to the 
same vocabulary in Klingsor’s article.178 He cites Artaud connecting van Gogh’s 
“whirling force” to an assertion that, on the evidence of these canvasses, the painter 
(and letter-writer) would clearly be “a formidable musician”.179 The purity of painting, 
Derrida argues, is again opened up – a break with the system of Fine Arts which only 
falls back on a more fundamental purity of the Arts, so reasserting, despite itself, the 
metaphysics of the One it seemed to break with. Nonetheless, musicality – the subjectile
as “composition of forces”180 – is this raising up of force as not-had-done-with, as the 
fount of gesture and the building of all-over effect. Derrida turns to the expressive force 
of the body to again show that if the innate forcefulness of the subjectile is being drawn 
up, here, it is by a body, an external projectile force: painting is applying tone, 
“intoning”, as Derrida has it, and the tone of a painting (which Klingsor had averred is 
modulated and bound into “general harmony”181 by the material-substrate, the 
subjectile) “has the power of evoking”.182 We are reminded, perhaps, of Artaud’s reading
in tones of “rhythmic and incantatory psalmody” to invoke “Baudelaire or Poe” and 
other “BODIES”.183 There, as in Derrida’s turn to “evoking”, it is the breath of the body 
beneath the voice which inaugurates these workings against those forces of judgement 
which would decompose – be it decompose the body from itself, or decompose the 
subjectile into innertness. Intonation as evocation is thrown out and calls up: the 
projectile raises innate force.
Armed with his soiled subjectile-substrate, Artaud declares himself a bad draughtsman –
whilst adamantly refusing to be judged as such by anyone else. He insists that he is not 
178 pp83–4, p127 Derrida “Unsense”, cf. p64n.1 ibid.
179 p502 SW, p89–91 Derrida “Unsense”
180 p127 Derrida “Unsense”
181 Klingsor “Bonnard” cited p64n.1 Derrida “Unsense”
182 pp83–4 Derrida “Unsense”
183 p464, p515 SW
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in need of “ten years of personal apprenticeship” before he can accede to the art, as he 
has already “worked ten years on drawing during my entire existence”.184 Artaud evades
judgement, here, slips in before it, to before the scene of judgement can establish itself 
elsewhere to his body. He makes an athletic slip to an art older than the establishment 
which builds itself on that name. For Derrida, though, when Artaud “abandons” the 
propriety of “the drawing principle”,185 he begins an interminable shuttling: Artaud’s 
bad (“maladroit”) drawings “so crafty, / and so adroit, / that say SHIT to this world”186 
are made a deconstruction by Derrida, an ongoing antagonism with the institution, with 
metaphysics, not something which can finally be had done with – neither by being 
absorbed by the establishment (“accepted in art”187), nor by finally escaping its 
claims.188 We are reminded, again, of Murray’s “not-yet”: here, too, Artaud’s projectiles 
will never make it to the lost world, to the other side of the iron wall.
If for Derrida, Artaud’s van Gogh shuttles between a purity of painting and excess 
(beyond representation of nature-as-given and outside of painting to music, etc.), he 
sees Artaud himself also shuttling between excess and purity (here, again, of writing-
drawing) and between facility and infacility as a draughtsman (“maladroit [...] and 
adroit”189). And for both van Gogh and Artaud, the deferment of the final scene is 
perpetuated by there being no firm ground between the applied force of the projectile 
they hurl (van Gogh’s making nature sweat, Artaud’s drawings “that say SHIT to this 
world”190) and the innate (“whirling” and “sacred”191) force they invoked from beneath 
the inert, anterior forms (page, nature, judgement, etc.).
As I will argue in the next Part of this Chapter, we can think beyond this shuttling 
impasse – as Artaud aimed beyond it – by turning away from the scene and rethinking 
184 pp226–7 OCXXI, cited p106 Derrida “Unsense”
185 p340 OCXX, cited pp104–5 Derrida “Unsense”
186 p9 “Dix ans...”, cited p108 Derrida “Unsense”
187 p259 OCXIX, cited p122 Derrida “Unsense”
188 In this way, this essay prefigures the theme of Derrida Artaud le Moma.
189 p9 “Dix ans...”, cited p108 Derrida “Unsense”
190 p9 “Dix ans...”, cited p108 Derrida “Unsense”
191 p502, p217–9 SW
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the subjectile in terms of Artaud’s engagement with the Earth, which for him is always-
already inseparate force-form. Whilst, as we shall see, this Earth takes in that which is 
anterior to the institutions and metaphysics of the West, and is a matter (force-form) 
older than but inseparate from the inert page, as we have seen, the question of the 
subjectile also involves figures, bodies – not least in Artaud’s third and final reference to
it. Before turning away from Derrida’s essay and to the Earth, then, we will conclude 
this Part by pursuing the question of the subjectile further into the question of bodies.
Gendering Force(s): S♀/S♂
As Artaud asserts, what botches the subjectile is the figure, the “people” badly drawn.192 
These figures, too, are worked upon to remake them – connect them to their anterior 
force – just as what masquerades as inert ground (the page, good drawing) must be 
subjected to dirtying and forcing to invoke the forces trapped beneath. We see in these 
written-drawings Artaud’s work on his figures – the kind of torturous retribution and 
violent protection-remaking prefigured in the spells which is later “the advance of a drill
in the lower depths of a latent sempiternal body”193; ungrounding the figure, the figure 
as ground. For Derrida, if we can think of the ground as figure, as subject and object, 
page and paper, and also of the figure as an object to be worked on, we face an equally 
interminable task if we attempt any final either/or gender determinations on the 
subjectile.194
The subjectile’s “supposed transcendent neutrality”195 – e.g. as inert page – conforms, 
for Derrida, to the male principle.196 This is the side which (in September 1932) betrays 
Artaud, and hence betrays itself; which gives itself away by appearing as anterior 
condition and judge – God the father.
Yet, for Derrida, if botched properly, invoked or penetrated by a projectile, the subjectile
can also engender “life and existence”.197 That is, the subjectile is not simply God, it can
192 p259 OCXIX, cited p122 Derrida “Unsense”
193 p8 “Dix ans...” cited p115 Derrida “Unsense”
194 p132ff Derrida “Unsense”
195 p132 ibid.
196 ibid.
197 p259 OCXIX, cited p122 Derrida “Unsense”
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also have a productive and nurturing side: for Derrida, “this same subject-he (subject-il) 
[also] makes all the signs traditionally interpreted as attributes of femininity, even of 
maternity”.198 On the one hand, these two genders are opposed – the projectile attacks 
the inert page or figure which “exposes itself passively” to “the marks and seizures of 
instruments or convex organs, the hand, the penis, the teeth, the pencil, the pen, the 
brush, the fire of the match or the cigarette”.199 But on the other hand, this breaks open 
“supposed transcendent neutrality”, remaking the masculine principle (god-the-father) 
as feminine principle (maternal-feminine), the “place of [...] birthing”.200
The subjectile which Derrida finds opening up before deconstruction in Artaud’s first 
two uses of the term, then, shuttles between male and female, proper to neither. 
Furthermore, for Derrida, it is a shuttling between various underneaths: the hidden 
underneath of the transcendent, neutral substrate which betrays Artaud and itself; the 
subjected, objectified underneath which has pencil and fire and spat phonemes hurled at 
it; and the maternal underneath – itself manifold layers, this “bed of birthing in all its 
layers”201 – which produces. As such, Derrida asserts that for Artaud, “War takes place 
between several underneaths.”202 Any scene or field of final battle is thus 
indeterminable, always in fact, a figure undergirded by something further; always, then, 
what Derrida calls a “superficial layer” or new ground to dig.203 In its indeterminate 
gender, across its transcendent, material and generative “layers”, the subjectile, Derrida 
has found, is “a groundless ground”.204 This applies equally, for Derrida, across the 
bodies, surfaces and institutions which Artaud works on to remake and dig beneath.
Bodies
The male and female, here, are for Derrida less gendered bodies than they are abstract 
notions, sets of associations, “resonances” and wordplays like “subject-il” (“subject-
198 p132 Derrida “Unsense”.
199 pp132–3 ibid. Given the violence of this list, the suggestion of volition in “exposes” is concerning. 
Rethinking this would involve troubling the neat association of the hidden with the male-transcendent
which we have seen Derrida make. Exposure, too, could then be thought of as an active aggression 







he”).205 Yet, as we have seen, throughout Artaud’s work the question of the body is 
paramount, and – in its relation to materiality, figures, gesture and the hand guided by 
the drawing principle – the question of art is no exception.
If in “Mise-en-Scène and Metaphysics” Artaud had bemoaned the hundreds of years of 
art which took painting, artists and viewers away from expressive force – from the 
cruelty of art and its capacity to reconnect to “life and existence” which Artaud sought 
in his own drawings – by the 1940s it was clear to him that this arresting of force was 
culpable and complicit in the deleterious anatomical state of our very bodies. Indeed, 
the blocked art – the perniciousness of the system of Fine Arts – had worked its way 
through the eye to infiltrate the whole body:
We have a mote in our eye from the fact that our present ocular vision is 
deformed, repressed[,] oppressed, set back, and suffocated by a certain 
wrongdoing on the principle of our cranial box, as on the dental architecture of 
our being, from the coccyx at the base of the vertebrae to the place of the forceps
sustaining the brain.206
It is no less than this which Artaud’s bad drawings are pitched against; indeed, 
rediscovering that the fight for his body was operating also on this level – in the way in 
which page and drawing principle collude against lucidity and the inseparate – 
galvanised Artaud: “Struggling against this wrongdoing”, he writes, “I have pointed up 
and polished all the angers of my struggle [...] and there remain these miseries, my 
drawings.”207 The bad drawings (miseries) take up the fight: remain against malicious 
divestiture, just as the soiled paper or absorbent cardboard will not disappear beneath 
the picture.
Clearly, Artaud’s third use of the term “subjectile” is very much concerned with bodies 
– though, as I will argue, perhaps not quite as exclusively as Derrida seems to suggest, 
and always more materially. I will quote Artaud’s final use of the term again:
The figures on the inert page said nothing under my hand. They offered 
themselves to me like millstones which would not inspire the drawing, and 
which I could probe, cut, scrape, file, sew, unsew, shred, slash, and stitch 
205 p133 ibid.
206 p266–7 OCXXI, cited p106 Derrida “Unsense”
207 ibid.
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without the subjectile ever complaining through father or through mother.208
For Derrida, many of the terms, here, are bivalent. He catalogues most carefully the 
series of verbs – “probe, cut, scrape” etc. – to demonstrate their intrinsically linked 
productive and destructive valencies.209 In each case, it is the violence of surgery which 
Derrida calls upon, and the logic of cicatrisation, whereby each wound is also the 
formation of new tissue. As we saw with the spells, Artaud’s protective operations begin
with violent processes, what Derrida, here, calls the “amorous aggression”210 of this 
“surgery [that is] at once aggressive and repairing, murderous and loving”.211 Cicatrix, 
for Derrida, but we might say pollarding, tree-surgery to encourage new growth – not 
forgetting that before it is a body without organs, Artaud writes of man’s once and 
future being as “a tree without organs”.212
Throughout Derrida’s exploration of these verbs as cicatrices, he foregrounds surface: 
“perforating”, “passing through to the other side”; “purifying” surface by “scraping” it, 
each time surface equated to “truth”.213 With the spells it was already clear that the page 
– the surface of the paper – was being worked on as if it were the surface of the body of 
the addressee, the skin. With Artaud’s third use of the term “subjectile”, ten years after 
the spells, this logic has persisted and even been doubled: now there are also “figures” 
on the page, figures which are being anatomically worked over in both a botching of the
drawing principle, and as protective remakings as their true bodies (figs.22, 24, 29). In 
working on these subjectile-figures, there is both an attack on transcendence and an 
invocation of something beyond it, something made older than it, scraps of which 
remain in the body, just as through its botching – “soiling”, “spoiling”214 – the page is 
found and founded as materialised paper.
I would argue that the list of verbs, here, can be split into two sets: those which involve 
passing to the other side of the surface (of the page, of the skin), and those which work 
on this surface. Of those which pass through the surface, there are those which expose 
the far side – the incisive – and those which loop back – such as sewing. In both cases, 
208 pp78–9 Cahiers d’Ivry, cited pp136–7 Derrida “Unsense”
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the otherside – the unseen layer which supports the visible layers – is testified to. Those 
operations which work only on the facing surface – the verbs of scraping and filing – 
damage the surface, risk irritating it, but also refine it, smoothe it. As I have discussed 
above, with Murray, and will again below, surface in Artaud’s work must also be 
thought in terms of substantiality, in its materiality; not least as resistance against the 
paper becoming, once again, page.
Page↔Figure
For Derrida, it becomes unclear quite where, who, what the subjectile is, here. Artaud 
tells us that the subjectile doesn’t complain – does not reach out for the law of the 
father, the mother-tongue, the other womb – but also tells us that the page is inert, that 
the figures say nothing. The “They” which offer themselves to the wounding-cicatrix is 
the figures – clearly it is these which are being remade, which are subjectiles. But the 
page, too, is having these things done to it and is keeping quiet. The subjectile, then, is 
figure, page, and something else: it is the constant shift of groundless ground; betrayal 
and botching and neither; ground and figure and neither; it is subject and object and 
neither, masculine aggression and feminine passivity and neither, paternal law and 
maternal birthing and neither. As both the dead form which must be remade, and that 
remaking already happening, the subjectile is unsure whether to take this “amorous 
aggression” lying down, “uncomplaining”.215 Once again, Derrida has found Artaud’s 
project to be one of massive metaphysical stakes confronted in mundane material, and 
thus far I agree with him, and am indebted to his persistent and precise readings. But, 
once again, this active metaphysics, pursued to the transcendent’s microscopic hiding 
places in order to wrest them from hidden God, violently denounced, is for Derrida 
necessarily caught up in vacillation, ambivalence and undecidability – here, in a pained 
and patient and hopeful silence: the “uncomplaining” subjectile.216
But we never fully pursue the body being remade, here, in tracking these vacillations; 
and so, I would argue, we never fully give ourselves credulously to subjectility. In such 
a scenario, where is transcendence’s final hiding place? Here, Derrida seems to me to 
also make a significant claim which he leaves unexamined. Having discussed this 
215 p144 Derrida “Unsense”
216 pp137–8 ibid.
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“surgery at once aggressive and repairing, murderous and loving”,217 he continues: “the 
subjectile is this, that, that again, and me. And let’s not hesitate to say it: the subjectile is
all that and Antonin Artaud. And me.”218 The “me” we will return to in our Afterword 
when thinking of our readerly subjectility. Here, I would like to attend to an example 
which Derrida does not invoke in his essay but which, I will argue, allows us to take the 
logic which he has developed around the litany of surgical words – their cicatrixial 
bivalency – and move beyond their surgical attachment to the body toward a wider 
sense of the relation between bodies, drawing and material-substrates in Artaud’s later 
work. In this way it will also, I will argue, allow us to begin moving beyond Derrida’s 
melancholic shuttling subjectile. The example is the drawing Le Totem and through it I 






Artaud worked on Le Totem [The Totem] (fig.7) between December 1945 and February 
1946. Like several other drawings of this period, the figure in this drawing has a nail in 
it. What is particularly noteworthy about The Totem amongst the many nail-ridden 
drawings of these years, is that there is only one nail, which is lodged in the spine of the
figure. L’Homme et sa douleur [Man and His Pain], (fig.8) of April 1946 has many 
more nails in it, including one at this same point of the spine. As he would write in a 
notebook commentary for Man and His Pain “we have in our back full vertebrae, 
transfixed by the nail of pain”.219 Les Corps de Terre [Earth’s Bodies] (fig.23) shows 
figures with spines seemingly broken at this point, their faces and hands spotted with 
plague.
Evidently, in some of these drawings, nails are being used by Artaud as a way of 
attacking the figures – and as Derrida suggests in relation to the cicatrix operations on 
the subjectile, this may be “amorous aggression”.220 Nails might be thought of as rather 
blunt acupuncture needles, then – stimulating or re-routing flows of energy in the body 
– reminding us that Artaud was very impressed by the acupuncture treatments he 
received in the early 1930s.221
Whilst the only nails which Derrida mentions are fingernails,222 Thévenin cites a 
passage from Artaud’s 50 Drawings to Murder Magic, in which nails are given as a 
means by which drawing moves beyond figuration, of moving beyond “just drawing” in
the sense that van Gogh moves beyond “just painting”. Artaud writes:
these are not drawings, / they do not figure anything, / do not disfigure anything,
/ are not there to construct, / edify, / institute / a world / even abstract, / these are 
notes, / words, / trumeaux [pier-glasses], / they are ardent, / corrosive, / 
219 p74 Antonin Artaud “L’Homme et sa Douleur” in La Tour de Feu 112 (December 1971), cited p87 
Deleuze Logic of Sense.
220 p144 Derrida “Unsense”
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incisive, / spurting forth / from I don’t know what whirlwind / [...] / for they are 
there as if nailed down / and destined no longer to move, / trumeaux then, / [...] 
tak[ing] on their body / then authentically.223
The whirlwind force which van Gogh found in painting-become-music and Artaud finds
in drawing-become-writing; like van Gogh, this is a moving beyond which does not 
absolutely negate the art form, but refinds its lost force. “Words” in this sense are not 
the dead forms of language for Artaud, but the “trilling” and “breath” which keep words
connected to the forceful origin of his body.224 Nails, then, have this bivalent function, 
here: to immobilise what is at hand (the world of form “nailed down” and made inert, 
uncomplaining); and to remobilise at a more fundamental level, that of the refound 
body. The nail, I will argue, as an instrument of subjectility: in one gesture, the 
application and awakening of force in both the material substrate and the body.
We saw, above, how Artaud tracked the system of the Fine Arts from the canvas, 
through the mote in the eye right through to “the base of the vertebrae”.225 The nails in 
the spines of these various drawn figures can, thus, be seen as an attempt to fix and 
reverse the insinuation into anatomy of the system of Fine Arts. But I would also argue 
that they are more than this. Let us look at two photographs taken at Ivry (figs.9–10). 
They are not dated, but Artaud only lived in his pavilion there from May 1946 to his 
death in February 1948, so the photographs certainly coincide with these nailed 
drawings being made. The photographs show Artaud sat on a bench – a bus stop in Ivry 
– with his friend Minouche Pastier; her husband Georges is operating the camera. 
Minouche’s posture and expression suggest surprise, she is taken aback. With a pen 
gripped in his right hand, Artaud has reached behind his back and is pressing into his 
spine. He is doing so at the precise point where the nails are inserted in the drawings: 
The Totem, Man and His Pain. What Artaud is indicating, with his pen and these nails, I 
would suggest, is his ninth thoracic vertebra, the one which was smashed by the force of
his spasms in an electroconvulsive “therapeutic” treatment administered by Dr 
223 Cited p43 Thévenin “Lost World”, cf. pp8–11 Artaud 50 Drawings
224 pp19–20 50 Drawings
225 p266–7 OCXXI, cited p106 Derrida “Unsense”
276
Latrémolière at Rodez in June 1943.226
The correlation of drawn anatomy and Artaud’s body which these drawings and 
photographs testify to gives grounds, I think, for two significant propositions: firstly, 
that the drawings are a means of Artaud reinventing his own body by becoming able to 
perform direct magical-surgical operations on it, (these, moreover, conform to the 
temporal mode of pluperfection or athletic slips discussed in the previous Chapters); 
secondly, that Artaud is thus identifying his own body as a subjectile, and hence 
establishing a cycle of identifications between paper, drawn figure and the volatile 
materiality of his own body – a set of workful identifications which develops those we 
have seen at work in the spells. I will discuss these two propositions further in this 
order, with the goal of establishing that pace Derrida, the subjectile can be affirmed as 
the always-already of the true body, rather than suspended in a deconstructive shuttling 
between breaking the transcendent law and birthing; and pace Murray, that the works on
paper are concerned with immediate, not delayed, effect – that where Murray insists 
“the only truly organless body for Artaud becomes the material surface of the paper 
itself”, and that the true body is ultimately an “impossibility”,227 we can affirm the 
inseparateness of man-and-complete-work, and so continue to try to think credulously 
of Artaud’s active material metaphysics.
Auto-Surgical Nails
Corroborated by the photographs, we find that The Totem is a sort of self-portrait – and, 
indeed, many of the more readily recognisable self-portraits – including that of 24th June
1947 (fig.30), La projection du véritable corps [Projection of the True Body] (fig.25), 
and a notebook page from 4th or 5th March 1947 (fig.39) – also show Artaud burning, 
226 The ninth thoracic (or dorsal) vertebra sits parallel to the base of the sternum, very much where 
Artaud is indicating. See the section on Artaud in Latrémolière’s thesis: pp49–51 Jacques 
Latrémolière “Observation 7” in Accidents et incidents observés au cours de 1200 électrochocs 
(Unpublished MD thesis. Université de Toulouse, 1944). Retrieved from 
<http://194.254.96.52/main.php?key=ZnVsbHxUVExzZTE5NDR4MDEyfHw> 6th June 2016.
227 p151 Murray Scum of the Soul
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exploding and incising his body; violent force applied not in acts of monomaniacal self-
obliteration, but as acts of protection and reinvention – what Derrida calls cicatrisation. 
Through these auto-mutilative acts Artaud doubles an existing pain and claims himself 
as author of it. If the violence which is inflicted upon Artaud is indicated by the gesture 
of pinpointing it with a nail tip or (in the photograph) with his pen, it is equally 
subverted by the force of a nail, a pen, a knife applied to it. One need not simply suffer 
the pain, Artaud discovers, one can nail it. In so doing, he not only nails (immobilises) 
the whole double-system that brought it upon him – the genito-monotheistic-
metaphysical system which produces bodies subject to pain, and the psychiatric-legal 
system which smashed his vertebra – he also slips in before these systems, creating a 
body which is neither answerable to them, nor abstracted from itself by their malevolent
forces.
This double nailing is evident in Man and his Pain (fig.8): the nail lodged in the spine is
being attacked by the force of a second nail. Posterior force is applied to produce 
anteriority: pluperfection. Put another way, through doubling, the indicator of a legally 
produced pain (pain produced in line with (divine, social) law) is attacked, invoking-
freeing an older force-form true body. For Derrida, this applied force and awoken 
anteriority would shuttle; I suggest the nail – holding still and piercing through what is –
is a posterior slip to anteriority: pluperfection.
Of course, two nails are not always necessary for this double movement of indicating 
and slipping-in-before; mostly one will suffice to say it hurts here, and it is my 
autonomously made pain; to announce that this is not pain inflicted upon me, but 
something I fix and slip in before, which I will no longer let hide in me. It is the double-
and-slip, as a means of fixing the transcendent adversary in its place and slipping to a 
time-place prior to its taking root as the world: this slip to before realism.
Nails also appear with great frequency in the notebooks (e.g. figs.40–43, 50–55). There,
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their double function is to fix in place and to subject-return form to force – to make 
force “spurt forth”.228 The nail can fix in place both figure and ground, or can fix one to 
the other – the same force applied to both in one gesture, as matches burn both substrate
and text and both paper and recipient with one flame. The nails drawn in perspective 
pass through the page, holding it in place (fig.51–2), or hold figures to the paper 
(fig.43). In this way, the forms of this world are transfixed by the force-forms of the 
nails; and the invigoration of the true body, remade and reclaimed, is already underway. 
This would require, of course, that Artaud actually identifies his body with the drawn 
images, and identifies the surgical and forceful gestures he makes on the paper and 
drawn figures as being also made on his own body. If my own comparison of these 
spine-nailed drawings to Pastier’s photographs needs corroborating, an observation 
made by Thévenin makes it clear that this is precisely the case. There are, Thévenin 
notes, pencil dots on the notebook pages especially which are “so heavily incised by 
[Artaud’s] hand that the hollow of their trace is perceived [...] even six pages further 
on.”229 She continues,
[t]he gesture that Antonin Artaud must have made to inscribe such heavy marks 
in the paper is certainly the same one that I saw him repeat hundreds of times 
when, having discovered on his back, or his head, or any other part of his body a
spot of particular pain, he would stick into it the point of his pencil or his 
knife.230
My second proposition was that in taking his extant, pained body as a given – as what 
Derrida calls a “superficial layer”231 bedded on a hidden ground (God, genitality, etc.) – 
and in working from and on this body in order to find and found, Artaud is identifying 
his body as itself a subjectile – both subject and object of destruction-reinvention. The 
subjectile that betrays (the given which would naturalise itself) and that which must be 
botched (the figure being worked over) is this paper littered with stab-holes and force-
drawn nails, these figures going under the cicatrix-knife, this suffering body with a pen 
228 Cited p43 Thévenin “Lost World”, cf. p8 50 Drawings
229 p41 Thévenin “Lost World”
230 pp41–2 ibid.
231 p145 Derrida “Unsense”
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pressed into its spine. We are already familiar with Artaud working on the body (as 
substrate) in order to work on the hidden transcendence (e.g. scraping God out of the 
body in order to have done with judgement). But a further circulation of homologies is 
established by the use of the nails in these works on paper, especially when seen 
alongside the Pastier photographs. This is the homology between the body of Artaud, 
the figure on the page, and the page itself as a material body. In a sense, this is an 
obvious connection: given that all of these can be considered subjectiles, they are 
clearly linked somehow. I am suggesting that we no longer have just the “soiling” and 
“spoiling” of an inert page,232 but – if we think of the hole burnt through the self-portrait
of 24th June 1947 (fig.30), or of the stabbed holes which brought the rhythm and force to
the manuscript of 50 Drawings to Murder Magic (figs.46–49), or of the careful burnings
which “send” Artaud’s spells – we find the exposed thickness of the “materialized 
paper”.233 In the notebooks, where, as Thévenin noted, force registers in thickness 
through thickness of octavos,234 we find nails working on figures and working on the 
material page, both of these means of recalling a lost world, and reinventing bodies. The
notebooks, too, in all their materiality must be reconciled with force, must refind – 
beyond the inert pages where transcendence might hide – active metaphysical 
materiality. The subjectile, I would argue, as revealed by these nails, is all three of these 
in their common, forceful materiality: paper, figure, body. Matter, then, as the place 
where Artaud finds and founds the fictions deadlier than reality – punctures this world 
with drawn nails which are not mere representations or “decals”.235
Body–Matter: On to Adventure
As I have been arguing, the lesson of the nails in relation to the subjectile is that what 
links the arts and the body is the subjectile as ideologically overcoded materiality 
against its inseparate forceful, active metaphysics. Which is to say, materiality must be 
232 p259 OCXIX, cited p122 Derrida “Unsense”
233 p10 “Dix ans...” cited pp119 Derrida “Unsense”
234 pp41–2 Thévenin “Lost World”
235 p8 “Dix ans...” cited p41 Thévenin “Lost World”
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freed from anything which would naturalise itself there: the body must be freed from 
the God and the genital parents which would naturalise themselves in it; the substrate 
must be freed from the system of Fine Arts which naturalises itself there; as I shall 
argue, even the rocks of the Earth must be freed from that which naturalises itself there, 
that which would make of Earth inert, blocked form. Body, subjectile, rock: these are 
what must be worked upon in order to be remade; but they are, as it stands, as it is 
given, equally the most pernicious and bulwarked repositories of that which must be 
destroyed. The problem is clarified again: here, where the fight is already impossible, it 
is most necessary. In the late 1940s, this is taken up again at the level of the body, the 
arts and at the level of matter. It is this last which Derrida does least to investigate. To 
engage this “volatilised matter”,236 we must go back to before Artaud’s internments, 
electroconvulsions. Alongside the notebooks themselves, the most apt material, I would 
suggest, for investigating Artaud’s interest in matter and the materiality of the body, is 
the encounters he has furthest from France, what we might call Artaud’s adventures.237
236 p27 OCIX cited p112 Hayman Artaud and After




Stage to the Earth
It has become all but hegemonic that discussions of Artaud’s drawings relies on the 
vocabulary of the stage. I will briefly give examples of this, explain its motives, and 
propose that we rethink both the stage and drawings in relation to Artaud’s materialism, 
an argument I will pursue through his adventures in the mid-1930s and into his 
notebooks and very final writings.
We have already seen how the language of theatre recurs throughout Derrida’s 
engagement with the subjectile: the “scene of the subjectile” (even if it does not take 
place),238 “the stage of the subjectile”,239 “actors” not complaining through father or 
through mother.240 Thévenin’s discussions of the spells, drawings and portraits have 
recourse to the theatre as both a metaphor and, more fundamentally, as the ground of a 
project which is continued in the drawings, as if they were theatre by other means. She 
writes of L’Exécration du Pére-Mére [Execration of the Father-Mother] (fig.21) being 
“dramatically composed, as if staged”241; of The Shit Sweeper, another drawing, now 
lost, she describes how the central figure “takes up the front of the stage”.242 The logic 
extends to Artaud’s portraits, too, of which she writes, the “operation that he undertakes 
when he hurls one of these faces [...] into life is a theatrical act, whence the undeniable 
dramatic power of his portraits.”243 In short, she asserts, “the reference to the theater is 
constant”.244
For Murray, Artaud’s “drawings are [...] explicitly theatrical”, and, indeed, “[j]ust as his 
theatre was filled with active hieroglyphs and signs made corporeal, the drawings are 
infused with a form of theatre that plays out on paper, engaging with staging, lighting, 
costumes and special effects, as if they were unnerving stage-plans.”245 Of the medium-
238 p61 Derrida “Unsense”
239 p154n.75 ibid.
240 p138 ibid.
241 p28 Thévenin “Lost World”
242 p29 ibid. The latter drawing is described p13 Prevel En Compagnie d’Antonin Artaud.
243 p37 Thévenin “Lost World”
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specificity of the spells and drawings, she argues that Artaud “engages with the paper 
itself, which is to say he is staging the support, interacting with it and using it in a 
similar way to how he mobilises space in the theatre; the stage itself is put on stage.”246
I am certainly not arguing against the position taken by these three writers, whose work 
has been of fundamental importance to the writing of this thesis. Surely, at the level of 
reinventing the body, these practices, these media, collude in the same project. Artaud 
makes it very clear that both the theatre and the drawings are
crucible[s] of fire and of true meat where anatomically,
through the stamping down of bones, of members, and of syllables,
the bodies are remade,
and the mythical act
of making a body is presented
physically and naked.247
But by looking at how Artaud’s ideas on the theatre and on matter changed in Mexico, I 
will argue that we can continue to think of the bodily project of active metaphysics 
whilst also rethinking how we understand the drawings as matter, as force – that is, as 
subjectiles. This in turn allows us to articulate connections between drawings, figures, 
material-substrates and bodies at the level of vulcanised materiality which pegging the 
drawings as stages (mapping page to stage and figures and objects to actors and props) 
does less to facilitate.
If the trip to Mexico, for Thévenin, marks Artaud’s abandonment of Paris – and a 
theatre scene too reluctant to be returned to its sacred fount in the gesturing, expressive 
body – it is precisely this goal for the body which, she argues, finds new paths in the 
works on paper. She writes:
And it must be said that it is after the relative respite of the Mexican attempt 
[...], after that sort of truce and long after he gives up the dream of realizing a 
total theatre – that again in 1937 there will appear from his hand, upon a white 
page, graphic signs.248
246 p119 ibid.
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These, of course, are the spells which open the decade of the “Ten Years Since 
Language Has Been Gone”; the spells which, on the page, reintegrate the body with 
language, graphemes and with figures at a more fundamental and energetic level. But, 
as I hope I have begun to show, and will now explore more fully, this is far from being 
on the “white page” as an inert, neutral given. I would readily concur that the trip to 
Mexico is instrumental in Artaud’s return to drawing. There, I will argue, Artaud finally 
finds the materiality of the stage betrayed: the page of the stage is exchanged in his 
thinking for the materiality of it, for what it stands upon. In the mountains of Mexico, 
this is the “Red Earth”.249 All this comes, as we shall see, at the same time as the Earth 
around him, the rocks themselves, are manifesting signs: not, note, being marked with 
signs, but expressing them through their own force, indeed their own “intelligence”.250 
As such, we must revisit those commentaries which discuss the drawings as stages with 
the caveat that, after Mexico, the stage is the Earth. If, for Thévenin, drawing returns as 
graphic signs “upon a white page”, I shall attempt to show, here, the subjectilian caveat 
is double: the white page must be thought as always-already materialised, as paper; and 
it must be returned to that source anterior to western metaphysics – before western 
metaphysics and the system of Fine Arts made of it an idealised, flat page – which is to 
say, it must be thought as originarily outside of the European. The white page of the 
works on paper – of the stage of drawing – is thus never the white page: it is, for Artaud,
henceforth, the vulcan intelligent materiality of the red Earth.251
We have already mentioned Artaud’s travels in Mexico in our previous Chapters. We 
will return to them here, and look also at his six-week trip to Ireland, where the spell-
casting began in earnest. I will be less interested in Artaud’s deportation from Ireland – 
the drama which predominates the literature when this adventure features at all – and 
more concerned with his fortnight in August 1937, spent awaiting the end of the 
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Mexico
Artaud had long aimed to incorporate the audience into the drama: if the actor was no 
longer to be the passive mouthpiece of a pre-written script, the audience must no longer 
be passive consumers of a spectacle. In Mexico, he sought a people, an audience, who 
would belong to the theatre as much as the actors did. At the same time, he found that 
the “stage” was no longer a demarcated area on which the “action” takes place: in 
Mexico, Artaud finds the edges of both stage and theatre erased. The stage, we might 
say, is deterritorialised onto the Earth, with no line marking a difference between inside 
and outside, between world and representation, theatre and life. In this sense, the Earth 
becomes both the support and the target of the expressive body. This Earth – the “lost 
world” – and this body are not those we already live, they must be awoken beneath 
mundane reality. In Mexico, Artaud seeks something like a fiction more real than reality,
one which inhabits and vulcanises the forceful materiality of the Earth. We recall him 
invoking a “fiction provoked by the drama” which is “a reality deadlier than [lived 
reality] and unsuspected by life.”253 A fiction more real than reality, one which inhabits 
and invokes the fluid materiality of the Earth. The consequence of the line of argument 
will be that it becomes possible to think of the notebooks and works on paper as not 
theatrical as much as, in a sense, geosophical. Something which Artaud would glimpse, 
years later in van Gogh’s making nature sweat – “no one until then had turned the earth 
into that dirty linen twisted with wine and wet blood”254 – expressing a nature deeper 
than the given.
Adventure I: Mexico City
At the beginning of 1936, aged 39, Artaud left Paris for Mexico. With a brief stop in 
Cuba, he arrived in Mexico in early February, and spent about two months in Mexico 
City before setting out for the mountains of the Sierra Tarahumara in April, returning to 
the capital in October for a few weeks before sailing for France.
In Mexico City, he gave a series of lectures at University of Mexico, and published 




output, perhaps the most clear and detailed statement of intent was Artaud’s second 
lecture at the University, entitled “Man against Destiny”.255 This was preceded by the 
lecture on “Surrealism and the Revolution”, and followed by one on “Theatre and the 
Gods”.256 And, indeed, the arguments made in “Man and Destiny” link these themes of 
revolution and the gods to the theatre and the body: on the one hand, Artaud argues that 
it is necessary to extricate surrealism and Marxism; and, on the other hand, that the 
Mexican youth would be well advised to reject the “scientific western” concept of 
revolution, and should, rather, look for inspiration from the few remaining indigenous 
populations of Mexico (hence of the world).257
Even if it came after his 1926 break with Surrealism, the movement’s association with 
Marxism – its signing up “in service of the revolution”258 – was, for Artaud, entirely 
wrong-minded; yet another symptom of the movement’s mangling of its inaugural 
impulses and possibilities, and grist to Artaud’s mill that surrealism represented a “deep-
rooted anguish which never quite found its direction”.259 He explains to the Mexican 
students, “[f]or me, the essence of Surrealism was an affirmation of life against all its 
caricatures, and the revolution invented by Marx is a caricature of life.”260 A dialectical 
materialism, for Artaud, is constitutively incapable of entering lucidly into reality, life, 
or time – or, as we shall see, relating to matter, the Earth. Any revolution based on a 
caricature of life – rather than on lucid expression – can only produce further caricatures
and “divided consciousness”.261 He goes on: “The head of a European of today is a cave 
in which images without force shift about, images which Europe mistakes for her 
thoughts.”262 Because European thought consistently mistakes the distorted image for 
the fullness of the forceful thing it is sundered from, Artaud argues, it is fundamentally 
“idolatrous”.263
This divided, idolatrous consciousness is the stock-in-trade of the universities, Artaud 
255 See pp357–64 and 633–6 ibid.
256 “Surréalisme et révolution” and “Le Théâtre et les dieux”, pp171–83 and pp196–206 OCVIII
257 p369 SW
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1995); and on Breton’s later relationship with Trotsky pp441–472 ibid.
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argues, which have “dismembered nature with [their] separate sciences.”264 The task 
which he charges the students of Mexico City with is the reintegration of consciousness 
with itself, with the body and with the earth; with “the hidden magic of the Earth”.265 
One thing this will involve is to refind the force of thought rather than prioritising its 
forms. As we have seen, this refinding of force older than idolatry takes on various 
names throughout Artaud’s œuvre, and it must always be force inseparate from 
substance: it is nerves weighed on scales; an affective athleticism; the true body without
organs. But perhaps the name he gives most frequently to the originary unity of force 
and form – that is, to undivided, non-idolatrous, active bodily consciousness – is 
“poetry”. This term takes on renewed importance in Mexico: he writes,
To arrest thought from the outside and to study it with regard to what it 
can do is to misunderstand the internal and dynamic nature of thought. [...]
I call poetry today the understanding of this internal and dynamic 
destiny of thought.266 
As we have seen, this poetry is in and of the body: we recall the letter on Coleridge in 
which Artaud indicts him as a “traitor” to poetry and to himself for allowing his body 
and his body of work to become differentiated: Coleridge allows his “mucus” to be 
stolen, and ceases to write “blood poetry”.267
So, this is why Artaud has come to Mexico – to warn the students of the dangers of 
universities, of marxism, of idolatry; and to exhort them to turn away from European 
images of thought, and toward a more integrated, embodied and “active” metaphysics. 
We might call this move beyond idolatry the search for an “imageless thought”, a term 
we encountered in the first Chapter in the discussion of idiocy. As we saw, for Deleuze, 
such an imageless thought – thought’s “central collapse, its fracture, its own natural 
‘powerlessness’ which is indistinguishable from the greatest power [... and which] 
Artaud pursues”268 – might also be called the “vertigo” of thought.269 Freed from 
idolatry, we might infer, thought newly reintegrated with the body does not “land” 
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moves without being bound by territories. Thought, we might say, that does not take 
place on a stage, but wonders the Earth. We are reminded of Deleuze’s preference for 
Nietzsche over Descartes: the sedentary Descartes – the thinker who trusts in thought 
but doubts he has a body, who begins his magnum opus by drawing his chair up to the 
fireside270 – eschewed for Nietzsche: in pain, constantly in a body, and out for a walk, 
his feet on the Earth, we might even say, allowing the Earth to think through him (as 
Deleuze and Guattari write of Nietzsche, and other such idiots, “[w]herever they dwell, 
it is the steppe or the desert. They destroy images [... and] place thought in an 
immediate relation with the outside, with the forces of the outside”271).
Artaud believes that such a way of thinking, and the way of life of which it is an integral
part – lucid, non-idolatrous, integrative thought bound in an expressive body and 
stepping on the volatilised matter of the Earth – is still present in a few places, amongst 
the few who have survived the ruination of thought and life and bodies by Christianity 
and, now, Marxist thought. He ends his second lecture to the Mexican students thus:
Of all the esoterisms that exist, Mexican esoterism is the last to be based
on blood and the magnificence of a land whose magic only certain fanatical 
imitators of Europe can still be unaware of.
I say we must draw out the hidden magic from an earth which bears no 
resemblance to the egoistical world that persists in walking on its surface and 
does not see the shadow that is falling on us all.272
Adventure II: Land of Speaking Blood
Not long after delivering these lectures, Artaud had managed to secure the funds – from 
the Mexican Ministry for Cultural Affairs, no less – for an expedition to the Sierra 
Tarahumara, what he had called his “Voyage to the Land of Speaking Blood”.273
As much as he clearly has a sense of what he expects and wishes to find in the 
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mountains, there is no sense that Artaud would be an unreceptive observer glibly 
confirming preformed hypotheses about a people; he has a lot at stake. He writes to Jean
Paulhan, shortly before leaving Mexico City, “soon I am going to reach the Indians [...] 
and there I hope to be understood”.274 This departure for the Sierra will mark a 
summation and a break for Artaud: The Theatre and Its Double is now finished – and he
urges Paulhan to get it published “as soon as possible” so that he “can finally be free of 
[his] literary past. / This seems to be the condition for success”.275 On the other hand, it 
is the ideas elaborated in that book which the Parisian public was unreceptive to, and for
which Artaud still wishes to find a people, an audience. What Paris could not recognise, 
Artaud felt the Tarahumara would.276 As he would later recall:
I did not go to Mexico on a voyage of initiation or for a pleasure trip [...] I went 
there to find a race of people who could follow me in my ideas. If I am a poet or 
an actor it is not in order to write or recite poems but in order to live them. When
I recite a poem I don’t do it to be applauded but to feel the bodies of men and 
women, I said bodies, tremble and turn in unison with my own.277
This urge for synchronisation of bodies brought about through contact with a shared 
vibration or force, recalls a musical image from The Theatre and Its Double, where 
Artaud writes of the actor as a snake charmer, producing vibrations which the audience 
take up through their whole body:
If music affects snakes, it is [...] because snakes are long and coil their length 
upon the earth, because their bodies touch the earth at almost every point; and 
because the musical vibrations which are communicated to the earth affect them 
like a very subtle, very long massage; and I propose to treat the spectators like a 
snakecharmer’s subjects and conduct them by means of their organisms to an 
apprehension of the subtlest notion.278
The significant shift three years later, in Mexico, to the image of bodies trembling in 
unison, is that actor and audience are no longer distinguished: what is foremost is not 
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the actor as controller or conductor – wielding an instrument that is also a baton, that is 
also a choreographer’s score – but rather the synchronisation and unity which now binds
them all, and which does away with any real distinction between actor and audience. I 
would argue that the importance of the Earth, as that which mediates between charmer 
and snake will, in Mexico, take on a more literal sense, to become that through, on and 
with which bodies “tremble and turn in unison”.279
What characterises this audience which Artaud seeks is not a specific capacity to be 
affected, but a way of living which integrates symbols, signs, musculature, images, 
dreams, language, breathing, matter...: like the actor or poet, this audience, too, are what
Artaud calls “the bodily and physical materialization of total being[s] of poetry”280; in 
place of idolatry, they retain and renew lucidity.
A crucial element of this is a sense of place, of continuity with a place; which is to say a
capacity to be affected by the force of its matter – belonging, here, is a sensitivity to the 
expressive force of the mountains. The Tarahumara, Artaud believes, will have “an 
overpowering sense of the presence of these forces, [they will seek] throughout their 
entire organism, if necessary by means of a real vertigo, the means of remaining in 
contact with the release of these forces.”281 Remaining in contact with forces, then, 
rather than the idolatry of mutually exclusive images of thought, may involve a vertigo. 
We have here, then, as we also find in Deleuze, this strange proposition that contact 
with the Earth is not with solid ground, but a vertigo, a sort of ground without 
groundedness. We will return to this, and to Derrida’s arguments about the subjectile as 
“groundless ground”282 in our Conclusion.
There is a shift, as Artaud crosses the Atlantic and crosses Mexico, beyond the 
manifesto on theatre and acting, toward developing his ideas about awakening the 
integrative bodily lucidity of the audience themselves, their own dormant and blocked 
forces. This shift makes more explicit that the actor must not only attack the separation 
between stage and audience, but that this must be accompanied by an awakening of the 
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of Mexico, this requires that actors and audiences not be separated from the more 
fundamental level of where things happen: what had previously only been thought of as 
the “undersides” of the stage (subtending its spatiality) will be turned toward engaging 
with materiality in all its vulcanicity.283 From a desire to directly affect an audience, 
Artaud has come to be with the audience, on the Earth. Having told the urban youth that 
he expected “from Mexico a new concept of Revolution” necessarily accompanied by 
“a new concept of Man”284 – and having also been vocally disappointed by the “solely 
Marxist” students in Mexico City285 – Artaud set out in search of the “real physical 
source of [...] revolutionary force”,286 and a new idea of man “as only Mexico can still 
present him to us”.287 He will find this body “carrying deep within him the ancient vital 
relation of man with nature” – a relation which, I hope to show, cedes no transcendent 
anteriority to nature.288
Adventure III: Mountain of Signs
Artaud had to be lifted onto his horse for the final part of his journey to the Sierra 
Tarahumara, the reins placed in his hands. Once again, he was in withdrawal from 
heroin; addiction is also a form of idolatry, and purging the body of it is inevitably 
agonising. Riding through the Sierra, Artaud saw symbols and images everywhere, with 
increasing frequency and distinctness. These were not symbols made by people, not 
forms sculpted by human hands. He writes, “[o]f course there are places on the earth 
where Nature, moved by a kind of intelligent whim, has sculptured human forms. But 
here the case is different, for it is over the whole geographic expanse of a race that 
Nature has chosen to speak.”289
For Artaud, these forms were expressions produced by the rocks themselves, by their 
proper force, the force of the Earth. He “discovered drowned men, half eaten away by 








the stone, and on rocks above them, other men who were struggling to keep them down.
Elsewhere, an enormous statue of Death held an infant in its hand.”290 And, “I saw twice
the same animal’s head carrying in its jaws its effigy which it devoured [...] and I saw, 
from their beginning, all these shapes pass gradually into reality.”291 In these 
expressions, Artaud recognises an unmistakeable but inorganic intelligence, manifested 
as symbols and figures, and through a numerological symbolism.292 In these mountains, 
Artaud writes, “a whole area of the earth develops a philosophy parallel to that of its 
inhabitants”.293 Intelligence, clearly, must be understood here not as a capacity for 
reasoning – not accession to the forms and formalities of “proper” thought – but a 
violent decoupling from idolatry in the name of lucidity as material expression; a move 
which cannot privilege the human, organic-cerebral at all. The “Mountain of Signs”,294 
we might say, is the idiocy of the Earth made visible – surfacing, expressing – testament
also to the fluidity of its materiality.
The Tarahumara, as Artaud notes, do not come from the Sierra. As their creation myths 
impart, “they fell out of the sky”.295 Nonetheless, they create in accord with the Earth, 
here, and express in their arts that which the Earth, too, expresses: “This inhabited 
Sierra, this Sierra which exhales a metaphysical thinking in its rocks, the Tarahumara 
have covered with signs, signs that are completely conscious, intelligent, and 
purposeful.”296 Inhabitation, then, does not mean a reciprocal belonging between 
Tarahumara and the mountains – not the Earth as property, atavistic links between blood
and soil, nor sign-making as territorial branding. The sense in which the Tarahumara are
on the Earth, here in this place, in these mountains, is that they create and philosophise 
(if we understand that in a lucidly expanded sense) on and with the Earth. And this both 









leads him to deterritorialise the theatre – and hence, later, the drawings – onto the Earth 
as always-already volatilised, intelligent matter. Here, in the mountains, I would argue, 
Artaud reconceives his ideas of theatre, and of nature, and discovers a way of exposing 
the stage – wrecking its bad transcendence and finding its hidden force. This is an 
unearthing of the formative force which is already in the stage and is older than the 
playwright: its forceful materiality. It is the stage put back in touch with its anterior 
force as always-already thinking Earth: it is on this, alongside it, that the body 
expresses, but it does not determine that body from some transcendent, anterior height. 
There is, here, a sort of debounding of the stage – deterritorialisation we might say: 
from a supposedly inert representational space to being opened onto the Earth itself. As 
I will argue, if the works on paper are to also produce true bodies, the paper itself – 
which we have already seen is a subjectile at stake alongside figures and bodies – must 
be thought beyond the stage, as unframed onto and dug into “Nature”, the Earth itself: 
paper, too, as vertiginal plenum of a volatilised matter.
As insistently material as this is, it is, of course, fundamentally inseparate from 
metaphysics. As Artaud argues when in Mexico,
To invoke metaphysics today is not to separate life from a world which goes 
beyond it, it is to reintegrate into the economic idea of the world everything man
has tried to remove from the world, and reintegrate it without hallucination.297
If Artaud needs this, he will find and found this lost world such that his body will never 
be subjected to idolatrous attacks; but he will not be made of the stuff of this lost world 
– will not eat and shit in it. This is what I am calling Artaud’s lucid materialism – the 
presence of metaphysics in the physical; the sensibility to (in an expanded, non-
idolatrous sense) “read” this, and the resultant agency, or self-direction within ontology 
which this brings to the lucid body (that is active metaphysics or sempiternal will). In 
“The Mountain of Signs” – and later in the essay on van Gogh and 50 Drawings to 
Murder Magic – the place and content of this lucidity is called, simply, “nature”, a 
nature which “obstinately manifests the same idea” as the inhabitants of the Sierra.298 
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Crucially, finding the lucid materialism of the true body, does not deliver that body to 
the Earth as an anterior force: this body, like the Tarahumara falling into the Sierra, 
inhabits parallel to, intimately with the Earth, but without causal hierarchy.
Adventure IV: Peyotl Dance
Shortly before Artaud arrived, a member of the Tarahumara community he would stay 
with died. With Artaud’s voice added to those petitioning the local authorities to allow 
it, reluctant and grudging permission was given for the Ciguri ceremony to be held for 
the deceased, a ceremony involving peyotl, the cactus from which the hallucinogen 
mescaline is derived.299 A 28-day wait separated Artaud’s arrival and the ceremony. He 
was in a great deal of pain in this period: he had hoped to be involved in a peyotl 
ceremony, and had already thrown away his heroin supplies on the journey to cleanse 
his body in preparation.300 The sense of not coinciding with oneself – which has tortured
Artaud since his youth – persists in this withdrawal, but rather than just wishing it gone 
he begins to see that pain can also, in a sense, lead beyond itself. Artaud writes of his 
withdrawn body as “intelligent but out of tune, needing to be dragged, needing to be 
killed, almost, to stop it from rebelling against me”.301 Pain is not only to be reactively 
rejected, it is also to be traversed and bound to the new body it already testifies to: “I 
was ready for all the burns, and I awaited the first fruits of the fire in view of a 
conflagration that would soon be generalized”.302 This, for Artaud, was the “nourishing 
plague” which the “Red Earth” visited upon him, a plague more thorough-going than 
even that which he and his contemporaries had called for in the Parisian theatre schools 
of the 1920s.303 Against the nostalgia which we saw Beckman accuse Artaud of in our 
first Chapter, he is moving toward more cicatrixial ideas of pain, here.
Before his departure, Artaud had already averred that the trip would be transformative, 
awakening and bodily: “in Mexico [...]. There, the theatre which I imagine, which 
299 For his 1955 experiments with this hallucinogen see Henri Michaux Miserable Miracle trans. Louise 
Varèse (San Francisco, CA: City Lights, 1963). Two books compare Artaud and Michaux at some 
length: Évelyne Grossman La défiguration: Artaud Beckett Michaux (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 
2004) and Amy Li Xiaofan Comparative Encounters between Artaud, Michaux and the Zhuangzi 
(Oxford: Legenda, 2015).
300 See pp384–5 SW





perhaps I contain within myself, expresses itself directly”,304 he wrote. And, in the same 
letter, “[c]ulture isn’t in books, paintings, statues, dances: it’s in the nerves and the 
fluidity of the nerves.”305 Even before reaching the Tarahumara he had recognised a role 
for the Earth – its vulcan, energetic materiality – writing, “[i]n Mexico, bound into the 
earth, lost in the flow of volcanic lava, vibrating in the Indian blood, there is the magic 
reality of a culture that could doubtless be materially ignited without much difficulty.”306
In the Ciguri ritual – in this sacred theatre taking place on the Earth – Artaud felt that 
what had been divided was reunited with itself. Preparation – from cold-turkey to the 
grating of peyotl we shall discuss below – is the ritual already happening, the blocked 
body, in pain, beginning to collapse, and the lucid materiality of the true body surfacing.
Cicatrixial manoeuvres, the body on the Earth becoming subjectile. On this nontheatre 
of Earth – catalysed by eating the Earth, the peyotl307 – Artaud sees how the celebrants 
“made their own bodies, bodies in which the idea of matter is volatilized”;308 Ciguri, 
then is “MAN as he constructed HIMSELF from HIMSELF in space”.309
Of course, there are also ways in which Artaud had already long been rejecting divided, 
idolatrous culture – divided from itself, from its force, and with even those false forms 
atomised from each other – as he searched to reintegrate his nerves to his body and 
refind their fluidity, their vulcanicity. On the boat out of Antwerp, bound for Mexico, he
settled on the title of his book: Theatre and Its Double. In the letter proposing this to 
Paulhan, the book’s editor, Artaud explained, “This word ‘double’ also refers to the 
great magical factor: the forms of theatre are no more than a figuration of it, waiting for 
it to become the transfiguration.”310 And it was this transfiguration – both the new figure
and its ongoing binding and internalisation of transfigurative force proper to itself – 
which he was already hoping to find in Mexico. As he wrote to René Thomas, shortly 
before leaving for Mexico, “I’m leaving in search of the impossible. We’ll see whether I
can nevertheless find it.”311 And ten years after returning from the Sierra Tarahumara, 
304 p336 Letter to Paulhan, 19th July 1935 in OCVIII, cited p101 Hayman Artaud and After
305 p335 Letter to Paulhan, 19th July 1935 in OCVIII, cited p103 Hayman Artaud and After. Emphasis 
added.
306 p159 “Le Mexique et la Civilisation” in OCVIII, cited p103 Hayman Artaud and After
307 “I prefer the people who eat off the bare earth the delirium from / which they were born / I mean the 
Tarahumara / eating Peyote off the ground” p557 SW
308 p27 OCIX, cited p112 Hayman Artaud and After
309 ibid.
310 pp272–3 Letter to Paulhan 25th Jan 1936 in OCV, cited p104 Hayman Artaud and After
311 p361 Letter to René Thomas 2nd April 1936 in OCVIII, cited p101 Hayman Artaud and After
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Artaud still felt that he had reached that impossible. In the ritual of Ciguri, theatre on the
Earth, he had glimpsed true theatre and his true body. In the vulcan, intelligent 
materiality of the rocks of the Sierra, suffering body being turned toward the true body: 
“I no longer had to carry my body”, he recalls “I understood that I was inventing life”.312
Oileáin Árann
Artaud’s trip to Ireland, nine months after returning from Mexico, is generally 
mentioned for two reasons (biographical completism aside): most often as the period 
which culminated in Artaud’s deportation and the beginning of his nine years of 
imprisonment in psychiatric asylums; and less often as the place from where, as we 
have seen, Artaud begins sending spells. In neither of these does Artaud’s time on 
Árainn seem to feature prominently. Certainly little is known about what Artaud did 
there – if they were made, no notebooks from the stay survive, and he mentions the stay 
very little afterwards. Nonetheless, I think brief attention to this adventure is germane to
my line of argument, as it will demonstrate that there is, at the very least, a 
contemporaneity between the casting of spells – that is, the cut after which Artaud will 
“have never again written without drawing”313 – and Artaud spending time in an area 
which, like the Sierra Tarahumara, is inescapably, insistently constituted of rock. This is 
rock, moreover, which refuses to be covered over, and whose insistent presence and 
visibility as a base constitutive force is everywhere on the island.
Cane
Artaud’s motive for the trip is often given as twofold, one negative, one more positive: 
on the one hand to leave Paris once again, having not settled since returning from 
Mexico, and in the wake of the break-up of his engagement to Cécile Schramme; on the 
other hand to return to Ireland the cane which he had acquired which he believed to be –
or associated with – the staff which Saint Patrick had chased the snakes out of Ireland 
with. The three most frequent ways of thinking of the cane are: one, that Artaud 
believed it to be the staff of Saint Patrick, and it was thus a symptom of his mental 
illness314; two, that Artaud never genuinely mistook the cane for the staff, and wielded it 
312 p117 “Une Note sur le peyotl” in OCIX, cited p110 Hayman Artaud and After
313 p8 “Dix ans...” cited p121 Derrida “Unsense”.
314 See, for example, pp148–53 Shafer Antonin Artaud
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as satire of the resurgent Parisian dandyism of the late 1930s315; three, that far from 
mistaking the cane for the staff in a psychotic collapse of terms, Artaud rather invoked 
an identity between the two, following a mimetic logic widely deployed throughout the 
esoteric traditions he was studying at this time.316 This last is the position taken by 
David Rattray, perhaps the writer who has given most serious attention to Artaud’s cane 
and his day-to-day use of methods of divination and magic.
For Rattray, the suggestion that the cane is a satirical gesture – and indeed, Artaud’s 
famous sense of humour often goes unremarked by all but his friends317 – does not 
preclude it being an attack which involves a deeper, magical reinvention. Roger Blin is 
not mistaken to think of the cane as his friend’s humour, but to think of it as only that. 
We repeat the false dualism if we cite Thévenin’s recollection that being drawn by 
Artaud “was like being flayed alive” without also recalling her recollection that this did 
not preclude Artaud humming and joking with the sitter.318
When Artaud was arrested in Dublin, outside the Cathedral where a relic said to be the 
Staff of Saint Patrick had been kept until the Church had burned it in 1538 “as an object 
of superstition”,319 it seems that Artaud was both goading Catholicism, and reinventing 
the ante-Christian active metaphysics of thaumaturgy which that Catholicism (the real 
idolatry, for Artaud) had denied and set itself to systematically destroy. The cane then, 
as Rattray figures it, is both a satirical offence to this world and a turn toward or calling 
up of something else. All magic begins in this world as much as it calls on another one, 
and the logic of magic is to show that these are always linked: as Rattray argues, the 
power of the cane is not despite it being a stick, it is precisely this connection to nature 
that gives it power320 – and, indeed, had Artaud not always argued that it is in the 
physical, in nature that metaphysics can and should inhere? If satire is the destructive 
attitude to this world, magic is also the turn to the next world, the coming state of affairs
315 See Roger Blin “Interview” in Lettres Français (21st June 1965), cited p149 “Artaud’s Cane” in 
Rattray How I Became One of the Invisible
316 Especially Rattray “Artaud’s Cane”. For a collection of Artaud’s esoteric notes from 1933–37, see 
pp129–158 OCVIII, and pp17–48 “Notes on Oriental, Greek and Indian Cultures” trans. Alastair 
Hamilton in Antonin Artaud The Death of Satan and Other Writings (London: Calder and Boyars, 
1974)
317 See e.g. pp80–1 Barrault Memories for Tomorrow
318 Compare: Clayton Eshleman “Spectator, Spectre, Sitter: The Art of Antonin Artaud” 
<http://www.claytoneshleman.com/spectatorspectre.html> Last accessed 22.08.16; to p31 Thévenin 
“Lost World”
319 See p163 Rattray “Artaud’s Cane”
320 p149 ibid.
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which the Tarot or other divination have revealed. We have seen precisely the logic of 
destruction and reinvention linked, earlier in this Chapter as the cicatrix; and our aim is 
to think them not as sequential or shuttling processes but as two sides of the same single
gesture, as I have argued Artaud’s use of nails allow us to do.
As Artaud writes in The New Revelations of Being, “I who am speaking have a Cane. / A
cane with 13 knots, and this cane bears on the ninth knot the magic sign of the 
thunderbolt; and 9 is the number of destruction by fire”.321 Canes – Artaud’s and those 
of the Tarot deck – are always “double rods of fire”,322 destruction and creation: fire as 
force (as we see it at work in the spells, as the force which sends the spell and that 
which effects destructions and protections) and cane as branch, nature. The destroyer 
and the rebirth. Again, these are not to be thought as sequential – one the condition for 
the other – but as simultaneous, intertwined. Thus the cicatrixial cane of fire is a syzygy 
– associated with both the destructive strength of the masculine principle and the 
generative power of the feminine principle.
Where in the Ciguri ritual Artaud had seen the two principles combined in the root of 
the peyotl and the markings on the ceremonial grater – “one point for the Male principle
and two points for the Female”323 – here he found the combination of the two principles 
in the forked head of the cane balanced by a pointed tip. To reaffirm this latter as the 
masculine principle, Artaud had tipped the cane with iron, such that it sparked as it 
struck the ground – a spike which creates flames.324
The cane, then, need not be thought of as a symptom, but can offer us insight to the 
practices and a worldview which Artaud had been researching at length in the 
Bibliothèque Nationale before his departure,325 and in which he is actively participating:
a non-idolatrous, pre-Christian worldview. It is precisely the kind of double logic which 
has recurred through this Chapter which Artaud wishes to take to Ireland: an attack on 
the current state of affairs and those who accept and perpetuate it, and an awakening of 
321 Cited pp157–8 Rattray “Artaud’s Cane”, cf. pp77–8 “New Revelations of Being” trans. Victor Corti 
in Artaud Death of Satan
322 ibid.
323 p390 SW. Also, “Four priests (two Males and two Females)”, and “the hermaphroditic roots [...] male 
and female sexual organs combined”. p388 ibid.
324 p148 Shafer Antonin Artaud
325 See pp164–9 Rattray “Artaud’s Cane”
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an ante-Christian metaphysics. And he has good reason to believe this will fall on 
receptive ears in Ireland; that, as he had hoped as he set out for the Tarahumara, he will 
“be understood”.326 Ireland’s fight continued against a colonial oppressor every bit as 
vicious as the one which blighted Mexico; and the resurgence of interest continued in 
Ireland’s immensely rich pre-Christian cosmologies and archaeologies.327 It is this 
Ireland – a place where the reawakening of a decimated culture had not only 
philological interest but great political stakes – that, I would argue, Artaud set out for; 
even if his goals for an awakening of a more explosively metaphysical nature were less 
widespread. The cane, the staff of Saint Patrick, represents both of these, then – the joke
being played on, and the weapon wielded at, this world; and the ante-Christian 
metaphysics of nature, numerology, and the non-exclusion of the male and female 
principles that heralds the invention-return of the lost world and the nonsuffering body.
Árainn
It was not in the metropolitan centres that Artaud expected to find these thin places 
between this world and the lost one. Those commentaries that prefer the psycho-
biographical details around Artaud’s stay in Dublin and Galway err doubly in that 
respect. Rather, I would argue, Artaud was predominantly motivated to go to Ireland by 
the desire to visit Árainn – indeed, upon disembarking the ferry at Cobh, he travelled 
directly to Galway and from there onto another boat for Cill Rónáin, the port of 
Árainn.328
Certainly Artaud had seen Robert Flaherty’s film Man of Aran during its acclaimed runs
in Paris in 1934, and its derring-do on the seas must have kindled fond memories of 
youthful boating trips with his father in the bay at Marseilles.329 If he had been aware of 
them, perhaps Artaud would even have been forgiving of the many liberties Flaherty 
took in his film with the facts of island fishing-life.330 But it is not maritime nostalgia 
326 p365 SW
327 Lady Gregory had died only four years earlier, and her legacy persisted, not least through Yeats and 
Synge, see e.g. Isabella Gregory Journals 1916–30 (London: Putnam, 1946), Ulick O’Connor Celtic 
Dawn: A Portrait of the Irish Literary Renaissance (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984)
328 All place-name spellings from Tim Robinson’s map Oileáin Árainn (Roundstone: Folding 
Landscapes, 1996)
329 See the recollections of Artaud’s sister, Marie-Ange Malausséna, pp86–7 Lotringer Mad Like Artaud; 
Man of Aran dir. Robert Flaherty (1932)
330 See pp161–9 Tim Robinson Stones of Aran: Pilgrimage (London: Penguin, 1990)
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and heroism which drew Artaud to these islands: as with the trip to the Tarahumara, it is 
this search for an ante-Christian worldview and way of life. He had read of just such a 
thing in J M Synge’s The Aran Islands, written thirty years earlier, and we can imagine 
Artaud being particularly taken by the folklore of ghost ships and the cruelty of faeries, 
and by passages such as this one: “[certain] rhymes are repeated by the old men as a sort
of chant [...]. All the time he was chanting the old man kept up a kind of snakelike 
movement in his body, which seemed to fit the chant and make it part of him.”331 Synge 
himself stayed on the middle island, Inis Meáin and when he did visit Árainn gives no 
account of ever having penetrated so far as Eoghanacht where Artaud lodged above na 
Seacht dTeampaill [the Seven Churches], not far from the formidable iron age mystery 
of Dún Aonghasa or the burial mounds as old as Gilgamesh. As the island’s 
cartographer, Tim Robinson argues, here “prehistory is as urgent underfoot as last 
night’s graffiti in city streets.”332
Artaud went to Árainn for the end of the world, and left disappointed. There was no 
great sense of transformation and revelation as there had been in the Tarahumara. But he
had been planning (and, to an extent, planning the outcome) of the Mexico trip for a 
very long time beforehand – perhaps even since his nose was buried in the magazines of
his childhood, which his sister recalls most delighted him when they sported Latin 
America on their sensational covers.333 Artaud spent his time on Árainn traipsing around
the neolithic sites – no doubt often in the rain – being teased by schoolboys who would 
make off with his cane.334 But what is inescapable in Árainn – what there is grounds, I 
think, to speculate was crystallised in his mind in this fortnight immediately preceding 
the first spells, that is, the return of drawing, the integration of which is the single most 
important practice of the last years of Artaud’s life – is that insistent presence and 
visibility of the surface and depth of rock as a base constitutive force. The forcefulness 
of matter; the surfacing always-already of the Earth. On Árainn, what we habitually 
think of as nature is not a given – soil has to be “made” by hauling seaweed onto the 
rocks to rot down.335 Rock is constantly resurfacing from under this cosmetic layer. 
331 pp153–4 John Millington Synge The Aran Islands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); for 
Faerie and ghost ships see, e.g. p150 ibid.
332 p4 Robinson Stones of Aran: Pilgrimage
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334 p92 Barber Anatomy of Cruelty
335 “making land” is a Connemara jibe against life on Árainn. See p200 Robinson Stones of Aran: 
Pilgrimage
300
Indeed, Robinson goes so far as to argue that the very basis of Árainn’s economic 
relations with the mainland is an emergent property of their different geologies.336 On 
Árainn, rock is more than simple substrate: less and more than solid Earth, it is the very 
stuff of flow, and constantly resurfacing.
Artaud did not find a thriving ante-Christian culture, here, and left disappointed. But he 
certainly found rocks, every pace a pace on the Earth, vertiginal paces on the surfacing 
materiality of deep history. One year earlier, Artaud had observed a root and grater, both
making inseparate the male and female principles, used in a place where the rocks 
themselves manifested signs and symbols. Here, in Árainn, he had brought his cane, his 
own symbol of inseparate masculine and feminine principles – fire and birthing – to a 
place of such remarkable and insistent geological presence, and would, within two days 
of leaving this island, begin a twelve-year experiment with the combination of symbols, 
materiality and pictochoreography which Mexico has opened up and Árainn had 
reinvigorated, launching the spells and the return to drawing.
Nature: réel inutilisé
Whether or not his time on Árainn reaffirms for Artaud the importance of materiality 
and “nature” in the magic, or active metaphysics of the written-drawings, the theme will
recur until his very final text, 50 Drawings to Murder Magic. What we see, here, is how 
the engagement with the subjectile as substrate is not only about the unearthing of the 
paper beneath the page or picture, it is also a turn to the always-already forceful 
materiality of the paper, which is to say, the paper as Earth. I propose two ways in 
which the paper is the Earth: on the one hand, it is a stage, and in Mexico the stage 
unframes onto the Earth. On the other hand, as van Gogh showed when turning “the 
Earth into that dirty linen”337 (and as we shall see in more detail below), the paper as 
subjectile has a forceful-material depth to be uncovered in it, a groundless materiality 
through which it breaks out from within itself. This innate volatile materiality makes it 
of the Earth. The Earth, here, is the “lost world” that very “fiction” which Artaud tells 
us is “deadlier” than reality “and unsuspected by life”.338 Lighting on his title to Theatre
336  Connemara peat from the impermeable granite subrock was traded as fuel with Árainn, and winter 
pasture on the island’s undamp limestone saved mainland livestock from rheumatism. This age-old 




and Its Double Artaud called this “le réel inutilisé par les hommes de maintenant” [“the 
real world left unused by men of today”].339 The lost world – like Artaud le Mômo with 
his factually dubious biography, and like Artaud’s meddling with van Gogh’s timeline – 
must be reached and built through both a certain fictioning of the facts, and by a turn to 
materiality – sweating out nature and making it sweat, returning it to its vulcanicity. 
Materialism, then, not as an armature of realism nor dialectics, but as lucidity taking 
place on the rocks and making of nature – which itself expresses its lucidity and which 
in its forceful materiality is also the Earth as stage, as paper – not another false 
transcendence, but the “crucible of fire” where “bodies are remade”.340
Perhaps Artaud’s most vituperatively lashed targets – in word and deed – in this last 
decade of his life are “the constraints of spatial form, perspective, measure, balance, 
dimensions”341; those extensive determinants which would impose limits on the theatre 
and drawing as much as on bodies and paper themselves. As I hope I have 
demonstrated, if the attacks on western theatre in the early 1930s would reinvent it as 
“spatial poetry”342, from the trip to Mexico onwards, this very spatiality, too, must be 
undermined to show its materiality and vulcanicity. It is the works on paper that most 
fully explore this, and especially the notebooks: there, I am suggesting, we should turn 
from seeing the white page as theatrical space, to engaging the paper as red Earth.
For Évelyne Grossman, Artaud’s turn to the small pages of the notebooks “should be 
seen as a symbolic analogy for the anatomical iron collar that in his view asphyxiated 
the human body”.343 I would rather argue that Artaud’s turn from spatiality to volatilised 
matter – that is to force-form – renders the extensive, objective dimensions of the page 
of little consequence (even less than the pre-Mexico theatre that was “not only to be 
measured by size or volume”344). After all, all work on paper is work on the Earth, an 
engagement with and inside the materiality of the subjectile. And, indeed, Grossman 
does also adopt the position – surely drawing directly on Derrida’s essay – that Artaud’s 
breaking off the page is a “break out within the sheet: [it is] to raise the paper surface, to
339 p273 OCV my translation
340 Artaud “Le Théâtre et la science”, cited p37 Thévenin “Lost World”
341 p1467 Œuvres, cited pvii Évelyne Grossman “Editor’s Preface” in Artaud 50 Drawings
342 pp26–7 CWIV
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344 p96 CWIV
302
dig into it [...], to open its unsuspected depths and thicknesses.”345 To conclude this 
Chapter, we will return, now, to the notebooks, to Artaud’s own discussion of his 
notebooks where, as we know, his pencil marks were so forceful they registered across 
thicknesses.346
50 Drawings to Murder Magic
Following a conversation with Pierre Loeb on the role of the drawings in his cahiers, 
Artaud selected eleven of the notebooks, with the intention of selecting from these fifty 
drawings to gather together in an exhibition, to be accompanied by a written piece. This 
was January 1948, and the final selections were not made before Artaud’s death on 4th 
March. The text, titled 50 Drawings to Murder Magic, dated 31st January 1948, proved 
to be the last which Artaud would complete. It fills notebook 396.
There is no sense in this final piece that Artaud has retreated to a distance to write a 
clinical account of his notebooks, of his practice. The text of 50 Drawings is always-
already joining up with the drawings, just as in all the notebooks, where the drawings 
comment on the writings, and vice verse in such a way as to – as Artaud puts it in this 
text – “aerate” them, to “clarify them” by opening them up.347 This very text occupies 
the page as a plastic space, imbuing it with rhythm; it materialises the page with stabbed
holes (these bring rhythm, too), that unearth the paper beneath the page and tunnel into 
the thickness of the octavos (figs.46–49). As throughout the notebooks, there are two 
movements which apply equally to the writing, the drawing, the body and the page: 
each must “leave the written page / and enter / the real”, but beyond this they must also 
“leave the real” for the place where the drawings “come from”, this fictional place 
which comes up to meet them, which is more real than the real.348 It is by thinking of 
this beyond-the-real as inseparate from the materiality of the notebooks’ paper that, I 
would argue, we approach a way of thinking the subjectile different from Derrida’s, in 
what I am calling Artaud’s lucid materialism. It is only by dint of having passed through
the work of Deleuze, Derrida and Murray that we will be able to think both of these two
movements in a single, originarily inseparate gesture. This originarily inseparate 
345 ibid.
346 pp41–2 Thévenin “Lost World”
347 p7 50 Drawings
348 p12 ibid.
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gesture, of course, also affirms the always-already originarily inseparate body which 
makes it – the true body with its originary inseparateness from itself, and from its 
works.
As we have seen, this passage from the page, good drawing, written language and the 
anatomical body is effected through both the application of forces (to reveal and attack 
the transcendent conditions), and the return to or invention of anterior force (athletic 
slips of pluperfection). These forces are both bodily and metaphysical, and are, as ever 
for Artaud, gathered together in breath: in one sense, all this is “purely / and simply / the
reproduction on / the paper / of a magical action / that I have performed / in true space / 
with the breath of my / lungs”.349
The body is, as we have seen, being reinvented, here. And with it, a world is being 
made. Artaud always has “a world / to create, to call forth.”350 This world, what is 
elsewhere called both the lost world and a world to come is, here, being created and 
called forth; it is to be both found and founded by Artaud. Crucially, though, the 
sempiternal body which he has spoken of previously, the true body, will not be reliant 
on this world – which is to say that the world will not have any historical or 
metaphysical antecedence over Artaud. Where the Tarahumara were not birthed from 
the Earth, but inhabit it, Artaud will have no reliance on the new world at all, not least 
because in reinventing his body, a “substance / far more substantial than / barley sugar / 
is born at this precise moment / instantaneously / in the body”.351 No more will the body 
have to partake of the outside – we recall, here, then, the arguments made in the first 
Chapter of this thesis regarding Artaud’s hunger being weaponised against the primacy 
of the outside which Deleuze would adapt the Body without Organs to represent.
The stuff of which this self-feeding – fasting-unhungry – body is made is, of course, not
without its proper energy: on the contrary, it is “electric matter”.352 Moreover, for 
Artaud, this body is explicitly mountainous, volcanic. This is a body as “volcanic rock 
wall, / lava in fusion / flowing from a volcano”.353 The stakes are, of course, the highest:







immediate future”.354 And as much as this takes place at the atomic and microbial levels 
which had been detailed in To Have Done with the Judgement of God two months 
earlier, in the remaking of the body and the world through attack and invention – all this
done in the apparently so-simple medium of a schoolchild’s notebook – here
we are
no longer in chemistry
but in nature
and I do believe
that
nature
is about to speak355
These are the final lines of this final text for publication. There is no full-stop closing it 
off. Where the rest of the text – its twelve pages of very loosely written lines – pulls one
through it as if in one breath, we are pulled up, here, pausing over these single words 
occupying lines to themselves. This is what “I believe”, Artaud announces, I am about 
to tell you it... I believe that you must turn to nature, turn to the Earth, and listen. The 
notebooks are already this; already the breath, drawing, writing, pictochoreography and 
volatilized matter of the body and the Earth. The reader has already been pulled into 
their materiality, their energetics, their magical breathings: already made to “enter / the 
real”, as Artaud has called it. But the notebooks, he tells us, are already also more than 
this: they are also the means of throwing us beyond this, to “leave the real” for the place
where all this has “come from”, the fiction of forces more real, more deadly than the 
real: nature, the mountains perhaps, depths of paper, an island of limestone; the Earth.356
This lost world of vulcanised matter, the Earth that is here, awakening in the notebook 
itself, which pours through a puncture pierced by the body as it reinvents itself, 
breathes.
This is what it will mean for Artaud to murder magic and turn to nature: to attack all and
any forces arraigned against him, and in doing so expose and harness the deeper magic 
of these malicious attacks: the single gesture which achieves both a vicious retributional





but the undivided gesture which both conquers the real, and launches beyond it. This is 
the gesture of the notebooks, the picto-choreo-graphico-respiratory materialising gesture
which gathers up image, movement, writing, breathing and the matter of the paper in 
one body-making, world-making force.
In our Conclusion, we will turn again to our three main secondary sources – to Deleuze, 
Derrida and Murray – to try to articulate this single gesture of destruction-creation, this 
fictioning and lucid materialism which the notebooks achieve, in such a way as to 
gather up the lessons from their work, as well as the disagreements which have 
preoccupied us in this thesis. This Conclusion will advance through the question of 
holes in Artaud’s notebooks, and hence begin to phrase positively and immanently – as 
a single gesture – the acts of destruction-creation which too-often we have found reefed 
in endless deferment. Against this turning of Artaud’s goals against himself, we will 
continue to try to read credulously, to affirm the inseparate body and vulcan matter, to 
allow Artaud to show those “attitudes of the body” through which he finds his way “to 





If for Edward Scheer, Artaud “stabs holes in his pages not just to foreground the 
material, but to reveal what it has hidden about its active role in artistic production”,1 we
see how the question of the subjectile is, once again, a question of war with the 
transcendent-anterior taking place in the concrete. But, as I have joined Derrida in 
arguing, this is a productive, not simply contrarian gesture. Matter is being restored its 
proper volatility. This latter is what I am calling Artaud’s lucid materialism, and if it 
applies to the paper of the notebooks and the Earth it is equally true of the affective 
athlete, the true body. Artaud is affirming materiality as the very place where an 
alternative, active metaphysics can be found and founded. This involves fictioning: 
“leaving in search of the impossible” and “nevertheless find[ing] it.”2 It carves out a 
formally unprecedented and metaphysically unallowable space or body, like the fourfold
of Artaud le Mômo, or van Gogh inventing nature from within his own death. In each 
case, these strategies call up and create anteriorities more primordial than the 
transcendent-anteriorities of judgement and the given; and in each case, they are 
sempiternal or volatilised, such that they do not themselves become divested from and 
antecedent-judges to the bodies they are bound to.
By way of concluding this thesis, I will summarise the disagreements, lessons and 
prospects of the three main inspirators of these Chapters – Deleuze, Derrida and Murray
– rephrasing their arguments as we have seen them around holes, an image they all use 
and an action which recurs in Artaud’s work, especially his notebooks. In this way we 
will summarise my own reading of Artaud’s subjectile.
1 p125 Scheer “Sketches of the -jet”
2 p361 OCVIII, cited p101 Hayman Artaud and After
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Murray
As we have seen, from the outset Murray argues convincingly for an identity between 
the paper of the spells and the skin of the recipient. Throughout the works on paper and 
the writings alike, she argues, “skin references seem to work materially and mimetically,
beyond a purely representative function, by continually disrupting the boundaries 
between surface and depth and between metaphor and material.”3 Skin demonstrates 
both the substantiality of the surface – through its eczematous flaking – and yet also 
gives Murray grounds to reassert the realist position that
considering the impossibility of actually carrying out the corporeal 
transformations that he calls for with the creation of a ‘body without organs’, 
perhaps the only truly organless body for Artaud becomes the material surface of
the paper itself.4
For Murray, then, whilst a homology exists between paper and body, Artaud’s surgical 
remaking of the paper and the figure on the paper is the remaking of his own body only 
by analogy not in reality; certainly not the remaking of reality. Moreover, if for Murray 
the notebooks – in their “resisting completion and publication”5 – are quintessentially 
delaying, the implication is that maintaining the connection between organless 
surfaciality of paper-skin and Artaud’s own body comes at the expense of the final 
finding-founding of the true body.
If holes are a crucial concern, for Murray, it is because they effect delay. She explains, 
the “complex temporality of the spell plays out in its very materiality: we can see that 
the hole has already been burned in the paper, but the action described is in the future 
tense”.6 But, she reminds us, the spells are only the “most immediately evident 





example” of Artaud’s use of holes, which pierce his “entire œuvre, marking its very 
structure”.7 For all the disagreements I have with reading the notebooks as delaying – 
which, for me, is realist foreclosure of Artaud’s goals, reaffirming their impossibility 
over their necessity – this insight on the structural importance of holes, and its coupling 
to Murray’s foregrounding of questions of surfacial substantiality open ways of thinking
about Artaud’s works on paper which were hitherto unavailable.
Derrida
In Derrida’s early essays on Artaud, the hole could be said to be that transcendent agent,
the Souffleur, the “hidden but indispensable center of representative structure”8 which 
Artaud would – according to Derrida – have done with by stealing himself back from it, 
“plunder[ing] the structure of theft”.9 The “hole” is thus, also, “reading”, the anteriority 
which steals by “perforating” speech and writing.10 Speech or poetry is “[a]lways stolen 
because it is always open”, that is to say, it is always originarily punctured by reading – 
just as the example is already punctured by the system of exemplarity.11 The hole as 
purloining anteriority is equally linked, in Derrida’s reading, to birth, to the “black hole”
from which the body comes de facto and the system of genitality which always 
punctures it, purloining it from itself de jure.12
In “To Unsense the Subjectile”, the holes, like Murray’s, are those which are made in 
the spells and works on paper, which burn through, making it “impossible to distinguish
between the subject of the representation and the support of this subject, [...] between 
the subject and its outside, the representation and its other.”13 The hole makes it unclear 
what it is a hole in, so for Derrida opens an undecidability on the substrate – the force 
7 p82 ibid.
8 p297 Derrida “Theater of Cruelty”
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“already at work” which prevents him talking of a scene.14 These holes “effectively 
produced in the very stuff of the subjectile itself”15 are traces of a passing over and 
destruction of barriers – such as in the notebooks where, Derrida argues, “the sending of
a projectile, a drilling, a piercing through” is a “passage beyond representation and the 
meaning in it”.16 If, in the early essays, the holes are representation, reading etc. as it 
pierces speech and writing, reasserting the anterior; here, holes make the material 
ground unstable.
Later in the essay, destruction and creation are linked, as we have seen, in the cicatrix, a 
logic which Derrida finds throughout the litany of verbs (“probe, cut, scrape, file, sew” 
etc.17) in Artaud’s final use of “subjectile”, though these are not operations Derrida links
immediately to the paper itself. Sew in particular is linked to holes as “amorous 
aggressions”.18 To sew is to destroy (“to pierce with a needle or a pointed lead, 
perforate, penetrate, make holes in the skin of the figure”) in order to effect the healing 
of a “suture”.19 Tracing it back onto the page, he argues that Artaud’s destructions of the 
paper are also creative: “those holes of fire in the page” are also “working”.20 But if 
Derrida demonstrates the importance of thinking the destruction-creation of Artaud’s 
projectiles, his “working” will not allow us to resolve the problem of thinking of 
actative work of art and the substantive artwork as originary inseparate. If, in the 
subjectile, these two are never dissociable, for Derrida, neither are they fully resolvable. 
As such, no final battle, no recovery of the lost world, no true body – none of those full 
and positive outcomes which Artaud works towards finding and founding with his 
fictionings and pluperfections, that is, his punctures in the cruel anteriorities of this 
world and the finding-founding of the inseparate, expressive body of the-man-and-the-




17 pp78–9 Cahiers d’Ivry, cited pp136–7 Derrida “Unsense”
18 p144 ibid.
19 p141 Derrida “Unsense”
20 p145 ibid.
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fidelity to Classical metaphysics “more faithful [...] than it is to itself”,21 we have argued
that Artaud’s “active metaphysics”22 does not puncture his body, but is originarily bound
to that sempiternal body, the fourfold finite-infinite of Artaud le Mômo.
“The crater makes the work”,23 for Derrida, but this destruction is present as trace: it is a
constitutive part of the work only by dint of being absent. The shuttling of actative force
and substantive presence remains interminable. Artaud’s work is ultimately, for Derrida,
working against Artaud himself as much as it is resisting falling to dead form. But 
“crater” could also, I think, point to a different way of thinking materiality. A crater in 
the Earth does not open onto something else behind; rather, the destruction of one 
surface makes another surface, exposes depths; there is a “gush[ing] forth” such as 
Artaud saw in van Gogh’s canvases.24 The same, I would suggest, can be said of paper: 
a stab hole opens up the page to the depths of the paper and to the thickness of the 
notebook (figs.46–49). If the naked eye cannot see the exposed thickness of a burned 
page, it is nonetheless just as clear as with the stab-holes that this is substantial paper. 
Whilst Derrida will not finally resolve vacillation, nor turn to the Earth, nonetheless his 
work provides an entry point for beginning to think of the cicatrix as a double 
articulation, what I suggest we could better think of under the single word resurfacing.25 
Derrida’s assertion that the subjectile reveals a “groundless ground”26 is readily 
accepted, but I would suggest that the double-articulation of the cicatrix can be used to 
think affirmatively about this groundless ground, this volatilised materiality, rather than 
use it as another means of suspending finding-founding of the lost world and Artaud’s 
true body in the “to be found” and “inaccessible”.27 As Artaud wrote, it is in a “real 
vertigo” that he will find “the means of remaining in contact with the release of these 
21 p230 Derrida “Soufflée”
22 p31 CWIV emphasis removed
23 p145 Derrida “Unsense”
24 p502 SW
25 I am indebted, in some senses, on this idea of resurfacing to Ben Woodard On an Ungrounded Earth:
Towards a New Geophilosophy (New York, NY: Punctum Books, 2013). See especially pp5–25. My 
deep thanks also to my students at Goldsmiths who took the Fictioning module, for examining 
Woodard’s ideas with me.
26 p145 Derrida “Unsense”
27 p313 Derrida “Theater of Cruelty”
311
forces” of the Earth.28
Deleuze
I have tried to follow with care the readings which Murray and Derrida put forward, and
picked up on figures they develop to take in other directions – to use in relation to logics
which they dismiss or foreclose – and certainly Deleuze’s engagement with the problem
of idiocy opened into my reading of Artaud le Mômo. But my initial disagreement with 
Deleuze concerned rather his appropriation of Artaud’s own figure (the body without 
organs) to ends which I have argued it is not commensurate with – a Spinozism directed
toward intuiting and experimenting toward the One-All.
As Brian Massumi notes in his foreword to A Thousand Plateaus, the germane question 
to ask of the book “is not is it true? But: does it work?”29 I would not disagree with this 
as a way of reading Deleuze, of entering into the positive upward spirals of affection 
which this work opens. But, in terms of reading Artaud, “it is true” and “it works” are 
indistinguishable, to the extent that both would make his case generalisable, accessible.
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze argues that “Artaud’s genius” is to recognise that 
“bodies have no surface”– are, indeed, “Body-sieve[s]”.30 Freud had already pegged the 
hole as a peculiarly schizophrenic symptom.31 But if Deleuze takes this as a sign that, 
for Artaud, “inside and outside [...] no longer have a precise limit”32 – which is to say, 
takes it as a schizoid-Spinozist insight which, like the body without organs or the 
fleetingness of thought reported in the Rivière correspondence, will be generalisable 
beyond his case – I am suggesting that Artaud’s late work deploys “drilling” and 
digging and surgical holing as strategies to both destroy surface and to resurface depth 
28 p360 SW
29 pxv ATP




in one gesture; that is, to destroy this superficial world and to invoke a surfacing of 
depths of volatilised materiality. As he has it in “Ten Years since Language Has Been 
Gone”, this is a “real bodily act”33 taking place in the notebooks, which is no less than 
“the advance of a drill in the lower depths of a latent sempiternal body”.34 The surfacing
of depth – drilling the sempiternal body, “aerat[ing]” the notebooks35 – is bloody work 
and not undertaken to deliver the body to a constitutive outside. Artaud’s body does not 
blur into the world: it produces its own food “far more substantial than / barley sugar”,36
it punctures this anterior world and awakens it to its own innate forces precisely so the 
two can live alongside each other – as sempiternal force-forms – without being reduced 
to each other. Artaud’s body unbelongs to this world: “this hole of a body” is a fiction.37
Deleuze’s readings of Artaud, then, consistently violate Artaud’s body, delivering it to a 
constitutive outside which it is Artaud’s ongoing, urgent concern to have done with. In 
Mexico, and in his later years, Artaud can articulate this unpersecuted, sempiternal body
as a living-alongside the Earth without being of it, and an awakening of the innate 
volatility and intelligence of an Earth which has also been divested of itself and blocked
by dark, idolatrous forces: as he insisted “we must draw out the hidden magic from an 
earth which bears no resemblance to the egoistical world that persists in walking on its 
surface and does not see the shadow that is falling on us all.”38 Van Gogh, especially, 
pushes forward these techniques of breaking Nature out of its blocked forms, to allow it 
to gush forth whilst simultaneously sweating it out of himself.39 And yet, if Deleuze’s 
readings persecute Artaud’s body, elsewhere in his œuvre, there are nonetheless themes 
which can be productively read alongside Artaud’s work in further investigating the 
question of the Earth as force-form. Given that Deleuze’s discussion of the Earth does 
not draw on Artaud’s work, it did not fall within the purview of this thesis to pursue 
33 p9 “Dix ans...” cited p119 Derrida “Unsense”
34 p8 “Dix ans...” cited pp115 Derrida “Unsense”
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such consonances, but brief attention to them here will, perhaps, mitigate my otherwise 
stern disagreements with Deleuze’s work and cast a forward glance to the possibilities 
of building on this research.
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari propose a volatility proper to matter 
which sees rocks “express themselves”.40 Indeed, through Cézanne, the philosophers 
find the formative volatility of rocks becoming visible, a process I might call substantial
surfacing of the Earth. In his paintings, they write, “rocks begin to exist uniquely 
through the forces of folding they harness” and landscapes render up their “thermal and 
magnetic forces”.41 Whilst their language seems more sober than Artaud’s discussions of
the intelligence of the rocks and their volatility, and less visceral than his discussion of 
van Gogh’s “reperspiring” of nature, and the application of “grinding”, “elementary 
pressure” to “make it sweat”,42 there is a shared insistence on the forcefulness of the 
Earth, that is to say, the always-already inseparateness of force and form, of matter as 
workful presence. What Deleuze and Guattari call “matter-flow”43 seems to bear much 
better comparison to Artaud’s lucid materialism than anything they say in Artaud’s 
name.
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari draw on D H Lawrence’s writings – 
another writer who was drawn to Mexico in the 1930s – to think of the artist as 
puncturing holes in an umbrella used as shelter against chaos.44 The umbrella’s interior 
is decaled with orthodoxies; but “Art is not chaos”.45 Rather, the puncture “let[s] in a 
breath of air from the chaos”.46 These two poles (firmament of doxa and total chaos) 
recall the “striated” and “smooth” spaces articulated in A Thousand Plateaus. If the 









third space given which is proper to neither striated space of the State nor the smooth 
space of the nomad; this is the “holey space” of the smith, the metallurgist. The 
“intuition of metallurgy” is that there is “a life proper to matter”.47 This is reducible to 
neither force nor form alone, neither the pure fluidity of molten metal (“prepared 
matter”) nor the absolutely striated “form to be incarnated”.48 Metallurgy is always 
“astride the thresholds” of force and form, just as holey space “communicates with 
smooth space and striated space”, but is reducible to neither.49 The strategy of working 
on the subjectile as I have been proposing it – which does not shuttle between force and 
form but finds and founds the originary inseparateness of the two in Artaud’s body and 
in the subjectile (Earth) at once – bears more resemblance to this “holey space”, I would
argue, than the ethics which Deleuze and Guattari unfurl in Artaud’s name.
Artaud
Smithying reminds us that Artaud insisted on himself working the bellows, forge and 
hammer to iron-tip his cane50; but it is no longer a case of playing at metalwork. Artaud 
as smithy is making for himself and of himself that “crucible of fire and true meat where
[...] / bodies are remade, / and the mythical act / of making a body is presented / 
physically and naked.”51
For Artaud, there is an urgent need to have done with the world as it is given – a need 
intensely felt in his body but which has metaphysical stakes and will be resolved 
through finding and founding the originary inseparateness of metaphysics and the body:
“active metaphysics”.52 To the extent that both thought and affect must be made 
inseparate to each other and to their own productive founts, we find the fourfold 




50 p148 Shafer Antonin Artaud
51 Artaud “Le Théâtre et la science”, cited p37 Thévenin “Lost World”
52 p31 CWIV
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hovering over it, and the writer who will not have his every thought originarily stolen 
from him. Thus the fourfold is an inseparate of life-death-thought-unthought: “life and 
thought, death and the nought”.53 It is intimately connected with breath, which holds 
together the abstract (language) and the concrete (body). Where breath might be thought
of as an imposed organic necessity, Artaud develops techniques to free himself of this 
anteriority and find a non-expropriable expressive body which draws on nothing and is 
older than divestment: the affective athlete. These slips to the anterior involve 
puncturing a hole, fictioning his way out of the de jure and de facto states of affairs and 
givens, to a body and a metaphysics older than this world – this world which is shown 
to be only a mutilated, idolatrous facet of the lost, impossible yet necessary world.
The hole which Artaud pierces in the world, in the given, is made to show it up for what
it is, to raze it and to move beyond it in a single gesture. It is an act of destruction and 
creation. In the case of van Gogh, Artaud sees the painter making a hole in the world 
three days long, the three days between the bullet entering his belly and his death. In 
this hole, he created – beyond the opposition of life and death, these made inseparate in 
his body – a painting that “turned the earth into that dirty linen”54 and set truer forces 
than given nature swirling and surging; a painting that much later would impress on 
Artaud the feeling of “being seen as if from the other side of the grave”.55
Artaud le Mômo has died, too, several times, has cast his body beyond the anterior 
metaphysics of cruelty – before it, out of it. In the 1930s, this is bound in Artaud’s 
thinking to the void. In New Revelations of Being, he explains that he has, for too long, 
been trying to reconcile himself to the world, “to consent to the forms (all the forms) 
with which the delirious illusion of being in this world had clothed reality”.56 But, in 
doing so, he had only become more enmired in this sick reality, more attacked by it. He 
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refusing the Void.”57 In order for him to fulfil the goal of fully reinventing his body, he 
now sees that it will be necessary to pass through the void, this hole in the given which 
he must pierce. The void and fire are linked, here – just as the two most material hole-
making forces Artaud uses are tunnelling stabs and matches or cigarette tips (figs.11–18,
30, 49) – such that passing through the void is also the process by which Artaud himself
“was made into a pyre [in order] to cure me of being in this world”58; as the “red Earth” 
would cover him in a “nourishing plague”.59 The void, the hole which destroys and 
creates in one is how Artaud will puncture the world and bind life and death: “Dead to 
the world; dead to what the world is for everyone else [...] rising up in the void I once 
refused, I have a body that suffers the world and disgorges reality.”60 Any pain can be 
nailed, any addiction can be subverted, all cruelties can become bound as expressive 
force – this is the system of weaponisation that Artaud develops in order to fight the 
ever-escalating forces arraigned against him. It is through the hole which he will make 
in this world that Artaud will have done with those cruelties. He has been “born by the 
most infamous magical maneuvres into a world I wanted no part of”, and “similar 
magical maneuvres” are being used “to prevent me from making a hole in this world in 
order to leave it.”61 But these magics, too, will be fought, and defeated, as he makes of 
himself a mountain, “a Himalaya of the soul in my body [...] where the spirits of hate 
can never again reach me”62; and by weaponising image, language, matter, breath, body 
as subjectiles.
But this is not only to fight, because the hole is also creation – and leaving this world is 
not simply to negate all that is, but also to call up from beneath in a resurfacing that 
affirms the volatile materiality of the Earth, the intelligence of the rocks and the always-
already of the true body. In the mountains of the Sierra Tarahumara, in the Ciguri ritual, 
the holes were dug in the Earth: the masculine-feminine peyotl was rooted up, and 
57 p63 ibid.
58 p64 ibid.
59 p538 SW. See also fig.23




returned to the hole as spit.
And the hole, with a wooden or earthen basin inverted over it, 
represents rather well the Globe of the World. [...]
And all night long the sorcerers reestablish the lost relationships with 
triangular gestures that strangely cut off the spatial perspective.63
As Artaud said of himself, with the “old Artaud” dead and buried in a hole, another 




He is this unframed hole
that life wanted to frame.64
But “after”, as Artaud le Mômo demonstrates, may also herald a return. And this work 
of finding my way back to Artaud’s texts out of those of Deleuze and Derrida and 
Murray has also drawn on those thinkers just as heavily. Even if he steals the wrong 
name for it, Deleuze shows us a plenum of forces beyond and before this murderous 
administered world, and something holey which runs between here and there. Murray 
shows us the substantiality of the surface, albeit too flakingly melancholic for me. And 
Derrida – attentive, careful, playful – can show us into the double session of the 
subjectile, even if he will not go on to resolve the destruction-creation credulously. 
Between them, but most of all, with Artaud, I hope I have shown that the subjectile is all
of these and none.
Mining into the paper we find the matter-flow, that lucid materialism of the Earth, the 
lost world; find and make it, of course, for this is “a nature and an air more real than the 





of it. Through its fictioning holes, the subjectile allows us to glimpse the matter-flows 
and active metaphysics. It is the vertiginal, lucid materialism of the sempiternal body, 




I will close this thesis with a short reflection on the question of reading which, as I 
remarked in the Introduction, frames and haunts this project.
Nietzsche announced “I am not a man, I am dynamite.”1 And as Malcolm Bull observes 
in his Anti–Nietzsche, even though the philosopher “is attributing the explosive power to
himself, not to us, we instantly appropriate it for ourselves.”2 This is misguided, he 
argues: to identify ourselves, too, as dynamite is not to read Nietzsche, it is to ape him. 
We should not “read for victory”, but read like “losers”.3 This would mean neither 
rejecting a text as mistaken (and hence lesser than the “proper” method or one’s own 
idea), nor appropriating the text as compatible with what one already is or would be; 
rather, it would mean “assimilating a text in such a way that it is incompatible with 
one’s self”.4
Certainly we should be wary of rushing to make neat comparisons between Artaud and 
Nietzsche. But there is, I think, in this case, a germane demand made in Bull’s 
insistence on a non-triumphalist mode of reading which could inform how we go about 
reading Artaud after Deleuze and Derrida. I have condemned Deleuze’s appropriations 
of Artaud’s figures and name to his Spinozist project; I have bemoaned Derrida and 
Murray’s interminable deferments of Artaud’s project through shuttling and realism. As 
mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, I have preferred a means of engaging with 
Artaud that seeks to maintain credulity against the demands of what is given as possible.
This is most necessary when it is most difficult, when it involves accepting Artaud’s 
improbable versions of events and his time-slipping athleticisms, his fictionings and 
pluperfections. Reading Artaud, in this credulous sense would involve not puncturing 
his work – his body that is his body of work – but being punctured by it, in our systems 
of thought and our bodies.
As Marthe Robert saw – in those lines which we have had cause to return to several 
1 p126 Friedrich Nietzsche Ecce Homo trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1979)




times in this thesis – amongst the friends of Artaud, “the perpetually guarded poet”, 
“how many can be sure of not having aggravated his suffering with a look, a question, a 
doubt?”5 In light of the inseparateness of the-man-and-the-complete-work, this question 
remains urgent for us, too, his readers. It is not a given that we are Artaud’s friends 
simply because we say we are (as Deleuze does in generalising his case), or that we 
know what, despite himself, will preserve Artaud (as Derrida claims). We are much 
more likely to be antagonists, here, and undoing this state of affairs will, as Artaud 
indicates, be a question of bodily reworkings.
As we have seen, “subjectile” names that which is worked upon: it is the paper, the 
figure, Artaud’s own body and the bodies of those he would protect with “amorous 
aggressions”,6 scratching out the blockages and transcendences that would hide in their 
organs and synovia, and delivering their true, nonsuffering, sempiternal bodies. But as 
Derrida avers, the subjectile is also “me”.7 This realisation is not at all the “So it’s me!” 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s body without organs – which, as we saw in our first Chapter, 
concerns the conjunctive synthesis of anonymous affections into subjectivities.8 In fact, 
I would argue, if we are to think an “it’s me” in relation to the subjectile, it will not be 
as an identification with anything. If Artaud’s body is subjectile, and mine also is, this 
does not bring us closer together. It rather means that my body – the body of the reader 
– is one of the agents through which the dark forces arraigned against Artaud acts. A 
reading of Artaud should not, in this sense, begin with our identifying with him, but 
with an excoriating admission of our witting and unwitting complicity with the cruelties
which beset him. After all, Artaud’s works do not set out to teach us, to lead us, but to 
have done with the judgements, thefts, cruelties, sufferings which the world of which 
we are a part visits upon him. To read Artaud, I am suggesting, requires a commitment 
to being worked on by Artaud; a commitment, perhaps, to being worked on by him 
“without complaining” through the organised body and transcendent structures of 
“father or [...] mother” and, as subjectiles, to become “inert”.9
Approaching the works on paper especially – “reading” the written-drawings and the 
notebooks – will involve effacing the distinctions between disciplines (especially 
5 p27 Robert “I am the Body’s Insurgent...”
6 p144 Derrida “Unsense”
7 p138 ibid.
8 p20 AO
9 p2 recto Cahier 237, pp78–9 Cahiers d’Ivry, cited pp136–7 Derrida “Unsense”
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between text, writing and materiality) and breaking the transcendent structures and 
institutions which preserve them. But these transcendences and institutions are not 
originarily outside us, they transect us and form (hence, steal) our thought, organise our 
bodies – our organs, articulations and the horizons of our expressions – today more than
ever. They must, as Artaud shows us, be scraped out.
Often in the notebooks the nails stick outwards, threatening the eye and body of the 
reader (figs.53, 55–56). Artaud said that, with the portrait of Jany de Ruy (fig.27), he 
was making for her “an armed head”.10 A nail sticks out of her forehead, and an “evil 
eye” glares at us from her throat. These, and the marks which cover her head, are 
cicatrices on de Ruy, surgical operations that protect and reinvent her, restore her to 
herself. As Artaud also demonstrated, to scrape evil out of the body is not simply to 
wage a war here and now in this world and this body, it is also to find-found the lost 
world, holing through to the always-already of the true body; a world of volatile, 
expressive materiality, and a body on which thought is inseparate from substantiality.
For Artaud, lucidity takes place in passage, in a thinking-body which moves on the 
Earth but is not of it, a body which reintegrates the “divided consciousness” of 
disciplinary thought, and find-founds an “active metaphysics” originarily inseparate 
from this lucid body.11 I am reminded of Artaud’s experience in the Sierra Tarahumara, 
that “[t]o take a step was for me no longer to take a step, but to feel where I was 
carrying my head.”12
It is this lucid materialism – be it traversing rock or paper – which we readers, too, must
construct at the same time as allowing our bodies to be attacked by the nails, minings, 
surgeries and invective of Artaud’s works. We cannot ignore nor dismiss those attacks, 
nor can we claim that we, too, are the attackers. We are the attacked, subjectiles. If 
Artaud’s works fight against the evil forces arraigned against his body, and also find-
found anteriorities of lucid materialism which are not subjected to malevolence, he also 
shows us that the Earth, too, is arraigned by blockages, and that its volatilised 
materiality – “the real world left unused by men of today”13 – must burst through, 
10 p148 Prevel En Compagnie, cited p36 Thévenin “Lost World”
11 p357 SW; p31 CWIV emphasis removed
12 pp382–3 SW
13 p273 OCV my translation
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surface.
Reading Artaud must have these two sides: on the one hand, it must have vectors toward
lucidity which Artaud reports his own journey to, which break down and derealise the 
antagonisms between proper modes of thought, and between thought and body, matter 
and lucidity; and, at the same time, it must have a vulnerability to Artaud’s projectiles 
which Deleuze and Derrida, in their ways, evade (we must read like losers, as Bull says 
of Nietzsche). Reading the notebooks of Antonin Artaud, then – reading as ourselves 
subjectiles – would be to call upon a lucid materialism, and perhaps to be opened to the 
lost world and the true body; attacked, pierced and becoming lucid in a single gesture. 
The eye crossing the page of these notebooks is always-already the true body of the 
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